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Abstract 
 
Over 500 Scots journeyed to Spain to fight on behalf of the Spanish Republic as 
part of the International Brigades, alongside some 35,000 other foreign 
volunteers. Their decision to personally intervene in the Spanish Civil War 
placed these Scots at a crucial juncture in history. They formed part of the single 
largest mobilisation of transnational foreign fighters in modern history, 
represented the apex of interwar anti-fascist activism and posed a complex 
security dilemma for the British state on their return. In examining the Scottish 
volunteers’ decisions and their consequences, this thesis contends that existing 
historical explanations of the International Brigades’ recruitment and 
organisation have significant limitations. Crucially, previous accounts have 
failed to appreciate the extent and importance of pre-existing social and 
political networks among the volunteers, which were facilitated by Scotland’s 
particular political cultures in the interwar period. Moreover, examination of 
the Scots’ time in Spain sheds new light on the International Brigades 
themselves, including their political organisation, the handling of dissent, 
desertion and disaffection and the volunteers’ relationships with Spanish 
civilians and conscripts. Finally, the post-civil war trajectories of the Scottish 
volunteers indicate limitations to enduring popular and historical narratives of 




This thesis takes as its subject the Scots who chose to journey to Spain between 
1936 and 1938 to fight for the International Brigades. These units were 
organised by the Communist International to fight for the Republican side in the 
Spanish Civil War (1936–9), forming a key element of Soviet intervention in the 
conflict, which also saw the large-scale involvement of Nazi Germany and 
Fascist Italy. Aside from examining an aspect of interwar Scottish history 
hitherto neglected by scholars, this account seeks to locate Scottish involvement 
in the conflict as part of a global response to the Spanish Civil War and the 
spread of fascism more broadly. Their motivations for going and their 
experiences once in Spain, it is argued, shed light on much broader questions, 
including the scale and methods of anti-fascist mobilisation in the period, how 
Stalin-era communist politics developed and affected adherents in different 
contexts and how British anti-communist policy was shaped during and after 
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Note on Language and Translation 
 
Any study of the International Brigades, especially those seeking to explore 
their transnational dimensions, is hamstrung by the multitude of languages 
spoken by the participants. No historian, certainly not the present author, can 
hope to be competent, let alone fluent, in all of them.  
The approach taken here focuses chiefly on the XV International Brigade, which 
always contained a high proportion of English-speaking volunteers, and English 
was often used in the internal administration of the brigade. Spanish was 
naturally also used frequently, both within the brigade and when corresponding 
with other units and organisations. Other common languages include German 
and French, reflecting their use in the overall administration of the International 
Brigades and the Comintern more broadly. Unless otherwise stated, translations 
provided for the aforementioned languages are my own, including of course any 
errors.  
Given the use throughout of oral testimony, it is important to acknowledge that 
Scottish interviewees came from a variety of geographic and social 
backgrounds, and often had strong accents or regional dialects. In cases where a 
published transcript is available, this account follows the spelling and usage 
provided there, which in many cases does an excellent job of capturing each 
individual’s voice. In transcribing taped interviews, I have tried to err on the 
side of a faithful reproduction and avoid excessive editing, but as a non-Scot I 
did not feel confident attempting to capture local vernaculars, sounds and 
spellings. As my interpretations do not rest upon the orality of the responses, 






List of Acronyms 
 
Anyone who has had the pleasure of perusing histories of the Spanish Civil War 
is aware of their general propensity for acronyms and initialisms. While every 
effort has been exerted to elude this issue insofar as possible, the following 
reference list may be of use. 
 
BUF – British Union of Fascists 
CGG - Cuartel General del Generalísimo (Headquarters of the Generalissimo) 
CNT – Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (National Confederation of Labour) 
Comintern – Communist International 
CPGB – Communist Party of Great Britain  
FAI – Federación Anarquista Ibérica (Iberian Anarchist Federation) 
HD(S)E – Home Defence (Security) Executive 
IBA – International Brigade Association 
IBMT – International Brigade Memorial Trust  
ILP – Independent Labour Party  
LBC – Left Book Club 
NUWM – National Unemployed Workers Movement  
PCE – Partido Comunista de España (Spanish Communist Party) 
POUM – Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Workers' Party of Marxist 
Unification) 
SIM – Servicio de Investigación Militar (Military Investigation Service) 
SSP – Scottish Socialist Party  
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A good deal has been said about the identity of the volunteers, but the 
most important thing of all has not been said. They were strangers. They 
were strangers to each other, divided by all of the things that unite 
ordinary men, namely, race, language and nation. They were united, if 
united at all, only by class and politics.1 
 
Michael Jackson’s prose describing those who fought in the International 
Brigades during the Spanish Civil War (1936-9) is poetic, but here at least, 
beauty is not truth. Those who fought for the Spanish Republic against a fascist-
backed military uprising did do so as part of a 35,000-strong international army 
without precedent or compare in twentieth century history.2 Yet describing 
them as strangers to one another misses a crucial point: what divided them is 
not so important as what united them. This was an army organised by the 
Communist International (Comintern), meaning, as scholars such as Lisa 
Kirschenbaum have ably sketched, that there were many transnational 
connections between the central actors.3 The International Brigades’ leaders, 
therefore, certainly knew each other. Yet it is not their well-known leaders that 
concern this thesis. From the perspective of this study, Jackson was wrong on 
much more fundamental level: the ordinary volunteers, the rank-and-file of 
international communism, knew each other both literally and figuratively. This 
contention underpins much of this account – that only in appreciating the 
interconnections between the volunteers can the International Brigades be 
understood. They knew one another as friends, colleagues and family before 
they left their homes to fight the spread of fascism; they already knew one 
                                                        
1 Michael Jackson, ‘The Army of Strangers: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War’, 
Journal of Australian Politics and History 32:1 (1986), 108–9. 
2 The Spanish Civil War has inspired a great deal of scholarship, often offering quite different 
interpretations and perspectives. Representative of accounts sympathetic to the Republic are 
Paul Preston, The Spanish Civil War (London, 2006); Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War 
1936–1939 (Cambridge, 2002). For less sympathetic accounts, see Stanley Payne, The Spanish 
Civil War (Cambridge, 2012); Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (London, 2003).  
3 Lisa Kirschenbaum, International Communism and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge, 2015). 
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another in the trenches of Spain and, even between nationalities, comradeship 
and cooperation was enabled by a common language of anti-fascism. Even after 
their return, narratives of their time in Spain continued to be shared across 
borders. 
In exploring these themes, this account takes as its particular focus the Scots 
who joined the International Brigades. Over 500 Scots volunteered to fight in 
the Spanish Civil War, making up approximately a quarter of the British 
contingent. This made Scots the largest regional grouping in the British 
Battalion, far out of proportion to Scotland’s population at the time. This was 
hardly the extent of Scottish engagement with the conflict. Others journeyed to 
Spain to offer medical services, humanitarian relief or as political observers and 
representatives. Many more took part in one of the largest and longest 
solidarity campaigns in modern Scottish history. Over the course of the conflict, 
tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of pounds were raised in Scotland to support 
the Spanish Republic, including funding a Scottish Ambulance Unit and two 
Scottish foodships, as well as providing shelter for child refugees from the 
Basque Country.4 These efforts required the sustained efforts of thousands of 
activists over nearly three years, and the continued generosity of chiefly 
working-class communities, still reeling from the effects of Scotland’s interwar 
slump. In a part of Britain where manifestations of domestic fascism were rare 
and generally ineffective, the Spanish Civil War became perhaps the most 
important theatre of anti-fascist mobilisation in Scotland during the 1930s.5  
The Scottish response to the Spanish Civil War was at once typical, in that it 
mirrored comparable movements across Britain and the world, and distinctive. 
While Spain was a truly global political issue, it was inevitably understood in the 
context of people’s own lives and experiences, and Scotland’s distinct political 
                                                        
4 Although several more nuanced regional studies of ‘Aid Spain’ have since emerged, the most 
comprehensive account remains Jim Fyrth, The Signal Was Spain: The Spanish Aid Movement in 
Britain, 1936–1939 (London, 1986).  For a critique of Fyrth’s approach, see Tom Buchanan, 
‘Britain’s Popular Front? Aid Spain and the British Labour Movement’, History Workshop Journal 
31 (1991), 60–72. 
5 Stephen Cullen, ‘The Fasces and the Saltire: The Failure of the British Union of Fascists in 
Scotland, 1932–1940’, Scottish Historical Review 87:2 (2008), 306–31. 
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cultures helped shape local responses.6 The relative diversity of Scottish politics 
– Scotland being home to Britain’s only Communist and Independent Labour 
Party MPs, as well as prominent anti-appeasement Tory Katharine Murray – fed 
into a varied series of representations of the conflict, complicated further by 
intersections between working-class politics and Catholicism.7 It is in this 
context that the decision of hundreds of Scots to participate directly in the 
Spanish Civil War needs to be understood. They were the product of specific 
political cultures, networks and communities, and their engagement with the 
conflict was shaped simultaneously by broad awareness of the international 
situation and very local concerns and perspectives. 
To date, the Scottish contingent has yet to receive sustained historical 
examination, unlike almost every other national grouping in the International 
Brigades. Yet beyond the opportunity to fill a neglected historiographical 
crevice, the emphasis on the Scots allows for the consideration of much broader 
questions, such as how so many individuals were mobilised to fight in Spain, 
International Brigade volunteers’ encounters with Spanish comrades and 
civilians and their relationship with their home governments. As a sample, the 
Scots offer a cohesive grouping, through which very local patterns can be 
observed, while still large enough to draw significant conclusions. Moreover, as 
a contingent with no distinct unit of their own, they invite approaches that 
eschew especial homage to the national perspective that has characterised so 
much history writing on the International Brigades. However, nor are they 
                                                        
6 On the interplay between local political cultures and context in shaping responses to Spain, see 
Malcolm Petrie, ‘Unity from Below? The Impact of the Spanish Civil War on Labour and the Left 
in Aberdeen and Dundee, 1936–1939’, Labour History Review 79:3 (2015), 305–27. A great deal 
of literature details the broader distinctiveness of Scottish radical and socialist political cultures, 
e.g. W. Hamish Fraser, Scottish Popular Politics: From Radicalism to Labour (Edinburgh, 2000); 
William Knox, Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800–Present (Edinburgh, 
1999); Catriona MacDonald, The Radical Thread: Political Change in Scotland, Paisley Politics: 
1885–1924 (East Linton, 2000). 
7 Scottish MPs were responsible for a diverse and influential series of contemporary 
publications on Spain, including religious issues, such as John McGovern, Why Bishops Back 
Franco (London, 1936) and Terror in Spain (London, 1937); Katharine Murray, Searchlight on 
Spain (London, 1938). On the Spanish Civil War’s impact on Scottish politics and sectarianism, 





typical transnational subjects. They tended to be immensely ordinary, 
overwhelmingly working class in origin and most had never previously left 
Britain. This, it is held, makes them more rather than less typical of the 
International Brigades more broadly. 
This, in other words, is not a parochial study. Their decision to fight in Spain 
places the Scottish volunteers at a crucial juncture in history, and understanding 
this choice and its ramifications takes us from grassroots histories of Scottish 
socialism, to the structures of international communism, to the battlefields of 
Spain and their place in the titanic clashes of ideas of the 1930s and 1940s. This 
thesis places the Scottish volunteers in the context of important wider histories: 
of foreign fighters, interwar anti-fascism and the relationship between 
communism and the British state. It is therefore simultaneously a work of 
Scottish, British and European history, with occasional trans-Atlantic or global 
implications, particularly when it comes to understanding other manifestations 
of foreign fighters, a topic of renewed contemporary relevance given recent 
history in Syria and beyond. 
 
The Spanish Civil War and the International Brigades 
 
Although no modern civil war has ever been entirely divorced from an 
international context, Spain’s civil war happened at a time and place that 
guaranteed exceptional international interest and involvement.8 Across Europe 
and the world, the political left and right readily saw their own struggles 
reflected in Spain. For the anti-fascist left in Scotland, the military uprising in 
Spain fit neatly into a broader global narrative of fascist expansionism. In the 
words of Edinburgh volunteer Donald Renton, Spain was ‘part and parcel of the 
general offensive by the Fascist Powers against working class rights and 
                                                        
8 On the war’s international context, see Michael Alpert, A New International History of the 
Spanish Civil War (Basingstoke, 2004). On the nature and conceptions of ‘civil war’ itself, see 
David Armitage, Civil Wars: A History in Ideas (New Haven, 2017). 
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liberties all over the world.’9 Many retrospectively shared Dundonian Tom 
Clarke’s view that the Spanish Civil War offered an opportunity to defeat this 
offensive, and ‘that if we were able to win there the possibility is you would 
never have had a Second World War.’10 These narratives left little place for the 
nuances of Spain’s politics and history, and the complex causes of the war 
itself.11 Insofar as Spain’s particular context was understood, it was through the 
broad sweep of Spanish history, with the old, feudal Spain of the army, landlords 
and Catholic Church conspiring to destroy the new modern, progressive Spain.12 
The conflict was rapidly constructed and construed as a set of moral binaries – 
progress against reaction, civilisation against barbarism and, above all, 
democracy against fascism.  
Viewing the Spanish Civil War as a flashpoint in a global anti-fascist struggle 
was lent credence by the conflict’s rapidly apparent international dimensions. 
Swift intervention from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany provided crucial early 
impetus for the military rebels, particularly in enabling the transfer of the 
Spanish Army of Africa – Spain’s most professional force – to southern Spain. 
Both also lent direct military support to the rebels on air, sea and land, as well 
as providing substantial material aid. On the Republican side, initial support 
from the French Popular Front government was soon withdrawn following 
British diplomatic pressure, reflecting British alarm at the potential for 
escalation should Spain become a proxy war between democratic and fascist 
powers.13 The impact of what became known as the Non-Intervention 
                                                        
9 Renton in Ian MacDougall, Voices From The Spanish Civil War: Personal Recollections of Scottish 
Volunteers in Republican Spain 1936–39 (Edinburgh, 1986), 21. 
10 Clarke in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 66. 
11 There is a great deal of scholarship examining the history of the Spanish Republic and the 
causes of the civil war. On the establishment and course of the Second Republic, see Gabriel 
Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931–1939 (Princeton, 1965); Fernando del Rey 
Reguillo, The Spanish Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War (1931–
1936) (Brighton, 2012). For differing perspectives on the conflicts’ causes, see Stanley Payne, 
The collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933–1936 (New Haven, 2006); Paul Preston, The Coming of 
the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution 1931–1936 (London, 1994).  
12 On British perceptions of Spain and the civil war, see Tom Buchanan, The Impact of the 
Spanish Civil War on Britain (Brighton, 2007), 1–22. 
13 British Government perspectives are discussed in Enrique Moradiellos, ‘The Origins of British 




Agreement was notably uneven, only restricting the participation of states that 
abided by international rules and conventions. This meant that while Italy and 
Germany happily continued to provide support for the rebels after signing, only 
the Soviet Union and Mexico proved willing to aid the Republic on similar terms, 
to considerably less effect.14 
For military historians, quantifying the support each side received in terms of 
guns, planes and tanks has proven an arduous task.15 Yet for this study’s 
purposes, it is the qualitative differences that matter more. Unlike Mussolini and 
Hitler, Stalin proved unwilling and unable to send a Soviet army to Spain to fight 
for the Republic. Instead, using the networks and influence developed through 
the Comintern, the Soviet Union undertook to recruit and organise an 
international volunteer army to fight for the Spanish Republic. Although the 
Comintern had not pioneered the idea of foreigners joining the Republican war 
effort, their involvement changed the nature of foreign volunteering. Not only 
did their resources prove vital in enabling far greater numbers to make the 
journey to Spain, the establishment of dedicated international units – the 
International Brigades – marked a departure from the scattered participation of 
individual volunteers. Their status as independent units leant them a unique 
and highly visible role, both militarily and in propaganda. 
The International Brigades fought for nearly two years before their withdrawal. 
They first saw action in the desperate defence of Madrid in November 1936, 
after General Franco’s Army of Africa had fought its way across southern Spain 
before being stopped on the capital’s outskirts. In early 1937 – by which time a 
British Battalion had been formed as part of the XV International Brigade – they 
fought in a series of defensive efforts to protect Madrid’s lines of 
                                                                                                                                                             
History Quarterly 21 (1991), 339–64. For the French, see David Wingeate Pike, France Divided: 
The French and the Spanish Civil War (Brighton, 2011). 
14 On these policies, see Douglas Little, Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain 
and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War (Ithaca, 1985). On Soviet intervention, Daniel Kowalsky, 
Stalin and the Spanish Civil War (New York, 2004). For the impact of foreign military aid, 
Michael Alpert, ‘The Clash of Spanish Armies: Contrasting Ways of War in Spain, 1936–1939’, 
War in History 6:3 (1999), 331–51. 
15 Alpert, ‘The Clash of Spanish Armies’, 331–3. 
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communication, with the International Brigades playing important roles in 
defensive victories at Jarama and Guadalajara. These battles would mark the 
high point of the International Brigades’ direct contribution to the Republican 
war effort, with foreign volunteers thereafter making up a progressively smaller 
proportion of both the Republican Army and the International Brigades 
themselves. For the British, exhausted after months of frontline service, July 
1937 saw further substantial losses in a failed counteroffensive north of Madrid 
at Brunete. The British then moved to Aragon, fighting at Belchite and Teruel, 
both costly Republican victories that were reversed in early 1938. In March 
1938, the British Battalion again suffered catastrophic losses during Franco’s 
Aragon offensive, which saw Republican territory split in two, with the 
International Brigades in Catalonia. The British Battalion’s last major actions 
took place here during the final Republican offensive across the River Ebro. 
This, as with other Republican offensives, was a temporary, costly success. The 
British were finally withdrawn from the line at the end of September 1938, and 
from Spain two months later. Although this was the end of their physical battle 
for the Republic, it marked only the beginning of the battle over their legacy. 
 
Writing the International Brigades 
 
The organisers of the International Brigades looked to history. Parallels were 
readily drawn with Byron in Greece and other romantic, heroic soldiers of 
conscience over the previous century.16 Equally, however, participants 
appreciated that their endeavour marked a departure from this history – in the 
words of George Aitken, ‘ours was the first Battalion of British workers which 
had left Britain to fight for freedom and democracy.’17 Writing to British 
Communist Party leader Harry Pollitt, Peter Kerrigan also pointed to the gaze of 
history while the British Battalion first prepared to go into action. 
                                                        
16 E.g. ‘Early I.B.’, [1937?], Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History [RGASPI], 
545/3/478/142–3. 
17 International Brigade Archive, Marx Memorial Library [MML], Box D-7, File E/1. 
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What many [volunteers] don’t visualise clearly, is the historic part they 
are playing. They are too close to it all to see that history is being made 
here.18 
Aitken and Kerrigan were both senior Scottish communists, in Spain as political 
representatives as much as fighters, roles that encouraged them to consider the 
broader picture. They were hardly alone in doing so: in mid-1937, an 
International Brigades Historical Commission was established, partly to 
produce propaganda, but also to ‘collect all material that will make the writing 
of an accurate and true history possible at some undefined future date.’19 This 
eye to future history writing – which might not be published ‘for 10-20-30 
years’ – complicates the task of the historian in the present, driving home the 
reality that archival material preserved in Spain was collected, selected and 
preserved with a view to its use in celebrating the International Brigades.20  
It should therefore come as no surprise that the participants were primed to set 
their experiences on record, forming the first generation of history writing.21 
Bill Rust, Spanish correspondent of the British Communist Party newspaper the 
Daily Worker, published an account within months of the British volunteers’ 
return.22 Rust’s book was unsurprisingly celebratory, mirroring similar 
accounts in other contexts in the years immediately following the end of the 
war.23 They were countered by several anti-communist publications, most 
notoriously those commissioned by the new Franco regime in an effort to 
discredit the international volunteers, but also from disillusioned ex-
                                                        
18 Kerrigan to Pollitt, 7 February 1937, MML, Box C, File 10. 
19 Historical Commission Circular, [1937?], RGASPI, 545/2/164/179. These efforts resulted in a 
number of wartime ‘histories’, such as Frank Ryan (ed.), The Book of the XVth Brigade (Madrid, 
1938). 
20 Minutes of Historical Commission Meeting, 23 September 1937, RGASPI, 545/2/164/47. 
21 For a historiographical overview, see Manuel Requena Gallego, ‘Las Brigadas Internacionales: 
una aproximación historiográfica’, Ayer 56 (2004), 11–35. 
22 William Rust, Britons in Spain: the history of the British Battalion of the XVth International 
Brigade (London, 1939). In the American context, see Edwin Rolfe, The Lincoln Battalion (New 
York, 1939). 
23 For a list, see Gallego, Las Brigadas Internacionales, 16–18. 
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volunteers.24 These early years saw the emergence of competing mythologies of 
the International Brigades, which were defined further by the onset of the Cold 
War. 
The 1960s and 1970s saw the advent of more traditional scholarly interest, with 
histories of the International Brigades published by Vincent Brome and Verle 
Johnston in English, and Jacques Delperrie de Bayac in French.25 These accounts 
marked an important shift in history writing on the International Brigades, 
although they suffered from uneven access to primary documentation. In Spain, 
Ricardo de la Cierva y de Hoces continued the work of early Francoist 
propagandists in denigrating the International Brigades, sometimes on 
laughable grounds, even after the regime’s end.26 For the Francoist state, such 
attacks served two key purposes: highlighting the ideological threat posed by 
their Republican foes, who had relied upon the services of such degenerate 
‘Reds’, while also helping to explain why Franco took so long to win the war, 
despite supposedly enjoying the support of all ‘true’ Spaniards. In this climate, it 
took many years for Andreu Castells’ account to be published, which would 
remain the standard work on the International Brigades in Spanish for several 
decades.27 
Interest in the Spanish Civil War was kindled on several fronts during the 
1980s, especially in the English-speaking world, thanks to a slew of 
anniversaries, Spain’s transition to democracy and Cold War escalation. In 
                                                        
24 Requena Gallego, ‘Las Brigadas Internacionales’, 16–17. In a British context, see among others 
Hamish Fraser, The Truth About Spain (Oxford, c.1950); Fred Copeman, Reason in Revolt 
(London, 1948) and Stephen Spender, World Within World (London, 1950). 
25 Vincent Brome, The International Brigades: Spain 1936–1939 (London, 1965); Verle Johnston, 
Legions of Babel: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War (Pennsylvania, 1967); 
Jacques Delperrie de Bayac, Les Brigades Internationales (Paris, 1968). 
26 Ricardo de la Cierva y de Hoces, Leyenda y tragedia de las brigadas internacionales (Madrid, 
1971), see also Brigadas internacionales 1936–1939. La verdadera historia. Mentira histórica y 
error de Estado (Toledo, 1997). 
27 Andreu Castells, Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España (Esplugues de Llobregat, 
1974). Subsequent Spanish accounts have added little analytic depth, e.g. César Vidal, Las 
Brigadas Internacionales (Madrid, 1998); Santiago Alvarez, Historia Politica y Militar de las 
Brigadas Internacionales (Madrid, 1996). More critical albeit not necessarily incisive is Antonio 




Britain, Bill Alexander, an ex-commander of the British contingent, wrote a new 
celebratory account. Intended to cement the historical reputation of the British 
‘Volunteers for Liberty’, Alexander’s book benefitted from his first-hand 
knowledge, contacts with surviving veterans and access to documents held by 
the International Brigade Association (IBA), but skirted many uncomfortable 
questions.28 The 1980s also saw the centre of gravity of revisionist work shift 
from Spain to the United States, with R. Dan Richardson’s account proving 
especially influential. Richardson was prescient, with many claims regarding 
Comintern involvement in organising and leading the International Brigades 
having since been vindicated.29 In particular, Ronald Radosh, Mary Habeck and 
Grigory Sevostianov published a series of documents from ex-Soviet archives, 
exploring the extent of Soviet involvement in the International Brigades and the 
Spanish Republic more broadly.30 For these anti-communist Cold Warriors, 
establishing Comintern involvement sufficed to prove the sinister nature of the 
enterprise. Yet aside from questions of selectivity – Radosh et al chose their 
sources based on their ideological needs – these accounts did far less to 
establish what Soviet influence actually meant for ordinary volunteers.31 
Michael Jackson was the first to address the gap, laying charges of communist 
incompetence and exploring the consequences for ordinary volunteers, 
although his account had its own limitations in interpretation and source 
material.32  
In the British context, the division between celebratory and revisionist accounts 
has only strengthened in recent decades. James Hopkins took a notably critical 
approach, particularly on the question of political repression, using newly-
                                                        
28 Bill Alexander, British Volunteers for Liberty: Spain, 1936–1939 (London, 1982).  
29 R. Dan Richardson, Comintern Army: The International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War 
(Lexington, 1982). 
30 Ronald Radosh, Mary Habeck and Grigory Sevostianov (eds.), Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union 
in the Spanish Civil War (New Haven, 2001). 
31 Helen Graham, ‘Spain Betrayed? The New Historical McCarthyism’, Science & Society 68:3 
(2004), 366–8. 




released archival material to substantiate his accusations.33 Robert Stradling 
also made important revisionist contributions, particularly in Welsh and Irish 
contexts.34 While these accounts were never fully convincing, for reasons 
explored in depth in Chapter Four, they did succeed in shifting the debate. 
Richard Baxell’s first book on the British contingent marked a change from the 
previous generation of scholarship in acknowledging and addressing 
controversial subjects.35 While still broadly celebratory, Baxell has done a great 
deal to explore and acknowledge the International Brigades’ failings. Moreover, 
Baxell’s first book is an invaluable work of social history, doing more than any 
other national account to establish a broad picture of who the British volunteers 
were. While unsatisfactory from a specifically Scottish perspective – while many 
Scots appear as actors, Scotland’s particular contribution is not explored – 
Baxell’s work offers a crucial foundation, without which the thematic approach 
taken here would be impossible.36 While Baxell’s books represent the best work 
on the subject, they paradoxically appear most often as targets of criticism, 
precisely because this account focuses so much on building on their 
achievements. 
Scottish volunteers naturally feature more prominently in Daniel Gray’s popular 
history of Scotland and the Spanish Civil War, yet despite longstanding 
academic interest in the subject, little scholarly history writing has emerged.37 
Ian MacDougall, Ian Wood and Victor Kiernan published brief pieces exploring 
or contextualising the Scottish involvement in the conflict, but stopped well 
                                                        
33 James Hopkins, Into the Heart of the Fire: The British in the Spanish Civil War (Stanford, 1998). 
34 Robert Stradling, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939: Crusades in Conflict 
(Manchester, 1999), Wales and the Spanish Civil War: The Dragon’s Dearest Cause? (Cardiff, 
2004) and History and Legend: Writing the International Brigades (Cardiff, 2003). 
35 Richard Baxell, British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (London, 2004) and Unlikely 
Warriors: The British in the Spanish Civil War (London, 2012). 
36 Histories of Britain and the Spanish Civil War often do not focus on regional or national 
perspectives, e.g. Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge, 1997). While 
Lewis Mates has concentrated on regional perspectives, he has thus far not included Scotland in 
his comparisons. Lewis Mates, The Spanish Civil War and The British Left: Political Activism and 
the Popular Front (London, 2007) and ‘Durham and South Wales Miners in the Spanish Civil 
War’, Twentieth Century British History 17:3 (2006), 373–95. 
37 Daniel Gray, Homage to Caledonia: Scotland and the Spanish Civil War (Edinburgh, 2008). 
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short of attempting a definitive account.38 This is in striking contrast to the 
Welsh and Irish contexts, which have seen substantial scholarly and popular 
interest.39 This has perhaps placed an undue burden on Gray’s contribution – it 
is not, and is not intended to be, a scholarly treatment of the subject. While ably 
sketching a broad narrative of Scottish participation in the Spanish Civil War, 
Gray does not seek to ask or answer particular questions about Scottish 
involvement in the conflict.  
What is striking about the historiography of the International Brigades is the 
staleness of debate, reflecting broader issues with history writing on the 
Spanish Civil War.40 Crucially, this has manifested not just in ideological 
divisions between celebratory and revisionist accounts, but in that research 
questions have also remained static, with the overarching question of 
Comintern involvement and its consequences continuing to drive agendas well 
into the twenty-first century. Two recent articles dealing with ‘myths’ of the 
International Brigades, from Richard Baxell and self-styled revisionists, Daniel 
Pastor García and Antonio Celada, typify this lack of movement.41 Both focus on 
remarkably similar themes, such as the long-defunct view that the International 
Brigades were predominantly made up of literary figures. Attempts to explore 
new topics – or to reconcile differing perspectives – remain rare. One exception 
                                                        
38 Ian Wood, ‘Scotland and the Spanish Civil War’, Cencrastus (Autumn 1984), 14–16; Victor 
Kiernan, ‘Foreword’ in MacDougall, Voices From The Spanish Civil War, v–xi. See also Petrie, 
‘Unity from Below?’. 
39 Aside from aforementioned texts by Mates and Stradling, see celebratory accounts by Hywel 
Francis, Miners Against Fascism: Wales and the Spanish Civil War (London, 1984) and Michael 
O’Riordan, Connolly Column: The story of the Irishmen who fought for the Spanish Republic 1936–
1939 (Dublin, 1979). See also Fearghal McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork, 
1999) and ‘Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War’, Irish Historical Studies 33:129 (2002), 
68–90; David Convery, ‘Ireland and the Fall of the Second Republic in Spain’, Bulletin of Spanish 
Studies 84:7–8 (2012), 215–225.  
40 On the broader historiography, see Ruth MacKay, ‘History on the Line: The Good Fight and 
Good History in the Spanish Civil War’, History Workshop Journal 70 (2010), 199–206. For the 
International Brigades in particular, see George Esenwein, Freedom ‘Fighters or Comintern 
Soldiers? Writing About the ‘Good Fight’ During the Spanish Civil War’, Civil Wars 12:1–2 
(2010), 156–66. 
41 Richard Baxell, ‘Myths of the International Brigades’, Bulletin of Spanish Studies 91:1–2 
(2014), 11–24; Daniel Pastor Garcia and Antonio Celada, ‘The Victors Write History, the 
Vanquished Literature: Myth, Distortion and Truth in the XV Brigade’, Bulletin of Spanish Studies 
89:7–8 (2012), 307–21. 
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is Remi Skoutelsky’s overview of the International Brigades, although it has 
sadly never been translated into English.42 Skoutelsky is willing to ask hard 
questions of both celebratory and revisionist narratives, painting a convincing 
picture of haphazard organisation and the ensuing gaps between intention and 
reality, as well as offering a careful reassessment of notorious individuals such 
as André Marty.43 However, Skoutelsky’s book, while valuable, is far from the 
last word in the field. Its scope necessitates a top-down approach, leaving 
correspondingly little room for the actual experiences of International 
Brigaders. Nor does it offer comparative analysis, preventing appreciation – 
much less explanation – of importance differences across national groups.44 
 
The ‘National’ Approach 
 
One reason that Skoutelsky felt little need to engage with national variety is 
because, in theory, these perspectives are well catered-for. While overarching 
accounts of the International Brigades have grown less common, work dealing 
with specific national contingents has flourished. Different national contexts 
often trace a similar ideological divide as in Britain. In the United States, for 
instance, a celebratory account written in the 1960s by ex-volunteer Arthur 
Landis was challenged by Cecil Eby.45 Following the end of the Cold War, both 
camps sought to make use of new archival material to reinforce their positions, 
with Peter Carroll releasing a new book in 1994, followed by Eby’s updated 
revisionist account in 2007.46 Both, particularly in comparison to British 
historiography, leave much to be desired. Carroll’s celebratory account is 
journalistic in style and lacks sufficient scholarly apparatus, making limited use 
                                                        
42 Remi Skoutelsky, Novedad en el frente: Las Brigadas Internacionales en la guerra civil (Madrid, 
2006).  
43 Skoutelsky, Novedad, 339–44. 
44 Skoutelsky has also been criticised for neglecting non-European volunteers, e.g. González et al, 
Voluntarios de Argentina en la Guerra Civil Española (Buenos Aires, 2008), 135–8. 
45 Arthur Landis, The Abraham Lincoln Brigade (New York, 1967); Cecil Eby, Between the Bullet 
and the Lie: American Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (New York, 1969). 
46 Peter Carroll, The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War 
(Stanford, 1994); Cecil Eby, Comrades and Commissars: The Lincoln Battalion in the Spanish Civil 
War (Pennsylvania, 2007).  
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of new archival material. Eby’s anti-communist tract is similarly journalistic, 
although deserves credit for taking seriously the challenge of integrating 
Spanish perspectives.   
Eby’s success in this regard points to a crucial limitation of the ‘national’ 
paradigm. Historians have often replicated the national divisions nominally 
found in the structures of the International Brigades, neglecting how these 
boundaries were crossed in reality. From early 1937, increasing numbers of 
Spaniards served in their ranks, while encounters – positive and negative – with 
other national groups were part of the day-to-day experience. Nonetheless, 
many national accounts deal only with ‘their’ nationality in any depth, paying 
little attention to how they interacted with other national groups, or even with 
Spanish soldiers and civilians. While overarching accounts such as Skoutelsky’s 
show the international character of the hierarchy, they shed less light on what 
these everyday encounters were like. This is especially problematic when 
considering groups that did not serve in their own unit, such as Australians, 
Cypriots and, of course, Scots.47 While national accounts might pay attention to 
obvious moments of friction – such as the defection of some Irish volunteers 
from the British to American Battalion in early 1937 – much less attention is 
paid to the kind of everyday transnational encounters that defined the 
volunteering experience.48 In the Scottish context, this is particularly egregious 
with regards to interactions with Spaniards, as explored in Chapter Five, but 
few historians have dealt with these questions in any depth. 
National accounts often have other weaknesses that are replicated across 
contexts. This approach – implicitly dedicated to exploring a given group’s 
distinctiveness – can be prone to romanticism, even in the hands of competent 
and critical historians. One frequent symptom is the replication of wartime 
                                                        
47 Such accounts tend towards a scattered, biographical focus. E.g. Amirah Inglis, Australians in 
the Spanish Civil War (Sydney, 1987); Paul Strongos, Spanish Thermopoylae: Cypriot Volunteers 
in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39 (Barcelona, 2009). 
48 The Irish incident is covered from various perspectives in Stradling, The Irish and the Spanish 
Civil War, 154–9; Eby, Comrades and Commissars, 34–5 and Baxell, Unlikely Warriors, 133–4. 
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discourses regarding the particular skills or reputation of each contingent.49 
Gerben Zaagsma provides an exception, pointing out that the supposed repute 
of the Botwin Company – the only explicitly Jewish unit – is based on internal 
propaganda.50 Enumeration is another difficult methodological challenge, with 
substantial numbers of volunteers living complicated transnational lives. 
Should, for example, a Finnish national who emigrated to Canada in the 1920s 
be counted as a Finnish or Canadian volunteer? Michael Petrou grapples with 
this question, as the Canadian contingent contained an unusually large number 
of recent immigrants, but this issue affects almost every national group to some 
degree.51 The tendency is often to count as many volunteers as possible, partly 
out of completeness but also likely because a larger total implicitly adds 
significance.52 In this vein, one study of Irish volunteers counted second-
generation immigrants of Irish descent as ‘Irish’ for their tally.53 While 
understandable, the result is a comparative and analytical nightmare. How can 
an overall picture of volunteer numbers be arrived at, if many are double 
counted? How can numbers between groups be compared, if all are 
underpinned by different methodologies? This problem is addressed in Chapter 
One, which seeks to establish an analytically useful definition of ‘Scottish’ while 
placing their numbers in their proper context. 
 
                                                        
49 E.g. Michael Petrou, Renegades: Canadians in the Spanish Civil War (Vancouver, 2008), 112–
13; Inglis, Australians in the Spanish Civil War, 124–6; Eby, Comrades and Commissars, 25–31; 
Carroll, Odyssey, 91–2, 102. 
50 Gerben Zaagsma, ‘“Red Devils”: The Botwin Company in the Spanish Civil War’, East European 
Jewish Affairs 33 (2003), 92. 
51 Petrou, Renegades, 22–33. Similar issues have occurred in the recent project to construct a 
database of Italian anti-fascist fighters in Spain and their involvement in European Resistance 
movements during the Second World War. In applying the widest possible inclusion criteria, the 
database now lists some 4,500 individuals – over 1,000 more than actually fought in the 
International Brigades. While such criteria made sense for this individual project, the value of its 
statistics for comparative purposes is limited. See ‘Oggi in Spagna, Domani in Italia’, hosted by 
AICVAS and Instituto Nazionale Ferruccio Parri. 
<http://www.antifascistispagna.it/?page_id=1966>, last accessed 16 February 2018. 
52 Petrou, for instance, revised the number of Canadians upwards to 1,700. Petrou, Renegades, 
13. For previous, lower estimates see Victor Howard, MacKenzie-Papineau Battallion: The 
Canadian Contingent in the Spanish Civil War (Toronto, 1969); William Beeching, Canadian 
Volunteers: Spain 1936–1939 (Regina, 1989). 





Given the limitations of national accounts, recent work has embraced 
transnationalism as a way of moving beyond artificial boundaries and exploring 
the complexities of volunteering in Spain. This has led to some valuable 
contributions shedding new light on familiar material, as well as asking fresh 
and interesting questions. Lisa Kirschenbaum’s aforementioned book on 
Comintern operatives in Spain stands out as an excellent contribution that has 
advanced the field substantially. Yet despite its effectiveness, Kirschenbaum’s 
piece shares a weakness with much transnational work in that it concentrates 
on what might be termed ‘transnational exemplars’ – those who have, to the 
historian’s eye, led interestingly transnational lives. In Kirschenbaum’s case, 
this is quite explicit: aside from the emphasis on elite, mobile Comintern 
operatives trained at the International Lenin School, the particular focus on 
Americans is justified as they were a ‘notably transnational and multilingual 
contingent.’54 Here, as with other calls to appreciate interwar anti-fascism as 
built on a ‘culture of exile’, there is a tendency to see physical movement across 
borders as justifying attention in itself.55 This is problematic when considering a 
grouping such as the Scots, the vast bulk of whom had never previously crossed 
borders. If explanations of the International Brigades are bound too closely to 
interwar migration, exile and diaspora, then we risk ignoring large swathes of 
participants, many of whom are already less visible in the source base.  
In addressing this concern, this account seeks to situate itself in an awkward 
gap in existing transnational work. Broadly speaking, two approaches to writing 
transnational history have appeared in this context. The first is typified by 
Kirschenbaum’s account: focusing on a category that allows for appreciation of 
transnational connections, such as the Comintern apparatus in Spain.56 Gerben 
                                                        
54 Kirschenbaum, International Communism, 5. 
55 Hugo García, ‘Transnational History: A New Paradigm for Anti-Fascist Studies?’, Contemporary 
European History 25:4 (2016), 566.  
56 Common in other contexts is focusing on particular movements or networks, e.g. Joseph 




Zaasgma’s recent book on Jewish volunteers is another excellent example, yet 
shares another weakness with Kirschenbaum’s work – the sheer difficulty of 
doing expansive transnational history.57 Just as Kirschenbaum’s focus was 
shaped by her background as an American historian of the Soviet Union, so too 
does Zaagsma’s study follow the lines of his particular expertise, in this case the 
Polish-Jewish Botwin Company, and the Jewish diaspora in Paris. This does not 
detract from the achievements of either account, but imposes constraints on the 
scope of their analysis. Rather than a failing on their part, this represents the 
practical limits on any single transnational study, with an all-encompassing 
study of Jewish volunteers, for instance, requiring a grasp of ten or more 
languages, and engagement with archival material spread even further afield.58 
The second approach has focused on examining ‘transnational lives’, tracing 
individual trajectories and building complex portraits of their motives and 
experiences.59 This approach to the International Brigades is typified by Helen 
Graham, who focuses on several such individuals from a variety of backgrounds, 
all of whom led exemplary transnational lives.60 This has the advantage of depth 
and complexity, allowing historians to appreciate the intricate range of push 
and pull factors that led people to Spain. Yet these advantages are also 
disadvantages – such individualised studies make it difficult to point to 
generalisable factors, absolving the historian of any need to explain the broader 
phenomenon. Moreover, such approaches reinforce the tendency to privilege 
elite or atypical voices. In broader transnational history writing, this problem 
                                                                                                                                                             
Movement of 1935', Diplomatic History 39:2 (2015), 245–74; Kasper Braskén, ‘Making Anti-
Fascism Transnational: The Origins of Communist and Socialist Articulations of Resistance in 
Europe, 1923–1924, Contemporary European History 25:4 (2016), 573–596. 
57 Gerben Zaagsma, Jewish Volunteers, the International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War 
(London, 2017). 
58 Zaagsma, Jewish Volunteers, 13–14. 
59 E.g. Dan Stone, 'Anti-Fascist Europe Comes to Britain: Theorising Fascism as a Contribution to 
Defeating it', in Nigel Copsey and Andrzej Olechnowicz (eds.), Varieties of Anti-Fascism: Britain in 
the Inter-War period (Basingstoke, 2010); Claudia Baldoli, ‘“With Rome and with Moscow”: 
Italian Catholic Communism and Anti-Fascist Exile’, Contemporary European History 25:4 
(2016), 619–43. More broadly, see collections such as Desley Deacon, Penny Russell and Angela 
Woollacott (eds.), Transnational Lives: Biographies of Global Modernity, 1700–present (London, 
2010). 
60 Helen Graham, The War and its Shadow: Spain’s Civil War in Europe’s Long Twentieth Century 
(Brighton, 2012), 75–91. 
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has been addressed through obscurity – that is, subjecting less notable lives to 
the same methods and scrutiny, in the assumption that less noteworthy lives 
are more representative.61 Yet exploring any biography in such depth requires 
an exceptional source base, which in turn usually requires an atypical 
individual. Source material relating to International Brigade volunteers has not 
been preserved evenly – those with status, education and political connections 
are far more prominent in the source base. Even as the myth of the ‘literary’ 
International Brigades is put to rest, we should be wary of building up a new 
unrepresentative picture in its place.62 The Scots offer a particular utility as a 
case study in this regard, precisely because so few of them lived explicitly 
transnational lives, although they were certainly still influenced by 
transnational networks and ways of thinking. 
Instead, this account proposes what might be awkwardly termed a 
transnational national approach.63 In examining a national group that did not 
serve in its own ‘national’ unit and in appreciating the fluidity of boundaries in 
both Scotland and Spain, it is intended that many of the methodological 
advantages of transnational history be preserved. Yet by using a bounded, 
cohesive sample, it is possible to also borrow from the methods of social history, 
utilising quantitative as well as qualitative analysis, enabling an approach that is 
simultaneously cognisant of individual complexity yet able to offer insight into 
the phenomenon as a whole. In doing so, this account holds that the particular 
local and national contexts from which volunteers came was important in 
understanding motives for volunteering, and never became irrelevant during 
their service.  
                                                        
61 This method is advocated as a means of answering concerns that transnational history ‘may 
become disconnected from the day-to-day struggles of ordinary people’s lives’ in Desley Deacon, 
Penny Russell and Angela Woollacott, ‘Introduction’ in Deacon et al (eds.), Transnational Lives, 
5. 
62 Baxell, ‘Myths’, 13.  
63 Ariel Lambe’s recent study of Cuba and Spain takes a similar approach, but concentrates on 
what Spain reveals about transnational Cuban anti-fascism and activism rather than pursuing 
insight into the International Brigades themselves. Ariel Lambe, Cuban Antifascism and the 
Spanish Civil War: Transnational Activism, Networks, and Solidarity in the 1930s (PhD Thesis: 






This approach to transnationalism is enabled by a particular approach to 
examining volunteers’ networks. While existing accounts such as 
Kirschenbaum’s have investigated elite networks in Spain, this thesis explores 
them from below, arguing that most volunteers were already integrated into 
communist networks before they went to Spain. This has profound implications: 
aside from framing the decision to enlist as a product of group dynamics, it also 
challenges claims that the International Brigades were significantly 
ideologically diverse or representative of a broad swathe of progressive 
thought. Moreover, these networks often survived the shift to Spain, where they 
continued to shape the volunteering experience throughout the International 
Brigades’ existence. 
This approach is informed by work on other transnational activist networks in 
the interwar period.64 Moreover, it takes seriously Michael Goebel’s plea to go 
beyond simply demonstrating the existence of transnational networks, but tie 
them to concrete outcomes, in this case not only the decision to volunteer, but 
also volunteers’ physical, mental and political experiences of volunteering.65 
Work utilising Social Network Analysis has also informed how these networks 
have been substantiated and visualised, but there is no attempt to employ 
quantitative methods associated with this approach.66 This limitation is 
imposed by the fragmentary and inconsistent source base, in part due to 
preservation issues, but also due to the nature of the networks themselves. As 
noted by Browne and Faue, the Popular Frontist left tended to ‘downplay the 
connections between the personal and the political and to focus their attention 
                                                        
64 Alongside work discussed in the context of transnationalism, see Isabelle Richet, 'Marion Cave 
Rosselli and the Transnational Women's Anti-fascist Networks', Journal of Women's History 24:3 
(2012), 117–39. 
65 Michael Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World 
Nationalism (Cambridge, 2015), 291. 
66 Of particular relevance here were approaches attempting to plot diffuse urban communities 
and their networks, see John Scott, Social Network Analysis (London, 2013), 78–82. 
20 
 
exclusively in the public realm of activism.’67 Activists often proved reluctant, at 
the time and since, to discuss the intersection between their social and political 
lives, yet enough material survives to sketch the outline of a network that 
crossed Scotland and beyond. The goal, particularly in Chapter Two, is to 
describe the bounds of this network qualitatively, positing that what remains 
visible in the source base resembles the tip of an iceberg, the whole of which 
represented the Communist Party sphere of influence in Scotland, underpinned 
by social as much as political connections. However, in emphasising networks, 
attention is paid to the concerns of Patricia Clavin and others regarding the 
portrayal of history as the development of progressively more interconnected 
transnational networks.68 While the networks discussed here were important, it 
was their local and regional dimensions that offer the most explanatory power 




In pointing to recruitment for Spain taking place chiefly within well-defined 
networks – and arguing that this is vital for understanding the decision – this 
thesis also engages with historical literature on the nature of ‘volunteering’ in 
warfare. Just as recent work has sought to complicate the patriotism-
volunteering causality that has dominated discussion of volunteering in national 
contexts, this thesis seeks to challenge the idea that International Brigaders 
chose to fight in Spain for purely ideological reasons.69 This task is complicated 
by the ubiquity of the word ‘volunteer’ when discussing the International 
                                                        
67 Kathleen Brown and Elizabeth Faue, ‘Social Bonds, Sexual Politics, and Political Community on 
the U.S. Left, 1920s–1940s’ Left History 7:1 (2000), 10. Useful discussion of connections between 
personal and political in the British context, albeit heavily focused on middle-class communists, 
is found in Thomas Linehan, Communism in Britain: 1920–39: From the Cradle to the Grave 
(Manchester, 2007). 
68 Patricia Clavin, ‘Defining Transnationalism’, Contemporary European History 14:4 (2005), 424. 
69 A recent edited collection sketches these issues across a number of contexts. Christine Krüger 
and Sonja Levson (eds.), War Volunteering in Modern Times (Basingstoke, 2011). See also Nir 
Arielli and Bruce Collins, ‘Introduction: Transnational Military Service since the Eighteenth 
Century’ in Arielli and Collins (eds.), Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the 
Modern Era (London, 2013), 7–10. 
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Brigades, not least by the participants themselves at the time and since. Using 
‘volunteer’ contributes to the historiographical tendency to think of the decision 
as internalised, the product of an individual’s personal communion with 
conscience and belief. However, avoiding this word is not an option, given its 
ubiquity in most primary and secondary material. Rather, this account uses the 
term as a descriptor, while acknowledging that any decision to ‘volunteer’ was 
subject to external pressure. It is useful to think of any decision to fight in 
wartime as lying on a spectrum, conceived here as triangular, with coercion, 
material gain and ideology at each corner. Thus we might think of a conscript, 
mercenary or volunteer as embodying each extreme, but must acknowledge 
that in reality, most such decisions will retain some ambiguity. A conscript, for 
instance, might have options such as draft-dodging or conscientious objection, 
while a mercenary might refuse assignments in accordance with their own 
moral framework.70 Thus, while International Brigade volunteers were usually 
inspired by their ideological beliefs, this does not mean that their decisions 
were entirely separate from material and especially social considerations. 
This means no longer regarding International Brigaders as inherently 
exceptional, but viewing them as subject to similar pressures as others who 
have participated voluntarily in modern conflicts. By this, it is not intended to 
rake over old ground and claim that volunteers were motivated by desire for 
adventure or unemployment – or, more extremely, that the Communist Party 
tricked unemployed workers to Spain by promising jobs.71 While one can point 
to those for whom adventure or chronic unemployment was a factor, both have 
fundamentally limited explanatory power. If unemployment sufficed to induce 
volunteering, the British Battalion would have been several million strong. If 
                                                        
70 Discussion of the malleable nature of mercenary service in this context is provided in 
reference to the American airmen who fought for the Republic, with John Edwards arguing that 
while most initially had mercenary motivations, they did come to identify with the Republican 
cause. John Edwards, Airmen Without Portfolio: U.S. Mercenaries in Civil War Spain (Westport, 
1997), xi–xiii. 
71 For discussion of such claims, see Baxell, British Volunteers, 27–30. Many accounts have 
placed some, usually limited, weight on these motivations, see Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish 
Civil War, 127; Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 454–5. 
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‘adventure’ was sought, it could be found elsewhere, not least comparable 
conflicts in China or Ethiopia. In other words, while such factors cannot be 
discounted in a biographical sense, they cannot be considered as explaining the 
wider phenomenon. Rather, the analysis of volunteering presented here seeks 
to ground the decision in its specific context. How did understandings, 
ideological and otherwise, of the Spanish Civil War lend themselves to the 
decision to personally intervene? If – as in other instances such as the First 
World War or Boer War – peer pressure and community expectations played a 
role in encouraging individuals to volunteer, how could such influences be 
sustained in the absence of anything resembling a national consensus?72 
Chapter Two posits that while a nationwide consensus was impossible, it was 
possible to forge collective understandings of the conflict on a local basis, in 
communities centred on the social and political networks to which the 
volunteers belonged. This in turn can help explain why recruitment was more 
successful in Scotland than the rest of Britain, and offers a basis for comparing 
the Scots not just to other contingents of volunteers in Spain, but other modern 




The study of individuals who, for non-monetary reasons, participate in conflicts 
in which their home state is not involved remains an emerging field. Although 
individual instances have been studied in depth, efforts to address the 
phenomenon itself are rare. Elizabeth Roberts was among the first to attempt a 
comparative approach, contrasting British volunteers in Spain with those who 
fought in Finland in 1940 and in the Greek War of Independence.73 Yet although 
                                                        
72 Alexander Watson, ‘Voluntary Enlistment in the Great War: a European Phenomenon?’ and 
Stephen Miller, ‘British and Imperial Volunteers in the South African War’ in Krüger and Levson 
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there is a clear genealogy across these examples, Roberts’ approach revealed 
few useful comparative insights, highlighting the methodological difficulties in 
comparisons across long periods and diverse contexts. More recently, interest 
has emerged among political scientists, driven by the role of Islamic foreign 
fighters in recent conflicts. David Malet has been the most explicit in exploring 
historical parallels of the contemporary phenomenon, yet from a historical 
perspective his methodology and analysis appears limited.74 Even on questions 
of interest to political scientists and historians alike, such as what drives 
individuals to volunteer overseas, conclusions rely on existing secondary 
literature, which the comparative framework did little to enhance.  
Nir Arielli has driven a comparative research agenda forward with more 
success. Based on more substantial knowledge of case studies such as Spain and 
the Israeli War of Independence, Arielli was better placed to leverage broader 
comparisons.75 This has allowed for greater insight into questions such as the 
relationship between foreign fighters and their home states, a question that in 
the Spanish case has often been dominated by narratives of victimisation on the 
part of volunteers.76 Arielli shows that the relationship was far more complex, 
with states viewing foreign fighters as a potential tool as well as a threat, which 
might allow intervention in conflicts while retaining plausible deniability, 
meaning that laws against volunteering overseas were rarely enforced 
absolutely.77 This theme is explored in Chapter Six, examining encounters 
between the Scottish volunteers and the British state, with particular regard to 
their participation in the Second World War.  
 
 
                                                        
74 David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts (Oxford, 2013). 
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Methods and Sources 
 
An overarching goal of this thesis has been to construct a ‘history from below’ of 
the International Brigades, exploring the lived experience of ordinary 
volunteers, including Spaniards, and identifying where their needs came into 
conflict with the International Brigades’ leaders. This formulation is not 
unproblematic, and it is acknowledged that the categories of ‘ordinary 
volunteers’ and ‘leadership’ were flexible and overlapping, and certain 
individuals might be considered to fall into either category at different points in 
time, or even simultaneously – a dedicated Party member, for instance, might 
align him or herself with political leadership but share gripes about military life. 
As such, the ‘leadership’ is used throughout to denote those seeking to support 
and enforce the institutional perspective of the International Brigades at a given 
moment. The needs of ‘history from below’ also necessitate using appropriate 
methodological approaches to different sources and questions, and the thesis 
draws on fields as varied as musicology, gender studies and intelligence history 
to explore aspects of the volunteering experience. As such, with the exception of 
particular methodologies that underpin the thesis as a whole, methods are 
discussed in context as necessary rather than here.  
Locating Spanish perspectives on the International Brigades, discussed in 
Chapter Five, represented the most substantial archival challenge, particularly 
as existing accounts of the International Brigades – especially of the Scots – have 
made relatively little use of Spanish archives. In particular, the Archivo General 
Militar, Avila (AGMA) and Archivo General de Guerra Civil Española (AGGCE) in 
Salamanca, proved useful for this study. The latter is a particularly strange 
collection, with its genesis as a Francoist archive containing an eclectic range of 
material captured during the Spanish Civil War. As noted by James Matthews, 
the Spanish Republican Army’s Political Commissariat preserved a great deal of 
material relating to ordinary soldiers’ morale and concerns, which was of great 
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use here.78 The Avila archive presents a particularly rich source of such 
material, but it is understandably not structured around the International 
Brigades. Rather, the bulk of useful information came not from documentation 
regarding the International Brigades themselves, but that relating to their 
parent units in the Republican Army. Nationalist military and intelligence 
service records offered further perspectives, and future work dealing 
specifically with the International Brigades through their opponents’ eyes might 
be especially fruitful. Alternative perspectives were also found in the 
Conferación Nacional del Trabajo archives at the International Institute for 
Social History, which preserve an institutional perspective very different from 
either the Republican or Comintern hierarchies. 
British Government records supply further alternative perspectives. Some of 
these records, particularly those generated by the Foreign Office, are familiar to 
historians of the British contingent, although they remain a useful source. More 
vital for this account have been Security Service records, many of which have 
only recently been made public. Few complete personal files relating to Scottish 
volunteers have been preserved. Crucially, however, I was able to discover 
important new records relating to the volunteers. Although most personal files 
were destroyed, the card index to these files was retained, each providing a 
brief case history. However, aside from a handful of digitised examples, these 
cards had been wrongly catalogued on release, and the full files were only made 
available after I petitioned the National Archives after noticing discrepancies 
between catalogue and digitised copies.79 Aside from supplying missing 
biographical information, these files provide substantial new insight into 
Security Service treatment of the volunteers, particularly during the Second 
World War. 
The Comintern’s archives, held at the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political 
History (RGASPI), were likely the single most valuable resource for this study. 
                                                        
78 James Matthews, Reluctant Warriors: Republican Popular Army and Nationalist Army 
Conscripts in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (Oxford, 2012), 12. 
79 These files are now correctly catalogued, and are found in TNA, KV 5/117–31. 
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Their use here reflects two major developments since their initial release in the 
early 1990s. Much use of this archive has been driven by a revisionist agenda, 
focusing heavily on exploring political repression.80 While this archive certainly 
addresses such questions, it also offers substantial insight into the volunteers 
and their experiences, and these records have been used throughout this 
account in a broad variety of contexts. Their use in this way has been 
underpinned by the digitisation of many records relating to the International 
Brigades, alongside a great deal of other material relating to national 
Communist Parties.81 This meant that rather than focused searches through 
poorly indexed files, I was able to undertake a broader, slower search for 
relevant material. Even so, there remains a great deal to be discovered in this 
archive, especially as further segments are digitised.  
The Comintern records, as with other collections such as the International 
Brigade Archive at the Marx Memorial Library in London, need to be 
understood as having distinct institutional purposes. There are some suspicious 
silences in these archives, which seem to indicate the deliberate avoidance of 
certain topics.82 It is possible to overstate the totality of such efforts – plenty of 
records survive that might well have been culled – but it must be acknowledged 
that archival gaps may sometimes be deliberate. This also applies to a certain 
degree to personal papers of volunteers collected by the Marx Memorial 
Library. With the archival project managed initially by the International Brigade 
Association, those who had broken with this organisation are less likely to be 
represented in these archives, meaning that material conforming to certain 
narratives is likely to be overrepresented.  
The nature of the Scottish contingent mitigates against the widespread use of 
correspondence and memoirs in any case. The only Scottish Spanish Civil War 
                                                        
80 Peter Carroll, ‘The Myth of the Moscow Archives’, Science & Society 68:3 (2004), 337–41. 
81 The digital archive, available in Russian as part of the ‘Documents of the Soviet Era’ project, is 
hosted by the Federal Archive Agency, and can be accessed at <http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/>.  
82 For instance, Allan Kemp, the only Scot executed for desertion, has a suspiciously empty file, 
with the only archival confirmation of his execution coming from division-level records. ‘KEMP, 
A’, RGASPI, 545/6/158/48–9; Orden Especial del Día, 11 January 1938, RGASPI, 545/3/4/103. 
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memoir, by Battalion Political Commissar Bob Cooney, was published only in 
2015.83 This reflects a distinct tendency in archival preservation and 
publication, which has favoured volunteers who were well-educated, middle-
class or had important roles in the British Battalion. Most Scottish 
correspondence preserved in the Marx Memorial Library, for instance, pertains 
to senior Communist Party figures.  In Scottish archives, the most extensive 
personal deposits relate to John Dunlop and Tom Murray, neither typical 
volunteers. Some gaps can be filled from other sources – some correspondence 
was preserved in Moscow and elsewhere – but this was by no means universal. 
While these kind of personal sources provide valuable insight, this thesis relies 
on them to a lesser extent than many existing accounts. This is in some ways an 
advantage – not only does it encourage a more creative methodological 
approach in places, it also helps avoid issues stemming from an 
unrepresentative source base. 
This lack of contemporary personal sources led to a greater reliance on oral 
history. No interviews were conducted as part of this thesis, but Scotland has 
been well served when it comes to oral testimony. Aside from Scots’ 
participation in wider oral history projects, the work of Ian MacDougall in 
seeking out and interviewing Scottish International Brigaders has proven 
invaluable.84 However, the nature of these projects – usually in the ‘recovery’ 
mould of oral history, with the goal of preserving voices that might otherwise 
have been lost to history – gave participants wide scope to tell their stories as 
they saw fit.85 Interviewees were rarely pressed to discuss aspects of their 
service that did not reflect the image they wanted to convey. Shame, 
demoralisation and other negative emotions found correspondingly little place 
                                                        
83 Bob Cooney, Proud Journey (London, 2015). 
84 Ian MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War; Voices from the Hunger Marches 
(Edinburgh, 1990); Voices from War and Some Labour Struggles (Edinburgh, 1995). Dr 
MacDougall was kind enough to allow me access to the original unedited transcripts, but the 
light editing touch employed made it preferable to use the more-accessible published versions. 
85 For discussion of the predominance of ‘reconstructive’ approaches in Scotland, and 
MacDougall’s work in particular, see Angela Bartie and Arthur McIvor, ‘Oral history in Scotland’, 
Scottish Historical Review 92 (2013), 113–26. 
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in their narratives. This could be personal – such as a failing marriage’s role in 
deciding to volunteer – or collective, avoiding or downplaying the failures of 
comrades who deserted, committed crimes or lost heart.  
As with any oral history project, interviewee narratives need to be regarded as a 
product of a particular moment. Most interviews took place during the 1970s 
and 1980s, a period that saw the democratisation of Spain – and thereby the 
vindication of the volunteers’ stated aims – as well as heightened class and 
labour conflict in Britain.86 Moreover, volunteers’ testimony could not help but 
be affected by the mythology surrounding the International Brigades, especially 
as these grand narratives embody such a heroic, positive vision of their actions. 
In some cases, the recordings’ public nature – notably those conducted at 
Loughborough University in 1976 – threw the collective shaping and 
maintenance of these narratives into sharp relief.87 With interviewees given 
relatively free rein to fashion their testimony, these oral histories are often best 
understood as reflecting how the ex-volunteers came to view themselves.88 
While discussion of motivations is the most obvious such moment of self-
fashioning, similar points can be made about other established narratives, as 
discussed further in Chapter Six. However, these tendencies should not be 
regarded as deliberate distortion, or a sign that interviewees were not 
trustworthy or were unable to remember events accurately. Many evidenced 
accurate recollections of places, people and events, with errors tending towards 
minor confusion rather than fabrication.89 Rather, their use required sensitivity 
towards emphasis, omission and language.  
 
                                                        
86 Abrams, Oral History Theory, 18. See also Ron Grele, Envelopes of Sound: The Art of Oral History 
(New York, 1991), 245. 
87 A recording of a group session is in TLS, MS, Tapes 228/A-B. Individual interviews sometimes 
referred back to narratives explored in this session, e.g. William Kelly, Tape 238. 
88 On ‘official’ narratives and individual testimony, see Josie McLennan, ‘“I Wanted to be a Little 
Lenin”: Ideology and the German International Brigade Volunteers’, Journal of Contemporary 
History 41:2 (2006), 289–90. 





 Chapter Structure 
 
This account is not structured as a chronological narrative, nor is it a military 
history of Scottish contributions to various battles. Those seeking either are 
well catered-for in existing history writing. Individual chapters are thesis-
driven, structured across three broadly chronological sections: ‘Scotland’, 
‘Spain’ and ‘There, and Back Again’, addressing in turn the volunteers’ 
background and motivations, their experiences in Spain and their return to 
Britain. Aside from this basic structure, the underlying purpose of each chapter 
shifts midway through the thesis, with Chapters One to Three broadly aimed at 
addressing the extent that the ‘Scottishness’ of the volunteers mattered, while 
Chapters Four to Six instead using the Scots as a case study through which to 
address broader questions about the International Brigades. 
‘Scotland’ contains Chapters One and Two, and asks why such relatively large 
numbers of Scots volunteered to fight in Spain. Chapter One establishes who the 
Scottish volunteers were and where they came from in Scotland. Beyond tying 
several specific features of the Scottish contingent to their later experiences in 
Spain, this chapter argues that far from a random or representative sample of 
the Scottish left, the Scottish volunteers can best be understood as 
representatives of a much smaller political sphere defined by association with 
the Communist Party. As taken up in Chapter Two, this changes historical 
appreciations of the decision to volunteer, which should be appreciated as the 
product of peer group and community dynamics as much as personal 
ideological belief. Moreover, this focus provides a more convincing explanation 
for heightened levels of recruitment in Scotland, where local political cultures 
encouraged community-focused tactics.  
‘Spain’ examines the Scots’ experiences during the civil war, with a particular 
focus on how their specific backgrounds – socially, culturally and politically – 
continued to matter throughout the conflict. Chapter Three explores the 
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continued relevance of Scottishness in the International Brigades, despite Scots 
not serving in a separate unit. Drawing on the previous section’s conclusions, it 
is argued that many personal networks survived the journey to Spain. These 
manifested themselves as small, unofficial groupings within the British 
Battalion, seeing Scots cluster together where possible. Moreover, they formed 
the basis of information-sharing networks across Spain and Scotland, serving a 
range of personal and political purposes. Chapter Four turns to the 
International Brigades’ political cultures, examining how discourse was shaped 
and constrained, exploring the effects of demoralisation and disaffection and 
assessing the extent and limitations of repression. It argues for acknowledging 
gaps between intent, perception and reality when it came to political control of 
the International Brigades, while appreciating the nature of volunteers’ political 
beliefs and how they might be challenged. Finally, Chapter Five examines 
transnational encounters between Scots and Spaniards. In highlighting the 
complexity of these relationships, it is argued that friction between 
international volunteers and Spaniards needs to be seen as a structural outcome 
of the International Brigades project, albeit one that was understood and partly 
mitigated on both sides.  
The final, and shortest section ‘There, and Back Again’ deals with the volunteers’ 
return home. Chapter Six charts the relationship between the Scottish veterans 
and the British state, challenging the common narrative that International 
Brigade veterans were barred from participating in the British war effort due to 
their service in Spain. It is argued that discrimination against International 
Brigade veterans cannot be distinguished from broader anti-communist 
measures, suggesting that ex-volunteers were not special targets of state 
intervention, as has generally been depicted in history writing. Finally, a short 
epilogue situates the thesis within the context of post-war narratives about the 
International Brigades and efforts to commemorate their service in Scotland. 
Across these chapters, this thesis seek to challenge the way that histories of the 
International Brigades have been written, from who the volunteers were and 
how they were recruited, to how their experiences in Spain were shaped and 
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understood, to the relationship between foreign fighters and the nation state. In 
doing so, it is hoped to elevate the Scottish contingent from their status as 
historiographical afterthoughts to an integral part of understanding the 


























Chapter One: The Volunteers  
 
  
The most distinctive characteristic of Scottish participation in the International 
Brigades lies in the disproportionately large representation of Scots among 
British volunteers, and any account dealing with them must address the 
fundamental question of why this was so. The failure to convincingly do so has 
been a weakness of the limited existing accounts of Scottish involvement in the 
Spanish Civil War, and the question has received next to no attention elsewhere, 
even in a purely British context. This issue is addressed here and in the 
subsequent chapter by exploring who the Scottish volunteers were and why 
they enlisted to fight in Spain. This particular chapter concentrates on the Scots 
in a collective sense, identifying the areas in which their lives bore similarities, 
intersected with each other and diverged. Richard Baxell’s work on British 
volunteers provides a crucial point of reference, as it rests on a detailed 
examination of demographic factors across Britain.1 While Baxell’s figures are 
improved upon here, thanks to the smaller sample under consideration and 
availability of new sources, the goal is to go beyond marginal improvements in 
accuracy and instead redefine the way the International Brigades are 
collectively perceived in Scotland and elsewhere. Rather than a disparate group 
of individuals who were thrown together once in Spain, the International 
Brigade volunteers should instead be seen instead as a relatively cohesive group 
even before they left home. In the Scottish case, the volunteers clustered along 
the intersection of class, geography and politics.2 While there were inevitable 
                                                        
1 Richard Baxell, British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (London, 2004), 8–24. 
2 While other places saw similar clustering, it often took place along different lines depending on 
context. In South Wales, for instance, connections within the mining industry were considerably 
more important. Lewis Mates, ‘Durham and South Wales Miners and the Spanish Civil War’, 
Twentieth Century British History 17:3 (2006), 374–5. 
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exceptions, the bulk of Scots who fought in Spain can be seen as coming from a 
recognisable and specific community.  
This argument contradicts much of the established literature on the 
International Brigades, which often emphasises the heterodox nature of the 
volunteers and their beliefs and backgrounds.3 There are several reasons for 
this, not least because it was politically useful at the time for the Communist 
Party to emphasise the volunteers’ pluralism and diversity.4 However, the more 
fundamental reason that the cohesiveness of the bulk of recruits has been 
overlooked is the artificial prominence of non-conforming British volunteers. 
These might be termed ‘individualists’ – those for whom fighting in Spain was a 
very personal choice, and whose motivation and decision to volunteer was 
shaped almost entirely by their particular circumstances, for any number of 
reasons. ‘Individualists’ were more likely to come from middle- or upper-class 
backgrounds and held a wider variety of ideological views. As such, they were 
most prominent in the conflict’s early months, not least because they required 
less help getting to Spain.5 Although this grouping is relatively prominent in the 
primary and secondary source base, largely because they included a number of 
– generally English – artists and intellectuals, their actual numbers were small.6 
Within the Scottish contingent, they were practically unknown, a phenomenon 
underscored by the absence of Scots in accounts that focus on artistic and 
literary engagement with the Spanish Civil War.7 Instead, the bulk of the Scots 
came from political communities and networks dominated by the CPGB, of 
which they were often members themselves. For this group, volunteering was 
not a choice made in isolation, and as such cannot be understood as purely the 
product of an internalised, individual process. Within the British Battalion, 
                                                        
3 According to Baxell, ‘the reasons lying behind the decisions to volunteer for Spain are as wide 
and as diverse as the volunteers themselves.’ Baxell, British Volunteers, 30. See also Tom 
Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge, 1997), 126.  
4 Baxell, British Volunteers, 14–16. 
5 Baxell, British Volunteers, 48–9. 
6 On the disproportionate attention paid to such volunteers, see Richard Baxell, ‘Myths of the 
International Brigades’, Ayer 91:1–2 (2014), 13–17. 
7 E.g. Hugh Ford, A Poet’s War: British Poets and the Spanish Civil War (Philadelphia, 1965); 
Valentine Cunningham, Spanish Front: Writers on the Civil War (Oxford, 1986).   
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these volunteers might be termed a silent majority – they left behind or 
preserved fewer personal sources, and as such their presence in historical 
writing is muted. Nonetheless, they made up the vast majority of those who 
went to Spain. 
To support this claim, this chapter utilises a database measuring key 
biographical variables across the volunteering contingent, including ages, 
political and trade union affiliations, occupations and points of origin, as well as 
other information relating to their service in Spain. It has been constructed 
using archival and other primary material relating to the International Brigades, 
most commonly British Security Service and Foreign Office documents held at 
The National Archives, the internal documents of the International Brigades 
from the archives of the Comintern and lists compiled at the International 
Brigade Archive at the Marx Memorial Library. This information is 
supplemented where possible using oral testimony, contemporary newspapers 
and other archival material including Spanish medical records, volunteers’ 
letters and the records of various interested organisations. While detail is 
uneven across the entire sample of volunteers, it proved possible to measure 
each variable for a substantial majority of volunteers.8 
Which individuals to count in this database is perhaps the single most 
significant methodological question facing this study. Several key criteria were 
established for inclusion. First, it was decided to focus on those who served 
specifically for the International Brigades. This meant discounting many of the 
Scottish medical personnel in Spain, who were naturally better represented in 
the independent ‘Scottish Ambulance Unit’ than the London-based Spanish 
Medical Aid Committee mission that was incorporated into the International 
                                                        
8 Owing to this fragmentary source base, it was not considered appropriate to embark on 
complex statistical analyses. Another approach was taken by Ariel Lambe, by sampling a single 
source base – Comintern personnel files – and comparing it with the 1931 Cuban census. While 
nominally allowing for more complex statistical analyses, this was not considered to offer 
sufficient analytical insight to justify the limitations in scope, nor were the Comintern files 
considered to be internally consistent samples in and of themselves, for reasons explored in 
greater depth in Chapter Four. Ariel Lambe, Cuban Antifascism and the Spanish Civil War (PhD 
Thesis: Columbia University, 2014), 73–158. 
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Brigades. This choice has disadvantages, chiefly in that it reduces the diversity 
of perspectives and characters engaged with. Only one woman – Annie Murray – 
meets these inclusion criteria. Only one other Scotswoman sought to enlist in 
the International Brigades, Kay Welton, who wrote to Edinburgh communist 
Tom Murray asking him to take her with him to Spain, explicitly as a ‘fighter’ 
and not ‘in a nursing line.’9 Tom Murray’s reply is not known, but there is no 
indication Welton went to Spain. However, including different perspectives for 
the sake of diversity would miss the point of the analysis presented here: that 
the International Brigades’ very lack of diversity offers insight into their 
recruitment.10 
In several cases, individuals volunteered but did not actually see service, as they 
changed their minds or were rejected for various reasons. They have been 
counted here if they succeeded in leaving Britain, on the basis that this 
represented a concrete attempt to enlist and follow through with their decision, 
and are therefore still relevant to discussions about recruitment for Spain.11 
Each individual also required independent verification, except in the few cases 
where there is good reason that they appeared in few records, such as if they 
died shortly after reaching Spain.12 Nearly all of those included have had their 
service confirmed in at least two independent sources. This measure was 
adopted to help prevent double entries – some served under a nom de guerre, 
and therefore appear under different names in different records – as well as 
                                                        
9 Welton to Murray, 10 March 1938, MML, Box D-4, File My/8. 
10 On broader Scottish involvement in Spain, see Daniel Gray, Homage to Caledonia (Edinburgh, 
2008), 92–5, 155–76. On ILP volunteers, see Christopher Hall, ’Not Just Orwell’: The Independent 
Labour Party Volunteers and the Spanish Civil War (Barcelona, 2009). For Scottish nurses and 
other female participants, Angela Jackson, British Women and the Spanish Civil War (London, 
2002). On Glasgow Anarchist Ethel MacDonald in particular, Chris Dolan, An Anarchist’s Story: 
The Life of Ethel MacDonald (Edinburgh, 2009). For the Scottish Ambulance Unit, Jim Fyrth, The 
Signal Was Spain: The Spanish Aid Movement in Britain, 1936–1939 (London, 1986), 181–91. 
11 There are only a handful of such cases, namely Andrew Marshall, A. Henderson, J. Docherty, J. 
Prior, John Paterson and R. Smart, identified as such in ‘List of Scots in Spain (Returned)’, MML, 
Box C, File 1/5. 
12 For example, J. Docherty, listed as being rejected on medical grounds after reaching Paris. His 
swift return meant that confirmation in Spanish records was impossible, and surveillance 
records unlikely. ‘List of Scots in Spain (Returned)’, MML.  
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individuals who were mistakenly thought to have been in Spain.13 Finally, 
usefully defining a ‘Scot’ is far from straightforward. In arguing that heightened 
Scottish recruitment was a product of very local circumstances rather than 
innate Scottish exceptionalism, it is difficult to include individuals who were not 
directly affected by these factors. As such, there are two categories of ‘Scot’ 
considered here. The first are those who were born and lived only in Scotland 
prior to the Spanish Civil War. The second emigrated either to or from Scotland, 
but who were demonstrably integrated into Scottish political networks and 
cultures. Those born in Scotland, but whose main political experiences 
happened elsewhere, have been excluded. While this definition is not perfect – 
adequate personal histories are not available in all cases – it allows discussion 
of Scottish distinctiveness to avoid romanticism. 
Using this database, this chapter explores various demographic variables, 
examining the commonalities and differences among the Scottish volunteers. It 
begins by establishing the number of Scottish volunteers, as well as examining 
factors such as age and occupation. The focus then moves to the geographic 
distribution of volunteers, and lastly to their political affiliations and adherence. 
Taken together, the data shows that clusters of volunteers can be found within 
very specific communities organised along the intersections between human 
and physical geography and politics. Of notable significance is the fact these 
communities were well-defined and made up relatively small sections of the 
general population. This means that Scottish volunteers should not be 
considered as a tiny minority of the Scottish population or even the Scottish 
working class, but as making up a substantial proportion of the small social-
political sphere from whence they came. 
  
                                                        






Despite the limited historiography dealing with the Scottish volunteers, 
estimates of their numbers have varied considerably. Tom Buchanan gave the 
figure as 437, while Iain MacDougall estimated ‘about 500.’14 Baxell settled on a 
total of 549, which was adopted by Gray without further discussion.15 This 
variation in figures reflects methodological problems that have plagued many 
accounts of the International Brigades. Earlier imprecision reflected uneven 
access to sources, yet even more recent attempts are still undermined by the 
inherent difficulty of defining identity in the 1930s.16 Complex and overlapping 
local and national identities, muddled further by migration, make this a non-
trivial task. In an attempt to resolve this longstanding issue, Antonio Celada and 
Daniel Pastor Garcia sought to establish the most appropriate single or dual 
national identity for each English-speaking volunteer.17 Rather than resolving 
the question, however, their work provides further evidence of the difficulty in 
enumerating the volunteers on a large scale. The detail provided for each 
volunteer is scarce, and a combination of insufficient source material for each 
entry and classification errors led to significant distortion. Approximately one 
fifth of the Scottish volunteers are either missing entirely or have demonstrably 
false information provided, while many others include information for which 
there is no apparent basis. Typical of such errors or inconsistencies is the entry 
for Robert Beggs, correctly listed as Glaswegian but classified as English, or 
George Shaw, who was listed as a dual national (Scottish and United States) for 
                                                        
14 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 126; Iain MacDougall, Voices From the Spanish 
Civil War (Edinburgh, 1986), 3.  
15 Baxell, British Volunteers, 159n; Gray, Homage, 1. 
16 Baxell used similar (although not identical) archival sources as this study, although it remains 
unclear how he defined volunteers’ points of origin. Baxell, British Volunteers, 159n-160n. 
17 Antonio Celada and Daniel Pastor Garcia, Los brigadistas de habla inglesa y la Guerra Civil 
Española (Madrid, 2002). 
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which there is no supporting evidence.18 They also contain entries which 
proved to be doubles of other individuals, or whose service cannot be 
independently confirmed. 
The approach used here is designed to address these concerns by adopting a 
more rigorous approach that allows for difficulties caused by categorisation. By 
applying the criteria discussed above, this account considers that 520 Scottish 
volunteers left Britain with the intention of joining the International Brigades. 
By relaxing either the definition of ‘Scottish’ or the requirement for independent 
verification, many more might conceivably be included. It could certainly be 
argued that many of those excluded felt some affinity for Scottish culture, or 
identified as Scottish. However, without demonstrable exposure to the Scottish 
socio-political cultures discussed in this chapter, it would be misleading to claim 
these individuals as evidence for the thesis presented here. With confirmed 
Scots alone making up at least 22 percent of the British contingent – double 





Although volunteers were supposed to be over 21 and under 40 years old, and 
ideally between 25 and 35, in practice there was considerable flexibility.19 Any 
attempt to enforce this rule was undermined by individuals’ willingness to lie 
about their age, often aided and abetted by their peers. Stephen Fullarton, 
eighteen when he volunteered in April 1938, recalled discussing this with local 
Party organiser George Campbell. 
He says, ‘you better say you’re 19’ ‘OK, I’ll be 19 if they ask.’ They did ask. 
They told me… ‘You’ll be going down to London now and they’ll see you 
in London and you better tell them ye’re 20 because 19 sounds a bit 
                                                        
18 George Shaw himself made it clear that aside from service during the First World War, he had 
never previously lived outside Glasgow. See ‘Autobiography of George Shaw’, 25 April 1937, 
RGASPI, 545/6/199/26. 
19 Baxell, British Volunteers, 16–18. 
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young’ ‘Aye OK I’ll be 20.’ Well, when I went to London my age increased 
from 20 to 21: ‘You better say you’re 21.’ And when I got to Paris that 
was me 21.20 
Judging by Fullarton’s enlistment paperwork, by the time he reached Spain he 
had had several more such conversations, eventually giving his age as 23.21 
Similarly, the oldest known Scot, Francis Casey, was 53 years old when he 
joined the British Battalion in December 1936, but only admitted to being 42. 
The youngest, sixteen year-old Robert McGuire, claimed to be 21 when 
enlisting.22  
Age Scottish (%) British, inc. Scots (%) French (%) American 
(%) 
Under 21 5.3 4.2 2.6 38.0 
21-25 26.3 32.2 24.8 
26-30 26.3 23.6 32.6 26.0 
31-35 21.1 20.4 21.9  
36.0 36-40 12.9 12.3 13.7 
Over 40 8.0 7.3 4.4 
Table 1.1: Age ranges of volunteers in Scottish, British, French and American 
contingents.23 
The widespread practice of creative imprecision with ages hinders meaningful 
comparisons across groups. Baxell identified several cases of volunteers lying 
about their age, but a systematic attempt to correct such ‘errors’ appears to 
have been impossible at the time.24 As this account was able to catch many more 
creative age-related claims, comparisons are less useful than they might be. 
While the slight variation between groups visible in the table above could 
conceivably be meaningful – for example, higher proportions of older 
volunteers might point to a drop in acceptance standards – methodological 
inconsistency makes such arguments difficult to substantiate.  
                                                        
20 Fullarton in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 290. 
21 ‘7.4.38–14.4.38’, RGASPI, 545/6/91/169. 
22 ‘Arrivals during and before Dec 1936’ and ‘Arrived prior to 10.1.37’ RGASPI, 545/6/91/57, 
82; ‘MCGUIRE, Robert’ and ‘CASEY Francis’, TNA, KV 5/119, 127. 
23 For Scottish figures, see Appendix A. For the British, see Baxell, British Volunteers, 16. The 
American data comes from a 1937 roster, which is problematic in light of changing age patterns 
over time. Peter Carroll, The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (Stanford, 1994), 15–16. 
French data is from Remi Skoutelsky, ‘L'engagement des volontaires français en Espagne 
républicaine’, Le Mouvement social 181 (1997), 11. 









































Under 21 4.6 6.4 0 0 0 7.1 2.9 9.4 7.4 9.1 
21-25 20.2 22.2 13.6 21.1 37.5 32.1 28.6 50.0 31.5 27.3 
26-30 23.9 19.2 22.7 52.6 33.3 35.7 25.7 18.8 25.9 29.5 
31-35 21.1 26.3 22.7 10.5 29.2 0 20.0 18.8 18.5 27.3 
36-40 14.7 14.1 22.7 10.5 0 21.4 11.4 3.1 14.8 6.8 
Over 40 15.6 11.1 18.2 5.3 0 3.6 11.4 0 1.9 0 
Table 1.2: Ages of Scottish volunteers arriving between December 1936 and April 
1938.25 
Within the Scottish sample, volunteers grew steadily younger as the conflict 
lengthened. Prior to May 1937, fewer than 30 percent of volunteers in any given 
period were under 25, compared to at least 31.5 percent from May onwards, 
including nearly 60 percent in November and December 1937. This change 
likely reflects shifting attitudes on the part of recruiters. Despite the optimistic 
claim by one British commander that ‘there were men of over fifty who did as 
well as those half their years’, older volunteers often struggled to cope with 
strenuous demands of military service, with many relegated to rear duties.26 
Concerns about the suitability of new recruits were raised in reports from Spain 
as early as February 1937.27 By mid-1937, with the number of volunteers unfit 
for frontline service rapidly outstripping the number of useful jobs for them, 
preventing overage recruits became a higher priority.28 The concern was also 
financial; the Communist Party had promised to support volunteers’ 
dependants while they were in Spain, and subsidising the presence of 
volunteers who were unable to contribute meaningfully to the war effort was 
                                                        
25 See Appendix A. 
26 Tom Wintringham, English Captain (London, 1939), 115. The increasingly weary attitude 
towards older volunteers was evident in Matthew Murphy’s rejection in February 1938: ‘43 
years old. He would not be sent to the line because of his age, and there is no room for him in the 
rear. Sent home’, ‘MURPHY, Matthew’, RGASPI, 545/6/176/33. 
27 E.g. Kerrigan to Pollitt, 6 February 1937, MML, Box C, File 10. 
28 Paynter to Pollitt, 9 June 1937, MML, Box C, File 13; ‘Observations’, 22 December 1937, 
RGASPI, 545/6/87/39–40.  
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proving a substantial burden, particularly as repatriation was heavily 




Occupational data is available for 417 of the Scots in Spain, allowing for a 
relatively complete picture. A bare handful might be considered professionals – 
two chemists, one teacher, one accountant and three journalists. Even these 
individuals were hardly models of bourgeois respectability. The accountant was 
still a trainee when he volunteered, while one chemist had recently been fired 
due to his communist sympathies.30 The teacher was actually working as a 
‘salesman’ when he volunteered, suggesting teaching was going poorly, while 
the journalists tended to have worked for the Communist Party newspaper, the 
Daily Worker.31 Beyond these quasi-professionals, few were non-manual 
workers: eleven clerical workers of various descriptions, two music hall 
performers and two nurses. The rest, some 394 individuals or 94.5 percent of 
those for whom information is available, worked with their hands.  
Patterns of trade union membership confirm this trend. 170 Scots were known 
to be trade union members, compared to Baxell’s figure of approximately 500 
for Britain as a whole, although this higher proportion is again likely due to the 
broader source base consulted here. The two samples are generally similar. The 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), for instance, was the most 
common affiliation for both British and Scottish volunteers, unsurprisingly 
given that the TGWU was one of Britain’s largest unions at the time.32 Some 
differences do emerge. Mining unions were the second-largest grouping in 
Scotland; in England they did not make the top ten. There were fewer Scottish 
                                                        
29 ‘Observations’, 22 December 1937, RGASPI. 
30 Dunlop and Drever in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 117, 277–8. 
31 ‘BURNS, Timothy’, TNA KV 5/118; ‘Transport of 2–4–37’, RGASPI, 545/6/91/100. For 
journalists, see for example ‘John Paterson: Signed statement’, January 28 1937, RGASPI, 
545/6/183/79–81. 




members of the National Union of Seamen, while Boilermakers and Railwaymen 
were better represented. However, the similarities are more striking than the 
differences.  
It is difficult, however, to locate any particular occupational cluster beyond the 
dominance of manual labour. No industry stands out as having supplied 
especially disproportionate numbers of volunteers, especially when placed 
within a British context. Baxell compiled the most extensive list of the British 
volunteers’ occupations, although as he only covered a minority of the British 
contingent, direct comparisons are not useful.33 However, it is possible to 
compare the proportion of occupations by sector. 
Occupational Sector Scotland (%) Britain, including 
Scotland (%) 
Manufacturing and Construction 37.6 30 
Transport 20.6 22 
Trades 11.5 20 
Mining 16.5 9 
Publishing 1.8 6 
Professionals 1.2 6 
Local Government 0.2 1 
Arts and Crafts 0.9 1 
Miscellaneous 9.7 4 
Table 1.3: Proportion of Scottish and British volunteers in occupational sectors.34 
These figures still present certain difficulties. 51 individuals had two or more 
occupations listed in different sources.35 This likely reflects the nature of 
employment in 1930s Britain, with individuals turning their hands to whatever 
work they could find, irrespective of experience or training. Many volunteers 
would have had to choose between stating their latest position and the job they 
were trained for.  
                                                        
33 Baxell is imprecise about his sample size, but extrapolating from his figures gives 
approximately 1,000. Baxell, British Volunteers, 21–2. 
34 For Scottish figures, see Appendix A. British figures from Baxell, British Volunteers, 22.  




More problematic is that the criteria by which Baxell divided these sectors were 
not made clear.36 Numerous occupations are inherently ambiguous, such as 
carpentry – conceivably either part of ‘Trades’ or ‘Manufacturing and 
Construction’. There were also substantial numbers of Scots in the service 
industry, such as salesmen or waiters, who have no obvious place in Baxell’s 
calculations, and have been included here under Miscellaneous. Furthermore, 
the most common single occupation, ‘labourer’, defies precise categorisation, 
and it is unclear how they figured in Baxell’s calculations. As such, the only firm 
conclusion is that Scots had more traditionally ‘working class’ occupations than 
the British overall, with Scots three times less likely to work in publishing, local 
government, arts or as a professional than the British average.37 The 
disproportionate number of Scottish miners is also noteworthy, although not to 
the same extent as in Wales. According to Hywel Francis and Robert Stradling, 
between 99 and 110 Welsh miners served in Spain, representing two thirds of 
the Welsh contingent, compared to 55 Scottish miners comprising a sixth of the 
Scots.38 This, along with Scotland’s more dispersed coalfields, contrasts with the 
exceptional mobilisation along regional-occupational lines seen in Wales. 
However, Scots and Welsh together made up three quarters of all miners who 
volunteered. Clearly, English miners were considerably less willing to go to 
Spain than their Welsh and Scottish comrades, pointing to substantial 





                                                        
36 He did not, for instance, use the same categories as the 1931 census occupational reports. 
Census of England and Wales, 1931, Classification of industries (1934), 1–2.  
37 Some of this difference can be explained by differences in sector size between Scotland and 
the rest of Britain, A. K. Cairncross, The Scottish Economy (Cambridge, 1954), 41. However, the 
number of Scottish volunteers working in non-manual categories was still small compared to 
Scotland as a whole. Census of Scotland, 1931. Vol. III Occupations and industries (1934), xiv. 
38 Hywel Francis, Miners Against Fascism (London, 1987), 95; Robert Stradling, Wales and the 
Spanish Civil War (Cardiff, 2004), 104. 
39 Mates discusses these differences in the context of South Wales and Durham. Mates, ‘Durham 





It is unclear how many individuals were actually employed in the occupations 
they claimed. Many appear to have listed either a customary trade or a previous 
position instead of admitting to being unemployed. As discussed below, 
approximately one fifth of all volunteers indicated some connection to the 
National Unemployed Workers Movement (NUWM), indicating that a 
substantial number of Scots faced chronic unemployment in the years prior to 
Spain.40 This was certainly the case elsewhere, with several sources estimating 
that between an eighth and a quarter of British volunteers were unemployed.41 
However, as interwar unemployment was particularly severe in Scotland, it is 
probable that the Scottish proportion is higher than the average.42 Moreover, 
the particular link between communism and volunteering – explored further 
below – also indicates that higher numbers of Scottish volunteers were 
unemployed. The Scottish district of the Communist Party was singled out as 
having the highest – ‘over 50%’ – number of unemployed members in October 
1936.43 This figure improved only slowly, with 45 percent of Scottish 
communists still unemployed by November 1937.44 Even by June 1938, the 
figure was 43 percent.45 Compared to other large districts such as London, 
where just 185 out of 4806 members were unemployed by April 1937, or 
Lancashire where the figure was 16 percent in November 1937, this points to 
                                                        
40 Not all unemployed were necessarily members of the NUWM, and several were ‘ex’ members. 
E.g. Allan Craig, ‘Arrived various dates prior to 10.1.37’, RGASPI, 545/6/91/58.  
41 Baxell, British Volunteers, 23–4, 30. See also Wintringham, English Captain, 330; K. Watkins, 
Britain Divided: The Effect of the Spanish Civil War on British Political Opinion (London, 1963), 
283–99.  
42 Christopher Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes: Scotland 1900-2015 (Edinburgh, 2016), 
50-1; William Knox, Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800-Present 
(Edinburgh, 1999), 189–95. 
43 ‘Information Material Concerning Party Organisation and Cadres’, 17 December 1936, 
RGASPI, 495/14/215/29–32. 
44 ‘Report on some main tactical, organisational and cadre problems confronting the CPGB’, 
December 1937, RGASPI, 495/20/91/35. 
45 ‘Report on Scottish District’, 3 June 1938, RGASPI, 495/14/260/56. 
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the Scottish contingent containing a much higher proportion of unemployed 
volunteers.46  
Previous accounts have generally been content to note the apparent connection 
between unemployment activism and volunteering without considering the 
precise ways that it actually shaped recruitment patterns for Spain.47 Yet as only 
a tiny minority of Britain’s unemployed joined the International Brigades, it is 
difficult to tie this mass phenomenon to successful recruitment directly. 
Unemployment was not necessarily a direct motivation for enlistment – 
representing Spain as an ‘escape’ from the ennui of unemployment is overly 
simplistic.48 Rather, unemployment gave the Communist Party space in which to 
build a political movement based on the NUWM, a space that was often 
uncontested by the official labour movement or Labour Party.49 This influenced 
not just the CPGB’s ability to expand and attract recruits, but also qualitatively 
shaped the way the Party operated and helped it develop new capabilities that 
proved useful when recruiting and managing the International Brigades.  
Campaigns against unemployment exerted a profound influence on the 
Communist Party’s organisation in Scotland. Such was the reliance on 
unemployed members, Party leaders worried that many local branches were 
being run ‘by an unemployed comrade who is generally not the most capable’, 
while more capable candidates were ‘employed and unable to give the 
necessary attention to the work.’50 While this trend was encouraged by other 
factors – notably that CPGB members often faced victimisation in the workplace 
and official labour movement, discouraging those in employment from 
becoming open members – it is clear that years of relatively successful work 
                                                        
46 ‘Membership Report’, April 1937, RGASPI, 495/14/239/197; ‘Report on some main tactical, 
organisational and cadre problems’, December 1937, RGASPI. 
47 Baxell, British Volunteers, 42–3; Mates, Spanish Civil War and the British Left, 210; Gray¸ 
Homage, 25–6. 
48 E.g. Elizabeth Roberts, ‘Freedom, Faction, Fame and Blood’: British Soldiers of Conscience in 
Greece, Spain and Finland (Brighton, 2010), 202. 
49 While Knox is justified in characterising the unemployed as ‘fatalistic rather than radical’, this 
overlooks the impact that even a small minority of the vast number of unemployed could have 
on what was a very small Communist movement. Knox, Industrial Nation, 13. 
50 ‘Scottish District of the CPGB’, RGASPI, 495/14/190/48–51. 
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with the chronically unemployed had shaped Party demographics by 1936. By 
offering a path to actively resist unemployment, and the deeply unpopular 
measures associated with government responses such as the Means Test, the 
Communist Party was able to effectively tap into community anger, which often 
manifested itself in collective action to thwart unwelcome government 
intrusion.51 By offering a holistic critique of the system failing many Scottish 
communities, and new forms of protest through the NUWM, the Communist 
Party was able to translate localised anger into a wider mobilisation. 
By 1937, however, the NUWM was on its last legs. The improving economic 
situation undermined its relevance, and the CPGB leadership frankly discussed 
its continued future.52 However, the NUWM had already served its purpose from 
the perspective of this study. As Malcolm Petrie has argued, the NUWM was 
noteworthy in that it sought to contest ownership of public space in a 
continuation of traditions of popular protest, taking on added importance for a 
demographic for whom newer, more genteel political norms held little 
attraction.53 As such, it helped bring in a new generation of activists who were 
intensely motivated and angry, and had no stable employment, family or even 
fixed abode limiting their mobility.54 Although Party members were a minority 
in most NUWM branches, they tended to be in charge.55 Glasgow NUWM activist 
Tom Fern, for example, recalled that out of ‘about 200 members’, ‘a dozen’ at 
most were communists – but ‘they were the driving force.’56 For the 
unemployed who wanted to play a greater role in the movement, the natural 
                                                        
51 Annmarie Hughes, Gender and Political Identities in Scotland, 1919–1939 (Edinburgh, 2010), 
193–8. 
52 By August 1937, it was considered to be ‘largely bad’ and even an ‘obstacle’ to organisation. 
Central Committee (CC) Meeting, 6 August 1937, RGASPI, 495/14/235/44. 
53 Malcolm Petrie, ‘Public Politics and Traditions of Popular Protest: Demonstrations of the 
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54 The Means Test was calculated based on household income, so claiming benefits often meant 
leaving home. John Stevenson and Chris Cook, The Slump: Britain in the Great Depression 
(Harlow, 2010), 79–81.  
55 Although the totality of CPGB ‘control’ of the NUWM is debatable, the close organisational 
links are undeniable. Alan Campbell and John McIroy, ‘The National Unemployed Workers’ 
Movement and the Communist Party of Great Britain Revisited’, Labour History Review 73:1 
(2008), 61–88. 
56 Fern in MacDougall, Voices from the Hunger Marches, 138, see also 282, 335. 
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route to greater participation was through joining the Communist Party, 
developing the requisite social and political connections to receive training and 
responsibility. Michael Clarke of Greenock was forceful in his recollection of this 
process: ‘I think – I don’t think, I know – that the NUWM was a recruitin’ ground 
for the Party.’57 The result was an influx of relatively young individuals to the 
Communist Party, radicalised by their first-hand experiences of capitalism and 
with few fixed ties keeping them at home – characteristics that leant themselves 
to recruitment for Spain. 
Beyond encouraging the recruitment of members who might be more open to 
joining the International Brigades, the NUWM also helped prepare them for 
service in Spain. The NUWM’s campaigns stretched conceptual frontiers of 
political activism. Although much of their activity was local, their most famous 
undertakings were the Hunger Marches, which saw groups of unemployed 
marchers converge from across the country on a single destination. In the last 
large march, not coincidentally just as mass recruitment for the International 
Brigades got underway in November-December 1936, over 500 Scots marched 
on London.58 Marches made activism mobile, altering the participants’ 
perceptions of their ability to effect change outwith their immediate 
surroundings. It was also activism on the offensive. Rather than defending 
against government intrusions locally, appealing Means Test verdicts or 
complaining about conditions, marchers took the fight to where it could achieve 
the most, just as Spain could be understood as taking the anti-fascist struggle to 
its most important flashpoint.  
The Hunger Marches also affected the CPGB’s organisational capabilities, both 
real and perceived. The logistics of marshalling hundreds of marchers over a 
trek that lasted up to six weeks were complicated, and helped develop skills 
among the cadres who later took on military or political responsibilities in 
                                                        
57 Clarke in MacDougall, Voices from the Hunger Marches, 164. 
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Spain.59 Specific lessons were learned – such as the necessity of medical 
examinations beforehand – that could be directly applied when recruiting 
volunteers for Spain.60 Moreover, the success of the Hunger Marches helped 
develop faith in the Party itself. In being able to adequately clothe, feed, shelter 
and protect their charges, faith in the tactics and capabilities of communist 
leadership was reinforced among their followers. Among the most active NUWM 
members – those most likely to be drawn into the political orbit of the 
Communist Party itself, given the evident strength of their convictions as well as 
the opportunities for propagandising that a six-week march afforded – the 
Communist Party had developed strong foundations for a successful 




As indicated by their occupations, Scottish volunteers were overwhelmingly of 
working class origins. While it is possible to list some Scots who did not fit this 
mould – such as David Mackenzie, a University of Edinburgh student – these 
examples are exceptions. Most estimates place the proportion of working-class 
volunteers in the British battalion as being between 80 and 90 percent, but 
given the preponderance of working-class volunteers among the Scottish and 
Welsh contingents, this suggests that most of this ten to twenty percent of 
middle- or upper-class volunteers were English.62 By comparison, the American 
contingent contained a somewhat higher proportion of professionals, 
intellectuals and students.63  
                                                        
59 Donald Renton, for instance, was secretary and organiser of the Edinburgh NUWM, leading 
their contingent in the 1936 Hunger March. He was made Company Commissar on arrival in 
Spain. Renton in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 20-1; ‘RENTON, Donald’, TNA, 
KV 5/130.  
60 MacDougall, Voices from the Hunger Marches, 6. 
61 During the 1936 march, propagandising was centred on Spain itself – especially the newly-
formed International Brigades. Lochore in MacDougall, Voices from the Hunger Marches, 320. 
62 Baxell, British Volunteers, 22; Hopkins, Into the Heart of the Fire, 155. 
63 A survey of 1225 American volunteers in Spain showed at least 290 coming from this sort of 
background. ‘Professions’, RGASPI, 545/3/455/148–52. 
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These class differences between the British national groups are reflected in the 
pattern of arrivals. Many middle-class, intellectual volunteers arrived in the 
early months of the war. These tended to be the ‘individualists’ alluded to in the 
introduction – those for whom going to Spain was a choice made in isolation 
from others, for chiefly personal reasons. For them, the cause and opportunity 
was enough, and further enabling factors unnecessary. Yet making such a 
decision required the means to see it through. There may have been working-
class Scots with similar mentalities – George Drever, for instance, claimed to 
have tried to volunteer to fight in Abyssinia in 1935, an indication that he was 
perhaps looking for somewhere to fight rather than swept up by specific 
enthusiasm for Spain.64 However, without money to pay fares, a passport or 
knowledge of international travel, most working-class volunteers were unable 
to journey to Spain before a route was established thanks to cooperation 
between the Comintern and British and French Communist Parties, who 
arranged travel, accommodation and fares.65 Of the British volunteers trickling 
into Spain from August to November 1936, just seven percent were Scots. Once 
a route was established, the next three months saw Scots make up 42 percent of 
British arrivals. The Communist Party’s aid must be seen as a crucial factor in 
allowing recruitment to take place on such a large scale, especially when it came 
to working-class volunteers.  
Disparities in social composition among the different national groups in the 
English-speaking XV International Brigade had ramifications. Leadership 
composition came to reflect the varying proportions of middle- or upper-class 
volunteers in each national group. Americans came to dominate the higher 
ranks, to the chagrin of the other nationalities – an internal report written in 
1938 acknowledged the failure to promote Canadian and Latin American 
officers, and the British too were forced to contend for adequate representation 
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at Brigade level.66 Among the British, however, a similar process was underway, 
with English volunteers coming to dominate the higher ranks. That is not to say 
that Scots were completely passed over – Jock Cunningham was one of the 
Battalion’s most celebrated commanders, while George Aitken and Bob Cooney 
were both senior Political Commissars. However, the disproportionate number 
of Scottish volunteers was not matched by a disproportionate presence in 
leadership roles. Petrou made similar observations regarding the chiefly 
working-class Canadian contingent, which was often provided with middle-class 
American officers.67 
There are several reasons why rank and social background became connected 
in Spain. Middle- or upper-class volunteers were more likely to have 
participated in Officer Training Corps schemes at school or university, training 
which assumed relative importance given the scarcity of volunteers with 
substantial military leadership experience.68 Educational background also 
played a role, particularly regarding language training. Few working-class 
recruits could speak a language other than English, a prized ability in the 
multinational environment of the International Brigades. The importance of 
Spanish in particular is readily apparent, and evidence suggests that working-
class volunteers struggled to learn the language compared to better-educated 
individuals with prior knowledge of Romance languages.69 Scots had 
particularly poor language skills. One document from January 1938 listed all 
British volunteers able to speak a second language; just four out of 76 were 
                                                        
66 ‘Report on the political development of the XVth International Brigade’ and ‘Report on the 
work of the North Americans the XV Brigade’, 1938, RGASPI, 545/6/21/21–2,61–2. 
67 Petrou, Renegades, 110-11. 
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Scottish.70 Finally, the nature of the training available for officer candidates 
mitigated against the rapid promotion of working-class volunteers. Due in part 
to the chronic shortage of materiel, officer training was heavy on theory and 
short on practice, favouring those used to formal education and with higher 
degrees of literacy and numeracy. In one graduating class of officer candidates 
in late 1937 for which evaluations are available, most Scots were posted to units 
as non-commissioned officers, with only well-educated, middle-class volunteer 
John Dunlop noted to have any immediate potential for higher rank.71 Fewer 
and fewer Scots even had the chance at acquiring higher rank as time went by: 
the next graduating class contained just two Scots out of 54 candidates, both 
classed as ‘not recommended for promotion.’72 
 
Religion and Marital Status 
 
Although not directly linked, enumerating the Scottish volunteers’ religious and 
marital backgrounds presents similar challenges, with neither consistently 
recorded at the time. This was particularly the case for religion. Richard Baxell 
found less than one hundred British volunteers for whom a denominational 
background could be established – 80 Catholics and ‘a very small number’ of 
Protestants – and it is difficult to improve on this picture directly.73 One 
important difference is the relative absence of Jewish volunteers among the 
Scots, with Alec Marcovitch and Charles Hyman the only confirmed Jews to 
volunteer from Scotland.74 This is in stark contrast to estimates for Britain as a 
whole, which range from a minimum of 60-80 to as many as twenty percent of 
                                                        
70 ‘Liste de camarades anglais parlant plusieurs langues’, 16 January 1938, RGASPI, 
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all volunteers.75 This in turn likely reflects differing contexts of anti-fascist 
mobilisation, with few British Union of Fascists (BUF) campaigns against 
Scottish Jewish communities, unlike in Manchester and London’s East End.76 
This meant that while Scottish Jews were naturally still likely to oppose fascism, 
community connections with the Communist Party were less well developed, 
and volunteering for Spain a less obvious extension of earlier anti-fascist 
campaigns.77 
By reputation, Irish Catholics were prominent in the Scottish Communist Party, 
particularly in Glasgow. One observer, David Murray, referred to Scottish ‘CPers’ 
as ‘a pack of Irish not very ex-Papists.’78 Less pejoratively, Chris Smith recalled 
that 75 percent of the Scottish Communist Party were Catholic, although this 
likely reflected his immediate circles in and around Glasgow rather than the 
Party throughout Scotland.79 Such remarks, along with the relative frequency of 
common Irish names such as ‘Kelly’ or ‘Kennedy’, indicate that many volunteers 
likely had a Catholic background. Several such volunteers were listed as being 
born in Ireland in various sources, or can be traced in the census as having at 
least one Irish parent.80 However, even the census is little help in establishing 
broader patterns, in part due to the difficulty of tracing most volunteers, but 
also as the 1911 census is the most recent currently available. Not only does this 
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exclude many younger volunteers, it also means that those yet to migrate to 
Scotland do not appear. Other direct references to individuals’ religion, past or 
present, are too rare to establish any sort of proportionality – those such as 
James Cassidy who were specifically referred to as Catholic were a tiny 
minority.81  
Similarly, observations about marital status were too infrequent to establish a 
full picture. Despite recruiters’ stated preference for single men without 
dependants, this was often ignored.82 Would-be volunteers could also deceive 
recruiters by initially claiming to have no dependants, only to later ask for 
financial support, as suggested in one missive written by Peter Kerrigan. 
Here is another dependants claim, and, as usual, from Scotland. L. Inglis 
75 Florence Street Glasgow C5. Wife and two children. The argument or 
excuse put up by these lads is that they understood they would be 
rejected if they had dependants.83 
Kerrigan’s words indicate that this was a particularly Scottish problem, perhaps 
due to added emphasis placed on seeking single recruits in this district. 
However, there is little specific evidence suggesting that Scots were more or less 
likely to be married than the norm. Overall, at its peak the International Brigade 
Wounded and Dependants’ Committee were supporting the families of some 
1,100 British volunteers, although not all of these were necessarily wives and 
children, with provision also available for elderly parents.84  
Surprisingly, perhaps the best sample of volunteers’ religious beliefs and 
marital status comes not from British or International Brigade records, but from 
the Spanish Nationalists. Some prisoners of war were subjected to detailed 
physical and psychological examination by the Spanish psychiatrist Antonio 
Vallejo Nágera. Despite the suspicion with which Vallejo Nágera’s 
pseudoscience must be treated, many of the observations made about basic 
attributes such as age, occupation and class do correspond relatively closely to 
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other sources, suggesting that the material was not fabricated out of hand.85 
Other information, such as their religious background and marital status of the 
volunteers, goes well beyond what is available in other sources, and these 
results are summarised in Table 1.4. 
While these figures cover all of Britain and cannot be broken down by region, 
their detail and internal consistency is a useful step towards an overview of the 
volunteers’ personal lives. Two-thirds did not have children, and less than a 
quarter had ever been married. Despite the supposed prominence of Catholics 
within the Communist Party, it is clear that this can be overstated, although 
hidden regional variation likely obscures a greater Catholic presence among 
volunteers from cities such as Glasgow and Liverpool. It is possible that 
reconciling active Catholicism with socialism or anti-fascism was considerably 
more difficult than for Protestants. Although Protestants often professed to 
retain their religion, the author made it clear in the commentary that despite 
such claims, further investigation established that ‘en su inmensa mayoría son 
indiferentes religiosos y mucho de ellos ateos.’86 However, such judgements need 
to be treated sceptically, especially as Vallejo Nágera’s key thesis was that ‘la 
irreligiosidad’ was a major cause of Marxist tendencies.87 
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Religion Total Percent  Marital Status Total Percent 
Catholic 12 29.3 Widowed with 
children 
1 2.4 
Retain their beliefs and 
practice 
2 4.6 Married with 
children 
6 14.6 
Retain their beliefs and 
don’t practice 





1 2.4 Single, cohabiting 1 2.4 
Converted to Catholicism 
and practice 




Lost their beliefs 3 7.3 Single, abstinent 1 2.4 
      
Protestant 17 41.4    
Retain their beliefs and 
practice 
12 29.2    
Retain their beliefs and 
don’t practice 
4 9.7    
Converted to Catholicism 1 2.4    
      
Atheist 12 29.3    
No family religion 3 7.3    
Protestant family religion 9 21.9    
      
Total 41   41  




Thus far, while a demographic analysis has identified trends and offered a basis 
for comparison with other nationalities, it has done relatively little to narrow 
the scope of the enquiry. No precise commonalities have emerged across the 
categories examined. However, the geographical distribution of volunteers’ 
origins offers considerably more scope for such clustering to emerge. It is well 
established that British International Brigade volunteers tended to come from 
urban industrial centres. Baxell offers a regional breakdown of where 
volunteers came from, showing notable concentrations in the industrial regions 
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where the Communist Party had made the most significant inroads, namely 
Wales, North-West England, Scotland and the South-East, with particular urban 
concentrations in Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow and London.89 However, 
there are two major limitations in Baxell’s analysis. The first is that while a 
regional analysis is helpful, it remains a very broad measure of where 
volunteers came from. The approximately 370 volunteers from North-West 
England, for example, came from a relatively large population even once age, 
class and occupation are taken into account.90 If clustering occurred on a more 
local level, it might reveal much more about who precisely the volunteers were. 
Second, although regions with higher numbers of volunteers tended to be the 
main Communist Party strongholds in Britain, measuring and understanding 
Party strength and its influence on recruitment is not straightforward. 
Determining volunteers’ precise point of origin is often problematic. Many 
addresses provided on enlistment were for next of kin. Furthermore, there is no 
single authoritative list of such addresses, and information here was compiled 
from many individual sources across multiple archives – sources that are 
sometimes conflicting. In order to maintain consistency while incorporating as 
broad a source base as possible, a hierarchy of evidence has been established 
that prioritises certain measures over others, based on the specific needs of this 
study. As noted above, a key criterion by which volunteers were judged to be 
Scottish was the extent to which they were exposed to Scottish political cultures 
prior to Spain, and this criterion continues to be important in judging a 
volunteers’ point of origin. As such, wherever possible the point of origin has 
been determined as being the locale where an individual’s political life took 
place – their membership of a particular political party or trade union branch, 
for example. If this information is unavailable, it is judged based on a home 
address provided in contemporary sources. If these are unavailable, locations 
mentioned in testimony, reports or letters, or listed in material compiled later 
are accepted. Finally, in the few cases for which no other information is 
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available, their birthplace or next of kin is accepted as the best possible 
approximation.  
It is immediately apparent that the Scottish volunteers came from very specific 
places. 438, or just over 84 percent, came from places that saw at least five 
individuals go to Spain. In other words, most who chose to go to Spain lived in 
close proximity to others who made the same decision. In fact, many among the 
other sixteen percent still lived in close proximity to other volunteers. In Fife 
and Lanarkshire, the two areas with the highest proportion outside these 
clusters, the sample is fractured by the prominence of volunteers from smaller 
villages – typically mining villages – in close proximity to each other or to 
neighbouring towns. Furthermore, even for the smallest clusters such as 
Prestonpans in East Lothian, there is evidence that volunteers knew each 
other.91 In very few cases was the choice made in complete isolation from other 
volunteers.  
The exact places these clusters occurred are also significant. The distribution 
among Scotland’s major urban centres reflects the nature of their economies, 
with heavily industrialised Glasgow and Dundee home to nearly half of the 
Scottish volunteers, with proportionally smaller numbers coming from 
Edinburgh and Aberdeen. Other Clydeside industrial towns are similarly 
prominent, albeit on a smaller scale. The Scottish coalfields are also well 
represented, with clusters among mining communities in Fife, Lanarkshire and 
to a lesser extent East and West Lothian. As noted above, however, Scottish 
miners did not participate on the same scale as those from South Wales and did 
not come from a single mining region. The patterns of clustering correspond 
well to the volunteers’ occupational data, concentrated in locales with 
economies dominated by industry, transportation and manual labour.  
 
  
                                                        













Vale Of Leven 15 
Other 4 




























Total Other 40 
Total Scotland 520 
Table 1.5: Scottish volunteers’ point of origin.92 
Glasgow is the most notable single cluster, providing the point of origin for 
almost two-fifths of the Scottish contingent. However, Glasgow’s status as 
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Scotland’s largest city at the time means that this is to some extent expected, 
and does relatively little to narrow down exactly who the volunteers were. Yet 
the Glaswegian volunteers came from very specific places within the city. 
Location (within Glasgow) Total Percent of known total 
Anderston 5 2.9 
Bridgeton 16 9.4 
Central 9 5.3 
Dennistoun 5 2.9 
Gorbals 23 13.5 
Govan 14 8.2 
Maryhill 16 9.4 
Possilpark 9 5.3 
Shettleston 11 6.4 
Springburn 19 11.1 
Townhead 18 10.5 
Other known districts 26 15.2 
Total known 171 100 
Unknown 28 - 
Total 199 - 
Table 1.6: Point of origin of Glaswegian volunteers.93 
Discounting the 28 volunteers for whom Glasgow is the most precise 
approximation available, the proportion who came from a neighbourhood with 
five volunteers – just under 85 percent – is almost identical to the same 
measure applied to the whole of Scotland. Over 60 percent came from the six 
densest suburban clusters alone. As was the case with the previous table, this 
likely underestimates the Glaswegian volunteers’ close proximity to each 
another – Glaswegians’ high mobility within the city meant that individuals 
could develop connections outwith their place of residence or work. The specific 
districts acting as hubs of volunteering are also significant. These areas are 
among the most deprived in Glasgow, often home to recent immigrants, most 
frequently from Ireland. The structural downturn in heavy industry and the 
reduced demand for manual and industrial labour had hit these areas the 
hardest, resulting in extremely high unemployment rates in the years prior to 
the Spanish Civil War.94 The combination of low-skilled populations, structural 
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unemployment and, in some cases, Irish Catholicism represented three 
elements that link the effectiveness of communist campaigning and recruitment 
in interwar Scotland.95 
The picture presented thus far by the various measures of demographic data 
available indicates that patterns of volunteering were shaped considerably by 
the industrial geography of Scotland and by associated socioeconomic trends 
such as migration. That immediate geographical proximity was such a universal 
commonality for Scottish volunteers suggests this physical closeness was also 
accompanied by direct personal ties between individuals. However, even with 
the relatively complete picture available of who the volunteers were in a 
demographic sense, solid connections among volunteers are still generally 
absent in the data examined so far. There are some exceptions – Robert Milton 
and George Gowans, for instance, were the same age and belonged to the same 
trade union branch in Ayrshire.96 The two volunteers from Peterhead, George 
Eddie and James Buchan, were both seamen in their mid-late thirties.97 At least 
nine Dundonians had some connection to the textile trade, through either stated 
occupation or union membership. Many mining areas showed connections in 
terms of occupation and union membership, notably in Bellshill, Bathgate, 
Prestonpans and many places throughout Fife. However, these specific 
intersections of occupation and geography remain very much the exception 
rather than the rule. If there were, as the clustering suggests, direct connections 
between individual volunteers from the same place, these connections were not 




Any analysis of the Scottish volunteers’ political affiliation begins with the 
Communist Party. It was an open secret that the CPGB was the driving force 
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behind recruitment for the International Brigades in Britain, and volunteers 
could not help but be aware that the Party continued to exert control and 
influence over the British contingent during their service.98 Most estimates 
claim that Communist Party members made up over 60 percent of the 
International Brigades.99 However, efforts were made to recruit from other 
parties, especially the Labour Party, for which Baxell counted some 110 
members in Spain out of a sample of 1,489 volunteers.100  
Political Affiliation Number in Spain (from 520) 
CPGB 238 
Young Communist League (YCL) 54 
Labour Party 20 
Independent Labour Party (ILP) 1 
NUWM 105 
Left Book Club (LBC) 1 
Other 5 
No affiliation found (including 29 trade union 
members) 
177 
Table 1.7: Political Affiliations of Scottish volunteers prior to enlistment.101 
At first glance, the Scottish contingent conforms to Baxell’s observations. Taking 
the CPGB and YCL together, some 56 percent of Scots were Party members – 
slightly under the estimate for Britain as a whole. This figure may be an 
underestimate. Baxell, for instance, claims that Party members tended to keep 
their affiliation to themselves, partly to avoid repercussions in the event of 
capture but also to preserve the appearance of a united front.102 However, while 
this may have been true in day-to-day interactions between volunteers, it was 
not true from an administrative perspective, and considerable effort was 
expended keeping track of and evaluating Party members in the British 
Battalion.103 While there is no definitive list of all Party members, given the 
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plethora of places in which membership was a category of administrative 
interest, not to mention external observation from interested agencies such as 
the Security Service, it is unlikely that many individuals were Party members 
and did not appear listed in at least one record. As such, it is doubtful that this 
approximation for Scottish Party members is a significant underestimate. 
However, this conclusion does not hold for other categories, as there was never 
such consistent interest in recording them. As such, the figure of 177 without 
any official political affiliations is likely to be somewhat lower in reality. 
The smaller political groupings are also noteworthy. On initial appearances, the 
number of Labour Party members is roughly in proportion with Baxell’s total. 
However, in Scotland this diversity proved largely illusory. Although twenty 
volunteers indicated some attachment to the Labour Party or local affiliate, at 
least eight of these were also members of the Communist Party or a front 
organisation such as the NUWM. The Party also had substantial direct influence 
within the Labour Party, with many potential CPGB recruits believing that ‘even 
if you agree with the Communist Party and its basic aims that you can render 
better service to the Party by remaining in the Labour Party.’104 By 1939 there 
were some 1,500 ‘concealed’ CPGB members in organisations such as the 
Labour Party that maintained a policy of refusing membership to 
Communists.105 These practices means that the presence of Labour Party 
members indicates less ideological diversity among the volunteers than might 
be assumed. 
The lack of ILP members – despite Glasgow representing their major stronghold 
at the time – also speaks to the extent that ideological positions were relatively 
homogenous among the Scottish volunteers.106 The absence of LBC members is 
also telling. While the LBC had substantial membership in Scotland – and was 
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noted to be growing quickly in Glasgow by 1937 – it primarily catered for a 
middle-class readership rather than the working-class communities from which 
volunteers came.107 However, as LBC membership was never a matter of 
administrative interest in Spain this figure may be underreported. Finally, very 
much in the ‘Other’ category, Robert Grierson of Dumfries had actually belonged 
to the BUF, an affiliation that naturally excited considerable suspicion in Spain. 
However, even the most zealous Stalinists were forced to conclude that he was 
‘mostly harmless’, before his death in March 1938 rendered him no political 
threat whatsoever.108 
When individuals joined the Communist Party is also important. While such 
detailed biographical information is not available for the majority of Party 
members, it is available for those who joined the Spanish Communist Party 
(PCE). Applicants filled out a ‘Biografia de Militantes’, detailing their personal, 
social and political histories. Some 47 Scottish Party Members, and three active 
non-members, completed these declarations. Of these, 60 percent had joined the 
Party prior to 1935 and the adoption of the Popular Front line, even though at 
most 40 percent of the Party’s members in 1938 had joined prior to this date.109 
This disproportionate favouring of longstanding members is unsurprising, as 
such individuals were more experienced and had had more opportunity to earn 
the Party’s trust and favour. As noted in other studies of national Communist 
Parties, the turbulent ‘Class against Class’ period resulted in the development of 
a core membership characterised by their discipline and relatively 
unconditional acceptance of the Party line.110 Although the Communist Party 
had begun a successful period of expansion after 1935, these figures indicate a 
qualitative difference in the Party’s new recruits. They were perhaps less 
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doctrinaire and uncritically accepting of the Party, shaped as much by their anti-
fascism as by their embrace of Bolshevism and, as a result, may have been less 
trusted by the Communist Party leadership.  
These biographies also give a qualitative insight into the Scottish contingent 
more broadly. Membership of the PCE is a useful proxy for understanding the 
spectrum of political loyalties in Spain. Admittance to the Spanish Party was an 
honour reserved for those who had a good record in Spain and had 
demonstrated their political dedication, making this group a political ‘elite’ 
among the British.111 It was a voluntary act of commitment to the Party – those 
who had started to harbour doubts or had lost interest in politics in Spain were 
unlikely to either apply or be accepted – making this group the best 
approximation of the ‘Party faithful’ among the Scots. Given that almost all 
applications dated from April 1938 or later, this points to this group making up 
a quarter of the approximately 220 Scots who served in the British Battalion in 
this period. Given that over a similar period approximately one-sixth of British 
volunteers were classified as ‘bad’ by Party leaders, this indicates that between 
a core of committed communists and somewhat smaller group of disaffected, 
dissenting or criminal individuals, a majority were not doctrinaire communists 
but did retain some attachment to the Party or its principles throughout their 
service.  
To understand this middle ground, which covered a spectrum of political 
attachment or attraction to communism, it is necessary to appreciate 
membership numbers as just one facet of the CPGB’s presence in Scotland. The 
period from 1935 onwards was generally characterised by expansion, thanks to 
the aforementioned Popular Front policy and the impetus sparked by the rise of 
fascism in Europe, including the Spanish Civil War itself.112 During the main 
period of recruitment for the International Brigades from December 1936 to 
                                                        
111 Baxell, Unlikely Warriors, 351. 
112 Andrew Thorpe, ‘The Membership of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1920-1945’, The 
Historical Journal 43:3 (2000), 793–5. 
68 
 
May 1938, Party membership in Scotland grew from 1,800 to nearly 3,000.113 
However, this expansion masked a great deal of fluidity in individual and 
regional experiences before and during the conflict.114 Many drifted in and out 
of the party during the 1930s, often finding themselves unable to afford 
membership dues during periods of unemployment.115 In 1939, fourteen 
percent of Scotland’s members were known to be in arrears with their dues, 
which was noted to actually represent ‘a definite improvement.’116 Failure to 
pay membership fees was just one way in which individuals might leave and 
return to the Party. Disagreement about ideological stances, personality clashes 
or migration could all act to interrupt membership. Many, such as Glaswegian 
William Hunter, had previously been expelled from the Party, or, like George 
McDermott, had let their membership lapse. At least 25 Scots – almost ten 
percent of the CPGB total – fell into these categories. Given the lack of detailed 
knowledge regarding many volunteers’ personal histories, the actual number is 
likely higher. For many individuals, their relationship to the CPGB was liminal – 
integrated into its orbit, but not with full or permanent membership of the Party 
itself.117 
Relying on membership numbers to explain recruitment patterns also disguises 
the extent to which the Communist Party influence actually mattered in a local 
sense. Membership strength alone was rarely a completely accurate predictor of 
how many volunteers a district could recruit. At the Party Conference in May 
1937, it was noted that London had more than twice as many members as 
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Scotland.118 Estimates of the number of Londoners in Spain, however, range 
from 520 to just 350, with a lower estimate probable as many volunteers used 
London ‘care of’ addresses when they signed up for Spain.119 Even the upper 
range of this estimate, however, shows that as many Londoners went to Spain 
as Scots, despite London having a considerably larger CPGB membership base. 
While there is clearly some connection between Party membership and 
recruitment, such mismatches indicate that this connection is more complex 
than simple arithmetic. Influence might also be measured through the numbers 
who attended Communist rallies, showed up to Party social activities or who 
gave money to their causes.  
There are numerous examples within Scotland where membership figures do 
not tell the full story. In Glasgow, membership was noted to be ‘far from 
commensurate with Party’s influence and prestige.’120 The CPGB‘s only MP at 
the time was elected in West Fife, and thousands of Fife miners had been 
members of the Communist-controlled United Mineworkers of Scotland.121 Yet 
in September 1936, the Fife District of the Communist Party had just 232 
members. This was partly due to the blacklisting of CPGB members by the 
official mining union and pit owners, meaning that most Fife communists faced 
unemployment.122 Similarly, the Vale of Leven had only 47 Party members in 
July 1937, yet was singled out by Stuart Macintyre as being an archetypical 
‘Little Moscow’, where the CPGB enjoyed unusual local social and political 
clout.123 Clearly, the Party could count on influence beyond the relatively limited 
circles implied by its membership figures in these locales. Opposite examples 
can also be given: Kilmarnock had one of the largest concentrations of Party 
members in Western Scotland, with 72 members in July 1937, higher than 
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comparable nearby towns such as Greenock (34), Paisley (38) or Clydebank 
(62).124 Yet no International Brigade volunteers were recruited from 
Kilmarnock, indicating limitations when it came to mobilising this membership 
base. Such examples indicate the need to appreciation communist strength in 
terms of influence rather than membership – and just as importantly, how 
effectively this influence could be translated into mobilisation, especially as the 
call to arms reached beyond the inner core of the Party faithful. 
The qualitative variation in different types of Communist Party influence is 
reflected in the absence of significant clustering along union membership lines 
noted above. This is unlikely to be a matter of poor record keeping, as the Party 
had every motive to collect this information, as it was perceived as useful 
leverage when negotiating with the official labour movement.125 More likely, 
this reflected structural factors pertaining to how the Communist Party 
operated within the official labour movement. Facing pressure from the national 
leadership, many unions operated some form of anti-communist discrimination. 
Although these measures’ actual effectiveness tended to vary, and did not 
altogether prevent communist penetration and influence, they did preclude the 
sort of community building that could take place around the Party branch 
system.126 In Glasgow, it was noted that the Party had failed to ‘draw active 
Trade Unionists into Branch meetings and Branch life’ and despite many 
individuals’ success in achieving positions of influence in local trade unions, 
there were ‘active and influential Trade Union comrades’ who over ‘a period of 
years, have failed to recruit a single new member.’127 As such, while the 
Communist Party clearly had significant influence in the Glasgow Trades 
Council – they claimed to ‘have 60 delegates and a majority on the E[xecutive] 
C[ommittee]’ – it was not a sphere for active Party building.128 While the labour 
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movement remained a key theatre of activity for the Party, success was 
achieved through the placement and promotion of key individuals, not creating 
and sustaining communities that could provide a solid basis for recruitment for 
either the International Brigades or the Party itself. 
Even without considering broader definitions of ‘influence’, the number of 
Scottish Communist Party members who volunteered for Spain represents a 
considerable proportion of the Party’s strength. Based on membership figures 
from September 1937 adjusted only for gender, nearly fifteen percent of 
Scottish communists fought in Spain, including nearly twenty percent of the 
Dundee membership, eighteen percent in Glasgow and over a quarter in 
Greenock.129 These are likely slight overestimates, as the total includes some 
volunteers who joined the Communist Party after September 1937. Yet even 
using the membership figures from mid-1938 – some 3,070 including 
approximately 500 women – there is no doubt that well over ten percent of all 
male Scottish communists fought in Spain, even before accounting for age or 
fitness.130 This indicates that the CPGB and its local presence are central to 
explaining recruitment for the International Brigades, in contrast to prior 
accounts’ characterisation of volunteering as a product of a broad ideological 
spectrum, or considering communist volunteers to make up just a ‘small 
proportion of the total membership of the CPGB.’131 While a minority, it was 




The Scottish volunteers’ demographic profile shows that volunteers shared 
important commonalities in terms of class, locality and political beliefs, while 
remaining disparate in terms of occupation, age and status within the official 
labour movement. The commonalities strongly indicate that the volunteers 
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tended to have pre-existing relationships with other volunteers, defined along 
specific axes. If such personal connections between volunteers were not 
typically formed in the workplace, or within the official labour movement, then 
there are two other likely possibilities. The first is through involvement in 
political parties and activism. The second is that the connections formed socially 
– through family, friendships, being members of the same clubs or even 
drinking at the same pubs. However, in Scotland any such separation of social 
and political factors is misleading. Rather, the success of radical political parties 
in Scotland in the interwar period lay in their ability to foster community and 
social activity alongside political activism, particularly at the local branch level. 
This was thanks to a history of political organisation in Scotland which 
emphasised grassroots organisation, local branch autonomy and community 
development ahead of hierarchical leadership with power invested in the upper 
echelons of a party.132 In particular, the ILP had done a great deal to encourage 
the conflation of social and political activity in many places throughout the 
country, most notably in Glasgow.133 It is within the resulting social-political 
sphere that potential personal connections between Scottish volunteers become 
generally apparent. Discussion of these connections, and their influence on the 
recruitment process, is taken up in the following chapter. 
The political affiliations of volunteers point towards most such social-political 
connections being defined around the Communist Party. The comparatively 
massive proportion of Scottish communists that went to Spain indicates that it 
was near impossible that their decision was made in isolation from their 
community. Going to Spain was not a theoretical prospect, but a decision being 
made or considered by their friends, families and colleagues. As such, a key 
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factor in explaining the effectiveness of Scottish recruitment for the 
International Brigades was the Communist Party’s strength, defined not simply 
by membership figures but their tactics, influence and ability to attract and 
develop those who were particularly predisposed towards volunteering. This 
points to the necessity of understanding communist ‘influence’ as having 
qualitative differences in different places. The Party could develope intellectual 
influence through initiatives such as the LBC, or organisational influence 
through infiltrating the labour movement and winning over key figures, but 
these were not spaces that greatly facilitated the mobilisation of volunteers. 
Rather, mobilisation – for Spain or other direct, sustained activism – required 
influence to be built around a community. The connections between volunteers 
indicate the ways and places in which the communists were successful in 
developing this sort of influence, with their success in Scotland being based on 
locality rather than industry or the labour movement.  
The extent that communist influence transcended their membership base in 
Scotland allows for a different understanding of who the Scottish International 
Brigaders were. Instead of a rigid differentiation between ‘communists’ and 
‘non-communists’, such an explanation posits that the vast majority of 
volunteers were part of a broader social-political web, the core of which was 
made up of Party members but the influence of which spread considerably 
further. The 177 volunteers for whom no political affiliation could be discerned 
should not, therefore, be regarded as neutral, or disassociated from the 
communist political sphere. The next chapter explores the basis for Communist 
Party influence in Scotland in greater depth, and the importance of integration 
into such networks for non-communists. It suffices to note here that successful 
recruitment for the International Brigades in Scotland was achieved not just 
through a relatively strong membership base, but also the influence the Party 
had been able to build by leveraging broader political and community identities. 
This in turn implies that the Scottish contribution to the International Brigades 
was not a product of the broader left as it has often been portrayed in Scotland 
or elsewhere – rather, it was almost exclusively a Communist Party 
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enterprise.134 This should not be seen as reinforcing traditional narratives of the 
communist-led ‘Good Fight’ in Spain – rather, it indicates the CPGB’s failure to 
establish the International Brigades as an embodiment of the hoped-for united 
front. 
This lack of diversity has important implications. In terms of political beliefs, 
and potentially also socially, the concentration of Scottish volunteering within 
relatively sharply-defined, small political communities makes for an interesting 
comparison with non-British cases. The concentration of volunteers from New 
York, in the American case, or Vancouver in the Canadian, points to a similar 
pattern of recruitment among established communities defined along axes of 
politics, class and geography.135  The French – by far the most numerous 
contingent, with approximately 10,000 volunteers – provide a further 
example.136 At first glance, these figures do not resemble the Scottish experience 
of intensive recruitment among a defined support base – the French Communist 
Party had won almost 15% of the vote in 1936, and by 1937 counted some 
300,000 members. However, as Remi Skoutelsky has shown, this was a recent 
phenomenon, with membership growing tenfold since 1933. Yet almost half of 
the French volunteers in Spain had been Communists prior to this expansion.137 
Seen in this light, the recruitment of thousands of volunteers among the core of 
30,000 ‘old guard’ French communists represents a mobilisation on a similar 
scale as Scotland.  
This finding is of broader interest for studies of transnational foreign fighters. 
Such fighters are often seen as scattered individuals, with perceived potential 
recruits vastly outnumbering the number of individuals who actually decide to 
volunteer. This is the outcome of treating recruitment as a process that takes 
                                                        
134 The view of the International Brigades as embodying an ideologically-diverse united front 
continues to inform political and historical understandings, e.g. Paul Corthorn, ‘Cold War Politics 
and the Contested Legacy of the Spanish Civil War, European History Quarterly 44:4 (2014), 
691–2. See also Gray, Homage, 35; Baxell, British Volunteers, 15. 
135 Justin Byrne, ‘From Brooklyn to Belchite’ in Carroll (ed.), Facing Fascism: New York and the 
Spanish Civil War (New York, 2007), 72–82; Petrou, Renegades, 20. 
136 Remi Skoutelsky, Novedad en el frente (Madrid, 2006), 169–70. 
137 Skoutelsky, Novedad, 181–2. 
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place among a broader general population. As seen here, the Scottish 
International Brigade volunteers should not be seen as a tiny minority of the 
Scottish population, or even Scots who supported the Spanish Republic. Rather, 
they need to be appreciated as a substantial mobilisation of a very specific, 
small community. By more carefully appreciating who makes up the bulk of 
volunteers and searching for connections between them, it may be possible to 
re-evaluate the recruitment of foreign fighters in other conflicts as the large-








Chapter Two: Decisions 
 
 
The decision to fight in the Spanish Civil War has long fascinated historians, and 
with good reason. The foreign volunteers’ motives appear distinct from the 
usual pressures to take up arms – the International Brigades were not 
defending their homes and families, they did not stand to gain financially nor 
did they owe Republican Spain any personal loyalty. Eighty years later, it seems 
almost completely irrational, harkening back to a noble, almost chivalric ideal of 
risking one’s life for the sake of purely-held beliefs. It is these beliefs, therefore, 
which have dominated scholarly discussion of their decisions to volunteer.1 
Even accounts that propose other, less flattering motivations, such as 
adventure, profit or unemployment, still acknowledge the importance of 
ideological belief.2 Stronger accusations, such as volunteers being ‘tricked’ 
through promises of jobs in Spain, have rarely been given credence in scholarly 
discussion.3 This is understandable – the volunteers were defined by their 
collective anti-fascism more than anything else, and their belief in the need to 
combat fascism offers a seemingly straightforward explanation of why they 
chose to go to Spain.  
Yet relying on ideological belief to explain the phenomenon does not do justice 
to the question. As much as anti-fascism was a unifying cause, the precise 
meanings of anti-fascism differed from volunteer to volunteer – in the words of 
Tom Buchanan, ‘it is easier to define what the volunteers were fighting against 
                                                        
1 Richard Baxell, British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (London, 2004), 25–46; James 
Hopkins, Into the Heart of the Fire (Stanford, 1998), 42–57. For Scotland, see Daniel Gray, 
Homage to Caledonia (Edinburgh, 2008), 23–36. 
2 Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge, 1997), 127; Hugh Thomas, The 
Spanish Civil War (London, 1990), 454–5; Elizabeth Roberts, ‘Freedom, Faction, Fame and Blood’: 
British Soldiers of Conscience in Greece, Spain and Finland (Brighton, 2010), 202.  
3 Richard Baxell vehemently denies this, claiming to be working against a conservative historical 
consensus. Yet it is telling that primary material from right-wing tabloids is cited rather than 
historians. Baxell, British Volunteers, 27–30. In another case, Baxell’s evidence comes from the 
online comments section of an article in the Spectator. Richard Baxell, ‘Myths of the 
International Brigades’, Bulletin of Spanish Studies 91:1–2 (2014), 23.  
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than what they were fighting for.’4 Emerging transnational studies of anti-
fascism have emphasised the ‘multiple meanings of anti-fascism as a concept.’5 
At the very least, this demonstrates a need to consider ideological motivation 
beyond the oppositional, and link it more closely with the specific decision to 
volunteer. Moreover, relying on ideology to explain volunteering does little to 
explain the International Brigades’ uniqueness: the world was home to far more 
than 35,000 anti-fascists, so why did a specific minority go to Spain? More 
broadly, strong ideological principles were hardly unique to the late 1930s, so 
why was Spain so particularly attractive for foreign fighters? The first section of 
this chapter examines the role of ideology in motivating enlistment, looking at 
what these beliefs entailed and how they were articulated. Rather than being 
motivated purely by opposition to fascism, it is argued that volunteers 
developed and expressed ideas about reshaping Spanish society, and this in turn 
helps explain why Spain’s particular attraction for those that volunteered.  
Insofar as ideological explanations of motivation have been challenged, it has 
been through attempts to appreciate a broader spectrum of push and pull 
factors at play in individual decisions to enlist. This approach has been 
pioneered by historians such as Nir Arielli and Helen Graham, who seek to 
portray the decision as the function of complex personal motivations and 
contexts, of which ideology is but one facet.6 These contributions have been 
fruitful, not least by opening up discussion on neglected dimensions such as 
recruitment networks and emphasising the complexity of the decision.7 
However, these approaches remain problematic, partly because they often focus 
                                                        
4 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 127–8. 
5 Hugo García, ‘Transnational History: A New Paradigm for Anti-Fascist Studies?’ Contemporary 
European History 25:4 (2016), 571. 
6 Nir Arielli, ‘Induced to Volunteer? The Predicament of Jewish Communists in Palestine and the 
Spanish Civil War’, Journal of Contemporary History 46:4 (2011), 844–70; Helen Graham, The 
War and its Shadow: Spain’s Civil War in Europe’s Long Twentieth Century (Brighton, 2012), 75–
8. This approach has proven influential in newer literature, see Gerben Zaagsma, Jewish 
Volunteers, the International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War (London, 2017), 19–20; Tom 
Buchanan, ‘Ideology, Idealism, and Adventure: Narratives of the British Volunteers in the 
International Brigades’, Labour History Review 81:2 (2016), 123-40. 
7 Nir Arielli, ‘Getting There: Enlistment Considerations and the Recruitment Networks of the 
International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War’ in Arielli and Collins (ed.), Transnational 
Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era (Basingstoke, 2012), 219–30. 
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on a transnational elite for whom we have enough information to understand 
specific push and pull factors. More fundamentally, it implicitly abandons any 
attempt to understand what made the International Brigades such a unique 
phenomenon – that is, not only how individuals made the decision, but why so 
many did. As with earlier approaches, there remains an assumption that 
ideology is the only way the volunteers were connected. This has gone 
unchallenged thanks to the International Brigade volunteers appearing 
scattered and disparate, a small number when considered as part of a general 
population. Yet as the previous chapter has shown, the volunteers can also be 
seen as a relatively cohesive grouping within a much smaller politically- and 
geographically-defined population. By considering the volunteering 
phenomenon as more than just an internalised, individual choice, 
understandings of what motivated enlistment for Spain come into line with 
existing explanations of voluntary recruitment. In particular, by examining the 
role of community expectations, peer pressure and social standing, it is possible 
to appreciate not just why volunteering was an attractive response to the 
Spanish Civil War, but also why Scotland proved such an effective recruiting 
ground.  
The findings in Chapter One strongly suggest that the Scottish International 
Brigade volunteers could be mobilised on a large scale thanks to the Communist 
Party’s particular strength in Scotland, and the Party played a central role in 
terms of both leadership and providing many rank-and-file recruits. In itself, 
however, the confluence of volunteers around locality and party does not suffice 
to explain why this necessarily led to successful recruitment, and why these 
methods worked so particularly well in Scotland. Little about the recruitment 
process is well documented. Most public calls were vague, skirting potential 
illegalities by avoiding specifics and merely expressing that it was desirable for 
British volunteers to go to Spain.8 Due to this legal ambiguity, there could be no 
‘official’ recruitment campaign, and little was committed to paper regarding 
                                                        
8 E.g. Bob Morrison, ‘How the British Communist Party and British Working Class are Helping 
the Spanish Workers’, 31 December 1936, RGASPI, 495/14/213/79–80. 
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how the CPGB went about it. As sources discussed throughout this chapter make 
clear, this decentralised campaign relied chiefly on word of mouth and appeals 
made by senior communists in person.9 Although this means little can be said 
about the process, the shape of the volunteering cohort can be readily 
understood as the outcome of such a decentralised, semi-secret recruitment 
campaign. The connections between volunteers described in the previous 
chapter are exactly what one might expect from a campaign that relied chiefly 
on existing political and social networks to spread. Other predictable outcomes 
– such as conflicting understandings of the terms of service among volunteers 
or varying physical and political standards – also became apparent during the 
British Battalion’s time in Spain.10 
This observation is confirmed in the second section, which examines how this 
decision to fight in Spain was made. It is argued that the Communist Party’s 
ability to mobilise communities around a common ideological understanding of 
the conflict underpinned their ability to recruit. Going to Spain became more 
than a way of fulfilling abstract beliefs – with others in their immediate circles 
contemplating or having already decided to fight, potential volunteers faced 
pressure to match their peers’ commitment to the common cause, and thereby 
cement their social and political standing. This focus on the role of group 
dynamics also helps explain why Scotland saw relatively strong recruitment for 
the International Brigades. The final section ties this success to Scotland itself. 
The CPGB presence in Scotland developed along particular lines, partly owing to 
strategy but also due to the context and environment they worked in. 
Communists were influenced by much older Scottish political traditions, which 
                                                        
9 One exception was a circular written by Socialist League leader H.N. Brailsford. This was 
unusually indiscrete, despite the letter noting that 'nothing must get into the press; it should be 
done by letter and word of mouth.' As noted in the margin of a CPGB copy, being so explicit 
made it ‘illegal’. Circular, 9 December 1936, RGASPI, 495/14/213/42.  
10 It may be tempting to construct some model of Scottish exceptionalism based on such 
differences. However, doing so means relying on Scots’ own judgements – like Alec Donaldson’s 
claims that Scotland was sending a ‘a good type of Comrade’ and it ‘takes a Scotsman to get 
things done.’ Donaldson to Kerrigan, 3 April 1938, MML, Box 50, File Dn/1. Non-Scots took 
different views. Bill Paynter, for instance, complained of ‘very bad types’ from Scotland, where 
‘it was known to the leading people that many of those who came from that District were 
uncontrollable.’ Paynter to Pollitt, 9 June 1937, MML, Box C, File 14/1. 
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encouraged and even necessitated that the Communist Party prioritised 
community-led approaches.11 It was this ongoing influence of Scottish socialist 
and radical cultures that inadvertently placed the CPGB in such a strong 




International Brigade volunteers’ ideological views have already received 
substantial historical attention, with most modern scholarship agreeing that the 
volunteers were motivated by anti-fascism. In a British context, Richard Baxell 
has convincingly argued that the vast majority of volunteers were anti-fascists, 
and describes the various ways that they had become anti-fascists.12 Yet the 
term ‘anti-fascist’ remains problematic. Communist Party opposition to fascism 
cannot be seen as solely conservative – communism hardly embraced pluralistic 
parliamentary democracy as either the means or end of their struggle.13 Yet 
even within the Communist Party, shifts in doctrine – notably towards the 
‘Popular Front’ – meant that different generations of Party members might have 
different ideas about what fighting under an anti-fascist banner actually 
meant.14 Moreover, this formulation allows little space for positive intent in 
going to Spain, with Baxell concluding that the variety of volunteers’ beliefs 
                                                        
11 This argument builds on a body of literature on Scottish radical and socialist cultures, notably 
Stuart Macintyre, Little Moscows (London, 1980); Alan McKinlay and R. Morris (eds.), The ILP on 
the Clydeside, 1893–1932 (Manchester, 1991); W. Hamish Fraser, Scottish Popular Politics: From 
Radicalism to Labour (Edinburgh, 2000); William Knox, Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and 
Society in Scotland, 1800-Present (Edinburgh, 1999); William Kenefick, Red Scotland! The Rise 
and Fall of the Radical Left, c. 1872 to 1932 (Edinburgh, 2007); Neil Rafeek, Communist Women in 
Scotland: Red Clydeside from the Russian Revolution to the end of the Soviet Union (London, 
2008). 
12 Baxell, British Volunteers, 25–46. For further analysis, see Josie McLennan, ‘“I Wanted to be a 
Little Lenin”: Ideology and the German International Brigade Volunteers’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 41:2 (2006), 287–304. 
13 Revolutionary political intent has been mooted in other contexts. Amirah Inglis, Australians in 
the Spanish Civil War (Sydney, 1987), 116–17; Fearghal McGarry, Irish Politics and the Spanish 
Civil War (Cork, 1999), 60-1. However, even British revisionist accounts avoid such questions. 
E.g. Robert Stradling, ‘English-speaking Units of the International Brigades: War, Politics and 
Discipline’, Journal of Contemporary History 45:4 (2010), 744–66. 
14 Baxell differentiates between ‘doctrinaire’ communists and those who saw communists as 
fascism’s most effective opponents. Baxell, ‘Myths’, 14.  
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beyond opposing fascism makes further analysis impossible.15 However, by 
adopting a different methodological approach utilising contemporary music, 
there are indications that Spain was attractive not just as a place to oppose 
fascism but also where volunteers could potentially realise their own vision of a 
socialist and democratic society.  
The use of music helps to address some major source limitations.16 Fearghal 
McGarry used revolutionary statements made prior to the Spanish Civil War to 
complicate communist assertions that they were merely defending 
democracy.17 While suggestive, such evidence does not necessarily prove that 
volunteers left with revolutionary intent, as it remains plausible that their 
understanding had genuinely changed along with the context. While oral 
histories avoid these problems, their use in this context has other issues. Most 
Scottish volunteer testimony follows the ‘recovery’ mould of oral history, in 
which the primary goal is to preserve voices that might otherwise escape the 
historical record rather than engage critically and actively with the narrative 
being told.18 Respondents were given free rein to tell their stories as they 
wished, and as such tended to emphasise narratives that portrayed their service 
in the most favourable light possible. As such, it is unsurprising that the 
motivations that resonated best in a post-war climate – such as the defence of 
democracy and the prevention of the Second World War – are most common.19 
When volunteers were questioned more closely, such as Garry McCartney being 
asked whether he thought volunteers expected to stay in Spain after a 
Republican victory, responses soon veered into different territory. 
I’m quite sure that a number of people possibly had that in mind, you 
know, because those people who did not have family ties for example, 
would no doubt have these ideas in mind in some respects and why not? 
                                                        
15 Baxell, British Volunteers, 30; Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 127–8. 
16 For discussion, see McLennan, ‘“I Wanted to be a Little Lenin”, 288–91. 
17 McGarry, Irish Politics, 61. 
18 Angela Bartie and Arthur McIvor, ‘Oral history in Scotland’, Scottish Historical Review 92 
(2013), 113–26. 
19 E.g. McCusker, McCartney and Murray in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 45, 
260, 324.  
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After all they were fighting for a cause and if successful, they would want 
to share in the joys of reconstructing what had been destroyed.20 
Even aside from questions of emphasis and focus, the meanings of volunteers’ 
ideological touchstones have shifted over time. In particular, a contemporary 
audience brings its own assumptions about ‘democracy’ that do not necessarily 
translate to this era. This is taken up by Tom Buchanan, who questioned ‘what 
kind of democracy anti-fascists were seeking to defend’ and ‘what type of 
democracy they were trying to create.’21 According to Buchanan, for Party 
leaders and theorists the Soviet Union represented ‘true democracy’, meaning 
that ‘defence of democracy’ entailed substantial and necessary changes to 
liberal parliamentary systems.22 A similar thread can be detected in oral 
testimony. Many linked their politicisation to their experiences of British 
capitalism during the interwar slump. For David Anderson, it was experiencing 
unemployment that convinced him ‘that there was something wrong with the 
system’, for George Watters, the reaction of the police and government to the 
miners’ strike of 1921 did the same.23 Hugh Sloan was more explicit in 
questioning whether France and Britain ‘had been truly democratic 
governments.’ For Sloan, the Soviet Union and by extension the Spanish 
Republic represented an ideal truer to his own vision of democracy, precisely 
because they opposed capitalism.24 Similar perspectives are evident in 
contemporary sources. In one survey, Party members were asked to identify 
their formative political influences. By far the most common responses were 
explicit or implicit critiques of British capitalism: working conditions, strikes, 
unemployment and social problems.25 Yet these surveys were rarely a space in 
                                                        
20 Garry McCartney, TLS, MS, Tape 168. 
21 Tom Buchanan, ‘Anti-fascism and Democracy in the 1930s’, European History Quarterly 32:1 
(2002), 40. See also Zaagsma, Jewish Volunteers, 65. For broader discussion of the evolving 
relationship between anti-fascism and democracy in the period, see Michael Seidman, 
Transatlantic Antifascisms: From the Spanish Civil War to the end of World War II (Cambridge, 
2017), esp. 9–51. 
22 Buchanan, ‘Antifascism and Democracy’, 53. 
23 Watters and Anderson in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 33, 89. 
24 Sloan in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 238–9. 
25 E.g. ‘Biografa de Militantes’ of William Moses, RGASPI, 545/6/204/98; Frank Webster, 
RGASPI, 545/6/213/7; James Cunningham, RGASPI, 545/6/121/39. 
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which volunteers explicitly tied their beliefs to their motivations in coming to 
Spain, and in oral testimony such discussion is secondary to more appealing 
narratives about preserving democracy and peace. Neither allows a complete 
appreciation of ideology’s role in the decision to volunteer. 
In light of these issues, volunteers’ music and song offers useful insight into 
their collective ideological beliefs. Wartime music is still an emerging approach 
for understanding soldiers’ views, perspectives and concerns, and although 
there has been longstanding interest in the literary and poetic compositions, 
their music has been neglected.26 Yet particularly in an age before mass visual 
media, the collective performance of and participation in singing served an 
important role in establishing and re-affirming group identity, alongside many 
other purposes.27 Songs are by their very nature performative, allowing the 
collective expression and celebration of identity, reinforcing communal 
appreciations and understandings in a natural and enjoyable manner.28 Their 
own compositions were often dense with meaning, with volunteers carefully 
writing their own lyrics to existing tunes. Moreover, by choosing whether to 
participate and help make a song popular, or by subverting a song’s intended 
meaning through parody or appropriation, singing offered a degree of 
individual and group agency in determining the volunteers’ collective self-
image.29 As such, song can offer an untapped avenue of insight into how the 
volunteers perceived the purpose of their fight in Spain, and the deeper 
meanings of their collective anti-fascism. 
                                                        
26 In Valentine Cunningham’s classic anthologies of civil war writing, for instance, poetry and 
prose dominate, with songs almost absent. Valentine Cunningham, The Penguin Book of Spanish 
Civil War Verse (London, 1980) and Spanish Front: Writers on the Civil War (Oxford, 1986). 
27 On the First World War, see Grahame Seal, ‘”We’re Here Because We’re Here”: Trench Culture 
of the Great War’, Folklore 124:2 (2013), 178–97. For American Civil War, see Christian 
McWhirter, Battle Hymns: The Power and Popularity of Music in the Civil War (Chapel Hill, 2012). 
For a theoretical overview of music and political expression, see John Street, ‘Rock, Pop and 
Politics’ in Frith, Straw and Street (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Pop and Rock 
(Cambridge, 2000), 240-9. 
28 McLennan, ‘“I Wanted to be a Little Lenin”, 301–2. 
29 E.g. Dunlop in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 146.  
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Moreover, songs and singing were essential to the experience of serving in the 
International Brigades.30 Many written records dealing with their music have 
survived, including several songbooks published by the International Brigades 
during the conflict.31 The act of publication itself indicates the degree of 
significance attached to these songs. The importance of songbooks could 
transcend the Brigades themselves: one such songbook was the subject of an 
official request from the German Condor Legion, who asked that Nationalist 
spies secure them a copy in Madrid.32 Interestingly, they were unable to comply, 
with their contact claiming that copies were not available for sale, having been 
printed only for internal distribution in the International Brigades.33 If true, this 
is further indication of the songbooks’ importance specifically for the volunteers 
themselves, an act of inward self-definition rather than externally-directed 
propaganda. Even unpublished songs were treated with some respect: many 
were written down and found their way into trench newspapers, others were 
specifically collected by the International Brigade administrators and preserved 
in their archive.34  
The obsession with songs was not merely an administrative peculiarity. 
Omnipresent singing litters volunteers’ recollections of Spain – ‘any time you 
went on the march you didn’t go without singing.’35 This was practical as much 
as enjoyable. Singing helped overcome language and national differences, an 
omnipresent concern in the International Brigades.36 For many volunteers, their 
first efforts at communication came on their arrival to Spain at the old fortress 
of Figueras, where each group used songs to proclaim their national and 
                                                        
30 On uses and meanings of such songs, see Joaquina Labajo, ‘La práctica de una memoria 
sostenible: El repertorio de las canciones internacionales de la Guerra Civil Española’, Arbor 
187:751 (2011), 847–56. 
31 A collection is found in RGASPI, 545/2/409–13. 
32 Oficina de la Legion Condor to SIM Jefatura, 20 September 1937, AGMA, C.2914,11, d.1. 
33 SIFNE to SIM Jefatura, 25 October 1937, AGMA, C.2914,11, d.5. 
34 E.g. ‘Notes, poems, song lyrics, slogans and drawings by 15th Brigade volunteers‘, RGASPI, 
545/3/473. 
35 Anderson in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 97. 
36 Kirschenbaum, International Communism, 95–8. 
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political identities.37 This pattern repeated whenever different linguistic groups 
came together, such as Burns Night in January 1937, featuring ‘Scottish, Irish 
and French songs’ alongside ‘two Dutchmen yodelling and playing 
concertinas.’38 One song in particular was used to overcome seemingly 
impossible interpersonal barriers: The Internationale. It used the same tune the 
world over, allowing every volunteer to sing together. When John Dunlop 
crossed the frontier, he remembered each nationality singing their own songs 
until, 
At last, somebody started up singing The Internationale, which of course 
we all knew, and we joined in. I find it extremely difficult to explain the 
feelings that swept through me when this singing of The Internationale 
started up. Here we were, all young men from really all the nations in 
Europe, and some from outside Europe as well, joining in this one song in 
their own language.39 
Thanks to its particular significance, The Internationale became the defining 
song of the International Brigades. Their official songbook gave it pride of place, 
publishing the lyrics in eleven different languages.40 Yet the song itself was 
already known as the anthem of the Soviet Union and the international 
communist movement. Dunlop recalled the reaction of some Spanish anarchists 
in their ranks to its ubiquity. 
They said, ‘Why do we have to sing The Internationale? After all The 
Internationale is not a Spanish song. It is not the Anarchist song. It is the 
international Communist song…’ The short simple answer to that was, 
‘Well, we’re in the International Brigade and it happens to be one of the 
songs of the International Brigade… Apart from that we consider that it’s 
the song of the international working class all over the world.’ But I don’t 
think they were very well convinced about that.41 
In this light, the International Brigades’ adoption of The Internationale was one 
of the many practical and cultural expressions tying the volunteers to both 
                                                        
37 Lochore in MacDougall, Voices from War, 114. The British used It’s a Long Way to Tipperary to 
similar effect. Fausto Villar Esteban, Un valencianito en la Brigada Lincoln (Unpublished 
manuscript, 1988), Labadie Collection, University of Michigan, 49–50. 
38 Lochore in MacDougall, Voices from War, 119–20 
39 Dunlop in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 125. 
40 ‘Canciones de guerra’, 1937, RGASPI, 545/2/409/58-9. 
41 Dunlop in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 148. 
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communism and the Soviet Union.42 It was a useful shibboleth for the anti-
fascist fighters, allowing each national group to understand themselves as 
fighting the same struggle, using a common signifier of political intent that 
transcended language. Yet while The Internationale presents a positive vision of 
the dissolution of differences and uniting to achieve common goals, it is still 
about revolutionary societal change. The British version calls for, amongst other 
things, doing ‘away with all superstitions’ and to ‘change forthwith the old 
conditions.’43 If The Internationale represented what the International Brigades 
were fighting for, it is clear that International Brigade volunteers did not expect 
post-war Spain to resemble British parliamentary democracy  
The Internationale was not alone in promoting a particular vision of democratic 
Spain. Other published songs included Comrades, March Shoulder to Shoulder 
(Militant, strong and defiant / Workers will conquer the world / And the red 
banner in triumph / Will be forever unfurled), Red-Front (In the face of our class 
enemy / We ask no quarter, they shall not turn us back / We’re standing ready 
for the final attack / On our enemy the bourgeoise), and many others with 
similar themes.44 However, aside from The Internationale it is unclear whether 
these songs, many of which predated the Spanish struggle, found resonance 
among rank-and-file volunteers. Better evidence comes from the songs that the 
volunteers wrote for themselves. The archives of trench newspapers are filled 
with poetry and songs written by volunteers attempting to express the 
emotions engendered by their service in Spain. Not all were overtly political. 
The most famous, There’s a Valley in Spain Called Jarama, written by Glaswegian 
volunteer Alex McDade in mid-1937, draws instead on pride in loss and 
adversity.45 Perhaps in part because it avoids overt political statements, it was 
                                                        
42 The popularity of Soviet culture in Spain is discussed in Kirschenbaum, International 
Communism, 120-5. 
43 ‘Canciones de guerra’, 1937, RGASPI 545/2/409/59. 
44 ‘Comrades, March Shoulder to Shoulder’ and ‘Red Front’ in ‘Canciones de guerra’, RGASPI 
545/2/409/10,18–19. 
45 This song was originally satirical, but the eventual ‘official’ version replaced most such 
elements (e.g. ‘For ‘tis there that we wasted our manhood/And most of our old age as well’ 
became ‘It is there that we gave of our manhood/And most of our brave comrades fell’). 
Cunningham, Spanish Civil War Verse, 75-7. 
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widely adopted by the English-speaking volunteers, and has had a long life as a 
folk song commemorating the British and North American volunteers.46 
However, many other songs composed by the volunteers did draw on political 
themes. No Pasaran linked their struggle to the Russian Revolution (Twenty 
long years into history have passed / Since red revolt was victorious last) and 
projected the Soviet Union as the model for Spain and the world (Great beacon 
lights that in Russia were bright).47 Another, Ours Alone, makes it clear that 
post-war Spain was being envisaged in very specific ways: 
Let victory, when it comes, be ours alone 
And jealously this triumph we shall hold 
Lest others try to snatch it from our grasp 
 
This war-torn Spain is ours to gain and keep 
That on that day when shall reign supreme 
We bend our backs to build our land anew 
And those who toil shall own the things they make.48 
 
Similar themes are evoked by another work simply titled International Brigade, 
which depicted the volunteers, including ‘Scots from Glasgow slums’, uniting to 
‘hammer the world into shape.’49 These are typical of a genre of volunteer 
compositions that went well beyond the official line that this war was in defence 
of the status quo. It was natural, perhaps inevitable, that the volunteers 
envisaged the society they fought for, and that this society best resembled an 
idealised Soviet model.  
This is not to say that volunteers’ claims to be defending democracy were 
cynical. Rather, the belief that the Soviet Union represented a genuinely 
democratic model needs to taken seriously. The communist critique of 
                                                        
46 Artists such as Billy Bragg and Woody Guthrie have performed famous versions. ‘Billy Bragg 
and Maxine Peake in CD Tribute’, IBMT Newsletter 32 (2012), 1. It is still commonly performed 
at commemorations, e.g. ‘Music, Words and Wreaths in Jubilee Gardens to remember the 
volunteers’, IBMT Newsletter 30 (2011), 4. 
47 ‘No Pasaran’, RGASPI, 545/3/473/26. 
48 This composition was ‘rejected’, presumably for publication in the Brigade newspaper, likely 
because it explicitly contradicted the official line. ‘Ours Alone’, RGASPI, 545/3/473/41. 
49 ‘International Brigade’, RGASPI, 545/3/473/54. 
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capitalism was rarely so powerful as during the interwar slump, while the 
Soviet Union retained mystique and moral standing as the world’s first socialist 
nation. That the volunteers believed in this ideal and fought for it should not be 
taken as evidence that they were ‘dupes of Moscow’ or fighting to establish a 
similar dictatorship to those later seen in Eastern Europe.50 That the Soviet 
Union failed to live up to its ideals does not invalidate the desire of individuals 
to fight for them, just as the failures of British democracy in the 1930s and 
before does not invalidate the choice to fight in 1939. Yet equally, it is important 
to contextualise the assertions of volunteers like Gary McCartney who claimed 
that they went to Spain to fight only for ‘the freedom of a people to put a cross 
on a ballot paper’, not to ‘usher in socialism or communism.’51 Their vision of 
the democracy they fought for was often considerably more complex than this. 
Instead, the ideological attraction of fighting in Spain should be understood in 
terms of both oppositional and positive factors. In resisting a ‘fascist’ takeover, 
Spain’s struggle took on a mythic allure for activists more used to defeats and 
setbacks. Importantly, the nature of anti-fascism itself facilitated understanding 
Spain as a flashpoint in a worldwide conflict. Communism and anti-fascism were 
inherently internationalist, encouraging adherents to view their struggles as 
interconnected with those taking place elsewhere. For Scottish volunteers, it 
was easy to understand Spain within their own frame of reference: just as 
confronting the BUF reflected a wider international struggle, so too was Spain 
already part of their own struggles before they left. For volunteers such as John 
Lochore, this way of thinking was second nature. 
I made a speech at a mass unemployed meeting… I got quite a severe 
telling off afterwards… [as] it was purely a demonstration against the 
[Unemployment Assistance Board] and here I was talking about 
                                                        
50 In the British context Robert Stradling is most cynical about the Comintern’s role, although 
selective quoting is required for his argument to resemble ‘Stalin-controlled dupes betrayed by 
the Communists’, as characterised by Baxell. Stradling, ‘English-speaking Units’, 752–3; Baxell, 
‘Myths’, 14. Elsewhere, particularly in America, critical work comes closer to this 
characterisation, e.g. Ronald Radosh, Mary Habeck and Grigory Sevostianov, Spain Betrayed 
(New Haven, 2001), 103–4, 231–5. 
51 McCartney in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 260. 
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recruiting for the International column in Spain. The two issues, for me, 
were connected.52 
In the few parts of Scotland that saw active fascist movements, this connection 
was even more apparent.53 According to anti-BUF campaigner John Londragan, 
the fight, ‘whether it be here in Aberdeen against the British Union of Fascists’ 
or ‘against Hitler and Mussolini in Spain, was exactly the same fight to me, no 
difference at all.’54 For volunteers like Lochore and Londragan, there was no 
need to separate their personal struggles at home, and their eventual fight in 
Spain. This seamless integration mattered – as discussed in the previous 
chapter in relation to anti-unemployment activism, the more that the decision 
to go to Spain appeared as a natural extension of individuals’ activism, the 
prospect was less likely to seem impractical or unappealing.  
Yet Spain was also alluring as a place where an individual might make a positive 
difference. In Spain, unlike Britain and Scotland, revolutionary change appeared 
not just possible, but already underway. The enemy was out in the open, not 
hiding behind institutions, law and tradition. For those whose anti-fascism was 
based on socialist beliefs, as for most volunteers, the chance to realise these 
aspirations beyond anything possible at home was a key part of Spain’s 
attraction. This was especially true for those whose work in Britain was 
stagnating. Some CPGB branches seen by the Party as ‘weak’ saw especially high 
rates of volunteering. Greenock and Rutherglen, both declining branches, saw a 
third and half of male members volunteer respectively.55 Such patterns reflect 
Fearghal McGarry’s observation that Irish communists’ poor progress at home 
encouraged them to go to Spain, where their efforts might count for 
something.56 
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It is in this context that the aspirational songs of the International Brigade need 
to be understood. It is the expression of the hopeful, positive vision of Spain that 
helped draw the volunteers to fight. This should not be seen as the culmination 
of a Soviet plot to export communism – rather, Party leaders worried that 
articulating such desires could provoke division and controversy. Lochore, 
despite being chastised for subverting the leadership’s pragmatic approach at 
home, evidently learned this lesson eventually. 
There was still quite a lot of confusion in our ranks as to the role of the 
Brigade and the nature of the struggle taking place. Confusion arose from 
the failure to recognise the difference between a Socialist Red Army 
establishing workers’ power and a Republican Army fighting against 
fascism.57 
While, judging from later testimony, many volunteers accepted this line by the 
time they left Spain, their initial ‘confusion’ is still important. Spain was 
attractive not just as a place to confront fascism, but as a space in which a new 
society seemed possible – a sentiment that many International Brigade 
volunteers continued to express through their music during their time in Spain. 
While the International Brigades were likely not intended as a Stalinist plot to 
overthrow the Republic and turn Spain into a Soviet satellite, and the aims of 
Soviet intervention were considerably more modest, this does not necessarily 
imply that rank-and-file volunteers shared such a clinical view of their role.58 
Rather, as their self-expression through song often indicated, their emotional 
investment in being part of positive change should be appreciated as an integral 




                                                        
57 Lochore in MacDougall, Voices from War, 118–19. 
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Networks, Party and Community 
 
While it is impossible to understand the choice to volunteer without ideology, 
ideology alone does not provide full insight into the process of making the 
decision. The overwhelming focus on ideological factors has its roots in the 
assumption that as ‘volunteers’, the choice must have come from within and 
therefore be based on belief. Viewing the International Brigades as being 
anything other than ‘volunteers’ is complicated by the language used to describe 
them: they are almost universally referred to as volunteers, and they 
consistently used the word to describe themselves. Equally, it is difficult to 
conclude that any Scots were ‘conscripted’.59 The Communist Party’s limitations 
lend credence to this – they could in no way emulate the power of a nation state 
in directly compelling military service. In Scotland, certainly, no individuals 
were forced to enlist.60  
Yet direct conscription is not the only way individuals can be induced to fight in 
wartime. Most importantly, creating the social expectation of military service 
could be a powerful tool in attracting voluntary recruits. Such methods require 
a society or specific community to collectively accept the necessity and 
justification for the conflict, creating an atmosphere in which individuals face 
constant communal pressure to enlist. Such pressure is compounded by success 
– the choices of friends, family and colleagues acting as a powerful impetus to 
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conform. Notably, Britain relied on impetus created by communal appreciations 
of patriotism and empire to sustain voluntary recruitment in conflicts such as 
the Boer War and the First World War.61 Although service on such terms did 
require a voluntary act, peer pressure and the prospect of social exclusion 
constituted significant external influences. While the Communist Party was 
rarely able to compel enlistment, they could foster similar social pressure to 
enlist in certain spaces throughout Scotland.  
As shown in Chapter One, clusters of Scottish recruits converged around locality 
and politics. A logical extension of this trend is that far from coming together 
from scattered backgrounds to serve in Spain, recruits were already 
interconnected, with social ties already existing alongside the political. This 
implies the existence of communities where social and political identities had 
become intertwined – meaning political consensus could be channelled into 
social pressure to conform to the group’s expectations. However, this is a 
theoretical construction based on the observation of broad patterns. To what 
extent did it reflect the actual experiences of Scottish volunteers?  
As with the question of ideology, oral testimony is a crucial resource. However, 
beyond aforementioned issues regarding narrative influences, the bounds of 
oral histories are curtailed both by the stated interests of the questioner, and 
what the interviewee expects their audience to find interesting. Veterans 
sometimes skipped over factors such as personal relationships and their social 
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sphere, either out of privacy or believing it was uninteresting.62 In particular, 
most testimony naturally avoids topics that were either painful or shameful. In 
one case, Eddie Brown’s testimony does not mention his wife once, although his 
friends considered that their deteriorating relationship ‘may to a certain extent 
have accounted for his decision to go to Spain.’ Any pre-existing difficulties were 
compounded when his wife eloped to London after falling pregnant with a 
fellow Perth communist during his absence in Spain.63 Clearly, his silence did 
not reflect its irrelevance, but rather an understandable desire to avoid a painful 
issue. While testimony is occasionally supplemented by contemporary material 
such as letters, the performative nature of these texts casts doubt on whether 
they provide complete insight into an individual’s choices – their purpose was 
often to reassure loved ones or affirm political beliefs to their peers.64 While 
these sources still provide insight into the question of why individuals chose to 
volunteer to fight in Spain, the prominence given to certain factors in testimony 
and letters should not be regarded as proof of their absolute importance.  
Despite these limitations, an analysis of the Scottish volunteers’ personal 
networks confirms that pre-existing personal connections were present on a 
large scale. The network shown in Figure 2.1 (overleaf) is a depiction of a 
substantial single network, featuring dozens of interconnected individuals 
across Scotland. It divides the volunteers into rough geographic clusters by 
placement and colour, with Glasgow (red) and Edinburgh (blue) at the bottom 
left and right respectively, and Fife (orange), Dundee (green) and Aberdeen 
(cyan) above. The strength of each relationship is represented by the thickness 
of the connecting line, distinguishing between acquaintances, political 
associates, friends and family.  
                                                        
62 This tendency reflects findings in other contexts, e.g. Kathleen Brown and Elizabeth Faue, 
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Figure 2.1: Pre-existing ties between Scottish volunteers.65 
                                                        
65 Relationships have only been included if they predated Spain. It is based on information 




Most key hubs are Scottish Communist Party officials such as Peter Kerrigan 
and Bob Cooney, and many others were important local Party figures. It is 
natural that such individuals had the most extensive networks, thanks to 
contacts made at Party conferences, committee meetings and speaking 
engagements. Yet it is noteworthy that these connections still encompass many 
less prominent individuals, including some who were not Party members, 
especially as senior communists are considerably more visible in the source 
base.66 This bias is compounded by the uneven geographic preservation of 
source material and testimony, with Edinburgh and Aberdeen 
disproportionately represented compared to Clydeside and Dundee.67 This 
indicates that far from showing the limits of personal connections between 
volunteers, this diagram represents just a small fraction of pre-existing ties 
between volunteers, defined by the limits of the source material rather than the 
networks’ actual extent. As suggested in Chapter One, these ties appear to be 
defined chiefly by locality, social bonds and political activity. 
This is confirmed by closer examination of individuals within the network. Hugh 
Sloan, who was especially forthcoming about his personal relationships, shows 
how a Communist Party member of middling standing developed connections 
with future volunteers. From his home in Methil, Sloan knew several local 
activists who also went to Spain, including his foster brother George Smith, and 
fellow CPGB member Malcolm Sneddon.68 Sloan had also spent time in Dundee 
in 1933, where he ‘acquainted [him]self’ with local CPGB members such as 
Arthur Nicoll, a future political commissar in Spain. These new connections led 
to his appointment as the Dundee YCL secretary, in which capacity he recruited 
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several future volunteers to the Party, including William McGuire and John 
Kennedy. His involvement in the NUWM from 1930 also brought him into 
contact with organisers and Hunger Marchers across the east of Scotland, 
including future volunteers Fraser Crombie and Tommy Bloomfield of Kirkcaldy 
and Jock Tadden of Dundee.69 He even met Scottish District Leader and CPGB 
representative in Spain, Peter Kerrigan, when both attended the Fife miners’ 
gala and discovered a mutual appreciation for ocean swimming.70 In all, Sloan 
mentioned pre-existing relationships with nine other volunteers, including 
Hunger Marchers, Party members and local colleagues, friends and family.  
While Sloan’s geographic range of contacts was unusual, it was hardly 
exceptional – many volunteers had similar histories of activism or internal 
migration in the 1930s.71 Other well-connected figures such as George Murray 
lived in an atmosphere where volunteering was simply a feature of his social 
circle. 
I was active in left-wing politics and of course when the Spanish War 
started all my mates were of like opinion more or less. A lot of them were 
going to Spain, you know, and I decided to go too. It was one of the things 
you did at that particular time.72 
Even volunteers with less extensive histories of political activism still tended to 
know each other. Steven Fullarton, who ‘wasn’t a member of any party at all’, 
convinced his friend, William Gauntlett, to join him, and knew two other 
neighbours who had gone to Spain.73 Brothers volunteering together were also 
relatively common, such as Daniel and George Gillan of Dundee and James and 
John Miller of Alexandria.74 Family, local and Party loyalties were often 
intertwined: Donald Renton and William Cranston of Portobello were brothers-
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in-law as well as members of the same CPGB branch.75 The impact of others’ 
choices did not need to be immediate, with David Stirrat recalling his ‘emotional 
involvement’ after his close friend, Tommy Flynn, ‘had gone to Spain early on 
and been killed.’76 Conversely, while Jimmy Maley was the first volunteer from 
his branch, he noted that ‘quite a few’ later ‘followed [his] example.’77 For 
almost all volunteers for whom relevant evidence exists, it is clear that their 
choice was not made in isolation. John Dunlop even claimed that rigorous 
background checks of aspiring recruits was unnecessary as most ‘were already 
known to each other from their home towns.’78  
This situation was hardly spontaneously, but rather reflected the longstanding 
use of social and personal connections for Party-building purposes. As Thomas 
Linehan has noted, communism and family and social ties often became 
intimately intertwined, with certain kinship groups emerging as ‘Party families’, 
of which the Murrays were a prime example.79 The process of radicalisation and 
recruitment described in contemporary sources is often deeply intimate, the 
product of individual and group relationships, social activity and earnest 
proselytising. This was a constant, tireless process: a letter from Lily Murray to 
her sister Margaret updated her on several such cases. 
Ida we are getting more and more into our way of thinking and I think 
we will soon have her ‘one of the fold’. They have had her to YCL 
meetings and J. Moir has also had his sister, who is progressing 
favourably!80 
Thanks to such efforts, political spaces influenced by the Party emerged in 
youth and sporting groups such as Clarion Cycling Clubs. Jimmy Crichton 
recalled that the Musselburgh Clarion Cycling Club branch he helped found 
underwent a factional split when it started organising Aid Spain activities, with 
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the Catholic and apolitical members leaving and setting up a new club. In 
Crichton’s eyes, political activity was an integral part of the club’s purpose and 
he was more willing to see it split than compromise.81 This is also reflected in 
Chris Smith’s recollections of his hiking group – it was never ‘just hiking’, rather 
‘you always made a point of holding a meeting somewhere, doing something, 
selling the YCL paper.’82 While it officially ‘wasn’t a YCL club’, Mary Johnstone 
remembered her ‘Vikings’ cycling club as being dominated by the YCL, who used 
to ‘used to sit and have a lot of political discussions’ during outings.83 Some, 
such as Marion Henry, attended the local Socialist Sunday School, where 
communists were just one of several parties with a presence from 1930 
onwards.84 Similarly, John Lochore recalled that the Socialist Sunday School, 
along with members of his hiking club, proved a ready source of recruits for the 
Youth contingent of the 1936 Hunger March, in turn a source of recruits for 
Spain.85 Mary Johnstone also remembered that, 
We were all Esperantists. That was outside the YCL. But on the other 
hand you could say a lot of them were political. Some of the teachers 
were also Party members. It was the Esperanto Society that actually ran 
the classes.86 
Few of these spaces were absolutely dominated by the Party, as testimony and 
indeed the Great Musselburgh Split makes clear. This was part of their utility – 
they offered an avenue to expand Party membership and influence. Desperate to 
expand its membership base, the Party seized on these methods as being the 
most effective way to recruit and retain members. In a circular directed to Fife 
branches in March 1936, explicit instructions were given on how to achieve 
their quota of 113 new members. The onus was placed on exploiting the 
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personal connections of existing members, as well as the latent sympathies of 
individuals already under some Communist influence, calling for: 
The mining fractions in East and West Fife and the Rail and Textile 
fractions in Kirkcaldy to arrange special meetings for the purpose of 
discussing the Party and its importance to the workers in those 
industries. Sympathisers and contacts to be invited with the objective of 
recruiting them to the Party.  
Specially prepared recruiting meetings organised by branches in each 
Area. Each branch member to be responsible for bringing along TU, Co-
operative or labour Party contacts; members of Study classes etc, Youth 
from sport organisations [original emphasis].87 
The circular went on to highlight the importance of engaging socially with new 
recruits: 
We draw attention to the importance of Social activity by our Branches, 
which the Secretariat and Area Committees will do everything to 
encourage. Also the Educational Classes and Open branch meetings on 
important local issues in the Area, pit and factory [original emphasis]. 
Social activities have a two-fold value; not only is the work of the Party 
lightened and its contacts widened, but a source of income is created for 
assisting in carrying on the general Party activities.88 
By using such tactics, the Communist Party had done more than foster a new 
generation of revolutionary cadres. They created groups of friends. The role of 
friendship, social expectations and peer pressure in aiding recruitment efforts is 
well established in other contexts. Yet the importance of these social 
interconnections in understanding the recruitment process has been either 
ignored or dismissed as ‘not a cardinal factor’ in existing history writing on the 
International Brigades.89 In Spain too, however, personal decisions to enlist 
cannot be regarded as distinct from the decisions made by volunteers’ peers. 
This alters any understanding of the decision to fight in Spain. Volunteering 
became in part a group decision, based on a collective rather than individual 
understanding of the conflict’s meaning. The involvement of friends meant that 
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going to Spain was no longer a venture into the complete unknown, as 
individuals could still rely on much the same support networks as they did at 
home. More fundamentally, it meant that group members were subject to 
external pressure from their peers – once they had collectively decided that 
volunteering was the appropriate response to the war in Spain, the pressure to 
follow through and commit to this course of action was considerable, and any 
individual defying this decision risked losing respect or standing. Volunteering 
could also become a way in which to demonstrate commitment, both in an 
abstract political sense but also to the group identity, making the decision to 
enlist as much about maintaining social standing and reputation as fulfilling a 
personalised political imperative.  
In many ways, the decision cut right to the heart of what it meant to be a 
communist in this period. Being a communist required subscribing not just to a 
set of political goals, but also accepting the need for direct action and personal 
sacrifice to achieve these goals.90 This meant demonstrating a willingness to 
forgo safety and fight for a common cause – in the words of Glasgow-Irish 
volunteer Sydney Quinn, ‘you’ve got to put your life where your mouth was.’91 
Maintaining a communist identity in this context also became bound up with 
their other concerns – in particular a masculine, ‘hard man’ self-image rooted in 
Scottish working-class identity, which required standing by one’s friends, 
particularly in a fight.92 This all left little room for individual worries about 
personal safety or aptitude for fighting, which might otherwise have deterred 
potential recruits. Moreover, once made in a social context, the decision to 
volunteer needed to be followed through with action – someone who decided to 
volunteer in isolation might abandon the project while disappointing only 
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themselves, but for most volunteers, abandoning the decision meant 
disappointing their friends, an altogether different prospect.  
It is not difficult to imagine how, in the charged political atmosphere of the time, 
these pressures might multiply and accumulate, as more and more individuals 
chose to go to Spain. As recruitment for the International Brigades reached its 
zenith over the winter of 1936-7, volunteering for Spain almost became the 
norm rather than the exception. The centrality of this particular period for 
Scottish recruitment is hard to overstate. It represents the point at which a 
trickle of isolated individuals turned into a critical mass, with groups of friends 
and acquaintances volunteering together becoming common. The importance of 
this phenomenon for Scotland compared to the rest of Britain is highlighted by 
arrival patterns. Nearly half of all Scottish volunteers left between December 
1936 and February 1937. In contrast, recruitment in England, Wales and Ireland 
was more evenly spread, with just over a quarter arriving in these three 
months.93 This points to a recruitment rush particular to Scotland, with 
decisions to volunteer cascading throughout tight-knit communities, and 
collective enthusiasm outweighing any doubts. In such an atmosphere, choosing 
not to go to Spain could become a decision needing considerable justification 
and soul-searching rather than the other way around.  
These pressures are particularly apparent among a much-neglected group: 
those who considered volunteering but did not. Like those who refused to serve 
in more conventional conflicts, the lionisation of the International Brigades has 
left little space for those who subscribed to the same beliefs but chose not to 
fight.94 Recounting their choice not to go to Spain decades later still evoked 
defensive responses amongst many of the activists who were part of the same 
social-political circles as the volunteers. Several such perspectives are found in 
Ian MacDougall’s various oral history projects, as well as one published 
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autobiography.95 In all, ten such accounts were found, a considerable number 
given that MacDougall located just twenty-three Spanish veterans after years of 
searching, while the inclusion of these ‘near-misses’ was an unintended by-
product of other projects. They tend to fall into two categories. Some, such as 
Tommy Kerr and John Carroll, were on the periphery of Party circles. Kerr was 
still in the process of joining the Communist Party when he considered 
volunteering. 
Aboot joinin’ the International Brigade maself, well, the funny thing, ye 
know, ah kind o’ regret it tae some extent. But there was only one time 
ever there wis an approach, and it wis a casual meetin’, because ah 
hadnae been in nae party at the time… ah used tae go intae the pub tae 
meet, ken, some o’ the pals, and I met Fred Douglas either when ah wis 
comin’ oot or gaun in and the question wis raised aboot recruits for the 
International Brigade. But it never went nae further. Oh, well, ah never 
volunteered.96 
Similarly, Carroll recalled that volunteering ‘widna ha’ took much, you know. if 
there had been a boy there that said, “Right, get on wi’ it,” we might ha’ been on 
it.’ Carroll was also not a Party member at the time although, like Kerr, he was 
part of the same social sphere.97 Without the sustained pressure that might have 
come from an immediate friend making the same decision or being tied more 
closely to the community, their thoughts never translated into action. 
The other accounts come from those more fully integrated into the requisite 
social-political circles – seven of the eight recalled that their decision was made 
in the context of close friends enlisting.98 Their responses make it clear that they 
sought to defer their own agency – maintaining their identity as dedicated anti-
fascists required that they demonstrated a thwarted desire to go to Spain. That 
is not to say that the various reasons given were illegitimate, yet it is also clear 
that even decades later, they wanted to avoid being perceived as having shirked 
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their duty. James Allison of Kirkcaldy was the most open about this in 
retrospect, admitting was not ‘an awfy brave man.’ Yet when two friends 
decided to volunteer, and looked to Allison to join them, he still seized on other 
reasons to avoid joining them, claiming that ‘I wid like tae go but I know if I was 
oot there I widnae eat and they would need tae send me hame.’99  
Most claimed to have wanted to volunteer, or taken active steps to do so, but 
were thwarted by a higher power. Jack Caplan and Guy Bolton blamed the 
official British ban on volunteers in early 1937 – in Bolton’s case, on the very 
day he departed from Lesmahagow with two friends seeking to volunteer.100 
When Jimmy Crichton attempted to enlist, the local organiser refused to let him 
go before finishing his apprenticeship, similarly, Thomas Davidson was rejected 
as he was newly married.101 William McVicar, having enlisted in the RAF prior 
to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, claimed to have been convinced by his 
friend Michael Clark to go to Spain. This put him in a difficult position: he would 
have risked prosecution as a deserter. He still went to pains to point out, 
however, that the ultimate decision was not his, but rather his peers’, who 
decided that ‘they couldn’t guarantee that [he] could get out of the country 
before the RAF would start lookin’ for [him].’102  
Others deferred to the needs of their families. John Brown, whose friend 
attempted to convince him to volunteer, was uncomfortable leaving his mother 
alone, especially since his father had died in the Great War.103 John Lennox had 
already volunteered when his then-girlfriend threatened to dump him if he 
actually went – Lennox cheerfully admitted that in light of their long, happy 
marriage, he could not regret missing out.104 Leaving their family without 
support was an obvious sticking point for many recruits, but was ameliorated 
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by the Communist Party’s pledge to provide for dependants.105 The importance 
of this pledge should not be underestimated – while volunteers were certainly 
not mercenaries, it is doubtful that many would have been willing to leave their 
families destitute, especially as some already faced accusations that they were 
abandoning their responsibilities.106 One volunteer, Glaswegian Thomas McColl, 
went so far to claim while in Spain that if the Communist Party failed to support 
his mother adequately, it meant ‘the agreement with [him] was broken and no 
longer binding’, justifying his immediate repatriation to support his family.107 
For McColl, and doubtless many others, service in Spain was undertaken with 
specific expectations and preconditions, and any violation was grounds for 
reassessing their decision. 
An unsympathetic reading of these narratives might suggest that these 
individuals were seizing pretexts to avoid following through on a daunting 
decision. The British ban on volunteers in January 1937, for instance, was 
poorly enforced and many others subsequently made it to Spain despite it.108 
However, such readings are speculative, and there are no specific grounds to 
question the sincerity of the testimony. What is telling is that they all felt it 
necessary to provide justification in the first place. For those at the heart of the 
Scottish communist movement, for whom the vital nature of the Spanish Civil 
War and the International Brigades was deeply impressed and whose friends 
were making the decision to fight, not going was not simply a matter of polite 
refusal or ignoring the call. To maintain their social and political standing, not to 
mention their own self-image, they needed a concrete justification for staying.  
These accounts also help confirm that participation in communist politics was 
linked to belonging to the requisite social circles, and this in turn meant that for 
those embedded in the movement, the choice to fight in Spain was partly a 
product of group dynamics. While ideology is clearly not irrelevant, the 
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presence of others in the decision-making process meant that rather than being 
a passing consideration, as it was for Kerr and Carroll, it was impossible to 
avoid making an active decision so long as volunteering was continually being 
discussed and acted upon by one’s peers. This in turn helps explain why Spain 
saw so such a large volunteering phenomenon. Unlike many other instances, 
where foreign fighters generally enlisted alone for their own reasons, the 
concentration of recruitment within such specific social-political circles meant 
that instead of recruiting isolated individuals, the International Brigades 
recruited in clusters, multiplying their numbers considerably.  
As suggested in Chapter One, the nature and influence of the social networks 
behind recruitment for the International Brigades indicates the causes of 
Scotland’s exceptional levels of volunteering. It was the Communist Party’s 
ability to build communities that transcended politics that served it best when 
recruiting for the International Brigades. Amid the plethora of ways the CPGB 
attempted to expand its influence in the 1930s, the Communist Party never 
developed the intellectual influence in Scotland that the Party had in England – 
their star recruit, Hugh MacDiarmid, was universally considered to be more 
trouble than he was worth – nor did they manage to dominate a trade union as 
with the South Wales Miners’ Federation.109 Their membership numbers lagged 
behind London. Yet by fostering localised political communities based on 
dynamic activism, they had adopted an approach that would prove notably 
effective when it came to mobilising their followers to fight in Spain. 
 
Scottish Political Communities 
 
Although it is tempting to reach for narratives of exceptionalism to explain the 
CPGB’s relative success in building political communities across Scotland, and 
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assume it was a product of innate Scottish progressiveness, this does not suffice. 
Even if true, this account has already shown that communist influence has no 
straightforward measure, and their particular approach in Scotland requires 
explanation.110 A more convincing answer lies in the specific political cultures of 
the Scottish left, cultures that predated the Communist Party yet continued to 
affect its development during the interwar period. In particular, the ILP’s 
influence shaped the way in which the Communist Party operated in Scotland. 
Not only did many of their Scottish leaders have formative political experiences 
in the ILP during its heyday, the necessity of competing directly with the ILP 
during the 1930s also influenced its tactics and necessitated a degree of 
imitation. Throughout Scotland, the ‘ILP’s domination of labour politics until the 
party’s disaffiliation from the Labour party in 1932’ influenced how politics was 
lived and understood in a variety of ways.111 This in turn reflected the divergent 
evolution of working-class politics in Scotland, which favoured structures that 
were more decentralised, democratic and local – fostering, in other words, a 
culture that greatly facilitated community-led approaches.112 While it is 
important to distinguish between aspiration and reality – no group was fully 
successful in building the kind of party they envisaged – the direction of their 
efforts were still important. Moreover, given that the volunteering phenomenon 
was objectively small, even limited successes suffice to help explain it. 
The impact of the ILP’s disaffiliation from the Labour Party in 1932 indicates 
their centrality to Scottish progressive politics in the period.113 The Labour 
Party lost their entire network of local representation – according to McKinlay 
and Smyth, ‘in 1932 the Labour Party was little more than a shell organisation 
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still dominated by the ILP.’114 This was especially true in Glasgow, where the ILP 
managed to survive disaffiliation from the Labour Party, retaining multiple 
Parliamentary and local government representatives throughout the 1930s, 
with their influence in local government actually peaking in 1935-6.115 While 
their days of hegemony in Scottish labour politics were over by the time of the 
Spanish Civil War, their influence in shaping the nature of socialism in Scotland 
remained. 
Key to understanding this influence is the nature of the ILP’s aspirational vision. 
According to Morris, the ILP attempted a different approach to socialism. 
The experience of the Glasgow Labour movement was of thriving 
community politics. The ILP was a party at the centre of a network, 
harnessing the energies of everything from Socialist Sunday Schools and 
Clarion Clubs to the Co-op and Trades Council. Such experience brought 
a confidence in decentralised socialism which many trades union leaders 
and London intellectuals did not share. The difference between Attlee 
and Maxton was not a matter of left and further left but of democratic 
centralism versus diffused community authority.116 
The ILP privileged local branches and community building over centralised, 
powerful leadership, with ‘the first loyalty of the individual ILP-er [being] to his 
or her own branch, not to the city or national organisation.’117 It conceived of 
political parties as having purpose beyond political organisation, with a role in 
providing ‘social, educational and cultural activities.’118 It was a strategy in 
which success depended on the party’s ability to sustain social networks 
alongside political belief – in other words, fostering the sort of interconnections 
that underpin the analysis presented here. 
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The ILP was a very different organisation to the CPGB, and it does not 
necessarily follow that the communists aped their approach to party building. 
However, there are indications that the CPGB did pursue similar strategies 
throughout Scotland. The language Stuart Macintyre uses when discussing 
‘Little Moscows’, for instance, shows striking parallels to the description of the 
ILP presented by McKinlay, Smyth and Morris. 
The relationship of the Communists to the community was therefore 
ambiguous… the Party organised sport, musical events, evening socials 
and so on… It was also significant that Party members occupied an 
accepted place in the community, based on an extensive network of kin 
and friendship. The identity of the left was much broader than politics in 
the conventional sense.119 
The widespread interconnections between the International Brigade volunteers 
discussed above suggests that the phenomenon Macintyre observed was not 
limited to rural settlements, but also existed in more diverse urban spaces. Neil 
Rafeek noted similar trends in Glasgow – the Communist Party’s ability to 
function not just as a political entity, but to become the focus of a wider 
community.120 Politics became entwined with everyday social and recreational 
activity in Party strongholds throughout Scotland, much as it had for the ILP 
before it. 
There are several reasons why the Communist Party might emulate the ILP. 
Although communists were nominally subordinate to both national and 
international directives, in practice local traditions of organising and 
conceptions of radical politics retained much importance.121 Prominent activists 
such as Harry McShane, organiser of the Glasgow NUWM and the Gorbals CPGB 
branch, had learned their trade in the ILP at its peak.122 Even by the late 1930s, 
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many younger activists had previously been ILP members. YCL and NUWM 
organiser John Lochore, for instance, pointed to his time in the ILP youth wing 
as impressing him with the importance of social activity and being ‘in the roots 
of the people.’123 These ties were compounded by the competitive nature of 
progressive politics in interwar Scotland. This was partly due to Labour’s 
aforementioned difficulties in dominating labour politics at the time, with the 
new Labour Party secretary in Scotland, Arthur Woodburn, remarking that his 
task was to ‘practically build from scratch.’124 His efforts were alternatively 
aided and hindered by the efforts of ILP defectors, notably Patrick Dollan, who 
founded the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), theoretically as a new Labour affiliate 
but in practice often competing for resources and representation.125 This 
allowed considerable space for other progressive parties to operate. Again, 
Glasgow provided the richest opportunities during the 1930s, with Labour, the 
SSP, the ILP, communists and anarchists all striving to effectively expound their 
vision of socialist progression – quite often in a literal sense, with rival speakers 
attempting to outdo each other on the streets in rhetoric and volume.126 To 
succeed, communists needed to challenge the other parties’ strengths – 
particularly the ILP’s entrenched community presence in many of Glasgow’s 
poorest districts.127 This involved not just enunciating a rival political message, 
but attempting to create a rival grassroots community.  
Importantly for their recruitment efforts, the communists were also well placed 
to attract those keenest for direct action. It was this attraction that enabled the 
NUWM’s campaigns – for those who wanted to challenge the system, it was the 
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communists whose rhetoric was most satisfactory, as was their track record of 
revolutionary success overseas.128 This is reflected in the recollections of 
activists from the time. When Tom Fern became interested in socialist politics, 
he carefully considered which party to join, and made up his mind after coming 
‘to the conclusion that the Communist Party was the party that was putting up 
the greatest fight on behalf of the working class.’129 The ILP’s commitment to 
parliamentarianism and pacifism appealed less to a younger, angry 
demographic looking for immediate, decisive answers.130 This yearning to do, 
not just observe or protest, is one that shaped many International Brigade 
volunteers’ political choices before Spain, and acted as mental preparation for 
personally intervening in a foreign conflict. 
It is necessary to be wary of overgeneralising political cultures across Scotland, 
particularly given Glasgow’s exceptional status as ‘the politically most advanced 
city in Britain’ in the eyes of the Communist Party.131 As William Kenefick notes, 
the focus on the politics in the west of Scotland ‘marginalis[es] and often 
ignor[es] events taking place elsewhere in Scotland’, but it does not necessarily 
follow that these events were fuelled by precisely the same political cultures by 
virtue of their happening in the same country.132 Malcolm Petrie, for instance, 
has shown that Dundee’s political climate on the eve of the Spanish Civil War 
was shaped by the relative absence of ILP influence, and the early polarisation 
of politics between the Labour Party and communism.133 However, the evidence 
discussed here does still indicate that Scottish recruitment for the International 
Brigades was underpinned by the way in which the Communist Party had gone 
about organising itself across Scotland in the years beforehand. These methods, 
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in turn, owed as much to the context of Scottish radical traditions as they did to 




The aim of this and the preceding chapter has been to explain why Scots 
volunteered to fight in Spain in such large numbers relative to the rest of 
Britain. This is not a question that previous accounts have been able to answer 
convincingly. Even where Scotland was the primary subject, the limitations of 
an ideology-driven approach meant that any answers were implicitly framed by 
Scottish exceptionalism. In considering a broader spectrum of ideological and 
other motivations, this account has not only provided a fuller picture of why 
Spain attracted so many volunteers from Scotland and elsewhere, but also 
shown that other explanations are possible. Scots were not necessarily 
distinguished by being inherently more radical than other Britons; rather 
methods of political organisation in Scotland leant themselves particularly well 
to this endeavour. These methods, in turn, were not a spontaneous invention in 
reaction to Spain but the product of political cultures that date back to the 
nineteenth century or beyond. It is likely that the Communist Party themselves 
had little idea why recruitment in Scotland proved so much more effective than 
elsewhere. This explanation raises another interesting possibility – if 
recruitment really was so intense among specific Scottish networks, then it 
follows that these networks would likely continue to function after being 
transplanted to Spain. The next chapter takes up this question, and examines 
the extent that Scottish networks continued to operate in the International 
Brigades. 
These findings are applicable well beyond the Scottish case study. Explanations 
for why so many people across the world volunteered specifically to fight in the 
International Brigades have often been limited in effectiveness for the same 
reasons as accounts dealing with Britain, and might be enriched by considering 
the impact of political communities and organisation in other contexts. Key to 
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applying this approach is a detailed knowledge of who the volunteers are, and 
the sort of interconnections that might exist between them. As both chapters 
have demonstrated, it is possible to consider even a relatively small number of 
foreign fighters as coming from a cohesive community rather than as scattered 
amongst a more general population. This may challenge R. Dan Richardson’s 
longstanding conclusion regarding recruitment patterns for the International 
Brigades, suggesting that numbers dwindled as news of ‘political terror’ and 
high casualties reached home.134 Such a position supposes that there was a large 
pool of untapped recruits left by 1938 – the pattern observed here suggests 
instead that the Communist Party had largely exhausted its limited networks, 
and substantial further recruitment was only possible by growing the Party 
itself, which proceeded slowly.  
In the broader comparative context, this approach can shed light on a much 
broader question: why did Spain attract so many foreign volunteers, and by 
extension, what factors are crucial in enabling the large-scale participation of 
foreign fighters in conflicts? One important distinction that emerges is the 
difference between ‘spontaneous’ and ‘recruited’ foreign fighters. The 
volunteers who journeyed to Spain before the advent of the International 
Brigades were qualitatively and quantitatively different than those who came 
later. These early months saw only small numbers of more mobile, better-
resourced individuals who had volunteered for their own reasons, often in 
isolation from others in their lives. Their decisions were internalised, making 
for very personal motivations, be it boredom, material gain or ideology. Many 
sufficiently accessible and well-publicised conflicts might expect to see 
comparable numbers of highly disparate, self-motivated volunteers. The sheer 
diversity of such individuals – thanks to their self-determined and varied 
motivations for fighting – makes establishing patterns difficult, and in Spain’s 
case at least, has led to a deceptive heterogeneity in how the volunteers are 
imagined.  
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However, following the Comintern’s decision to actively organise and enable 
recruitment in October 1936, volunteering changed profoundly. The volunteers 
became not just more numerous, but also much more cohesive in terms of class, 
background and beliefs, and tended to have come from specific social-political 
circles. Certainly, aid in making the journey to Spain was an important factor. 
Yet Spain is far from the only case in which volunteers were actively recruited 
or had their journeys arranged for them, with comparable efforts made to 
recruit the Mahal in the Israeli War of Independence, among other instances.135 
The key question becomes why the Comintern was so well placed to recruit 
volunteers for Spain. Part of the answer is clearly ideological, with communism 
and anti-fascism particularly well suited to transnational mobilisation. These 
ideologies are inherently internationalist, which meant that volunteers did not 
merely go to defend the ‘Spanish people’, they went believing that they were 
defending their own homes against future fascist expansionism. Significantly, 
Spain was readily appreciated as the decisive battlefield in the struggle against 
fascism, dwarfing the scale and stakes of the battle at home. Envisaging the 
overseas battlefield in Spain as a space in which personal ideological battles 
might be fought – and won – proved a major attraction for Scottish volunteers. 
While non-internationalist ideologies have the capacity to cross borders, they 
are far more reliant on circumstances and perception. While anti-communist 
Swedish nationalists – especially those in the military – readily appreciated the 
need to help defend Finland in 1940 as an extension of their own interests, few 
anti-communists living further away felt the same urgency.136 Ethnic or 
diasporic connections might also serve to motivate specific groups to fight in a 
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foreign conflict, but these connections are strictly bounded.137 Communism and 
anti-fascism, in contrast, were truly global ideologies. 
Just as important as ideology, however, was the nature of communist parties 
throughout the world. Thanks to their revolutionary doctrine and ethos, they 
tended to contain disproportionate numbers of individuals for whom direct 
action was appealing, even when their membership was small. Moreover, the 
intensity of their struggle bound them together closely. Being a Communist 
Party member was not a hobby – it was a way of life, shaping members’ social 
circles alongside their political activities. Communism, in other words, was 
often a community as much as a party. This meant that in exceptional 
circumstances, the community could be mobilised to defend itself and its 
interests. As seen in the Scottish case, recruitment was fostered by communal 
pressures and understandings as much as abstract political ideals. In fact, the 
exceptional level of Scottish recruitment for the International Brigades can best 
be understood as a by-product of the Communist Party’s relative success in 
adopting a community-led approach to party building in Scotland. This 
combination of well-established ideological communities for a recruitment base 
and a conflict appearing as the decisive battlefield for a global, internationalist 
ideology is distinct in modern history, and offers the best explanation for the 
unmatched scale of the International Brigades. Only the recent rise of pan-
Islamism – and its temporary breakthrough in Syria and Iraq – offers a parallel, 
and it is perhaps no coincidence that the Syrian Civil War has featured the 
largest mobilisation of foreign fighters since the Spanish Civil War.138 
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Chapter Three: Networks and Experience 
 
 
Although the disproportionate numbers of Scots in the International Brigades 
can be clearly linked to Scotland’s distinctive political cultures, it is less clear 
whether being Scottish continued to matter after they had left for Spain. As 
Scots never had their own unit, as national contingents often did, it is difficult to 
isolate a specific Scottish experience of service in Spain. Scots were sent to the 
same places as their English, Welsh and other comrades in the British Battalion, 
fought in the same battles and suffered through the same conditions. Any 
distinctiveness, if it exists, must stem from social and cultural causes. Yet even 
the label of ‘Scottishness’ brings with it problematic stereotypes and 
assumptions, and it is used here purely as a descriptor for those volunteers who 
came from Scotland, as defined in Chapter One. Any meaning ascribed to 
Scottishness beyond a degree of mutually recognised shared identity is drawn 
from the evidence presented here rather than preconceived notions of national 
character. Although expressions of a Scottish cultural identity did take place in 
Spain, the scattered occurrences as well as their inherent ambiguity reinforces 
rather than undermines the argument made here that the influence of identities 
can best be understood outside of the paradigm of national exceptionality. 
Although Scottish exceptionalism has implicitly underpinned existing 
explanations of recruitment for the International Brigades in Scotland, 
historians have been more reticent in exploring any distinctive aspects to their 
actual experiences. One refreshing feature of Ian MacDougall’s analysis is the 
frank admission that, 
The experiences in Spain of the Scots volunteers were much as those of 




Brigades. Within the British contingent itself, the distinctive contribution 
of the Scots volunteers was their disproportionately high number.1 
This is in contrast to many other accounts that ascribe exceptionality to various 
national contingents, often in terms of their military capabilities. Even Michael 
Petrou’s otherwise excellent account succumbs to this trope, claiming that the 
rugged, individualistic and egalitarian Canadians were the best fighters in 
Spain.2 Other national accounts often stress the perceived value of ‘their’ 
national unit as elite shock troops, each with a supposedly exceptional 
reputation even among other Internationals.3 However, such claims are often 
based on stereotype, internal propaganda and volunteers’ own self-
perceptions.4 Attempts to glorify each contingent can also lead to strange 
contradictions: while some British accounts stress the duplicity of Nationalist 
troops in singing The Internationale to confuse and capture a British unit, Italian 
accounts speak proudly of capturing a fascist Italian unit by speaking Italian and 
giving the appropriate salute to catch them off guard.5 One can also echo 
Michael Jackson’s unease at the very discourse of ‘shock troops’ in this context, 
given the brutal, mismatched nature of the fighting and resulting casualty rates.6 
In delving into the lived experience of the Scottish volunteers, it is necessary to 
go beyond much of the scholarly literature dealing with the International 
Brigades. Many existing accounts do go to some efforts to address the day-to-
day physical experience – the food, insects, shortages and discomfort. Yet the 
physical aspects of volunteering are the most universal; it is not in diet or 
comfort that a distinctive Scottish experience is likely to emerge. Rather, the 
focus here is on the personal, cultural and social. This chapter builds on the 
                                                        
1 Ian MacDougall, ‘The Scottish Soldier Abroad’, NLS, Ian MacDougall Papers, File 35. 
2 Michael Petrou, Renegades (2008), 43–5, 111–12. 
3 E.g. Cecil Eby, Comrades and Commissars (Pennsylvania, 2007), 25–31; Peter Carroll, The 
Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (Stanford, 1994), 91–2, 102; Amirah Inglis, Australians 
in the Spanish Civil War (Sydney, 1987), 124–6, 146 
4 Gerben Zaagsma, ‘“Red Devils”: The Botwin Company in the Spanish Civil War’, East European 
Jewish Affairs 33:1 (2003), 92. 
5 Venturino Venturini, The Last Great Cause: Volunteers from Australia and Emilia-Romagna 
(Sydney, 2010), 357; Baxell discusses the historiography of the British incident. Richard Baxell, 
British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (London, 2004), 74–6.  




argument that Scots volunteered in such large numbers because of well-
developed local political subcultures, which fostered friendship and social 
connections as well as political radicalism. Beyond the impact on recruitment, 
this also meant that Scots went to Spain already knowing many of their ‘new’ 
comrades. This has profound implications for how the conflict was experienced. 
It contradicts many of the tropes of military service, especially of friendship 
being forged in battle among strangers thrown together by chance. Here, 
friendships had already been forged in earlier political struggles and social 
interactions. The question of how this influenced the experience of volunteering 
has broader relevance beyond Scotland, with similarities likely to exist 
wherever sizeable local clusters of volunteers are found.  
Histories dealing with the social and cultural experiences of International 
Brigade volunteers have been slow in appearing. One exception is Elizabeth 
Roberts’ work, which argues that in a ‘fractious political climate’, dress and 
demeanour took on significance in establishing hierarchies, determining 
orthodoxy and conferring authority, pointing to a ‘complex and multi-faceted 
realm of experience and discourse.’7 However, Roberts' intervention is 
weakened by the reliance on published sources, which is problematic here as 
the working-class Scottish volunteers left behind few such accounts. Research 
into the lived experience of soldiers in the First World War present some useful 
parallels, particularly smaller-scale studies such as Helen McCartney’s work on 
the Liverpool Territorials. Combining analysis of the socioeconomic and cultural 
contours of Edwardian Liverpool with the use of personal primary sources such 
as soldiers’ letters, the book highlights continuities between Liverpudlian 
communities and service in France. McCartney touches on many topics 
discussed here, notably communication between the front and home, the impact 
of recruitment from tight-knit communities and pre-existing relationships 
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among soldiers, although the differences in context and focus are significant.8  
More broadly, Alexander Watson’s work suggests that soldiers’ cultural 
backgrounds have an appreciable impact on their service, while cautioning 
against making assumptions based on stereotype.9  
This chapter discusses two ways in which the volunteers’ Scottish origins 
played a role in Spain, and the effects each had on the volunteering experience. 
The first is the existence of unofficial Scottish groupings. Due to the processes of 
enlistment, which allowed those with pre-existing ties to stick together, small 
Scottish clusters formed within larger official formations. Aside from the impact 
this had on day-to-day experience, with the presence of familiar faces providing 
comfort, facilitating trust and enabling positive and negative behavioural 
tendencies, it also led to clustering in the incidence of death, capture and 
desertion. Secondly, the dispersal of Scots throughout the International Brigade, 
a tendency heightened by the lack of an official Scottish unit, meant that 
networks evolved or were adapted to enable Scots to stay in touch. While 
wartime correspondence is often envisaged as a two-way dialogue between 
home and front, this study highlights the importance of lateral connections. 
With no established bureaucracy, unreliable mail services and strict censorship, 
cultures of gossip developed in both Spain and Britain in order to deal with the 
scarcity of information. Once established, these communication networks 
served ancillary functions, such as political observation and control as well as 
informal backchannels for feedback and evaluation within the Communist Party 
hierarchy.  
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On 5 February 1938, Dan Burns departed Britain for Spain.10 He did not travel 
alone – with him were six other Scots, three of whom he knew from his 
hometown of Greenock: Michael Clarke, Harry Blackley and William McLennan. 
Clarke was a friend of his through the NUWM, while Burns, McLennan and 
Blackley were members of the same Communist Party branch.11 George Jackson, 
John MacPherson and William Campbell, three miners from in and around 
Cowdenbeath, made up the septet.12 Theirs was not to be a quiet or easy time in 
Spain. That summer, one would be killed, three captured and two others 
wounded, one of whom then deserted.13 Only one, John MacPherson, left Spain 
relatively unscathed. 
What their case tells us about the volunteering experience is that there were 
continuities, from life at home, to the front line and beyond. That three of seven 
volunteers who had left together were captured on the same day is highly 
suggestive that they did not just travel together to Spain, but that they also 
trained, fought and were taken prisoner together. This was in fact the typical 
experience for Scottish volunteers: they departed together with friends and 
acquaintances, formed further bonds based on shared identities on the journey 
and during training, a process which Scottishness – shared backgrounds, 
acquaintances, cultures and accents – facilitated, and these connections then 
formed the basis for the smaller subunits of the British Battalion.  
That these groupings could form at all is due to the nature of the International 
Brigades themselves. As Remi Skoutelsky has demonstrated, the endeavour was 
organised on the spot, hastily and with little expertise.14 Bureaucracy and 
procedures were created as needed, where needed. As such, the allocation of 
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volunteers into smaller units usually followed the path of least resistance and 
kept existing groups together. Even at higher levels, there was flexibility, as 
demonstrated by the Irish volunteers, who collectively decided to switch 
battalions twice during the war.15 This was not a pattern limited to the British. 
Cecil Eby observed the formation of an entire company based on shared 
occupational identity.16 This scope to choose one’s own immediate comrades, 
combined with recruitment conducted with precision among relatively small 
communities, opened the door for the grouping of volunteers along lines based 
on their own preferences, which naturally were channelled towards serving 
with those whom they already shared mutual acquaintance, trust and shared 
identities.  
Other volunteers’ recollections suggest that Burns’ experience of leaving 
Scotland with friends, acquaintances and other Scots was the norm. David 
Anderson recalled that 
There were five of us altogether that left Aberdeen for Spain on the 12th 
of February 1937. One lad, John Flett from Park Street in Aberdeen, was 
older than we were. He would be about 45. Three of us were members of 
the Communist Party: Alex Gibb, Archie Dewar and myself, but the other 
two weren’t members of any particular party.17 
Anderson’s Aberdonians were soon absorbed into a larger group, with at least 
eleven other Scots noted to be in the same party sailing to Calais. Volunteers 
departing together in small clusters before joining larger Scottish groupings was 
a common experience. Donald Renton described a similar process, with shared 
local and regional identity bound this group of volunteers for their journey, 
even with an unusually heterogeneous mix of Party affiliations.   
Among the men who left Edinburgh in November 1936 there was my 
very, very good friend George Watters and a number of others: Harry 
Fry, who was destined to become one of the commanders of the British 
Battalion of the International Brigades; George Bridges, who was killed 
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at Jarama, who was not a member of the Communist Party but of the 
British Section of the International Socialist Labour Party; and a lad 
called Forrester, who also was a member.18 
Anderson and Renton were part of the flood of volunteers that left Britain in the 
winter of 1936-37.19 As such, groups could be defined by precise point of origin, 
with those from the Aberdeen or Edinburgh districts travelling within a larger 
Scottish contingent. Later, as the number of volunteers dwindled and 
departures grew less frequent, such specific local clusters were less common. 
However, the evidence suggests that Scots usually still travelled together, as 
recounted in a letter describing Tom Murray’s journey in April 1938. 
There are thirty-five leaving Paris tonight including 11 Scots. Birt Smith 
of Kirkcaldy and I have been appointed Group Leaders + he has five Scots 
+ I six Scots to pilot over the frontier. In my lot are two youths from 
Glasgow, the two Dundee fellows who offered their services when I was 
there and an Aberdeen fellow.20 
Other volunteers provided less detail about their travel arrangements, but made 
it clear that they travelled to Spain accompanied by other Scots. Fife volunteer 
Tommy Bloomfield journeyed with a Glaswegian who ‘got us out of difficulties 
when we were passing through southern France because he spoke Esperanto.’21 
Tom Clarke recalled leaving Dundee with two other local volunteers.22 Eddie 
Brown, living at the time in Perthshire, remembered that he went ‘to Glasgow 
and said I wanted to volunteer... There was a group o’ people with us, in fact I 
was along wi’ an Aberdeen fellow, John Londragan.’23 Of 482 volunteers for 
whom details are available, over 400 travelled alongside other Scots.24  
Although it is natural that geography formed the basis for the groups of 
volunteers that travelled to Spain, it is less obvious that these associations 
                                                        
18 ‘British Section of the International Socialist Labour Party’, and Renton in MacDougall, Voices 
from the Spanish Civil War, 21. 
19 Baxell, British Volunteers, 11. 
20 Tom to Janet Murray, 4 April 1938, NLS, TMP, Box 1, File 1. 
21 Bloomfield in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 52. 
22 Clarke in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 57. 
23 Brown in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 108. 
24 This is likely an underestimate as different sources recorded different dates, most often either 
departure from Britain (Security Service surveillance) and arrival in Spain (Battalion records). 




mattered in Spain. Yet evidence suggests they did. Steve Fullarton, for instance, 
implied that it was actually unusual for one’s immediate companions not to be 
those you arrived with, as well as confirming that the majority of these were 
fellow Scots. 
I was associating with Dusty Miller from Alexandria, Benny Richardson 
from North of England, Jimmy Glavin from Glasgow, who hadn’t been in 
the same gang as me going out, and another man – I think he was from 
Dundee.25 
Making the journey to Spain together was not the only way in which shared 
identity bound Scottish volunteers together once in Spain. Volunteers could 
actively seek out those with whom they shared personal or local bonds after 
arriving. Alec Park arrived in Spain on 12 January 1938 with a large group of 
Scots, including six fellow Glaswegians who, like Park, hailed from Glasgow’s 
East End.26 Park wrote several times to his wife upon arriving, reassuring her 
that he was ‘in a British Company and [Tom McWhirter] is my section leader 
further all of us who left together are in the same company’ and that he enjoyed 
‘the comradeship of most of our Glasgow Group.’27 In Park’s case, there was 
clear synergy at work. He departed with several local comrades, who were 
immediately welcomed into a pre-existing ‘section’ made up of individuals they 
knew from home. Park’s comments about the existence of a ‘Glasgow Group’ are 
echoed in a different context in Rob Stradling’s work, where he discusses Tony 
Hyndman’s experience of a mob of Glaswegians’ ‘drunken loutishness’, 
supposedly targeting his effeminacy.28 As well as perhaps reinforcing 
stereotypes of Glaswegian masculine identity, this incident serves to confirm 
Park’s experience of Glaswegians sticking together in Spain, for better or worse.  
The limitations of the British Battalion records hampers sweeping conclusions 
regarding the composition of smaller units. However, there was one ‘official’ 
subunit where it is possible to see these trends in practice. In May 1937, a 
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British Anti-Tank (AT) Battery was created. Commanded by the enigmatic 
Malcolm Dunbar, the AT battery was dominated by Scottish volunteers. Eddie 
Brown, an early recruit, remembered half the unit being Scots when it was 
formed, chiefly from the east of Scotland.29 A snapshot of unit personnel from 
February 1938 reveals that although the number of Scots had thinned, their 
early dominance had cemented their position in the unit hierarchy, with Scots 
making up three out of five non-commissioned officers, the Political Commissar 
(and acting commander), as well as the clerk and quartermaster.30 
Brown was not the only Scot in the AT battery who gave testimony: George 
Murray, John Dunlop, Hugh Sloan, John Londragan and Bill Cranston were also 
interviewed by Ian MacDougall, while Arthur Nicoll’s recollections were 
preserved by the Imperial War Museum. Their complementary descriptions of 
their journeys to Spain and the formation of the unit confirm that the process 
was similar to that hypothesised above. Londragan noted that the unit was 
formed almost exclusively from the group of sixteen that he arrived with, which 
included several smaller clusters of Scots.31 As with those discussed above, 
these travelling groups of Scots were characterised by pre-existing personal, 
political and geographic connections. One group contained Londragan, Brown, 
Dunlop and Murray.32 Within this group, Dunlop and Murray were members of 
the same Communist Party branch, Murray and Brown were old friends from 
Perth, while Londragan met Dunlop en route to Spain, if not before.33 Another 
group led by Dundonian Arthur Nicoll featured similar patterns of political and 
personal acquaintance. Nicoll knew Hugh Sloan through the NUWM, while Sloan 
himself knew Kirkcaldy volunteer Fraser Crombie from protests against the 
Means Test.34 Personal connections also played a role in selecting newcomers to 
the unit. Arthur Nicoll was able to get his brother Peter assigned ‘in my own unit’ 
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to ‘keep him in sight’ when he arrived in October 1937.35 Like Alec Park above, 
this suggests that for volunteers with the right connections, there was a degree 
of choice involved in assignment. The natural choice was to serve alongside 
friends and family. 
If Scots tended to serve together in small groupings, there are several outcomes 
that might be expected. The first is that losses would not be spread evenly, as 
groups who ended up in particularly dangerous situations would be expected to 
suffer higher casualties. It is not coincidental that so many Scots who served on 
the AT battery survived – they served in a long-range support role back from 
the front line, which carried with it a reduced risk. This was apparent to the 
volunteers themselves; Bill Cranston noted that ‘only two or three of our crowd’ 
were killed.36 Other cases provide an opposite story. The group of Edinburgh 
volunteers containing Donald Renton and George Watters found themselves in a 
difficult situation during the Battle of Jarama. Serving together in the Machine 
Gun Company, they found themselves out of position and surrounded. The 
survivors’ accounts make it clear that the group that had travelled together 
remained largely intact going into action, and that they shared in the trauma to 
come. 
Our Company at the beginning of that encirclement probably had around 
120 men. When we finally were in Fascist hands there were only some 
thirty of us left, the bulk of whom in one way or another had been 
knocked about rather badly. I’d been wounded in the legs, Harry Fry had 
a broken arm, shattered with machine gun bullets, Jimmy Rutherford 
was battered soft, George Watters had gone down.37 
Watters recalled the death of his friend in the same action. 
My mate from Prestonpans he was badly wounded just the day before we 
were surrounded and I advised him to wait on them comin’ up wi’ the 
ambulance men that would take him down on stretchers. But he felt the 
stretchers were needed for men that were more severely wounded than 
he was. He didn’t realise how bad he was and unfortunately he died.38 
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Similarly, Donald Renton remembered the ‘bad’ death of another Edinburgh 
volunteer in this action, Robert Mason, who succumbed to severe burns.39 Of the 
volunteers who left Edinburgh in December 1936, five perished at Jarama and 
five more were captured together. Only one Edinburgh volunteer served in the 
battle without being captured, wounded or both.40 Their accounts indicate that 
this high toll among a specific geographical subset of volunteers was due to the 
majority of Edinburgh volunteers serving together in one of the most dangerous 
areas of the battle. Other instances, such as that of one shell killing three 
volunteers from eastern Scotland, add weight to the conclusion that thanks to 
the tendency for volunteers from the same area to stick together, exposure to 
danger often had some relationship to regional and local origins.41 
Although first-hand accounts are not available for many such incidents, it is 
possible to obtain a broad picture of whether origins affected how likely 
volunteers were to be killed. Using the data presented in Richard Baxell’s work 
on British volunteer origins, combined with the official ‘Roll of Honour’ of 
volunteers maintained by the IBMT, Table 3.1 shows a Britain-wide picture. 
These figures indicate that while Britons in Spain suffered a high rate of 
fatalities – although slightly lower than the 25 percent calculated by Skoutelsky 
for all internationals – different regions show distinct variation.42 However, 
these figures are not entirely satisfactory, as Baxell provides rough estimates of 
each region's proportion of the total rather than precise numbers, and his 
underlying methodology is not discussed.43 Even so, the marked differences 
between regions indicates some connection between origins and casualties.  
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Region Number of 
volunteers 
Total killed Percentage 
killed 
London and South East 775 154 19.8% 
Scotland 525 131.5 25% 
North-West 375 68 18.1% 
North-East 200 23 11.5% 
Wales 150 28.5 19% 
South-West 50 10 20% 
Midlands 75 19.5 26% 
Northern Ireland 50 13 26% 
Ireland and Empire 225 39.5 17.5% 
Other 25 8.5 34% 
Total 2450 495.5 20.2% 
Table 3.1: Approximate totals of volunteers and deaths by region.44 
 
However, if the thesis presented here is correct – namely, that local as much as 
national factors fuelled recruitment – then similar variation should be present 
within Scotland. Based on independent calculations, it is possible to paint a 
general picture of variation in the Scottish volunteering experience. 
 
Locale Total volunteers Dead (prop.) Prisoners of war 
(prop.) 
Deserters (prop.) 
Glasgow 199 60 (30.2%) 20 (10.1%) 33 (16.6%) 
Edinburgh 48 7 (14.6%) 9 (18.8%) 5 (10.4%) 
Dundee 57 15 (26.3%) 4 (7.0%) 9 (15.8%) 
Aberdeen 23 5 (21.7%) 2 (8.7%) 3 (13.0%) 
Airdrie 10 2 (20.0%) 1 (10.0%) 3 (30.0%) 
Alexandria 13 4 (30.8%) 3 (23.1%) 4 (30.8%) 
Clydebank 11 3 (27.3%) 2 (18.2%) 2 (18.2%) 
Greenock 17 4 (23.5%) 4 (23.5%) 3 (17.6%) 
Kirkcaldy 12 3 (25.0%) 1 (8.7%) 2 (16.7%) 
Cambuslang 7 0 1 (14.2%) 2 (28.5%) 
Paisley 8 1 (12.5%) 2 (25.0%) 2 (25.0%) 
Bellshill 8 4 (50.0%) 0 1 (12.5%) 
Blantyre 5 3 (60.0%) 1 (20.0%) 0 
Scotland 520 129 (24.8%) 58 (11.1%) 96 (18.5%) 
Table 3.2: Numbers of dead, prisoners of war and deserters by locale in Scotland.45 
 
Significant variation is again apparent. This suggests that the impact of origins 
worked on two levels. There was a wider, regional trend of Scottish volunteers 
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having higher mortality rates than their English and Welsh counterparts. This is 
not incompatible with the thesis presented here – it has been seen in numerous 
accounts above that Scots were often initially grouped together. It is plausible 
that perceived common ground as Scots, not to mention the initial experiences 
of travelling to Spain together, led to friendships and clusters forming more 
easily among Scots even without specific local connections. Furthermore, as 
shown in Chapter Two, recruitment networks often transcended individual 
locales, usually through internal migration or political activity. However, as seen 
in the latter table and numerous other examples given above, locality remained 
an important factor. The variation shown not just between large cities but also 
between the smaller clusters of volunteers, suggests that locality continued to 
be important alongside any overarching Scotland-wide impact. What both 
trends confirm is that beyond the impact of previous acquaintance in terms of 
day-to-day life, as Helen McCartney does in the context of the First World War, 
there were also concrete effects on the volunteering experience.46 
The relatively small groups of volunteers from certain locales present an 
interpretive challenge. Their numbers were small enough that figures can be 
easily skewed, limiting their comparative usefulness. However, if location and 
the associated personal connections did contribute to volunteer outcomes, the 
extent to which even small groups often featured a commonality of experience 
is telling. That Blantyre and Bellshill volunteers were so likely to die is not 
statistically significant, but in the context of this argument, it is nonetheless 
suggestive, as is the fact that places like Cambuslang and Paisley escaped 
relatively unscathed. Figures on prisoners of war and desertions are similarly 
suggestive. Even on the smallest scale, such patterns remain visible: each of the 
three volunteers who gave their address as 106 Parliamentary Road, Glasgow 
deserted following the Battle of Jarama.47  
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While such examples cannot be considered as statistical proof of the thesis 
presented here, they are nonetheless suggestive of some link between origins 
and propensity to desert. This is reflected in desertion narratives – it was often 
not a solitary act, with deserters frequently leaving in pairs or small groups. In 
such circumstances, personal trust was vital in order to safely communicate 
mutual unhappiness with the situation. Knowing one another prior to 
volunteering is an obvious way in which such trust might have been fostered. 
For one such pair of deserters from Uddingston, it is likely that the desertions 
were mutually planned and executed, with both deserting in late April 1937, 
caught in Alicante, and then sent to work in the Albacete Auto Park.48 
Furthermore, serving directly alongside each other meant that volunteers with 
existing ties had similar levels of exposure to stressful combat, shell shock or 
living conditions. A report on the desertion of James Donald and Malcolm 
Sneddon, both from Methil, Fife, provides one such example. 
They complained of frightful disorganisation in their battalion, the 
quartermaster running away with their money and no proper command 
in battle. Once 9 (!) men were sent out to follow up a tank, but the tank 
got frightened and turned back leaving the men in front of it. Most of 
them were killed. Donald and Sneddon just walked away after that, one 
can’t really blame them.49 
Aside from confirming again the continuities of service in Spain – Sneddon and 
Donald volunteered together, journeyed together, fought together and deserted 
together – this case shows desertion as a collective decision, shaped by shared 
origin and shared exposure to traumatic experiences. 
Point of origin was not the only factor that influenced a volunteers’ fate in Spain. 
Chronology played a role in determining the likelihood of death or captivity. 
Volunteers who arrived in time to fight in certain bloody battles – and, crucially, 
too late for adequate training beforehand – were more likely to die or have 
other negative outcomes. Over three quarters of Scots who arrived in November 
and December of 1937, for example, were killed, captured or deserted, 
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compared to just 30 percent of those who arrived six months earlier. It must be 
allowed, however, that there was interplay between chronological, national and 
local factors. In November 1937 Alexander Elder, Charles Scott, John Crate and 
Alistair McDonald were apprehended after deserting and stowing away on a 
ship bound for Gibraltar.50 There is no evidence they knew each other prior to 
leaving Scotland, being from Leith, Glasgow, New Cumnock and Kirkcaldy 
respectively. It is likely that Elder, Scott and McDonald met on the journey to 
Spain, with Crate arriving two weeks later.51 They apparently continued to 
serve in close proximity to one another before reaching a collective decision to 
desert in early November. In such cases, chronology cannot be readily separated 
from origin – it is natural that groups of friends from the same place would tend 
to volunteer together when possible, and even for those without direct 
connections, the shared journey to Spain alongside other Scots could still shape 
the development of subunits.  
Local or national identities were not the only ways volunteers could make 
connections in Spain. The vast majority of Scots were working class, which 
doubtless helped keep them clustered together. Unlike the Americans or Welsh, 
however, occupational ties proved less important, likely because, as discussed 
in Chapter One, the trade union movement was never an effective forum for 
recruitment. Several Scots, notably Wilfred Macartney, came from more 
privileged backgrounds, which could distance them from other volunteers. 
Macartney was sent home after commanding the battalion during its initial 
training period, with Communist Party officials judging him unsuitable, not least 
due to the gulf between Macartney and the volunteers.52 The testimony of 
middle-class volunteers indicates that while they retained many connections to 
Scots in the International Brigades, they were more adventurous in seeking out 
new acquaintances. John Dunlop, for instance, recalled a much wider circle of 
associates in the International Brigades than many of his working-class 
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comrades. As well as mentioning several ‘English chaps’ he got on well with, 
Dunlop also frequently chose to eat with the ‘Spanish group’ of his unit.53 
Working-class Scots also made friends based other shared connections. Tom 
Clarke, for instance, recalled that he ‘pal-ed up’ with Liverpudlian Alex 
Alexander, apparently based on a mutual appreciation for Spanish wine, which 
unsurprisingly landed them both in some trouble.54  
Scottish identities need to be appreciated as one factor among several that 
shaped the way Scots made connections in the International Brigades, albeit an 
important one. While these connections clearly influenced volunteers’ 
immediate companions within the Battalion, the chaotic nature of the conflict 
and lack of a dedicated Scottish unit meant that it was unlikely for any given 
volunteer to have immediate companionship with all of their friends or family. 
Hospitalisation, promotion, reassignment and repatriation helped scatter 
volunteers further. A realistic conclusion is that while Scots were usually able to 
serve alongside some acquaintances, it was just as common for Scots to have 
pre-existing contacts serving in different units. With the dispersal of volunteers 
throughout the Republican zone, strategies beyond clustering together were 




The scholarly use of soldiers’ wartime letters has progressed beyond their 
portrayal of day-to-day life, with recent work examining the self-images soldiers 
wished to portray to their loved ones, the methods and means of 
communication between the front and home in wartime and how this shaped 
perceptions of the conflict at home.55 The letters written by Scottish volunteers 
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in Spain offer similar insight, and if anything their importance was heightened 
by the special nature of the conflict. Normal wartime communication difficulties 
were compounded by the poor state of communication channels between Spain 
and Britain. The lack of an official, well-resourced bureaucracy to manage 
information, the censorship of letters, the unreliability of the Spanish postal 
system and the rarity of leave all impeded the flow of information. 
Communication strategies evolved to cope with this, meaning that rather than a 
two-way line of communication between war zone and homeland, exchanges of 
information took place laterally within Spain and Scotland. This correspondence 
between Scots in Spain traces lines of communication that stretched across the 
conflict zone and Britain, forming networks that complemented the Scottish 
clusters discussed above. As with these groupings, such connections may have 
been particularly dense among Scottish volunteers due to the depth and 
breadth of previous acquaintance, but were likely present among other national 
groups. 
Scholarly literature on soldiers’ wartime letters highlights their ambiguity as a 
source into indivduals’ thoughts and feelings. Letters must be understood as 
performative, projecting a desired self-image to its audience.56 As seen in 
Chapter Two, this has particular pitfalls when considering letters as evidence of 
motivation and ideological commitment – just as First World War letters 
attempted to convey the image of the dutiful, patriotic and carefree warrior to 
those at home, so too did volunteers in Spain attempt to convey the ideological 
purity of both their cause and themselves. In this context, however, it is the 
nature of the audiences that these performances were designed to reach that 
provide insight. The public nature of these letters, read not just by the recipient 
and the censor but a wide audience of acquaintances at home – in some cases 
even intended for public use as propaganda – is part of their very fabric. The 
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intended and actual uses of volunteers’ letters therefore reflect the needs of 
communication, patronage and political manoeuvring. 
What is striking about volunteers’ letters is the extent that they were given over 
to gossip. Pages were filled with news of injuries, deaths and captives, changed 
addresses, chance encounters and visits to mutual friends and family. Rather 
than simply idle chatter, it is argued that this gossip fulfilled an important 
function in the absence of reliable lines of communication. Information was 
often not personalised; it was passed on from a wide circle of acquaintance on 
both ends, in the knowledge that of several letters sent, only one might arrive in 
good time, or at all. These connections served purposes beyond the sharing of 
vital personal information. For senior communists, who often had the best-
developed networks, this correspondence served as an informal backchannel 
for advice, feedback and political direction. Scottish networks also offered a 
means of surveillance both within and without Spain, allowing for individuals’ 
morale to be monitored and manipulated, the identification of and coordination 
against dissenting voices and effective promotion of the International Brigades 
at home.  
This passage, written by William McGregor of Maryhill, Glasgow, is typical of 
many such letters: 
Regarding Jimmy Riddel, I have no personal effects belonging to him, he 
went from my section to the [unclear] on the 9th July, during the Brunete 
offensive, about the 12th or 13th July they were bringing food up in the 
camion when they were strafed by a plane, Cde Woodhouse was killed, 
Jimmy was wounded, he got better of the wound but died of some 
internal trouble in Murcia, Cde John Angus, who is with me just now was 
there wounded and has given me the information. Tell Mrs Riddel her 
son was a brave anti-fascist fighter both at Jarama and Brunete. At 
Jarama Johnny and I went over together and lay behind the same olive 
tree. I wrote Aitken a few days ago. I have seen Bob Middleton who is 
with Battalion just now, Bobby Ball is training here. You have to find out 
if Johnny Young’s wife is writing, he has had no word from home for 
some time, he is in the Maryhill local.57 
                                                        




McGregor’s letter blends news from the front and rear with messages for 
friends and family, from both himself and others. Aside from exchanging details 
unavailable through official channels, such as the circumstances of Riddel’s 
death, McGregor also makes it clear which friends he has seen lately, where they 
are and what support they needed. The recipient of the letter was not the final 
destination, rather they acted as a node through which information can be 
distributed further, just as the writer has collected information from those 
around him. McGregor’s network was particularly well preserved. Its members 
were Glaswegian Communist Party activists who occupied key roles within the 
English-speaking units, with Peter Kerrigan, Scottish District Leader and 
sometime CPGB representative in Spain, at its centre.58 Others, such as Thomas 
McWhirter, were junior officers, while Alec Donaldson was in charge of 
propaganda for the British contingent.59 Thanks to their standing among 
Glaswegian Party members, their dispersal throughout Spain and their positions, 
information about individual Scots, especially Glaswegians, could constantly be 
gathered and exchanged. Donaldson was explicit in regarding Scottishness as 
the key connection, making ‘a point in getting in touch with the Scots lads’ in his 
vicinity.60 They often demonstrated a paternal outlook for the Scottish 
volunteers in Spain, keeping track of their progress and well-being. McWhirter 
kept a special eye on those from his district, Govan. 
Bobby Shields is in hospital at present, a slight chill of the usual 
acclimatising nature, the four Govan boys are settling down. I’ll keep my 
eye on big H—R, he is doing ok so far.61 
The reliance on gossip even among high-ranking, well-informed members of the 
Communist Party is indicative of just how reliant all volunteers were on these 
informal networks for basic information. Often, this was the only way for those 
at home or in Spain to hear of casualties among friends. 
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I was sorry to hear about Ralph Forrester and really surprised that such 
an apparently physically strong comrade should die like that. I can 
remember him very well in the Calton district when he really had a 
unique standing among the warring religious factions. I will let the 
Glasgow comrades know about his death.62 
Here, the network served to inform Donaldson of the death of a colleague, and 
allowed him to transmit this information locally among other ‘Glasgow 
comrades’ who had also known Forrester. This particular episode highlights the 
extent to which these networks complemented the existence of smaller groups 
of Scots within the International Brigades, with exchanges of information taking 
place both within and between such groups. Networks were both horizontal and 
vertical; information passed down the line through Communist Party leaders 
like Donaldson could be disseminated widely through the ranks. For those 
without such networks, news was often slow and unreliable. The wife of 
Glaswegian Alex Harvey, for instance, heard nothing for nearly six months after 
his death at Jarama.63 As a non-Communist in Spain for less than a month, 
Harvey lacked connections with other Glasgow volunteers. Without anyone to 
notice or communicate news of his death, his wife was left completely 
uninformed. 
It was not just bad news that was shared. The discovery that Clydebank 
volunteer Robert Beggs was alive and in a Nationalist prison camp spread 
quickly among the Glasgow network. 
We have just received word from Spain from Bobby Beggs that he is alive. 
He is a prisoner of Franco and this apparently is the first letter he has 
been able to get through from the time he was captured at Brunete.64 
In a further show of interconnection, it was Donaldson, not the recipient of the 
letter William McAulay, who replied to Kerrigan. 
A couple of days before your letter arrived McWhirter and myself were 
discussing Beggs and it was suggested that there was still a possibility of 
him being alive. I am glad that this is so because he was a good steady 
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comrade here and now that his capture has been established it ought to 
be possible to get his release.65 
The movement of individuals between front, rear and home also played an 
important role in keeping networks informed.66 Thanks to censorship and 
occasional need for delicacy, visits in person could be considerably more candid 
and informative. Writing to a fellow Blairgowrie communist, William Gilmour 
made clear the limits of communicating by letter. 
There are many things to tell you, things which it would never do to 
write upon, things that are only meant for the private conversation, and 
observance of two class conscious individuals, and I will if I ever reach 
home endeavor [sic] to enlighten you on some of the subjects, many of 
which have pleased, and others which have troubled me.67 
The development of communication channels was not limited to Glasgow and its 
dense concentration of Communist Party membership and activity. Similar 
networks formed among volunteers from other parts of Scotland. The Murray 
family, with three members in Spain and others active in solidarity movements 
at home, provides an excellent example of how these networks worked. Thanks 
both to their standing in the Party – they came from a good ‘CP family’ – and 
their migration throughout Scotland during the 1930s, the Murrays formed the 
backbone of a diverse network connecting Spain and Scotland.68 Annie Murray, 
in Spain as a nurse, often relied on information from Scotland to keep abreast of 
events in Spain. 
I am sorry to hear that Bridges and Mason were killed. I did not know 
that either was out. Is it little Mason of the party? I hope not he was such 
a good lad and such a hard worker. I am also very sorry about Donald 
Renton’s plight. Tell their people in Edinburgh that I send my sincerest 
sympathy.69 
Similar information was communicated among Murray siblings spread 
throughout eastern Scotland. 
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The Moirs have at last heard from Jim who is safely in Spain and has met 
George and Eddie. Jim’s mother and father were overjoyed to get word 
from him. Mrs Brown has also heard from Eddie who is feeling better 
and he mentions that George has not yet received one letter from any of 
us.70 
Jimmy Moir’s story is a tragic demonstration of the utility of such networks. He 
remained an active part of the network up to July 1937.71 However, Moir went 
missing during the Battle of Brunete, with Annie informing her family that while 
there was no ‘definite word’ yet, she was ‘afraid he is lost forever.’72 It was 
another month until the ‘official’ channels caught up. 
We heard officially that Jim Moir was lost on the 23rd of July when a big 
offensive was on and the members of the Brigade were asked to retreat… 
they hold out really no hope of Jim’s being alive – except on the very, 
very frail chance of his being a prisoner.73 
Correspondence concerning Moir highlights not just the way that news of 
individuals could be tracked and communicated using unofficial networks, but 
also the extent that these networks operated considerably more efficiently than 
official channels. However, this was not their sole function. While the 
availability of timely and detailed information was no doubt important, for the 
Communist Party figures at their centre they offered other benefits. This is 
hinted at in further discussion regarding Moir’s death. 
I am glad Jimmy’s people have reacted the way they have. Do you ever 
see his sister now? When I was in hospital I opened a letter addressed to 
Jimmy to see if the writer had any news of him. It was from his mother 
who was, she said, ‘perplexed and hurt’ that he should have been leading 
a life of which she knew nothing and that he had gone away to fight in a 
war which could have nothing to do with him! She seems to have a very 
limited vision.74 
Any signs of wavering from Moir’s parents were cause for significant 
apprehension, as the families of dead volunteers could be sources of damaging 
publicity for the International Brigades in Britain. George Murray’s concern was 
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more explicit in another letter urging his brother to arrange a visit to Moir’s 
family.75 This intervention was part of a wider effort to monitor and influence 
the morale of volunteers and their families. The case of Eddie Brown, a friend of 
the Murrays who had travelled and fought alongside George, is particularly 
revealing. In late 1937, while Brown was hospitalised due to wounds, the 
Murrays learned that Brown’s wife, pregnant with the child of a fellow Perth 
Communist, had eloped to London.76 Several weeks of frantic communication 
across Spain and Scotland, discussing the crisis behind Brown’s back. Annie 
Murray wrote to her brother in Scotland that 
[Eddie Brown] has not heard anything from his wife and I have told him 
nothing. He seems quite happy and resigned to his ‘letterless fate’. I 
expect that he has his sleepless nights of worry but he seems much less 
worried.77 
Even by mid-January 1938, the Murrays were still concealing the news from 
Brown.78 The deliberateness of this approach is suggested by Brown’s 
evaluation, which highlighted mental health concerns, labelling him as 
‘hypochondriacal [sic].’79 Previous bouts of low morale are also alluded to in 
previous letters.80 Viewed charitably, the incident reflects the qualitative 
difference of serving alongside friends and family, who could not just provide a 
support network but had intimate knowledge of their comrades’ situation and 
needs. Viewed cynically, however, the Murray network was being used to 
control the flow of personal information in order to manage an individual’s 
morale for the good of the Party. 
Other cases show more clearly the subordination of Scottish networks to 
Communist Party needs. Networks were used to monitor repatriated volunteers, 
informing Party members in Scotland of potential issues and developing 
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strategies to deal with troublemakers. After Tom Murray left for Spain in April 
1938, his wife Janet wrote regarding two returned volunteers. 
I also want [Smith] to see Fred to refute if necessary any stories that 
Gembles might be spreading about things that might give a wrong 
impression. Smith’s story and his do not tally and his stories about 
superior food the officers are getting (all lies I know) could cause a lot of 
harm.81 
Thomas Gembles was a 19 year-old who had been repatriated following a truck 
accident, which had left him half-blinded ‘with the mentality of a boy of 13.’82 
The use of Scottish networks to monitor such dangerous sources of dissent from 
the ‘official’ line was not limited to the Murray clan. William Gilmour wrote 
home about several former comrades who had escaped Spain in April 1937. 
The names of the “deserters with the yellow streak” were McDonald of 
Kirkcaldy, Craig of Glasgow and Parker of Dundee, I believe you would do 
something to expose the Parker renegade as I believe he was an 
erstwhile member of the CP. They were all yellow. They ran away while 
the fight was at its worst. There is some excuse for men whose nerves go 
under the strain. But there is no punishment severe enough for men who 
desert their comrades in the thick of the fight, and then go home to 
Britain pertaining to be the bearers of a petition bearing the names of 32 
of our comrades who wanted to go home. These men have deliberately 
tried to destroy our principles by [missing] lies and the sorry part of it all 
there are a section of the public will believe it.83 
Such efforts complemented broader efforts to control the flow of information to 
and from Spain. The International Brigade Censorship Section explicitly saw its 
purpose in such terms, preventing the ‘sorti de courrier demoralisant par les 
volontaires’ as well as the arrival of ‘courrier nuisible et destructif au moral des 
volontaires.’84 Such decisions were often framed in terms of sparing families 
unpleasant news, such as when Glaswegian James McKissock died in an accident. 
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He fell out of a window and fractured his skull. You had better not let it 
be known in this way however, as my reports are he was drunk and fell 
out, hardly inspiring for his relatives, or politically.85 
It is telling that what was ‘best’ for the relatives so often coincided with what 
was best for the political image of the International Brigades. John Dunlop, 
discussing the execution of a Scottish volunteer, used a similar formulation. 
Needless to say this was not reported at home. They were both 
mentioned as having died in action as it was reported in the Daily Worker, 
which would save their families the shame of knowing.86 
Morale could also be managed proactively through these networks. After 
several repatriated Glasgow volunteers allegedly spread ‘rumours’ in early 
1938, Tom McWhirter put together a rejoinder signed by the Glaswegians in his 
unit, which was duly sent back to help refute negative claims.87 In this case, the 
speed which information could travel along unofficial lines of communication, 
combined with the large cluster of Glaswegians McWhirter served alongside, 
enabled an effective response. In other cases, the networks functioned to send 
appraisals of those around them. Annie Murray, for instance, provided snippets 
about her co-workers. 
Nurse Susan Suton, Glasgow trained, Violet met her, she came out with 
me. She speaks Spanish and French well, is a very good nurse has been 
brought up in very bourgeois circles but is now much improved 
politically and very popular with everybody and so smart and clever. 
Then a nurse Mary Slater, very political… She is not a good mixer and is 
ever so happy on night duty or with someone untrained and really needs 
a bit of tactful handling but is a good worker too.88 
Peter Kerrigan’s Glasgow network was used for similar ends. Alec Donaldson 
was particularly forthcoming on such matters, writing to Kerrigan about 
volunteers such as Andy Anderson, who was ‘a very good lad with some 
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weaknesses’, and ‘McDougall, McWhirter, O’Connell’, who were ‘real gems.’89 He 
saved his most fulsome praise for Aberdonian Bob Cooney. 
Recently I met Bob Cooney for the first time in my life. He impressed me 
tremendously and I am of the opinion that he is the best political man out 
here. He is popular and balanced. I think he shall go to the Brigade and 
not the Battalion. It is better so because we have too many good 
comrades as battalion commissars.90 
Such informal observations underpinned a broader system of evaluations in 
Spain, a theme returned to in Chapter Four. As Skoutelsky has shown, these 
evaluations were important in determining individuals’ future progression in 
the Party.91 In a large, dispersed organisation, those making judgements often 
relied on their colleagues when evaluating those they did not know directly. A 
network of peers whose opinion they could rely on was of clear utility – not 
least because it helped safeguard their own status in the Party.   
Networks could also act as an informal backchannel through which advice, 
concerns and suggestions could be aired without fear. As discussed further in 
Chapter Four, openly expressing disagreement with Party policy was difficult. In 
informal and private settings, however, communication tended to be relatively 
frank.92 However, in situations where informal face-to-face meetings were 
impossible, personal correspondence bridged the gap. A striking element of the 
correspondence of Kerrigan’s network is the familiar and informal tone. It is 
jarring to read of Kerrigan, the most important Party official in Scotland, 
referred to as a ‘big bear with a sore nut’ by McWhirter.93 Alec Donaldson used 
humour to deflect criticism – when Kerrigan raised concerns about the ‘gloomy’ 
tone of his propaganda output, he replied that his ‘revolutionary soul was 
temporarily crushed.’94 He could also be brutally honest: 
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[I] was considerably cut up after the Brunete events. The fact that our 
best comrades went ‘down’ in that offensive upset me tremendously. 
That, perhaps, is the best comment on your estimation of my ‘cynicism’.95 
Alongside justifying and defending their actions to their superiors, these mid-
ranking Party members also felt comfortable offering criticisms and suggestions 
themselves. In a letter in February 1938, Donaldson complained about stifling 
censorship and the poor screening of volunteers, writing that there was not 
‘good enough control of the type of people being sent’, with ‘one or two 
scandalous types who managed to get through.’96 McWhirter was even more 
explicit in his opinions on repatriation of ‘useless’ volunteers. 
The so-named “Repatriates” are on the way back up, definitely a disgrace 
on political grounds… and I don’t believe it is in the best interests of the 
struggle. Naturally, I have not discussed it except here. I warn you as I am 
sure it will have repercussions at home, but I suppose your enquiries will 
be as manifold.97 
McWhirter‘s displeasure was abundantly clear, but his lack of opportunity to 
discuss it openly highlights the importance of correspondence in the absence of 
trusted colleagues. Donaldson also made delicate political suggestions, notably 
in the case of Maryhill volunteer Johnny O’Connell. A YCL member and seasoned 
campaigner in the NUWM, O’Connell had come to Spain in early January 1937 
and fought at Jarama.98 Due to ‘his youthfulness, death of personal friends and 
disgust at leadership’, he deserted at Brunete but was soon caught. Despairing 
at the loss of his comrades and unable to ‘forgive himself’ for deserting, 
O’Connell was demoralised and despondent for months.99 Donaldson petitioned 
Kerrigan to get O’Connell repatriated. 
Personally I am worried about Johnny O’Connell and I think you aught to 
whisper into somebody’s ear. Only the mechanical approach to the 
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subject by the person now responsible for this work is holding him 
back.100 
The leniency shown to O’Connell is striking. He avoided punishment and sent 
instead to the Battalion kitchen, away from the front.101 Moreover, his Party 
standing suffered relatively little, likely thanks to his connections. Donaldson 
himself wrote O’Connell’s official evaluation, referring to his desertion in very 
understanding terms and classing him as ‘good.’102 A second evaluation, written 
by non-Scottish officials, was harsher, downgrading his rating from ‘good’ to 
‘fair’ and referring to his personal conduct as ‘not satisfactory’ – still a lenient 
evaluation, given that most deserters were classed as  ‘weak’ or ‘bad.’103 While 
there were limits to the benefits volunteers like Johnny O’Connell could gain 
from being part of the right network, it is clear that despite the corrections 
made, he was treated with considerably more leniency than a volunteer with no 
such connections. For many deserters or otherwise ‘deficient’ volunteers, not to 
mention cases like Thomas Gembles or Alex Harvey discussed above, the lack of 




Being Scottish mattered while in Spain. It influenced volunteers’ companions 
both on and off the battlefield, which in turn had a demonstrable impact on 
mortality, desertion and captivity, to say nothing of their day-to-day lived 
experience in Spain. That Scots banded together and sought each other out at 
every stage of the volunteering process is testimony to the value placed on 
maintaining existing relationships in difficult and testing conditions, and the 
continued importance of the Communist Party networks sketched in Chapter 
Two. Yet this is not simply a question of nationality and imagined common 
ground between Scottish volunteers – locality is particularly vital in 
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understanding the way in which volunteers sought out companions in Spain. 
The relationships that shaped Scottish clusters in Spain were formed in local 
political communities throughout Scotland. These comrades did not just 
volunteer together, they travelled, fought and died together. At no point in the 
volunteering experience did their prior relationships become irrelevant. 
However, it would be a mistake to ignore Ian MacDougall’s words quoted at the 
start of this chapter. Scots should not be regarded as inherently exceptional. 
What distinctiveness they showed is for the most part a matter of scale – 
groupings and networks grew from pre-existing relationships fostered by the 
particularly active political communities that existed in the hubs of Scottish 
recruitment for the International Brigades. The relative unimportance of banal 
signifiers of identity indicates that the arguments presented in this chapter are 
applicable to any grouping that saw especially concentrated recruitment from 
specific communities. As such, it is likely that local and regional identities 
influenced the lived experience of volunteering in the International Brigades, 
regardless of nationality.  
These conclusions also point to the enduring power of networks in the 
International Brigades. Even when physically separated, being part of a Scottish 
network influenced other aspects of volunteers’ experiences in Spain. It 
determined how quickly and from whom their family received news, kept them 
informed while in Spain, shaped perceptions of their reliability and character 
among communist elites and allowed for safe and productive informal 
discussions, including under otherwise adverse circumstances such as captivity. 
It also allowed for heightened surveillance of individuals, facilitated propaganda 
efforts and opened volunteers to manipulation at the hands of their peers. In 
these ways, the Communist Party was able to effectively leverage Scottish 
political communities not just to bolster recruitment but also to further their 
goals in Spain. As a result, having the right social connections and being part of 
the right networks offered tangible benefits, while lacking them meant 













Soon after crossing the Spanish border, and reaching the international, polyglot 
Republican outpost at Figueras, Scottish volunteer John Dunlop recalled a 
strange encounter amidst the general atmosphere of camaraderie. He found 
himself seated beside a German man, who seemed ‘a little bit odd.’  
We thought that this man was really not one of us. That was the feeling 
that we had about him, because he did not seem to talk the same kind of 
language as ourselves. The whole atmosphere about him was different. 
Well, a day or two later we were taken in trucks and put on the train to 
go to Barcelona… We saw our strange friend walking down the track… 
the Frenchmen dashed away round, back up the track the way we had 
come. The next thing we knew here they were back again, hustling along 
this German. He was brought on the train and was pushed into a seat 
opposite me, against the window, and a crowd of us round about so the 
chap had really no chance to escape… 
When we got into Barcelona the German was taken away and we never 
heard of or saw him again. But the curious fact about him was that he 
was wearing three suits of clothes. He had three pairs of trousers on and 
three jackets, and was walking along this railway track in the middle of 
May. So either he must have been a bit off his head or he was not what 
we in Scotland would call the clean tattie. We assumed, and I think 
rightly, that the man was a spy.1 
Dunlop’s vignette highlights the role of communist norms in enabling 
understanding and connections between volunteers. Despite coming from 
dozens of countries, and speaking nearly as many tongues, the International 
Brigades still shared a common language, a political language whose use 
implicitly framed a series of basic assumptions about how the world worked, or 
ought to work. Some level of fluency in this language of international Stalinism 
was vital, acting as a shibboleth that enabled trust across personal and national 
                                                        




divides. Equally, lack of fluency was a severe handicap. ‘Spy’ was a familiar term 
in the Stalinist lexicon, and one that might have dangerous consequences. 
Two further aspects of this story stand out. The first is the link between 
language, behaviour and outcome, hardly a controversial observation so long 
after the linguistic turn.2 In this case, not only was lack of fluency in the 
language of international communism a factor in engendering suspicion, the 
language itself was mobilised in persecuting the outsider. Tellingly, Dunlop and 
his diverse companions all readily came to the conclusion that this man was a 
spy, and this meant he needed to be caught, physically restrained and handed to 
the authorities. For these multinational comrades, ‘spy’ was a universally 
understood label for someone out of place, and, once applied, this label had an 
inevitable force to it, enough to convince local authorities to formalise the 
arrest. Secondly, the story indicates that fluency in this language predated their 
journey to Spain. This and other incidents confirm Lisa Kirschenbaum’s 
argument that many volunteers were already highly familiar with Stalinist 
norms, and needed little prompting to apply them once in Spain.3 Stalinism was 
not a way of thinking imposed upon the International Brigades, but the product 
of a negotiation between pre-existing and new beliefs that led to shifting 
definitions of what Stalinism meant and how it was best applied.4 This in turn 
left space for the evolution of distinct political cultures in spaces such as the 
British Battalion, influenced not just by pre-existing notions of Stalinism but a 
broader spectrum of political and philosophical assumptions.  
It is important to appreciate that despite its reputation, Stalinism in this time 
and place was neither monolithic nor totalitarian. Just as historians, notably 
Daniel Kowalsky, have shown that Soviet attempts to control and influence the 
Spanish Republic faced substantial political and logistical barriers, so too did 
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communist control over the International Brigades have significant limitations.5 
While the NKVD wielded near-unchecked power in the Soviet Union in 1937-8, 
the same cannot be said of Soviet representatives in Spain – even had they 
aspired to emulate Stalin’s purges and show trials.6 Furthermore, by the very 
nature of communist movements in countries such as Britain, adherence to 
Stalinist norms and discipline was essentially voluntary. Moreover, just as in the 
Soviet Union itself, Stalinism could still be understood and experienced 
positively and there were ways in which critique, disagreement and dissent 
could be expressed that did not necessarily lead to suspicion or punishment.7 
This carried over into Spain, where even during wartime there remained 
cultural and practical limits on the degree of coercion and disciplinary measures 
that could be imposed upon the volunteers. Stalinism, even in Spain, remained a 
voluntary belief system, which could still be accepted, questioned or to some 
extent even defied without risking life or freedom. Between the extremes of a 
relatively small core group of communists with an unconditional commitment 
to the Party line, and an even smaller number who took an open stand against 
communist control, most volunteers came to terms with the situation in their 
own way, for their own reasons. 
The value of a Scottish perspective on these questions lies in their usefulness as 
a sample rather than a particular distinctiveness. Apart from studies of the 
International Brigades themselves, with their aforementioned limitations, much 
focus has been on the workings of the Comintern and its various leading 
personalities.8 Even studies such as Kirschenbaum’s tend to focus on a 
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transnational communist elite – the overlapping categories of ‘those of long 
standing’ in the Party or who had ‘worked or studied in the Soviet Union.’9 
However, as the Scots’ experiences show, the nature of volunteers’ political 
beliefs varied considerably depending on their status and background, and 
appreciating this diversity is vital to understanding the International Brigades’ 
political cultures.  
While this chapter aims to critically interrogate the political cultures of the 
International Brigades, including darker sides such as desertion and dissent, it 
is important to distinguish between a critical approach and criticism. While 
harshly critical accounts by historians such as James Hopkins and Rob Stradling 
have done a great deal to advance our knowledge of the British Battalion and 
the International Brigades, they have been less convincing in building a cohesive 
picture of how individual cases translated into a wider system of political 
repression.10 Doing so requires appreciating the gulf between the ubiquity of 
Stalinist norms, and their limitations in practice. At least in the British Battalion, 
the purpose of labelling an individual a Trotskyist, a saboteur or spy was not to 
justify and enable their liquidation. Obsessive monitoring of the volunteers did 
not lead to individual dissidents being singled out and persecuted. Instead, this 
chapter contends, Stalinism was mediated by other influences. For almost all of 
the Scottish volunteers, even senior Party officials, this was their first real 
chance to put their political ideas into practice. They were fluent in the language 
of Stalinism, had accepted the need for discipline and sacrifices for the cause, 
but were only just discovering what this meant in a wartime context. While they 
might desire to measure up to a Bolshevik ideal in the eyes of their peers both 
national and international, the volunteers were still the product of other 
political and moral cultures.  
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This chapter explores this subject across three themes, each marrying an 
analysis of the structures of political control in the British Battalion with an 
appreciation of how they were understood and experienced. The first deals with 
surveillance and political discourse. Surveillance differed in implementation and 
intent from the totalitarian structures imagined by critics, and in practice the 
constraints of Stalinist modes of communication were more potent in shaping 
political expression, with fluency in the forms of Marxist-Leninist democratic 
centralism particularly vital for expressing political views. The second section 
examines demoralisation and disaffection. Pre-existing constructions and 
understandings of communism and Stalinism, especially the claim that their 
methods were uniquely efficient and effective, were vital in shaping the political 
attachment of ordinary volunteers. However, these preconceived notions of the 
organisational benefits of communism could be contradicted, sometimes 
violently, and disaffection can often best be understood as reactions to the 
Communist Party’s failure to live up to its own values. Finally, the third section 
looks at systems of punishment. Despite the picture painted by revisionist 
histories, far from a well-oiled system for identifying, containing and 
exterminating non-conformists, the treatment of troublesome individuals 
indicates that the British Battalion was ill-equipped for dealing with political 
dissent. For all their talk of Trotskyites at home and abroad, British communists 
were surprisingly ill-prepared to counter actual political dissent with anything 
more than words. 
 
Political Organisation, Surveillance and Discourse 
 
Writing a decade after the war, Hamish Fraser described what he saw as the 
totalitarian structure of the International Brigades.  
Consider the following picture of the Soviet State in embryo, as seen in a 
typical Communist unit of the Republican army. There was of course, as 
in all armies other than anarchist ones, a military leadership. To share its 
responsibility and at the same time to check upon it there was the 
Political Commissariat. To check upon both, there was the SIM (Military 




the system of espionage, there was the party that operated within all 
three in addition to its other responsibilities… 
Think, if you can, what this fourfold system of espionage means in terms 
of the freedom of the individual. It means that in every unit of such an 
army, from the platoon upwards, there are in addition to officers and 
NCOs, a representative of the political apparatus, a representative of the 
secret police and as many party men as there are members of the party. 
And in case the reader may imagine that there may be any danger of 
laxity in this fourfold check-up, let me hasten to assure him that there is 
no such danger for the simple reason that all four organisations see to it 
that reports are handed in daily to the agent one step further up the 
ladder of the hierarchy, so that the supreme command may not be in 
ignorance of anything that appertains to the ‘welfare’ of their charges. It 
need hardly be added that one is not particularly free to give expression 
to ‘dangerous’ thoughts under such supervision.11 
Fraser knew what he was talking about. He had been a SIM agent, and had direct 
knowledge of its workings.12 Yet his account, perhaps deliberately, ignores the 
gulf between the intent behind these structures, their actual functioning in 
practice and how they were understood by volunteers. In other words, Fraser 
gives little insight into how these structures were viewed by the volunteers 
themselves – and therefore how they actually influenced behaviour – and does 
mot acknowledge the significant limitations that this system faced in practice. 
Fraser also worked for the SIM relatively late in the conflict.13 Particularly 
before the SIM was founded in August 1937, surveillance of the International 
Brigades was carried out on an ad hoc basis.14 John Lochore, for instance, was 
asked to join ‘the intelligence services’ by George Aitken in early 1937, tasked 
with submitting ‘reports of anything that was untoward, treacherous or 
otherwise.’15 Although Lochore claimed never to have reported anything, he 
evidently forgot at least one instance. Written from Madrigueras in March 1937, 
it mostly provides trivial observations about minor practical and personnel 
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issues. Someone, whose name he thought was ‘Anderson’, ‘gave some trouble’, 
and was therefore ‘being watched well.’ One unnamed comrade was ‘walking 
about but doesn’t seem attached anywhere’, and he noted ‘irregularities’ in 
volunteers travelling between Albacete and Madrigueras.16 Lochore’s report 
casts a different light on Fraser’s claims. While at first glance it confirms the 
eagle-eyed nature of surveillance, with ‘Anderson’ being ‘watched well’ for 
merely grumbling, Lochore’s frequent imprecision regarding names does not 
speak to a well-oiled machine that efficiently conveyed information up the 
political chain of command. In all, the document gives the impression of an 
untrained operative seeking something substantive to report to superiors, with 
little idea of what they actually wanted to know. It is likely his superiors had 
little idea either. 
Even allowing for the formalisation and professionalisation of this work over 
time, the report-generating culture that Fraser describes was never as 
monolithic as portrayed. Regular political reports had a tendency to skirt over 
or downplay substantive issues, preferring to highlight positive developments 
and efforts.17 A commissar who reported defects was only inviting intrusion 
from superiors demanding action or threatening replacement. Fred Thomas, for 
instance, noted just how little resemblance to reality such reports could have, 
gently mocking Bob Cooney’s daily lie that ‘the morale of the troops remains 
high’, while the Battalion seethed about delayed repatriation in late 1938.18 
Critical or interrogative reports tended to be written by outsiders when 
something went wrong, not by commissars dealing with day-to-day problems.19 
In fact, these daily reports also challenge Fraser’s cynicism about concern for 
volunteers’ welfare: commissars often highlighted practical problems in an 
attempt to get them resolved. After a series of reports in April-May 1938 
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highlighting the Battalion’s clothing needs, Cooney resorted to brutal sarcasm to 
make his point.20  
Fashion note: Pants are being worn short this season – in some cases so 
short as to be hardly visible. Boots are being worn without soles.21 
Such reports rarely touched on individuals as imagined by Fraser, and tended to 
deal with morale and discipline only in general terms. There were, however, 
other channels available. Perhaps most infamous were the ‘characterisations’, a 
broad effort to summarise and categorise each volunteers’ political and military 
reliability. Yet these were far more ambiguous than they first appear. The 
characterisations’ repeating formulae and authors indicate strongly that this 
was not the gradual outcome of espionage reports from informants, but rather 
exercises in which certain individuals were given lists of volunteers on whom to 
offer their opinion. Among the Scots, Cooney, Peter Kerrigan and Alec 
Donaldson sometimes performed this duty, alongside other senior communists 
such as Arthur Olorenshaw and Mick Economides.22 The inevitable result was a 
slew of hasty, ill-informed and occasionally contradictory observations. Charles 
McLean of Dundee, for instance, was evaluated twice in the space of a week, first 
judging him to be ‘good’, ‘steady’ and ‘brave.’ Three days later, another report 
took the opposite view – he was ‘bad’, ‘anti-Party’ and ‘anti-Leadership’, and, 
memorably, ‘not intelligent enough to be a Trotskyist.’23  
The language of Stalinism seeped into these evaluations. Volunteers might be 
‘lumpen’, ‘demoralised’ or ‘inactive’, an ‘opportunist’ or a ‘bad’ or ‘mediocre’ 
element, or worse, a ‘disruptor’, ‘provocateur’, ‘spy’ or ‘Trotskyist’.24 Many of 
these labels were used liberally, to the extent that one is left with the 
impression that few volunteers measured up to expectations. Yet it is curious 
how little power these labels appeared to have. While being branded a 
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Trotskyist would seem an immensely serious accusation, it was no guarantee of 
any special punishment, much less liquidation. William Bannerman, for 
example, noted to have ‘Trotskyite tendencies’, never faced any action against 
him whatsoever.25 Dundonian George Poustie was similarly noted to have 
‘Anarcho-Trotskyite’ views, which had made him a ‘disruptive element.’ 
However, it was not until he deserted – allegedly to join an anarchist unit – that 
he faced punishment, and even then his treatment was unexceptional, being 
assigned to a fortification detail before his capture during the Aragon retreats.26 
In fact, it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish any pattern to the punishments 
meted out to those receiving Stalinist labels. The most persuasive interpretation 
is that such labels were applied after an individual had fallen from grace. This is 
aptly demonstrated by cases where dissenting views emerged after volunteers 
had left Spain, such as John Paterson of Edinburgh, who attacked the ‘Stalinists’ 
controlling the International Brigades after going home, but was never 
identified for censure during his actual service.27 Deserters or criminals were 
not presciently labelled as troublemakers; rather, their crime led to a re-
evaluation of their prior service and character. Labels followed punishment 
rather than the other way around.  
This suggests that rather than being a system designed to monitor and control 
political expression, these systematic evaluations had another purpose. One 
route to understanding it is the communist view that their success relied on the 
identification, training and development of exceptional activists, or ‘cadres’, to 
provide the required level of leadership at all levels. In its ideal, this was a truly 
transnational system – local districts identified talent and provided training, 
developed further at the national level and, for a chosen few, at the 
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International Lenin School at Moscow.28 National Communist Parties were 
under constant pressure from the Comintern to expand, improve and justify its 
cadre policy, and this dynamic carried over into the International Brigades, with 
the identification and development of cadres a key concern for leaders at all 
levels.29 
There is no doubt that the CPGB saw its cadre policy as intertwined with the 
International Brigades. Spain was seen as a crucible from which activists would 
emerge hardened and experienced, providing a new generation of leaders for 
the Party.30 Robert Walker, for instance, observed in December 1937 that 
‘there’s no doubt the Party in Britain is going to be immensely enriched from the 
ranks of the IB when this is over.’31 Moreover, peacetime approaches to cadre 
development informed practice in Spain. Assessing potential – now as section 
commanders and commissars, rather than district committee representatives – 
was still a major concern. This meant an almost universal need for information 
about recruits and veterans alike, to identify those who performed well and 
demonstrated potential for promotion. A negative evaluation, therefore, was 
usually not a punishment, but a warning against their being trusted with further 
responsibility. This in turn helps explain why so many volunteers were framed 
negatively, even when their military service was satisfactory – they were not 
being measured against their actual service, but their perceived potential.  
There is considerable evidence for this interpretation. For one, volunteers who 
died tended to not have accrued evaluations, indicating that it tended to happen 
either near their return home or following a transgression.32 The single most 
                                                        
28 Gidon Cohen and Kevin Morgan, ‘Stalin’s Sausage Machine. British Students at the 
International Lenin School, 1926–37’, Twentieth Century British History 13:4 (2002), 328–9. 
29 E.g., ‘Report on Some Main Tactical and Cadre Problems Confronting the CPGB’, 26 December 
1937, RGASPI, 495/20/91/29–54. 
30 This aim was most explicitly reflected upon in CPGB Central Committee Meeting, 19 March 
1939, 495/14/265/49,53. Equally, it was acknowledged that Spain had substantially disrupted 
cadre work in Britain. ‘On the work of the Cadre Commission’, 16 August 1937, RGASPI, 
495/14/241/36–7. 
31 Walker to Kerrigan, 30 December 1937, MML, Box 50, File Wk/1. 
32 Ernest Sim of Aberdeen, for instance, was in Spain from October 1937 until his death in 




extensive attempt to evaluate volunteers came immediately prior to their 
withdrawal in December 1938, with some completed just days before the 
volunteers returned to Britain.33 Such documents could have little bearing on 
how individuals were treated in Spain; their only logical use was informing 
Party work at home. A summary was sent back to Britain, alongside a letter 
from Andre Marty explaining the logic of the evaluations, which classified each 
volunteer as either ‘cadre’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘weak’ or ‘bad’.34 It was very clear that 
the purpose had been to evaluate the volunteers’ potential for future Party 
roles.35 Cadres, for instance, might ‘play a valuable role in the majority of district 
leaderships’, while the merely ‘Good’ might be ‘cadres in the local committees’ 
but would likely ‘greatly benefit from a course of political training.’ Conversely, 
while ‘Weak’ comrades ‘can do useful work’, ‘the Party should never forget the 
weakness they have shown in Spain’ and ‘bad’ volunteers were to be excluded 
from the Party altogether.36 Both timing and method indicate an effort to 
manage human resources, not monitor or punish those with dissenting political 
views. 
Comintern cadre policy was also reflected in attempts to gather 
autobiographical information on the volunteers. This was common practice in 
the Soviet Union, where foreign communists were required to complete a series 
of forms and oral declarations about their personal histories, which in turn 
acted to enhance surveillance and control of the Party membership.37 In Spain, 
cadres often had to provide detailed autobiographical statements early in their 
service, while those who joined the PCE also filled out long autobiographical 
questionnaires, processes that were more haphazard than in the Soviet Union 
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but broadly comparable.38 Attempts to extend this process to rank and file 
volunteers on their departure, however, exposed the limits to the transmission 
of Stalinist cultures to Spain. For many volunteers, there was little impetus to fill 
out these forms fully or faithfully, subverting their use as a window into their 
personal and political backgrounds.  
Beyond indicating the limits of Stalinism in Spain, this attempt to expand the 
boundaries of autobiographical declarations resulted in a useful set of sources, 
allowing junior or ‘undeveloped’ volunteers the chance to express themselves in 
a way usually reserved only for the Party faithful. As such, these particular 
forms provide insight into those who were neither ‘true believers’ nor overtly at 
odds with the Party. Using several isolated examples, James Hopkins and Robert 
Stradling claim that these forms confirm an atmosphere of paranoia, pointing to 
several responses indicating that they felt unsafe expressing dissenting views.39 
Yet this also indicates that perceived political surveillance had limited impact in 
curtailing political expression. While these individuals had concerns, they were 
nonetheless comfortable openly admitting to holding dissenting views while 
still in Spain.  
A wider sample provides a somewhat more nuanced picture than Hopkins and 
Stradling allowed. Nearly half of the thirty-one Scots whose forms were 
preserved left political questions blank or gave fragmented or single-word 
responses, perhaps indicating disinterest, or simply that the long form was 
tedious to complete. Disinterest in politics was also conveyed by responses 
indicating that they had not studied the Spanish Government’s ’13 Points’ 
programme.40 Most answers, fragmented or not, were positive, ranging from 
John Alcorn’s sole observation that ‘Fascism must be crushed whatever the 
price', to Hugh Sloan, who wrote several florid lines in response to most 
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questions.41 This helps confirm the conclusion that while they considered 
themselves political, most working-class volunteers had less interest in abstract 
theory and doctrine.  
However, despite this general positivity, this was not necessarily a place in 
which volunteers’ views were sanitised. A substantial minority took the 
opportunity to express criticisms or grievances. Several, responding to 
questions about punishments received in Spain, indicated their resentment. 
James Glavin, who received a fine and a stint in a labour battalion for drinking, 
thought the verdict was just, ‘but sentence was too harsh.’42 Robert McLean, 
jailed for desertion, also did not think that he had received ‘just’ treatment.43 Yet 
both were still positive about the Battalion itself, with McLean writing that he 
was ‘proud to have belonged to it although I wasn't a credit to it.’44 Others trod a 
similar line. Allan Hughes thought there was ‘much room for improvement’ in 
the Battalion, echoed by James Arthur who noted that it ‘could have been 
better.’45 Yet both also responded positively to political questions, Arthur 
commenting that ‘what I have heard of [the 13 Points] is excellent.’46 The overall 
impression is of a frank willingness to identify problems, but distinguishing 
between individual grievances and the International Brigades as a whole. While, 
as discussed in the next section, it is a mistake to divorce practical complaints 
from political meaning, it is clear that while many volunteers found fault with 
the International Brigades, few questioned the cause itself. 
The few such forms completed by senior communists contrast with the others, 
while providing their own insights. George Murray and Chris Smith were more 
senior than the norm for this form, and gave long, detailed responses, befitting 
their advanced political development. Yet both also took the opportunity to 
                                                        
41 ‘John Alcorn – Declaration’, RGASPI, 545/6/101/16; ‘Hugh Smith – Declaration’, RGASPI, 
545/6/202/87. 
42 ‘James Glavin – Declaration’, RGASPI, 545/6/140/26. 
43 ‘Robert McLean – Declaration’, 3 November 1938, RGASPI, 545/6/171/63. 
44 ‘Robert McLean – Declaration’, RGASPI. 
45 ‘James Arthur – Declaration’, RGASPI, 545/6/102/32; ‘Allan Hughes – Declaration’, RGASPI, 
545/6/150/16. 




point out flaws. Murray criticised the International Brigades’ ‘military 
weaknesses’ stemmed from the ‘avoidable exposure of officers to danger,’ while 
Smith claimed that their ‘military organisation very often lags behind that of 
Spanish Brigades.’47 As a SIM representative, Murray’s willingness to offer 
criticism is especially interesting.48 Thanks to his job, Murray would have been 
more aware than most as to the limits of acceptable expression, not to mention 
any potential consequences. That he felt comfortable speaking his mind to at 
least some extent indicates that the effect of surveillance was not as draconian 
as claimed by the likes of Hamish Fraser. Bob Cooney also showed little fear 
when castigating the SIM to his superiors after the mistaken arrest and 
imprisonment of Eugene McParland. 
I think something should be done about the slovenly methods of the 
SIM… Comrade Ivan tries to justify himself by saying that ‘McParland 
deserves to be arrested anyhow.’ This is irresponsible talk and such an 
attitude puts weapons into the hands of bad elements.49 
As Baxell points out, Cooney’s willingness to voice such criticism challenges any 
argument that the SIM wielded absolute power over the International 
Brigades.50 Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how any system designed to 
curtail or punish political deviance could have functioned in the British 
Battalion without the knowledge or participation of Cooney, its chief political 
officer. Rather, the relative independence of figures such as Cooney – 
unimpeachably loyal yet willing to stand up to superiors – points to their 
potential as circuit breakers between the extremes of repression enacted by the 
SIM or NKVD in other arenas, and the relatively isolated political cultures in 
individual battalions.51  
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Cooney, Murray and Smith were clearly experienced enough political operatives 
that they felt qualified and able to make criticisms. This reflects the importance 
of democratic centralist doctrine in the Communist Party, with members 
expected to communicate criticism and feedback to their superiors, while 
strictly maintaining the Party line in public.52 Moreover, in Smith and Murray’s 
case, the conservative nature of their criticism indicates sensitivity to 
misinterpretation. Their comments can be interpreted as aiming to demonstrate 
an active and critical political mind, while sticking to safe subjects that would 
not be construed as disloyalty. As such, while their words point to the limits of 
any absolutist interpretation of political control in the International Brigades, 
they cannot be taken as evidence that volunteers were able or willing to freely 
express political views. Instead, they and other examples point to a more 
complex set of constraints on political expression, which operated through a 
series of Stalinist norms that acted to police the boundary between acceptable 
and unacceptable discourses. These norms worked not just by defining suitable 
topics for discussion, but also by shaping the language used, the appropriate 
settings and individuals’ personal standing. 
Less politically experienced individuals were more likely to run afoul of these 
unwritten rules. An outsider’s perspective is found in the memoir of Fausto 
Villar Esteban, who recalled a fraught experience when asked his views on 
strategy by some American communists. After hesitating but deciding to ‘speak 
[his] mind’, for most of his talk ‘all of the Brigaders are nodding approval, but 
the moment I mention the chances of Franco striking out for the Mediterranean, 
a chorus of murmurs goes up labelling me a defeatist and even a fascist.’ 
Although his friends smoothed the incident over, Esteban had learned his 
lesson, and was careful to frame his observations more prudently afterwards.53 
Charles O’Neill, an inexperienced Glaswegian communist, also stumbled over 
these unwritten rules. In O’Neill’s case, he was required to make an abject 
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apology to Political Commissar Dave Springhall for ‘allowing my personal 
feeling to get the better of me’ and ‘neglecting his CP line.’54 However, his 
‘political honesty’ and good front service worked in his favour, and O’Neill 
received generally positive evaluations, albeit not regarding his future as a 
complex political thinker.55 Such incidents confirm not just the existence of 
opaque boundaries to ‘acceptable’ criticisms, but also the importance of 
personal standing and strong relationships in mitigating any consequences.56  
Status and unwritten rules also defined more formal meetings, characterised by 
Cooney as ‘where our weaknesses were thrashed out in a spirit of healthy self-
criticism.’57 This can be understood as further evidence of democratic 
centralism in practice, with meetings acting as acceptable spaces for criticisms 
to be voiced, although Party leaders still expected criticism to be voiced in 
certain ways.  However, not all such discussions could be mediated strictly by 
Stalinist norms. Tom Murray was candid in acknowledging the reactive nature 
of some such meetings, particularly when confronting simmering issues like 
repatriation.58 One report from August 1937 noted that once withdrawn from 
the line, ‘almost every form of complaint began to be heard at once, combined 
with cynical expressions about the conduct of the war, the offensive, and the 
government.’ Even ‘good’ Party members took part, hinting at a dynamic where 
collective discontent provided a degree of safety and legitimacy for questioning 
military and political leadership.59 Such incidents recurred throughout the war. 
An ‘extraordinary meeting’ of XV Brigade Commissars in September 1938 
discussed the ubiquitous and open complaints regarding their exhaustion and 
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desire to return home, even among officers.60 Such examples suggest that the 
enforcement of Stalinist norms required collective understanding and policing 
of the boundaries, and as such could not simply be imposed upon an unwilling 
group. While the leadership was naturally concerned about such views, so long 
as they were commonly held there was little they could do. 
In some cases, however, the Party was very successful in shaping the 
boundaries of acceptable discourse, notably in the response to the May 1937 
fighting in Barcelona between communist-backed government forces and the 
POUM.61 The CPGB had especial reason for concern, even beyond the usual 
obsession with ‘Trotskyists’. The small British contingent in the POUM militia, 
as well as the presence in Barcelona of other non-communist activists, meant 
that other versions of events spread to Britain – a particular concern in 
Scotland, with several prominent Scottish ILP members and anarchists, notably 
Ethel MacDonald, able to provide alternative versions of events.62 Ignoring or 
downplaying the incident might have allowed space for these anti-Stalinist 
critiques of the communist role in Spain to take root among less ideologically 
committed volunteers.  
The response was a swift and unprecedented propaganda campaign. Within 
days, the XV Brigade press published articles on the ‘revolutionary face of 
fascism’, containing unprecedented vitriol. 
Following months of patient explaining, the Government has finally 
determined to tolerate no more ‘leftist’ sabotage in the rearguard. Not 
sabotage alone, but thinly disguised banditry alienating the sympathies 
of the peasant and small trader from the Republic... Against the Fascist 
inspired terrorists the central Government made its hand felt, taking full 
responsibility for public order in Catalonia…  
The hour for physical extermination of Trotskyism has arrived.63 
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This marked a distinct departure from the usual language of unity and the 
Popular Front. It is a sign, perhaps, that the extremes of Stalinism were only 
lightly buried, that the leap to policies of extermination was uncomfortably 
small. Any volunteer with connections to the Communist Party knew and 
understood the ‘Trotskyist’ label as signifying an enemy within, even before 
coming to Spain. As the Battalion was never called into direct action against the 
‘Trotskyists’, it is difficult to say whether these labels would have served their 
purpose in legitimising liquidation. Hugh Sloan recalled his newly-arrived group 
being asked whether they would be willing to ‘help put an end’ to the ‘situation 
in Barcelona’, to which ‘the whole group agreed.’64 What was meant and 
understood by this is vague, but ominous – although their willingness clearly 
predated arrival in Spain.  
Such language made it impossible to formulate any sort of legitimate dissent 
when it came to the POUM. A firm line had been drawn around acceptable 
discourse, and crossing it would mean setting oneself against not only the Party, 
but also the Republican war effort itself, which all volunteers agreed was 
sacrosanct. That is not to say that these attacks should be viewed entirely 
cynically. Private and public records indicate that the British leadership 
wholeheartedly believed what they were saying about the POUM. Casual 
references in private letters between communist loyalists follow the public line 
closely, such as one message from William McGregor to Peter Kerrigan, 
commenting on how the POUM and ILP had engineered the ‘rising in our rear at 
Barcelona.’65 For Party activists, these attitudes dovetailed neatly with their 
views on the ILP contingent. Even months after the controversy in Barcelona, 
William McAulay reacted bitterly to what he saw as the ILP’s attempt to 
piggyback on the International Brigades’ reputation. 
I showed your letter to several of the lads, and what surprised all of 
them, was the reference you made to the ILP speaking about an ILP 
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section of the International Brigade. I have been in Spain now for 11 
months and have never heard about it until I read your letter. We were 
all disgusted to hear that the ILP are attempting to cash in on the name of 
the International Brigade.66 
Such letters reflect the success of efforts to define political discourse 
surrounding the POUM and ILP. This was the result of consistent efforts to 
promote this line across several mediums. William Gilmour, for instance, wrote 
about one particularly effective lecture from American communist Bob Miller, 
who ‘simplified the recent Barcelona disturbances, the intricacies, facts and 
figures were all proved to us by documents and newspaper cuttings’, producing 
‘all that condemned the Trotskyites, and Fascists.’67 Articles continued to appear 
regularly in the Brigade press, such as a supposed first-hand account entitled 
‘Trotskyist Traitors’ by ILP volunteer J. A. Franford detailing the ‘suspicious’ 
activities he had witnessed while in the POUM militia, illustrated by a menacing 
caricature of Trotsky.68 Even a year later, in June 1938, Tom Murray wrote 
home about the political meetings he organised about the ‘Catalonian question’ 
and how Trotskyism ‘attempts to operate in Spain.’69 Even in oral history 
interviews decades later, there was often unwillingness to deviate far from 
these views. For some, the vendetta against the POUM and Orwell would last a 
lifetime.70 
Yet it would be a mistake to view this episode as entirely typical of the XV 
Brigade press. There is no doubt that the Party controlled the editorial line in 
the main publications, Volunteer for Liberty and Nuestro Combate/Our Fight, but 
they were still spaces that could allow for diverse forms of expression.71 Editors 
appeared genuinely concerned not just with conveying the correct political 
message but providing a useful service, soliciting advice, suggestions and 
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content from readers.72 Particularly in the earliest days of publication, Nuestro 
Combate was not written as a monolithic imposition of the Party line, but as a 
dialogue, implicitly giving space to and engaging with criticism of the political 
and military leadership. The first trial of British volunteers for desertion in 
March 1937 was one such instance. 
All of them have been connected with the working-class movement at 
home. These men pleaded guilty. They claimed worry about their 
relatives. Are not the over whelming [sic] majority of the comrades in the 
same position… 
Let us be frank. There are still other comrades who murmur that the 
sentences were harsh. We urge such comrades to reflect again upon the 
character of the struggle and to consider the danger of such weaklings in 
our ranks.73 
Similarly, the next issue confronted demands for relief, arguing that their 
leaders ‘know that better than we do’ and concluding that while everyone could 
use a rest, ‘it must not be as a result of committees, but when our comrades in 
the Brigade can get it for us.’74 An April issue acknowledged complaints about 
the postal service, a subject that still came in for gentle mockery months later.75 
While there is no doubt that this was an overt defence of the Party position, 
these formulations were qualitatively different from those used in describing 
the POUM and Trotskyism, in acknowledging critical voices and responding to 
them.  
Although most articles were earnest and serious, humour was not neglected 
altogether. Most full issues of both journals contained at least one political 
cartoon, often lampooning the foibles of fascism and its leaders.76 Aside from 
providing a rich vein of comic material, the normalisation of explicitly anti-
fascist humour served a useful political purpose. The use of humour could also 
be didactic – a long-running cartoon about the rhyming misadventures of 
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‘Moocho Pinter’ was one memorable way to reinforce correct military 
behaviour.77 A regular column named ‘After Taps’ reported brief vignettes and 
in-jokes about XV Brigade members, often impenetrably obscure.78 Here, the 
purpose was far more mundane but just as vital – entertainment and 
camaraderie. A similar mix of politics and fun is visible in the entertainment the 
volunteers organised for themselves, such as amateur dramatics, which might 
be based on anything from sending up Franco to the classic gag of dressing up in 
drag.79 
Occasionally, newspapers allowed for slightly edgier expressions of humour. 
This was sometimes a matter of form rather than substance, such as an article 
on beards using the tone and structure of the more usual political exhortations, 
gently mocking the newspaper’s propaganda as well as the beardless.80 Such 
content was common in the ‘wall newspapers’ run by smaller units, where 
articles were posted on bulletin boards that could be read in passing. Few 
examples remain, but one curated by Bob Cooney during training at Tarazona 
survives in the Comintern archive.81 Conceived of as an outlet for petty griping 
among the recruits, articles were often pointedly satirical. Even Cooney joined 
in the fun, writing a droll ‘Orders of the Day’, complete with illustrations.82 
Another mock report on a training exercise pilloried the volunteers’ collective 
obsession with food, but also showed keen awareness of the political language 
of the International Brigades, memorably blaming the failure to share out 
pilfered grapes on a ‘low level of political understanding.’83 
Such satires occupy an interesting cultural space. They were not intended to 
challenge authority directly, especially under the guardianship of a figure such 
as Cooney. However, such efforts were immensely self-aware. They indicate that 
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the authors – and presumably their audience – grasped that some aspects of the 
International Brigades’ political culture were ridiculous, and responded through 
‘the curious British habit of taking the piss.’84 While they might believe in the 
cause they fought for, and broadly approved of the methods employed, they 
were also able to realise and acknowledge that not everything worked perfectly. 
Seeking solace in humour, like many who find themselves in the grip of 
institutionalised absurdity, was a natural response. Such instances indicate that 
Stalinist norms were not simply imposed from above, rather, volunteers were 
aware of what was happening, able to critique and even mock some doctrinal 
excesses.85 Equally, however, responding with humour indicates a willingness 
to accept absurdity in the name of the cause. The volunteers, instead of being 
faced with a stark choice between subjecting themselves fully to Stalinism or 
rejecting it outright, found some space in which to define their own response.  
 
Demoralisation and Disaffection 
 
When considering the range of responses the International Brigades volunteers 
might make to their political environment, it is worth returning briefly to 
several points made in earlier chapters about who the Scottish volunteers were 
and why they went to Spain. Ideological diversity was considerably less than 
has often been assumed, with the vast bulk of volunteers coming from within 
the Communist Party’s orbit. Yet equally, only a minority were committed 
communist ideologues – perhaps a quarter, as suggested in Chapter One – and 
most were not intellectuals. This is not to suggest they were stupid – far from it 
– but their attraction to communism was rarely fostered by an appreciation of 
its theoretical constructs. Books were not required for working-class Scots to 
see the problems plaguing Britain during the interwar period – in the words of 
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David Anderson, it was ‘just plain common sense.’86 In understanding adherence 
to communism as transcending a deliberate or considered decision, this section 
builds upon the work of Thomas Linehan, who explores the importance of 
activists’ emotional identification with communism.87 For many working-class 
recruits who went to Spain, the attraction of communism was generally not its 
theoretical superiority to other forms of progressive thought, but its pragmatic 
and forthright activism. The claim that communism offered the only viable 
blueprint ‘with the potential to mount an effective revolutionary challenge to 
the capitalist order’ was a powerful one.88 The pre-Spanish Civil War record of 
communist activism – demonstrations, strikes, Hunger Marches and so on – 
reinforced this central message that they were the party actually addressing 
society’s problems. These were ‘instinctive’ communists – for whom the Party 
was attractive on a visceral rather than intellectual level.89  
Naturally, volunteers cannot be categorised neatly into two categories of 
‘intellectual’ versus ‘instinctive’ communists, and any given individual fell on a 
spectrum between the two. Most had been exposed to communist literature or 
lectures; equally, intellectual converts were animated by the thrill of taking 
direct action.90 Yet it is still clear that most Scots clustered at one end of this 
spectrum. When they were asked what they had learned while in Spain, they did 
not praise their theoretical instruction. Rather, they pointed to the practical 
lessons. Andrew Smith, for instance, channelled the spirit if not the language of 
the Popular Front in proclaiming that ‘a people together makes a better policy 
than a divided mob.’91 Allan Hughes allowed that he had learned ‘how to use 
many firearms and to take charge of men.’92 Evaluations abound of individuals, 
often competent fighters, who had little or no ‘political development’, other 
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reports decried the fact that many volunteers seemed to know ‘less about Spain 
now in a political sense than when they came here.’93 Perhaps both typifying 
this archetype and confirming its ubiquity beyond Scotland, Dundonian David 
Menzies was noted to share ‘the usual British characteristic of indifference to 
theory.’94  
Insofar as historians have acknowledged the perspective of these volunteers, 
the result has been to paint them as apolitical, sick of the preaching of Political 
Commissars, boring political meetings, or mystified by constant references to 
Marxist theory.95 Such points can be sympathetic – many historians can relate to 
sitting unwillingly through dense theoretical discussions – or used as evidence 
that the Communist Party had lost the plot when it came to politicising the 
International Brigades.96 Yet volunteers who disdained political theory were not 
necessarily apolitical. Rather, their understanding of politics and the purpose of 
the International Brigades and Communist Party was different – they were in 
Spain to take action, in accordance with their views that joined the Party if you 
wanted to get something done instead of talking about it. Being a communist 
meant being tough, pragmatic, organised and disciplined.97 In Roderick 
MacFarqhuar’s words, it was the ‘discipline, unity and comradeship’ that made 
such a ‘tremendous impression’ on him and many others who joined.98 Even 
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those who considered themselves anti-fascists rather than communists had 
often joined the International Brigades in the belief that the communists knew 
best how to defeat fascism. However, just as going to Spain could help affirm 
their political faith, the actual experience of serving in the International 
Brigades could challenge it.  
This makes it problematic to draw any neat line between demoralisation and 
political dissent. Baxell attempts to do so, writing that desertion in particular 
‘did not so much represent a dissatisfaction with the political organisation of the 
battalion’, but rather the ‘high casualties’ and the ‘lack of leave and 
repatriation.’99 These were indeed major drivers of desertion in Spain, yet such 
arguments are constrained by a limited vision of political belief. Given the 
nature of working-class volunteers’ allegiance to communism – based on a 
belief in the effectiveness of communist methods, the competency of their 
leadership and their claims to best represent the working class – demoralisation 
can readily be understood as a loss of faith in the Party’s promises.100 Real or 
perceived incompetence was not just demoralising in its effects, but a challenge 
to their political understandings. If communist methods and leadership became 
seen as ineffective, or as out of step with their fundamental values, the resulting 
disaffection must be understood as political. 
The potential for demoralisation to become political is best demonstrated by 
one of the most severe outbreaks of disillusionment in the Battalion’s history: 
the aftermath of the Battle of Calaceite and subsequent capture of over one 
hundred British volunteers.101 This was one of the worst disasters in the British 
Battalion’s history, and it is unsurprising that for many taken prisoner, faith in 
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communist leadership was shattered. In his secret report to the CPGB after their 
return, Gary McCartney recalled the first few days after capture. 
It is to be regretted that during this period we cannot be very proud of a 
large number of prisoners. True, the position was very uncertain and in 
many instances the treatment received was violent… Many prisoners 
were apprehensive and a large number demoralised. They expressed 
violent reactions to the Party and Battalion leadership. The Party was 
held responsible for the general administration of the Battalion and that 
the Battalion leadership was ineffective. But for this, it was held, no-one 
would have been taken prisoner.102 
McCartney’s judgement here – echoed throughout his report when referring to 
‘weak’ or ‘bad’ elements – hints at the extent to which demoralisation went 
beyond despair at the prisoners’ situation, but reflected a fundamental loss of 
faith in the effectiveness of communist leadership and methods. There can be no 
doubt that Calaceite was an unmitigated disaster.103 Questioning the 
competence and intentions of the Party in the circumstance, and re-evaluating 
one’s personal loyalties in light of this, was a natural response. For many 
volunteers, it was the Party’s claim that they alone offered effective leadership 
against fascism that had won their allegiance, and their recent experiences had 
given them ample reason to revise this judgement. It is worth noting that 
McCartney’s report was written by and for the CPGB leadership, and could 
hardly give credence to any notion of the Party’s fundamental failures. Blaming 
the disaffected volunteers’ own failings was the only way to avoid this. 
For McCartney and other ‘leading Party members’, it was clear that they needed 
to organise, or risk substantial numbers of the prisoners collaborating with 
their captors. However, thanks to the timing, this task was considerably more 
difficult than it might have been. The British Battalion had received many new 
recruits before the battle, and there had been little time to get acquainted. 
Without established personal connections, ‘it was extremely difficult for Party 
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members to consult’, not least because some ‘weak elements’ were ‘openly 
declaring their preference for Fascism’ and ‘applaud[ing] the Italian officers.’104 
In this atmosphere, it was connections from home that paved the way for 
cooperation. McCartney collaborated with two individuals known to him from 
Scotland, William Collins and John Penman, to form the basis of a secret 
committee.105 This meant trust could be established quickly, allowing the 
committee to take shape relatively rapidly and with confidence in one another’s’ 
reliability – a reminder of the continued importance of personal networks in 
Spain. This was not a specifically Scottish phenomenon. Unbeknownst to 
McCartney and his comrades, a separate group, centred on London Party circles, 
also formed a secret committee in these early days, along the same lines of 
established acquaintance and trust.106 It is no coincidence that the Party 
districts best-represented in Spain – Scotland and London – were those able to 
utilise established networks and form committees. Only after the situation had 
calmed did these committees become aware of each other and eventually 
amalgamate. 
Tensions also came to the fore in the various ‘sharp divisions’ that cropped up 
throughout their imprisonment, on issues as varied as whether they should 
agree to shout ‘Franco’ on parade, or if they should campaign for better food.107 
Initiatives boasted about later, such as educational lectures, ‘had to be 
discontinued due to the activities of informers and the attitudes of the 
officers.’108 Discontent could be difficult to address due to the situation. By 
necessity, the committee was secret, and had difficulty communicating and 
enforcing decisions.109 The organisers also decided to assume what amounted 
to dictatorial powers, rejecting proposals that decisions should be discussed 
and ratified by smaller groups, on the basis that this was ‘false democracy’ and 
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increased the risk of penetration by informers.110 While precautions were 
certainly understandable, this attitude could breed resentment – even Party 
members started referring to them as ‘the Secret Six’, and ‘much criticism and 
condemnation’ came from both ‘bad elements’ and ‘Party members’ alike.111 All 
of this meant that whatever the logic of their decisions, the Camp Committee, 
and by extension the Party, left itself open to accusations of arbitrariness, petty 
corruption and the uneven distribution of burdens and rewards. For some, such 
frustrations echoed their experiences of peacetime Communist Party 
branches.112  
In general, McCartney’s report can be read as a justification of the line taken by 
the committee, presenting itself as a middle way between defeatism and the 
dangerous, hot-headed types who wanted to take a more activist line against 
their captors. This closely reflects two ways that demoralisation became linked 
to volunteers’ adherence to communism. On one hand, defeatism and 
collaboration points to a loss of faith in communist competence, and their ability 
to provide effective organisation and leadership – in other words, their central 
claim that they knew how to best lead and organise an effective political 
movement. This very episode was adapted for this propaganda purpose, with a 
pamphlet published claiming that that the Party’s approach to organising the 
prisoners was ‘undeniable proof of the value of Communist leadership.’113 On 
the other hand, however, the actions of ‘hot-headed’ types, points to difficulties 
living up to their promise of forthright activism, that the Party took action 
rather than simply talking about it. For volunteers who had been attracted to 
communism for either of these reasons, the experience of captivity could readily 
lead to their partial or full repudiation of communist leadership. 
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The politics of demoralisation could also be a trap for Communist Party 
functionaries in less stressful circumstances than captivity. So long as problems 
like poor morale were viewed as stemming from a lack of political 
understanding – best remedied by political instruction – they risked being seen 
as talkers rather than doers. Lectures about politics were unlikely to appease 
volunteers who doubted their leaders’ ability to actually solve practical or 
administrative problems. Sometimes the best results were achieved by turning 
this question back on the volunteers, such as when Tom Murray stepped in to 
defuse tension ahead of the Battle of the Ebro in July 1938. 
This deputy chappie was a Welshman… he was given the task of making 
a statement to strengthen the feelings and morale of those people who 
had been constantly talking about going home. He made such a mess of it 
that I intervened… I made a statement in which I said ‘Look here, we’re 
soldiers of the Spanish Army. The Government, Dr Negrin’s Government, 
has a 13-point programme to which all of us have subscribed. We are the 
disciplined soldiers of the Spanish Army. We are not here to speculate 
about whether we’re going to the front or going home… Meantime, we 
know that we are preparing for an offensive against the Fascists, and 
therefore the only question before us is how efficiently we can 
prepare.’114 
Here, Murray describes reaching out to ordinary volunteers on their own terms, 
pointing out that they were there to take action, and everything else was 
secondary. While Murray may have been liberal with his self-praise, it is 
nonetheless clear that this method was considerably more effective than 
appeals to abstract political ideals. This points to morale problems stemming 
not from a lack of political will or instruction, but the inability of some senior 
communists to speak the same political language as the rank-and-file 
volunteers. For many volunteers, a political speaker who could cut through 
jargon and make a case plainly was highly valued.115 Interestingly, two of the 
most highly regarded Battalion Commissars, Cooney and Aitken, were both 
Scots. While this could be coincidental, it may also reflect the nature of Party 
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work in Scotland. As noted previously, the emphasis on practical organisation 
over theoretical instruction in Scottish working-class communities may have 
given Scottish communists a predilection for emphasising problem solving over 
political harangues in Spain – traits both Cooney and Aitken were praised for by 
Scots and non-Scots alike.116 
Murray’s encounter also aptly illustrates the duality of the Political Commissar’s 
role.117 A successful commissar could do much to identify and solve problems, 
acting as a mouthpiece for ordinary volunteers’ concerns. However, they could 
also act as lightning rods for dissent and dissatisfaction, especially if they came 
to be seen as apologists for the mistakes and inequities of higher command, or 
as purely political figures who avoided frontline service.118 Many more 
practically-minded volunteers saw them as a nuisance; James Chalmers 
declared when leaving that he had ‘never met a Political Commissar of any use’ 
and the Battalion could have gotten on ‘quite well without them.'119 Commissars 
could even be targets – famously, Clydebank volunteer Barney Shields urinated 
in Wally Tapsell’s boots one night, expressing his dislike for these ‘non-
combatant busybodies.’ Shields was the model of a volunteer whose politics 
were instinctive rather than theoretical – in John Dunlop’s words, he did not 
‘feel that he needed any political instruction on what he was there to do.’120 
Beyond Shields’ apparent disdain for political operatives, his choice of 
receptacle was no accident. Many believed that Political Commissars received 
differential treatment – their boots in particular became a status symbol, a 
potent one given most volunteers’ poor footwear.121 By sabotaging his boots, 
Shields was not merely taking petty revenge on Tapsell, but offering a pungent 
criticism of his office. Such ‘criticism’ highlighted discontent at the Party’s 
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failure to live up to its own egalitarian ethos, another key plank of many 
volunteers’ political attachment to the Party. That said, Tapsell understood that 
the Party risked alienating ordinary volunteers by privileging senior figures.  
I remain firmly convinced that it would have a good healthy affect if a 
leading Communist shared the ordinary life of the boys as a soldier, and 
not have the position where such comrades occupied exclusively political 
roles, or leading military ones. It would be a healthy touch of democracy, 
which would help things along.122 
Such themes of fairness and democracy were often drawn upon in volunteer 
complaints, such as in Alec Marcovitch’s critique of the differential conditions 
and treatment received by officers. While, as discussed further below, 
Marcovitch’s testimony is problematic, this issue clearly animated him 
considerably.  
They were sitting up there in this bloody HQ living like lords, they had a 
quartermaster, Walker his name was, a professional thief, organiser and 
manipulator, he used to go into the lorry in advance, get in touch with a 
colleague… before you said Bob’s your uncle there was a whole stock of 
good wines, choice wines and all the rest of it, and they were living like 
nobody’s business…  
I’m all in favour that there should be a differential in the circumstances, 
but don’t aggravate the differential. If you’re having a wee bit extra don’t 
throw it in other people’s faces, don’t make it so bloody obvious, you 
know, I mean people had it rough.123 
While similar complaints are likely universal in any army, they had particular 
resonance in this context. Communism presented itself as a doctrine of equality, 
so any real or perceived differential in treatment was not just a matter of 
irritation, but struck to the core of volunteers’ ideological commitment. The 
importance of communist fairness is drawn upon in a letter co-written by 
Dundonian James Doyle to the authorities at Albacete while imprisoned by the 
Spanish police for desertion. Doyle and his English companion claimed that as 
communists, they had ‘always fought against oppression’, which they contrasted 
with the poor treatment they were receiving in prison, at times ‘worse than we 
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receive in capitalist prisons where we expect vile treatment.’ Both admitted 
their crimes, but claimed that while ‘we deserve punishment’, ‘we also deserve 
fairness.’124 Fairness was perceived to be so integral to communist identity that 
they judged it their best avenue of appeal in the circumstances, deliberately 
contrasting the supposed fairness of communism with the inequality they 
expected under capitalism, implicitly accusing the Party of failing to live up to 
its own standards.  
Perhaps the most common complaints about differential treatment stemmed 
from the thorny issue of leave and repatriation. Senior communists were seen to 
be eluding restrictions that forced many volunteers to stay in Spain 
indefinitely.125 Many volunteers had been promised repatriation after a certain 
period of service, often six months, and demands to return home multiplied 
from mid-1937 onwards.126 George Aitken in particular struggled to cope with 
the volume of cases that needed ‘fobbed off.’127 The lack of repatriation 
opportunities was particularly egregious for the severely wounded. William 
Gilmour, for instance, became bitter about being forced to stay in Spain even 
after wounds left him unfit for further frontline service. 
Every time there is a possibility of me getting home something always 
seems to happen, and I am left high and dry, and disappointed… The part 
that rubs me is the fact that men who have not got half the service in, as 
good service, are managing to get home with comparative ease.128 
Gilmour’s complaint reflected the belief that while the rank-and-file languished 
in Spain, senior communists came and went much more freely. Baxell challenges 
this view, pointing out that the most famous such case, which saw many of the 
Battalion’s leaders recalled to Britain to answer for poor leadership, was hardly 
a holiday for those involved.129 Baxell is perhaps too generous here, however. 
However unpleasant the experience of being dressed down by Harry Pollitt, it is 
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unlikely to rival the privations dealt with daily at the front, or the frustration felt 
by those languishing in Republican hospitals. The characterisation of their 
return in Nuestro Combate as a ‘well-earned rest’ likely did not appease those 
who justifiably felt that they also deserved a rest.130 
Beyond this infamous example, some communists seemed to face fewer 
obstacles in coming and going. Sydney Quinn was open about the strings pulled 
to get him home. 
A certain comrade came to me, he says ‘there’s five of you going on a 
propaganda leave.’ Well, I was never a propagandist but apparently we 
would never have got away if we just said you’re going home, they had 
do something to satisfy the authorities. Now I wasn’t running away, 
neither was the rest of them, but we thought we’d done our share.131 
Robert Middleton, the brother of prominent Glaswegian communist George 
Middleton, also managed to obtain repatriation in slightly dubious 
circumstances. One account – which may have been unduly coloured by his 
subsequent falling out with the Party – claims he was sent home due to being 
drunk when sent to the front.132 Other sources indicate that he was wounded at 
the Battle of Jarama.133 What appears to have formally sealed his permission to 
return home, however, were ‘raisons de famille’ – his wife had died leaving three 
children requiring care. This, at least, was what had been told to the 
Commandant of the Albacete base, who supplied the necessary paperwork, but 
is not referenced at all in Middleton’s own correspondence or biographical 
details, and did not impede Middleton’s return to Spain in October.134 It is 
difficult to avoid concluding that Middleton, who had connections with CPGB 
heavyweight Peter Kerrigan, was provided with an acceptable excuse to justify 
his leave in a similar fashion to Quinn.135 
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Marcovitch is again outspoken on this question, claiming that individuals who 
had come out only briefly were going home and getting a ‘big middle page 
article’ in the Daily Worker ‘about their experiences in the Spanish Civil War.’136 
Aside from the implied slight to those who had served for months without 
publicity, Marcovitch questioned why repatriation could be arranged for them 
and not those for whom ‘if any compassion existed at all they should have been 
permitted.’137 He was hardly the only one to complain about this phenomenon. 
William Benson, while not a Scot, offered a particularly pithy summary of such 
feelings. 
Between them they sent young Barker back to the line, the one comrade 
who should have been sent back to England. He will probably get killed 
and nothing will be said about him, while hero’s [sic] like Kerrigan, 
Springhall, Aitken and Copeman, will continue to be headliners in the 
DW. shit [original emphasis].138 
Both Benson and Marcovitch linked perceived inequities surrounding 
repatriation to unhappiness regarding Communist Party representations of the 
volunteers. While most allowed that propaganda about the British Battalion was 
necessary, they also felt frustration at how the spotlight lingered on senior 
communists and other prominent figures, especially if reporting did not 
conform to what they had experienced. Such rewards tended to accrue to 
communists in good political standing, often regardless of the nature of their 
service – Alec Donaldson, for instance, was singled out to receive a special 
signed message from La Pasionaria as reward for good service, despite never 
serving at the front and having in fact refused to do so when asked.139 In 
another list of ‘distinguished’ figures in the XV Brigade, only one Briton, Scot 
George Murray, was not an officer or commissar – but he was the secretary of 
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the British Battalion’s Party Committee.140 While they may all have rendered 
outstanding service, such lists gave credence to the complaint that only a chosen 
few were receiving public glory for their actions.141  
Whether or not these complaints stemmed from perception or reality, there is 
no doubt that some among the Battalion’s leadership soon realised that they 
needed to be countered. Writing to Glasgow communist Thomas Anderson prior 
to the Battle of Brunete, Tapsell laid out the reasons why he was refused 
repatriation. 
All leave outside Spain, all repatriation other than grounds of complete 
physical incompetence for any form of military service, is completely 
forbidden to Party members. Cunningham with 4 severe wounds, one 
bullet in his lung and his left arm stiff, leaves today to rejoin the 
battalion. McDade with more or less permanent paralysis of his left arm 
ditto. 
Reason? There are plenty of lads with grave domestic problems, who 
have had severe but not incapacitating wounds, who would like either 
leave or repatriation… Under the circumstances Communists must be 
prepared to give a lead. Kerrigan and Springhall were ordered back for 
political work, but chaps here who are simply anxious to get home also 
want to do political work. I can appreciate and sympathise with your 
personal problems – the solution is to take your difficulty to your CO and 
get allocated some lighter job.142 
The issue, as put forward by the likes of Marcovitch and Benson, and implicitly 
allowed for in Tapsell’s letter, was again one of fairness. Communism, in the 
eyes of the volunteers and beyond, was based on egalitarianism. Many of the 
Communist Party’s most powerful critiques of British society were based on 
fairness, or rather the lack of it. These particular critiques were particularly 
powerful for working-class volunteers with ample direct experience of these 
problems. As such, by appearing to privilege certain members of the Battalion, 
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especially when those members were also senior communists, the leadership 
ran the risk of not just grumbling among ordinary volunteers, but challenging 
their very commitment to communism and its core values. Just as other events 
discussed above could test volunteers’ faith in communist leadership, the 
fundamental question was whether the Party was what it claimed to be. Often, 
sometimes understandably, they could not live up to their own image, and the 
result was that many International Brigaders came to question their loyalties. 
Some left with their faith in the Party completely shattered, such as Thomas 
Mitchell of Edinburgh, whose ‘general political attitude’ was that ‘Communism is 
a good thing’ but ‘individual communists almost without exception are no good’, 
or John Paterson, who bemoaned ‘the general contempt held by the bureaucrats 
for the rank and file in Spain.’143  
Tapsell’s letter points to another side of this question, however. The Party was 
well aware that such perceptions mattered, and much of what was meant by 
‘political work’ was not propaganda and rhetoric, but trying to show to 
volunteers how it was possible to reconcile the basis of their instinctive faith in 
communism with what the Party was doing in Spain. Sometimes, it worked. 
Even in the camp at San Pedro, Gary McCartney reported that through paying 
‘attention to weak elements’, ‘several greatly improved.’144 Such formulations 
point to the significant emotional labour undertaken in supporting demoralised 
volunteers. Bill Paynter, for instance, swiftly became exhausted by this work, 
writing to his superiors about the ‘nerve racking’ work of ‘being kind and 
persuasive hour after hour day after day.’145 Paynter was not exceptional: this 
expectation was at the heart of the ‘ideal’ Political Commissar, lionised as a 
tireless worker who supported his charges not just politically, but spiritually 
and practically.146 While such representations are propagandistic, they are 
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nonetheless important, presenting a model of behaviour and action that shaped 
how commissars approached their jobs, aimed not just at engendering trust for 
this alien figure, but guidelines for the commissars themselves. This meant that 
low morale, and with it disappointment in communist leadership, could be 
improved by changing circumstances and practical efforts to solve problems. 
Such cases are a reminder that even when talking about issues such as political 
disaffection, the International Brigades rarely provide a convenient binary. 
 
Desertion, Dissent and Repression 
 
The question of repression is one that has continued to excite historians of the 
International Brigades, with longstanding debates surrounding how its leaders 
responded to military and especially political ‘failings’.147 More than anything 
else, this debate is fuelled by the International Brigades’ implicit claim to 
exceptionalism. The participants invariably described themselves as volunteers, 
and they accordingly presented discipline as a function of political will and 
dedication to the cause. Any existence or appearance of repression, therefore, 
appears to give the lie to such claims – if these were pure volunteers for liberty, 
then why were such mechanisms necessary? If even a few volunteers were shot 
for desertion or their political beliefs, then some critics hold that the entire 
project was tarnished and failed to live up to its ideals.148  
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This is a problematic yardstick by which to judge the International Brigades. For 
one, as has already been discussed, iron discipline and self-sacrifice were 
integral to the Communist Party’s identity, apparent to communists and non-
communists alike. No Party member should have been surprised that discipline 
was expected and enforced in Spain, as it was in all Party spheres.149 Moreover, 
such expectations are hardly realistic. Remi Skoutelsky aptly quotes Trotsky, 
pointing out that no army can exist without repression, and the International 
Brigades were no different.150 Indeed, many of the disciplinary measures 
discussed here would be unremarkable in many militaries of the time. What is 
different is the International Brigades’ exceptional nature, composed of 
volunteers motivated by a positive political vision of their struggle, explicitly 
eschewing traditional military discipline.151 The goal of this section is to explore 
what this meant in practice. Did an inevitable need to enforce orders translate 
into a system designed to identify and punish those who did not measure up to 
communist expectations of military or political discipline? To what extent did 
such efforts dehumanise transgressors and decontextualise their crimes? Did 
punishment become disproportionate or stop serving any reasonable purpose 
beyond terror and liquidation? While there can never be a single, ‘correct’ 
opinion on such questions, this section aims to better establish the effects of 
repression on its victims, and where possible understand the causes for the 
treatment they received.  
Of the Scots who clashed with authority in Spain, Alec Marcovitch has proven 
the most controversial. Marcovitch was a rare Jewish communist in Scotland, 
hailing from the Gorbals district of Glasgow. He had a long history in the Party, 
joining the YCL at fifteen and soon becoming renowned as a street orator. He 
had also clashed with the leadership on questions of Soviet anti-Semitism – not 
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just in registering his own disagreement with the Party line, but trying to 
mobilise others to oppose it.152 This incident foreshadowed conflict between 
Marcovitch and Battalion authorities in Spain, which saw Marcovitch targeted 
for disruptive political activities. Although overlooked by historians during the 
Cold War, James Hopkins rediscovered Marcovitch’s case and used it as the 
centrepiece of his condemnation of the British Battalion’s political cultures. 
Hopkins combined Marcovitch’s testimony, given in an extensive interview in 
1977, with personnel records held in Moscow to paint a dark picture of the fate 
of dissenters in the British Battalion.153  
While Hopkins’ narrative does not rest solely upon Marcovitch’s testimony, it is 
nonetheless crucial to his argument, as Marcovitch was one of the only 
dissenters to be interviewed. His case is used to confirm the worst possible 
interpretations of the International Brigades’ political culture, showing that the 
Stalinist ways of thinking of the leadership translated to a repressive and 
dangerous atmosphere for non-conformers more generally.   
Marcovitch’s story is important because, as the Moscow archives of the 
International Brigade reveal, there were many like him who became 
disaffected, often deserted, and were conveniently summarized as being 
‘demoralised’ or ‘undisciplined’ or inactive’… Marcovitch would have 
agreed with John McGovern, the ILP leader, who predicted in 1937 that 
communism would still the tongues, shackle the limbs, and mold the 
robot minds in every militant fighter throughout the world.’154 
Yet Hopkins’ use of Marcovitch’s testimony in this way is problematic. To 
assume that Marcovitch agreed with McGovern’s critique is a stretch, especially 
as Marcovitch himself rejoined the Communist Party during the Second World 
War and voiced considerable contempt for the ILP.155 More fundamentally, it 
homogenises the experiences of others who deserted or became demoralised. 
While, as already discussed, it is wrong to depoliticise such individuals 
completely, they also do not conform to the picture of ‘dissent’ painted by 
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Hopkins, which ignores the extent that such disaffection was rarely absolute. 
Marcovitch, as shall become clear, was very much an outlier. 
Aside from the question of whether Marcovitch’s experiences were at all typical, 
his testimony needs to be treated much more critically than Hopkins allows. 
Marcovitch’s list of grievances do not tally with his file, which claims that he 
asserted the volunteers’ collective right to repatriation that was being stymied 
by Brigade leadership.156 While the ‘official’ version should not be trusted 
unconditionally, such discrepancies are grounds for wariness. Moreover, some 
of the factual statements Marcovitch made appear unusual, particularly his 
claim that he was sent to a commando unit charged with infiltrating enemy 
lines, destroying ‘outposts’, getting ‘prisoners back’ and ‘kill[ing] people.’ These 
claims present a particular interpretative challenge. Republican guerrillas, 
under the auspices of XIV Corps, were active at this time and place, carrying out 
scouting missions.157 However, the notion that he would have been trusted – 
immediately and without training – to undertake secret missions behind enemy 
lines is jarring, and implausible given that he was viewed with such suspicion.158 
It seems plausible that Marcovitch may have been drawing on accounts found in 
later literary and historical descriptions of the war that were published well 
before Marcovitch’s testimony was given.159 Crucially, despite Hopkins’ 
implications Marcovitch’s tale cannot be verified in International Brigade 
records. In fact, these records contradict Marcovitch’s account, placing him in 
Brigade prison and a disciplinary labour company during the weeks prior to the 
Ebro offensive, when he claimed to be undertaking secret operations.160  
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Interestingly, there may be another version of Marcovitch’s story available from 
an unlikely source. Ralph Glasser’s autobiography contains an intriguing section 
on his influences growing up during the 1930s in Glasgow, including his 
friendship with a young communist agitator, ‘Bernard Lipchinsky’. Lipchinsky’s 
description fits Marcovitch neatly – a young, talented orator, famous locally for 
his speeches and a member of the Gorbals Jewish community.161 Although 
impossible to prove definitively, it is very likely that Lipchinsky was an 
anonymised version of Marcovitch, and Glasser was recounting the story told to 
him by a childhood friend. If so, the similarities and divergences between these 
two versions of Marcovitch’s tale are telling. Both are thematically similar – 
covering political enthusiasm, disillusionment with petty corruption of higher-
ranking officials, and persecution for unclear and unexplained reasons.  
However, the details of each are wildly different. While Marcovitch cast himself 
as a guerrilla fighter in his testimony, here he is a ‘mind policeman’, who frets at 
his dirty deeds and the ‘lads [who] would never get back across the water 
because of me.’162 Eventually, he himself is targeted for ‘removal’ at the hands of 
a former comrade, whose ambush he escapes and he manages to shoot in self-
defence.163 As with the claim to have joined a secret guerrilla unit, this narrative 
lacks plausibility. As has been convincingly demonstrated, very few British 
volunteers were executed for political or other offences.164 While several 
volunteers worked with the SIM, none described anything like the atmosphere 
indicated in Glasser’s account.165 Like the guerrilla narrative, this story is self-
serving, painting Marcovitch as a heroic, dashing figure despite his persecution. 
Marcovitch’s apparent embellishments might be best understood as a reaction 
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to what he anticipated being his starring role in life becoming an essentially 
dull, unheroic experience. The most likely version, born out by International 
Brigade records, is that he was sent to a labour camp prior to the Ebro offensive, 
was briefly released back to the Battalion during the offensive, before being 
imprisoned once more, this time in a Republican jail.166 In other words, while 
Marcovitch’s oral account was accurate in a broad sense, he invented or 
exaggerated some key details.  
Marcovitch’s fall from grace can still shed light on how political non-conformity 
was handled within the British Battalion. His case confirms the observation that 
fluency in Stalinist modes of communication were vital for volunteers who 
sought to be part of any substantive discussion about the International Brigades 
themselves. Marcovitch, by both his own and his superiors’ accounts, did not 
conform to either the expected language or conventions required to successfully 
and safely communicate internal criticism. While Marcovitch clearly understood 
the precepts of democratic centralism – he recognised political meetings as an 
appropriate space to voice criticisms – he appeared to have a weaker grasp of 
how Stalinist norms operated in practice.167 Marcovitch was simply not 
constructive – his key ‘failing’ was not framing his criticisms in a way in which 
their solution could be understood as reinforcing rather than disputing the 
Party line. His public, self-admittedly ‘impetuous’ complaints also mitigated 
against their being downplayed by his superiors.  
Marcovitch’s troubles also point to the continued importance of the various 
communist networks discussed in Chapter Three. He, by his own account, saw 
himself as an outsider in both Spain and Glasgow, cultivating ‘grassroots’ 
connections ahead of relationships with more senior or influential figures, 
several of whom he mentioned falling out with.168 Strikingly, Marcovitch’s 
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testimony never touches on friendship – even the ‘grassroots’ figures he speaks 
of were faceless and anonymous, evoking a crowd that he felt he could 
influence, but not individuals with whom he connected. This suggests that 
Marcovitch understood the Party as a political space, but did not grasp the social 
bonds that underpinned the politics. Without friends in good standing who 
could speak for him and vouch for his benign intentions, it was much more 
likely that others would assume the worst. Put another way, Marcovitch, despite 
his apparent brilliance as a political orator, was a difficult character. This, as it 
would in many organisations, made him a much easier and likelier target for 
official displeasure. This is not to say that he deserved the consequences, rather 
that it is difficult to imagine an individual more likely to face the ire of the 
International Brigades’ political establishment. 
Marcovitch’s experiences also show the limits of arguments that paint political 
repression in the International Brigades as a well-oiled and practised system. 
His testimony paints a picture of small-scale and confused efforts. His 
punishments, particularly if his more outlandish stories are discounted, 
reflected the most common fates of ‘serious’ offenders: time spent in labour 
companies, correction camps and Republican jails, with little logic to where he 
was sent or for how long.  However, judging by his fellow prisoners, even 
without the secret missions Marcovitch’s experience of the camps was not 
entirely typical. 
There wasn’t a deserter amongst us… they were all men of integrity, all 
men of profound political conscience all men with background in 
revolutionary movement, illegally in some cases and in my own case 
from my limited membership of the party here. I thought to myself well 
there’s something bloody fishy I mean the seeds of discontent can’t be as 
narrow and exclusive.169 
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Hopkins uses Marcovitch’s description of these correction camps as proof that 
there was an extensive system that handled large numbers of dissidents.170 This 
assertion is undermined by Marcovitch’s own observations – he noted that the 
camp held a population of just thirty, of varying nationalities and including no 
other Britons.171 The presence of so many nationalities strongly suggests that 
this was a clearing-house for ‘serious’ political dissidents from the entire 
International Brigades. This, while hardly an inconsequential number, is far 
different to that implied in revisionist accounts. Hopkins contends that this was 
only one camp of many, but while he is correct in noting the existence of 
multiple camps, he appears to be conflating the different purposes such camps 
might serve. Some housed those who committed non-political crimes, such as 
James Queen, who was sentenced to four months in a labour camp for 
attempted rape.172 Charles MacCormick’s punishment was the cumulative result 
of drunkenness, racist statements about the Irish and abusing a superior 
officer.173 Most commonly, these camps we housed deserters. It is useful to 
contrast Marcovitch’s description of his small camp – explicitly noted to not 
house any deserters – with that of Sydney Quinn, who stayed in a larger camp 
for deserters while he himself was awaiting repatriation. After witnessing a 
group of French internees being cajoled to return to the line, Quinn recalled his 
friend’s observations. 
Tom Clark says, ‘these bastards’ll be back again, watch this’ so we waited 
and sure enough two or three hours later they come back one by one… I 
don’t know what happened to them but they must have been repatriated 
because they were no use to anyone.174 
The purpose of this camp, likely Camp Lukacs itself, was dealing with the 
numerous volunteers whose traumatic service had left them unwilling to return 
to the line. Their existence presented the International Brigades leadership with 
a quandary – if they were sent home, it could be interpreted as rewarding and 
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thereby encouraging desertion.175 As such, it became standard practice to 
attempt to redeem and re-motivate deserters, and try to elicit useful work or 
even frontline service.176 This puts such camps in a quite different category to 
that described by Marcovitch. While disaffection and demoralisation were not 
apolitical phenomena, they also cannot be read as wholesale rejection of the 
International Brigades and their purpose. 
Marcovitch’s further claim that the intent of his punishment was ‘the 
elimination of people who were politically contentious’ also requires 
examination. The idea that ‘inconvenient’ individuals were put into situations 
where their death was all but guaranteed, in lieu of carrying out an unpalatable 
death sentence, has been put forward elsewhere. Richard Baxell identifies two 
volunteers that he believed met such a fate, including Greenock volunteer Pat 
Glacken.177 Glacken was condemned to death for attempting to desert to enemy 
lines in January 1938, but the sentence was reduced due to his remorse and 
youth, both common grounds for commutation.178 Glacken was killed just days 
later, allegedly because he was placed in a position in which he was ‘virtually 
certain to be killed.’179 If this was deliberate, it is unclear why. Glacken was 
given a highly-public chance at redemption – his commuted sentence and the 
logic behind it was published as a Special Order to the entire 35th Division. 
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As to the Corporal Patrick Glacken, considering the service he has 
previously rendered, the sincerity with which he admitted his crime, and 
the plea that he be given the opportunity to atone for his failing… I order 
that the death penalty be commuted to demotion… and atoning for his 
crime by means of loyal service and work.180 
This stress on atonement through service was a common formulation, and given 
the broader emphasis on rehabilitation there is little reason to assume these 
orders were euphemistic. There are few other cases where the death of a 
Scottish volunteer appears deliberate.181 One candidate is Glaswegian William 
Meeke, whose case Hopkins noted as suspicious as he was ‘shot whilst 
attempting to escape prison.’182 As Baxell notes, however, Foreign Office records 
indicate that he turned up in a camp in France considerably later, and Security 
Service surveillance confirmed his eventual repatriation in February 1939.183 
His International Brigade file reveals further detail apparently missed by 
Hopkins. He was shot during an incident in which other prisoners attempted to 
escape – a ricochet off a wall struck him near the left ear – but he survived and 
was sent to hospital.184  
The overall picture does not suggest that there was any deliberate policy of 
trying to dispose of troublesome volunteers by deliberately placing them in 
harm’s way. Even exceptionally awkward individuals, such as pseudo-Scottish 
actor James Justice, who mismanaged the base at Madrigueras and was found to 
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be addicted to morphine, were generally expelled from Spain rather than 
‘gotten rid of.’185 The gulf between the extremes of Stalinist repression and what 
the British Battalion was willing to countenance is also highlighted in a June 
1937 incident, where Scottish officer William Meredith called for ‘drastic action’ 
against volunteers who were found drunk in action, as an ‘example to the rest of 
the Battalion.’ ‘Drastic’ punishment turned out to mean ten days in a labour 
company, and five days pay stopped.186 Fining volunteers, according to 
Marcovitch, ‘meant nothing because you couldn’t even use [money] as toilet 
paper.’187 Furthermore, the British Battalion and XV Brigade often evidenced a 
desire to keep judicial procedures – and harsher punishments – away from 
outside authorities. In one report on the conditions faced by internationals in 
Spanish prison, Paul Somogyi argued that such cases should be kept away from 
Spanish authorities, as he did not ‘think that Spanish judges would show much 
understanding for the special problems and mentality of English speaking 
people.’188 In particular, several sources are adamant that executions were 
vigorously opposed, including George Aitken, who claimed to have resisted 
suggestions from his superiors that the British ‘execute a few’ deserters, 
pointing to the ‘catastrophic’ reaction that such news would engender ‘if it ever 
got back to Britain.’189  
The potential reaction in Britain was often raised when it came to the treatment 
of transgressors. In an interesting reversal, one volunteer coming to the end of a 
prison sentence wrote to Aitken in May 1937 with a subtle threat: approve his 
request for repatriation, or his wife might get ‘worried over my position and 
[seek] other methods to get me home.’190 In the context, there is little doubt that 
this was a threat to go to the press, albeit couched in the language of loyalty to 
the Party and professing inability to stop his wife acting of her own accord. In 
other cases, the CPGB itself raised the issue with Spanish counterparts. One 
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letter to the PCE made the case in November 1938 that prisoners should be 
repatriated along with the rest of the volunteers. It claimed that while those 
who had committed military offenses would ‘receive very little sympathy in this 
country’ and that their interest was ‘by no means due to any concern with the 
men themselves’, there was a danger of ‘embittered’ relatives who might 
‘exploit a grievance’, as well as ‘anti-Republican influences’ who would ‘make 
propaganda’ out of the situation.191 This careful wording was doubtless 
intended to pre-empt any accusation that the CPGB was unwilling to approach 
such matters with the discipline required of true Bolsheviks. Whether 
motivated by pragmatism or humanitarianism, it is clear that opinion at home 
was of considerable concern to the CPGB, and limited their willingness to take 
Stalinist practices to their extreme.  
These conclusions are borne out by the actual fates of deserters. Of more than 
ninety Scots that deserted or attempted to desert, just seven later died of any 
causes, compared to over a quarter of non-deserters.192 This suggests that 
committing crimes actually made volunteers safer, rather than leading to their 
deliberate exposure to danger, especially as most of these seven did not perish 
during their punishment assignments. International Brigade labour companies, 
unlike the infamous Soviet penal units, were not simply used as expendable 
manpower, and it is possible that historians have been overly keen to read later 
Soviet euphemisms into International Brigade terminology. What seems more 
likely is that labour battalions were just that – an effort to get useful work out of 
defaulters, either as temporary punishment or as an acknowledgement that 
further front service was unlikely. Casual references to such units tend to 
support this interpretation, such as an October 1937 letter from Mick 
Economides to Bill Paynter, which mentioned that ‘rotters and other weak types 
[had been] put together in a special section which does odd jobs in the base.’193 
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While a few may have died while serving in these units, deaths were much more 
uncommon than in combat units, and were likely the result of exposure to 
indirect dangers behind the lines such as bombing or artillery fire. 
While execution may have been rare, that is not to say that this system 
succeeded in ensuring fair and consistent punishment of transgressions. It is 
useful to return again to Marcovitch’s experiences in Republican prisons. The 
prison he found himself confined in for the final months of the war, 
Castelldefels, was a relatively common destination for XV Brigade offenders in 
1938.194 As with other camps, not all of these prisoners were victims of political 
repression. There were two other Scots imprisoned alongside Marcovitch in 
January 1939, Thomas Dickson and James Queen, neither of whom could be 
classified as political prisoners. Queen’s crimes have been discussed above, 
while Dickson was a deserter, albeit an unusual one. Declared unfit by a medical 
commission in November 1937, he deserted and obtained passage on a British 
ship leaving Spain. However, he returned to Spain in December, attempting to 
sell contraband cigarettes. He was arrested, and apparently drifted through the 
Republican justice system, with his expulsion from Republican territory 
proposed in March 1938, confirmed that June, but never carried out before 
transfer to Castelldefels in December.195 
Although Dickson’s record in Spain bears little resemblance to Marcovitch’s, his 
experience of the Republican justice system did. For both, the experience of jail 
was one of inherent confusion, with the prevailing attitude seeming to be that if 
an individual was incarcerated, then they should stay that way, even if the 
original reasons were unclear. Marcovitch noted that ‘the man who was in 
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command of that particular place hadn’t the foggiest idea why we were there’ – 
Dickson might have said the same, given that the Spanish Government had 
already decided to expel him from their territory but he remained in prison 
nearly a year later.196 In another case, James Fisher of Renfrew was on the list of 
those at Castelldefels in September 1938, having arrived in March. Under 
‘Category’, however, officials had only been able to write ‘?’.197 Fisher was a 
serial deserter – on four separate occasions, according to one report – and it is 
unsurprising that he was imprisoned.198 That he had been left languishing for 
six months without reason or redress, however, was typical of the Republican 
justice system, as another letter in 1937 makes clear.  
The prison authorities state that [the English comrades] are being held 
there at the request of the Minister of National Defence, but they do not 
know on what charges. From the statements of all the prisoners it 
appears that they are deserters but have committed no other crime. 
Some of the prisoners have been in prison for five months.199 
Nor was such treatment limited to criminals – John Travers was mistakenly 
arrested en route to repatriation and imprisoned in Castelldefels for six weeks, 
with even the SIM not knowing the charge.200 This sort of Kafkaesque 
experience of the prison system likely had several underlying causes. In part, it 
reflected problems within the Republic itself, which during the war developed a 
considerable internal security apparatus, and indefinite incarceration without 
charge was not uncommon.201 This was compounded by their status as 
foreigners. The language barriers, unfamiliarity with Spanish bureaucracy and 
likelihood that these individuals were persona non grata in the International 
Brigades meant that they were ill-placed to seek any kind of redress within the 
prison system. The infamous case of Scot Bob Smillie – who had fought 
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alongside Orwell in the POUM militia and was detained following the unrest in 
Barcelona in May 1937 – reflects the dangers of imprisonment for international 
volunteers. Smillie, who apparently contracted appendicitis and died before 
adequate medical care was forthcoming, was the best-known victim of a prison 
bureaucracy that viewed international inmates as an annoyance best ignored. 
While various conspiracy theories surrounding Smillie’s death are 
unconvincing, the systemic neglect evidenced in his case is a familiar story for 
international prisoners of the Republic.202 
The issues faced by foreign prisoners in Republican jails is one factor among 
several that points to the need for a more complex understanding of desertion 
and its consequences. Robert Stradling, who lingers on the phenomenon, takes 
an absolute approach, arguing that desertion was considered a universally 
heinous crime for which ‘quasi-homicidal hatred’ was induced among the 
volunteers.203 This paints the number of British deserters – given as 367 by 
Stradling but potentially higher – as a catastrophic figure indicative of severe 
morale and organisational failings.204 Yet the testimony of volunteers 
themselves, and the administrative approach taken by the International 
Brigades, indicates that desertion occurred on a broad spectrum. Leaving the 
line in the heat of battle was viewed leniently, with an initial emphasis on the 
individual returning to their unit voluntarily. Such deserters rarely attempted to 
escape Spain altogether, rather they sought to remove themselves from 
immediate danger. The numbers of such deserters could run into the dozens in 
major battles – after the Battle of Teruel, for example, a list of forty desertion 
cases handled over the previous two months was composed, along with a note 
that they had actually ‘handled two or three times as many’, with the ‘majority’ 
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simply being ‘sent back to the front.’205 Similarly long lists of ‘minor’ desertion 
cases were composed during the Battle of Brunete.206 It is clear that even during 
the worst cases of mass desertion, the official view was relatively lenient, as a 
report to CPGB leader Harry Pollitt makes clear. 
I have had difficult experiences at the Base but never so difficult as in the 
last week or so. The toll of desertion has been heavy. We have over 
twenty in Albacete, and informed that there are more in Madrid and 
Valencia… 
The whole problem is being treated with greatest possible degree of 
humanity, which in some cases is being abused by the defaulters. To 
repatriate them would be an injustice to the men still at the front and an 
encouragement to defaulting… 
The men who have come to us have all been in Spain for more than six 
months. Almost without exception they have served at Jarama since the 
12th Feb. Many have been once wounded. All are exhausted and in bad 
nervous condition. Many of them have excellent records. Their past 
records prove they are not just cowards.207 
Even rearguard officials never lost sympathy for those who deserted, although 
there was a distinction made between those in ‘bad nervous condition’ and 
‘defaulters.’208 H. O. Knester’s report on Scots James Donald and Malcom 
Snedden’s desertion at Jarama concluded that he could not ‘really blame them’ 
for fleeing in the circumstances.209 Other ‘desertion’ cases could be petty – Tom 
Clarke, a Dundonian with a solid record, was accused by Fred Copeman of 
desertion due to a mix-up in orders which saw Clarke take a lorry to a village 
ahead of the main body of the Battalion. Needless to say, the incident was 
‘smoothed out’ and Clarke faced neither punishment nor a bad evaluation.210 
This all suggests that Stradling’s headline figure is worse than it looks, with 
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relatively few desertion cases being serious or successful attempts to escape the 
Battalion.211 
The only Scot actually executed in Spain, Glacken’s companion Allan Kemp, 
confirms rather than challenges the conclusion that desertion was understood 
differentially. Kemp and Glacken had attempted to desert to Nationalist lines, 
allegedly with information about the Battalion’s dispositions that would aid the 
enemy.212 While both were sentenced to death for this crime, according to 
several accounts Kemp’s age and superior rank led to the view that he was the 
ringleader and had persuaded Glacken to go along with his scheme. This 
incident was highly unusual – unlike Spanish troops, foreign volunteers almost 
exclusively deserted to the rear rather than to the enemy.213 Bob Cooney 
pointed to this in justifying the sentence – the punishment was ‘not for 
desertion’, but ‘because in order to carry out his desertion he was prepared to 
betray the lives of his comrades.’214 Aside from explaining the harsh 
punishment, this difference makes it difficult to portray the decision as a 
product of Stalinist cultures.215 This was betrayal and treason in any 
understanding, and Kemp would likely have received the same sentence in any 
contemporary military.  
Even short of execution, the worst punishments were reserved for those willing 
to harm their comrades – including Kemp, or three American volunteers who 
attempted to steal an ambulance in order to make their escape.216 The public 
trial and sentencing of these Americans, among a group of twelve English-
speaking volunteers tried for desertion, is another example of the differential 
treatment of deserters, with punishments ranging from death to just a month in 
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prison. For the most lightly punished, their front record, reason for desertion 
and willingness to seek redemption in action were cited, as was their ‘good 
antifascist attitude’ in the trial proceedings.217 Even in a moment cited as a clear 
instance of Stalinism in action in the XV Brigade, the trials followed an idealised 
version of Stalinist practice, one that allowed for due process as understood in 
the context, differentiated responsibility, appropriate punishment and mercy 
for those who sought redemption.218 This was not an attempt to emulate 
contemporary Stalinist purges, which were in any case not yet known of by 
most, if not all, volunteers, but rather the version of Stalinism imagined by 
Western communists – tough but necessary, efficient but fair, politicised yet 
‘democratic’.219  
If deserters were captured by other units or the police, they risked much 
harsher punishment, not least because of the issues with the Republican justice 
system identified above. Even then, however, efforts were still made to assess 
the circumstances and individuals’ potential for rehabilitation. One document 
communicated a series of decisions regarding nineteen XV Brigade deserters 
arrested by Spanish police. Eight were sent to Camp Lukacs for ‘work in rear.’ 
Most of the rest were released to either the Battalion or Brigade Political 
Commissar. One, Edinburgh volunteer John Kennedy, was detained for further 
questioning regarding the British Consulate in Valencia’s role in aiding and 
abetting desertion.220 However, the further deserters managed to flee, the less 
likely it was that such considerations were taken into account. One June 1937 
report written by Bill Paynter downplayed concerns about the handling of the 
Donald and Sneddon case, writing that ‘the fact that they are in prison in 
Valencia in all probability means that there are more serious charges against 
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them.’221 This, as has been seen above, was a problematic conclusion, and such 
attitudes only worsened the problems faced by volunteers in Republican jails. 
Desertion was therefore a crime that could be aggravated by the circumstances 
and method. If deserters were willing to cross certain lines – such as involving 
their home government or hostile newspapers – harsher punishments might 
follow. The successful desertion of several Scottish volunteers, who had gone to 
the Daily Mail claiming to bear a ‘round robin’ petition signed by others wishing 
to be repatriated, engendered a particularly strong reaction in Spain and 
Scotland.222 One of the trio, John Parker, was assaulted in Dundee as a 
punishment for his ‘betrayal.’223 This treatment, however, was the exception 
rather than the rule. The absence of reprisals towards returned deserters 
underscores a key limitation of any interpretation of the CPGB as a totalitarian, 
repressive organisation: once a volunteer returned home, the Party had few 
options to control them. Unless a returned volunteer wished to remain or 
progress within the Party, there were few ways in which their record in Spain 
might be held against them. There is little evidence that the evaluations so 
painstakingly composed in Spain were ever actually used by the CPGB. More 
often than not, even those who had deserted or otherwise transgressed in Spain 
were allowed to join both the Party and the ex-volunteers group, the 
International Brigade Association.224 Maintaining the International Brigades’ 
historical image quietly trumped any desire to draw lines between the worthy 
and unworthy. 
 
                                                        
221 Paynter to Pollitt, 9 June 1937, MML. 
222 The existence of this petition has been a matter of conjecture. Contemporary correspondence 
claimed that it was fabricated to justify their desertion. Gray implicitly follows this 
interpretation. Gray, Homage, 194–5. However, newly declassified Security Service material 
indicates that a list was given to the British Government in April 1937. Case files of four Scottish 
volunteers showed them as having ‘signed “round robin” asking to be sent home.’ E.g. DOUGAN 
William and DUNBAR, Alex, KV 5/120; Gilmour to Paterson, 5 April 1937, MML, Box 50, File 
Gl/17. 
223 Gray, Homage, 195.  
224 William McLennan, who had deserted in September 1938, was active in the IBA by May 1939. 
‘McLennan, William’, RGASPI, 545/6/171/77; ‘MCLENNAN, William’, TNA, KV 5/127. Even 






It was not only in Britain that the Communist Party faced constraints in 
punishing wayward volunteers. Even in Spain, where the military and judicial 
system allowed for, even condoned, the harsh treatment of crimes such as 
desertion, officials balked at imposing the harshest penalties. British Party 
leadership knew that its actions in Spain would be closely observed by a hostile 
press and political establishment, and were keen to avoid giving their 
opponents ammunition. This reflected a broader strategic need to not offend 
British sensibilities. The Republic’s chief, albeit forlorn, hope was winning the 
support of the world’s remaining democracies. Lurid tales of purges and 
executions would only strengthen the anti-communist instincts of Western 
governments. Whether or not the CPGB leadership was motivated by 
humanitarianism or expediency, this was a trump card against extreme internal 
repression from within or above. This provides a partial explanation of differing 
levels of political repression observed in other national contexts – the German 
contingent, for instance, composed chiefly of exiles, saw heightened levels of 
political paranoia, yet work by Michael Uhl suggests that this was still balanced 
by lenience towards desertion.225  
It is a mistake, however, to view external constraints as the only impediment to 
Stalinist terror in the International Brigades. Faced with a myriad of unexpected 
problems stemming from the unprecedented nature of the enterprise, the 
leaders of the British contingent relied on their political beliefs and training to 
provide guidance in overcoming them, just as these same factors affected rank-
and-file volunteers’ responses to these efforts. This made the volunteers’ 
existing beliefs vital in understanding how they responded to their new 
                                                        
225 Incidence of desertion appears to have been lower among Germans, possibly as they had 
nowhere else to go. Michael Uhl, Mythos Spanien. Das Erbe der internationalen Brigaden in der 
DDR (Bonn, 2004), 82. See also Peter Hubel and Michael Uhl, ‘Die Internationalen Brigaden: 
Politische überwachung und repression nach sichtung der russichen und westlichen 
archivatken’, Ebre 38 2 (2004), 32; Josie McLellan, 'I Wanted to be a Little Lenin': Ideology and 





circumstances in Spain. They – both leaders and followers – generally accepted 
the need for decisive leadership, for public justice to be done and above all the 
need for discipline. Their training as Bolsheviks-in-waiting had taught them this. 
Yet it had also taught them other values, in line with their perceptions of the 
supposed Soviet alternative. These values were immensely important, far more 
important than any specific doctrine or historical precedent, for the simple 
reason that, unlike the theory, almost all the volunteers had a firm idea of what 
they should mean in practice. Predictably, actually attempting to live up to and 
embody these ideals was impossible in the context of war in Spain. The result 
was a confusing web of political practices and cultures, as befits what was 
essentially an attempt to simultaneously conceptualise and organise a unique 
anti-fascist army. As has been shown here, there was little consistency between 
intent and implementation or imagination and reality when it came to the 
structures of political control within the British Battalion. The neat, ominous 
totalitarian structure envisaged by the likes of Hamish Fraser and subsequent 
revisionist historians did not exist, just as the propagandistic vision of the 
virtuous International Brigades was only ever mythical. While the International 
Brigades’ generally haphazard organisation accounts for some of the gap 
between the perception and reality of political repression, it also reflects the 
success of the British Battalion’s leadership in preserving a distinct and partly 













Although the structures of the International Brigades may have helped the 
British Battalion to preserve its own political cultures and practices, it is 
important to avoid ascribing too much importance to the imagined boundaries 
between national groups in Spain. As indicated in much of the Scottish 
volunteers’ testimony explored in previous chapters, interactions with other 
nationalities were an everyday experience when serving in the International 
Brigades. However, despite this indisputable reality, there is a tendency in 
existing historiography to divide the volunteers into neat categories, either by 
nationality or language group, and use these categories as self-contained units 
of analysis. Little attention is paid to how these boundaries were crossed, as 
they frequently and necessarily were, not least because even supposedly 
‘national’ units usually contained a majority of Spanish conscripts.1 The 
volunteers were thrust into a series of transnational encounters, and navigating 
them was an important yet neglected part of the experience of serving in the 
International Brigades.2 This chapter takes as its focus some of the most 
common yet rarely discussed such encounters: those between the International 
Brigade volunteers and Spanish soldiers and civilians. 
It is important to acknowledge that there were two sides to these interactions. 
Spaniards were not static objects for the volunteers to interact with, and their 
                                                        
1 Even otherwise excellent accounts assume that ‘contact with Spaniards was limited.’ Josie 
McLennan, ‘“I Wanted to be a Little Lenin”: Ideology and the German International Brigade 
Volunteers’, Journal of Contemporary History 41:2 (2006), 289. The tendency to divorce military 
forces from civilian life, especially during ‘friendly’ occupations, has been noted in other 
contexts. Craig Gibbs, Behind the Front: British Soldiers and Civilians, 1914–1918 (Cambridge, 
2014), 7–9. 
2 Lisa Kirschenbaum’s study is a notable exception, dealing with such questions in some depth, 
albeit with important differences in focus and analytical approach. The findings here 
complement and in some cases help confirm her observations. Lisa Kirschenbaum, International 




agency was a critical factor in shaping the encounters examined here. Yet this 
presents a methodological challenge. While there is an occasional paucity of 
sources from the perspective of ordinary Scottish volunteers, the available 
material by far outweighs that from Spanish perspectives. While there has been 
a steady market for the memories, writing and ephemera of foreign volunteers, 
the same cannot be said of Spaniards who also fought in the International 
Brigades or the civilians they met. This deficit in sources requires altering the 
scope of reference for this chapter, and using material that does not always 
pertain directly to the Scots. This means assuming that there were few 
fundamental differences in the way that Scots interacted with Spaniards 
compared to other English-speaking volunteers, and that Spaniards saw Scots in 
much the same way they saw other Britons, and to an extent also the Irish, 
Americans or Canadians. As the goal of this chapter is not to establish especial 
Scottish distinctiveness, but rather explore a neglected aspect of the lived 
experience of serving in the International Brigades, this assumption is 
sustainable. There is in any case little evidence to suggest that many Spaniards 
had a particularly developed appreciation for the nuances of British national 
identity. Scots, just as the English and Welsh, were usually simply ingles.  
Beyond their experiences in Spain, it is useful to understand these interactions 
as influenced by the volunteers’ own intellectual context. Part of this, of course, 
was the volunteers’ own anti-fascism, which provided them with 
preconceptions and expectations of the Spanish people and their struggle. 
However, other influences were also at play. While the bulk of Scottish 
volunteers had never set foot outside Britain, their society did provide them 
with certain intellectual tools to equip them for dealing with foreigners and 
foreign places – through depictions of imperial relations. While Scottish 
communists might well have been outwardly and genuinely anti-imperialist, it 




unspoken and pervasive assumptions about race.3 While historians have cast 
doubt on the success of the heavy-handed and overt attempts to instil imperial 
values in the British population, it is possible to point to the persistence of 
‘banal imperialism’ in the everyday stories Britons told themselves about their 
place in the world.4 For most Scots, knowledge or empire and race came chiefly 
from popular culture, from the music hall to the cinema.5 These mediums used 
stereotyped imperial relations to tell stories, stereotypes based on assumptions 
of superiority and the subordinate, single-dimensional roles of foreign actors as 
comic relief, victims or villains.6 Such assumptions could therefore inform Scots’ 
contact with other nationalities in Spain, contact which in turn could challenge 
or reinforce such ways of thinking.7 
It is more difficult to say precisely what preconceived ideas of Spain the Scottish 
volunteers brought with them. Some authors have tied perceptions of Spain in 
this period back to the notorious ‘Black Legend’, portraying Spain and Spaniards 
as intrinsically cruel and violent, a myth dating back to the sixteenth century.8 
However, such arguments most often rest on evidence from literary and artistic 
sources, few of which can be tied to Scotland. Tom Buchanan points to the 
                                                        
3 It is also important to note that by the mid-1930s, anti-fascism took increasing precedence 
over anti-imperialism in Party discourse, with collective security requiring strengthening rather 
than weakening Western democracies – and, by extension, their empires. Tom Buchanan, ‘”The 
Dark Millions in the Colonies are Unavenged”: Anti-Fascism and Anti-Imperialism in the 1930s, 
Contemporary European History 25:4 (2016), 600-3. In the Scottish context in particular, it is 
notable that one of the most effective popular anti-imperial campaigns of the late 1930s, in 
response to the Glasgow Empire Exhibition of 1938, was spearheaded by the ILP, not local 
communists. Sarah Britton, ‘Come and See the Empire by the All Red Route!’: Anti-Imperialism 
and Exhibitions in Interwar Britain, History Workshop Journal 69 (2010), 78-84. 
4 Krishan Kumar, ‘Empire, Nation, and National Identities’ in Thompson (ed.), Britain's 
Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century (2011), 299–302. For a Scottish perspective, see 
Richard Finlay, ‘The rise and fall of popular imperialism in Scotland, 1850-1950’, Scottish 
Geographical Magazine 113:1 (1997), 13–21 and ‘National Identity, Union, and Empire, c.1850-
c.1970’ in John MacKenzie and Tom Devine (eds.), Scotland and the British Empire (Oxford, 
2011), 281–316. 
5 Brad Beaven, Visions of Empire: Patriotism, Popular Culture and the City, 1870-1939 (2012), 
179–204; Jeffrey Richards, ‘Boys Own Empire: Feature Films and Imperialism in the 1930s’ in 
John MacKenzie (ed.), Imperialism and popular culture (Manchester, 1986), 140-62. 
6 Steve Attridge, Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture (Basingstoke, 
2003), 16–43, esp. 24–6. 
7 Kirschenbaum, International Communism, 114. 
8 E.g. María DeGuzmán, Spain's Long Shadow: The Black Legend, Off-Whiteness, and Anglo-




perceptions nurtured by the ‘British public’ of Spain and the Spanish ‘character’, 
but the extent that this ‘public’ included working-class Scots is unclear.9 Brian 
Shelmerdine discusses various stereotypes and the ‘assumptions of Spanish 
national character’ in the public mind, yet explicitly frames this analysis in 
contrast to ‘Englishness’, and furthermore does not consider how this shaped 
International Brigade volunteers’ time in Spain.10 Certainly, those who followed 
the left-wing press likely had knowledge of Spanish politics prior to the Civil 
War, with the advent of the Spanish Republic in 1931 and various political 
developments leading up to the war attracting substantial attention.11 In 
particular, the 1934 uprising in Asturias was well-covered in communist and 
certain progressive media.12 Scots, particularly those from Glasgow and 
surrounds, might also be assumed to be particularly aware of Spanish 
Catholicism, which had a particularly reactionary reputation.13 As such, 
Buchanan’s argument that the Spanish Civil War was understood as a clash 
between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Spain is a useful one, with the Republic seen as an 
idealised, modernising force countering an old, cruel and Catholic Spain.14 As 
shall be seen, it is also clear that many stereotypes of Spaniards – often as lazy, 
inefficient and undisciplined – are reflected in the volunteers’ writing and 
testimony. These almost certainly reflect popular assumptions about the 
Spanish ‘character’ that predated their arrival in Spain. 
Beyond exploring new aspects of volunteers’ experiences in Spain, this chapter’s 
goal is to establish that these encounters, both positive and negative, were 
shaped by specific structural factors. There is a tendency in historical writing on 
the International Brigades to consider negative interactions as either isolated 
incidents, or, in revisionist accounts, evidence for the fundamentally flawed 
                                                        
9 Tom Buchanan, The Impact of the Spanish Civil War on Britain (Brighton, 2007), 1–22. 
10 Brian Shelmerdine, British Representations of the Spanish Civil War (Manchester, 2006), 3. 
11 Buchanan, Impact of the Spanish Civil War, 2–7. 
12 Several volunteers recalled being aware of this coverage. Lochore in MacDougall, Voices from 
War, 317; Chris Smith, IWMSA, Tape 12290/2. 
13 Tom Gallagher, Glasgow: The Uneasy Peace: Religious tension in modern Scotland (Manchester, 
1987). 




nature of the enterprise.15 This account contends that such encounters were not 
isolated or random, but the product of specific, often endemic causes that 
stemmed from the nature of the International Brigades themselves, their 
purpose and the individuals that had been recruited. Rather than one-off 
occurrences, it is possible to see similar issues recur throughout the volunteers’ 
time in Spain. That is not to say that relations between Scots and Spaniards 
were static – they were influenced by changing circumstances and action by 
participants – but that they reflected underlying tension at the heart of the 
International Brigades project. Equally, however, the International Brigades’ 
internal capacity and willingness to address these issues demonstrates the need 
for a more nuanced approach than simply identifying and criticising failures. 
The aim is not to assess whether interactions between the internationals and 
Spaniards should be seen as positive or negative, but to explore factors that led 
to a complex and variable set of relations between foreign volunteers and 




While historians have not hidden the reality that the majority of those who 
served in the International Brigades were Spaniards, for the most part they have 
not portrayed the consequences in any detail. This is especially notable in 
accounts dealing with the Scottish and other British volunteers. It takes a close 
reading of Daniel Gray’s book on the Scots to find mention of the many 
                                                        
15 Gray is explicit in dismissing negative incidents as ‘extremely isolated’. Daniel Gray, Homage 
to Caledonia (Edinburgh, 2008), 83–4. See also Verle Johnson, Legions of Babel: The International 
Brigades in the Spanish Civil War (1967), 91–2. Baxell provides a more balanced picture, but 
does not delve into how relations were shaped, Richard Baxell, British Volunteers in the Spanish 
Civil War (London, 2004), 143–6. Hopkins makes brief mention of language issues and mutual 
antipathy as part of his broader condemnation of repression in the British Battalion, James 
Hopkins, Into the Heart of the Fire (Stanford, 1998), 214–16. Radosh et al use several such 
incidents to inform their broader criticism of the Brigades, Ronald Radosh, Mary Habeck and 
Grigory Sevostianov, Spain Betrayed (New Haven, 2001), 240-8. See also Daniel Pastor Garcia 
and Antonio Celada, ‘The Victors Write History, the Vanquished Literature: Myth, Distortion and 
Truth in the XV Brigade’, Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 89:7–8 (2012), 320; Robert Stradling, 
‘English-speaking Units of the International Brigades: War, Politics and Discipline’, Journal of 




Spaniards they served alongside.16 Richard Baxell devotes several pages to 
discussing tensions between the various national groups, including the 
Spaniards, although his analysis is often limited to testimony from British and 
other international sources, and does relatively little to systemically explore and 
explain how these relationships developed.17 In contrast, Cecil Eby was 
fortunate to gain access to a memoir written by a Spanish member of the 
International Brigades, and his account goes furthest in dealing with Spanish 
experiences of English-speaking units.18 Yet as valuable as this memoir is as a 
source – it is used here where appropriate – it cannot be considered as 
definitive in isolation. Moreover, Eby uses the source in line with his own 
expectations, highlighting the various inconsistencies, hypocrisies and ironies 
that Fausto Villar Esteban faced during his time in the XV Brigade. Yet by 
cherry-picking these moments from a single, rather unusual source, Eby’s 
account fails to fully convince, especially as it often does not supplement Villar 
Esteban’s words with sources that might add context and allow for broader 
conclusions to be drawn.19  
The goal of this section is to add depth to historical understandings of the 
relationship between international volunteers and their Spanish comrades. It is 
important to move beyond simple binaries – were relations good or bad? – and 
attempt to understand the dynamics that shaped perceptions on both sides. In 
particular, it is necessary to use a broader source base to try to understand 
Spanish perspectives within the International Brigades. Here, James Matthews’ 
work on Republican and Nationalist conscripts offers a model by which a range 
of voices can be appreciated within broad, often impersonal sources.20 This 
section calls upon a variety of such sources to help understand the dynamics 
between Scottish volunteers and their Spanish comrades. On the Scottish side, 
                                                        
16 Even when they appear, Spaniards are rarely actually discussed. E.g. Gray, Homage, 70. 
17 Baxell, British Volunteers, 144–8. On a broader scale, see Remi Skoutelsky, Novedad en el frente 
(2007), 280-4. 
18 Cecil Eby, Comrades and Commissars (Pennsylvania, 2007), xxii-xxiii. 
19 E.g. Eby, Comrades and Commissars, 277–8. 
20 James Matthews, Reluctant Warriors: Republican Popular Army and Nationalist Army 




this is relatively straightforward, although requires understanding the 
volunteers’ internalised assumptions about those they had come to fight 
alongside. The key methodological challenge is presenting a convincing and 
balanced Spanish perspective that does not rely on isolated points of direct 
evidence. As with Matthews’ study, the approach is made viable by the nature of 
the Spanish Republican Army itself, with its report-generating network of 
political commissars and attending concern with morale.21 Relations between 
Spaniards and Internationals was of ongoing concern to the military and 
political leadership, and a great deal of effort was spent addressing actual and 
potential grievances on both sides, as well as monitoring soldiers’ opinions and 
morale through observation and censorship. This is supplemented in places by 
archival material from other Spanish organisations, both Republican and 
Nationalist.  
While it is possible to establish a detailed picture of who the Scottish volunteers 
were in both an individual and demographic sense, doing so for their Spanish 
comrades presents a much more difficult challenge. While the Republican 
Popular Army naturally kept its own records, these were much less centralised 
than those kept about the International Brigades. The International Brigades in 
turn showed little administrative interest in their Spanish members. Beyond 
keeping lists of names of soldiers in various units, the International Brigades 
rarely recorded basic information such as political affiliation, point of origin, age 
or occupation.22 Tracing these names back to Spanish military archives to find 
enlistment paperwork containing further information would be a Herculean 
task. Such records remain in local military districts, and even attempting to 
match a small sample is rendered impossible by the lack of contextual 
information in the International Brigades records that might narrow the search 
by district or reserve class, or even help distinguish between recruits with 
                                                        
21 Matthews, Reluctant Warriors, 12. 
22 While the differing level of information available for internationals compared to Spaniards is 
apparent throughout the archive, it is best shown by British personnel records being stored 
across 118 files, compared to just twelve files covering Spaniards across every International 
Brigade. RGASPI, 545/6/100-218,455–67. This lack of administrative concern makes it difficult 




common names. This task is well beyond the scope of this study, and likely any 
future studies barring the wholesale digitisation of these records across Spain. 
The Franco regime’s post-war persecution does offer some insight into the 
collective identity of the Spanish soldiers in the International Brigades. As part 
of broader efforts to catalogue targets for legal and other repressive measures 
after the war, captured Republican documents were used to establish the nature 
of individuals’ wartime service on a massive scale. International Brigade 
hospital records and paysheets were archived and used to compile lists of 
thousands of Spaniards who served in the International Brigades.23 While the 
information available for each individual is inconsistent, these lists offer the 
best broad picture of who these Spaniards were. They tended to be somewhat 
younger, often with less-skilled occupations, than their Scottish comrades. They 
were more likely to be agricultural workers or otherwise come from rural areas 
than the mainly urban-dwelling Scots. Interestingly, English-speaking units 
contained a disproportionate number of Spaniards in the list, with nearly a third 
of the sample belonging to the XV International Brigade.24 There are two 
possible explanations. First, due to relatively lower levels of recruitment from 
English-speaking countries, more Spaniards were necessary to keep this 
brigade at full strength.25 Second, the XV Brigade suffered disproportionate 
casualties in various actions, notably Jarama, Brunete and Calaceite, not only 
increasing personnel turnover, but also increasing their visibility in hospital 
records.26 The appearance of so many XV Brigade Spaniards as casualties in 
International Brigade hospitals also challenges a common narrative – that the 
                                                        
23 ‘List of Spanish members of International Brigades’, AGGCE, PS-44/3. 
24 ‘List of Spanish members of International Brigades’, AGGCE. This trend is also visible in other 
documents. An August 1937 report noted that the XV Brigade required more Spanish 
reinforcements: 1,000 compared to 500-700 for other international units. ‘Proposiciones sobre 
la organización de las Brigadas Internacionales’, 11 August 1937, RGASPI, 545/1/1/27. 
25 Skoutelsky, Novedad, 165–171. 
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internationals were more willing to risk themselves for Spanish freedom than 
the Spaniards themselves.27 
Although the first Spaniards incorporated into the International Brigades were 
volunteers, it is unlikely that this remained the case for long. The bulk of rank-
and-file recruits were conscripts from spring 1937 onwards, soon after the 
British Battalion was founded.28 In particular, after the disastrous Aragon 
retreats in March 1938, the brigade was brought up to strength by 
incorporating large numbers of newly-conscripted Catalan youths. They, as one 
Nationalist intelligence report noted, had received little training, and 
represented a significant decline in the brigade’s quality, still nominally a shock 
unit of the Republican Army.29 While Nationalist intelligence reports were often 
prone to declaring their opponents to be demoralised and poorly motivated, 
there is little doubt that recruiting standards declined over the course of the 
war, as they did for the Republican Army as a whole.30 
For ordinary Spanish conscripts, being posted to the International Brigades was 
a mixed blessing. The memoir of Fausto Villar Esteban makes it clear that the 
International Brigades’ reputation preceded them: he described them as the 
‘most prestigious of all’ the Republic’s ‘shock forces’, likening it to joining the 
Francoist Foreign Legion.31 His testimony shows that while the Spanish recruits 
appreciated the prestige of their new unit, the experience of joining was 
overwhelming. After being told that ‘no one leaves except feet first and covered 
in glory’, Esteban remembered that the words ‘cut us deeper than the chill of 
                                                        
27 E.g. Hamish Fraser, The Truth About Spain (1950), 4. 
28 Baxell is unclear on this point, contrasting the poor performance of recently conscripted 
Spanish troops in September 1938 with ‘the battle-hardened and highly politicised Spanish 
volunteers in the International Brigades’, implying that the Spaniards were predominantly 
volunteers throughout the conflict. Baxell, British Volunteers, 145. As discussed by Matthews, 
however, the Republican reliance on conscripts meant that many if not most Spaniards in the 
International Brigades were no longer volunteers by spring 1937. Matthews, Reluctant Warriors, 
219. See also Skoutelsky, Novedad, 280. 
29 Cuartel General del Generalísimo (CGG) to Ejército del Norte, 29 May 1938, AGMA, C.1,1 d.9. 
30 Matthews, Reluctant Warriors, 30. 
31 Fausto Villar Esteban, Un Valencianito en La Brigada Lincoln [Unpublished Manuscript], 
Labadie Collection, University of Michigan, 5–6. Although undated, the memoir was apparently 
completed in the 1980s. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of the original Spanish by 




that brisk autumn night… We were, every one of us, dumbfounded.’32 His 
reaction reflected the significant downsides of serving in the International 
Brigades. The International Brigades were in action much more often than other 
units, and suffered extremely high casualties.33 According to one deserter to the 
Nationalists in May 1938, Spaniards resisted being assigned to the International 
Brigades as they were ‘mas expuestas.’34 There were other, more everyday 
disadvantages – the International Brigades, for example, received less leave 
than other units.35 This led to grumbling among international and Spanish 
troops alike, but was perhaps especially acute for Spanish troops, as several 
days leave offered the chance to see family and loved ones, rather than simply a 
chance for rest and recreation behind the lines.36 These factors led to tactics to 
evade service – a July 1937 memorandum noted the increase of self-inflicted 
wounds and desertion among Spanish recruits to the XV Brigade, and British 
political commissars judged that many desertion cases were of Spaniards 
seeking to join regular Republican units.37  
Even everyday life in the International Brigades could give rise to friction. 
Simply feeding both Spanish and International troops was an exercise in 
culinary diplomacy. The International Brigades’ right to supplement their 
rations ‘gusto y a la necesidad de cada Unidad’ was enshrined by a decree from 
the Ministry of National Defence in October 1937, doubtless formalising a 
practice that already existed.38 Not only did different national groups require 
different food – many Scots had an instinctive distrust of Spanish cooking – but 
these very differences could easily lead to allegations that one group was being 
                                                        
32 Villar Esteban, Un Valencianito, 5. 
33 Skoutlesky, Novedad, 394–5. 
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35 ‘Meeting of Political Commissars of the Battalion’, 8 June 1937, RGASPI, 545/3/435/50.  
36 ‘Meeting of the Political Commissars’, 8 May 1937, RGASPI, 545/3/435/43. 
37 ‘Memorandum sur la situation des Brigades Internationales’, c. July 1937, RGASPI, 545/1/1/8; 
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favoured over the other.39 One report from December 1937 mentioned a 
particular disagreement along these lines, with Spaniards complaining that 
sugar was never available for their coffee, with ‘the implication being that the 
Internationals use the sugar for sweet rice which Spaniards dislike.’40 Such 
issues reflected a fundamental problem with different national groups serving 
side by side in such close proximity – treating everyone the same would please 
nobody, while treating them according to national preferences could easily be 
seen as favouritism.41  
The International Brigades’ association with communism could also make them 
unattractive. Rank-and-file Spanish conscripts came from a wide variety of 
political or apolitical backgrounds compared to the Scots, especially in 1938 
when the Brigade received reinforcements almost exclusively from Catalonia, 
which led in turn to a rise in the number of anarchists and libertarians serving 
in the British Battalion. Everyday aspects of life in the International Brigades 
could be grating for non-communists, with communist culture and norms 
permeating everyday existence. Communists also dominated the Spanish units, 
as either open Party members or the communist-dominated youth organisation 
Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas.42 In one list of XV Brigade commissars and 
political delegates from February 1938, the only other Spanish party 
represented was the Partido Socialista Obrero Español, which had one lone 
member, while there was also one member of the anarcho-syndicalist trade 
union organisation Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT).43 Neither served 
in the British Battalion. Such documents confirm the observations of Scottish 
                                                        
39 For example, Andre Marty allegedly confiscated ‘personal parcels sent for the Canadians on 
the grounds that such preferential treatment accentuated national differences and was helping 
Fascism’, Alexander to Pollitt, 26 May 1938, MML, Box C, File 22/6. 
40 ‘Report on and Recommendations re the English Battalion’, [December 1937?], AGGCE, PS-
Aragon, Box 6, File 9. 
41 Assumptions about national preferences over something as simple as bread might fuel 
disagreements. Dunlop in MacDougall, Voices from the Spanish Civil War, 133. 
42 Helen Graham, ‘The Socialist Youth in the JSU: the Experience of Organizational Unity, 1936–
8’, in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), Spain in Conflict, 1931–1939, Democracy and its Enemies (1986), 
83–102. 





volunteer Gary McCartney, who ‘never [knew] any commissar of any battalion 
to be other than Communist.’44 
This list was indicative of a broader issue that caused tension between Spanish 
recruits and the International Brigade leadership throughout the conflict – the 
tendency on one hand to view political development as a solution to morale and 
discipline problems, while on the other having to accommodate a wide variety 
of political beliefs. Commissars were simultaneously expected to instil 
communist discipline and political understanding amongst their charges, yet 
nominally forbidden from attempting to extoll communism itself. There was no 
pleasing both sides. Other groups showed considerable concern about the 
organisation of the International Brigades and the nature of communist 
influence.45 Even before the influx of large numbers of Catalonian recruits, the 
Defence Section of the CNT National Committee had received complaints from 
their members and sympathisers in the ranks of the International Brigades. 
Es cada vez mas terrible la situación de un cantidad de compañeros y 
simpatizantes que actuan de dichas Brigadas, se nota una 
descomposición que se debe a la disciplina estupida que no permite que 
un miliciano lea un diario o un manifesto que sea otra tendencia que la 
comunista. Por el solo hecho de llevar una insignia libertaria o un 
pañuelo roji-negro se detiene a los soldados. Sería deseable ver si es 
posible hacer algo para librar a estos infelices de esta situación 
angustiosa.46 
                                                        
44 Garry McCartney, TLS, MS, Tape 168. 
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It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which such complaints were based on fact 
or rumour.47 Certainly, and as the communists themselves acknowledged after 
the war, it was easy for misunderstandings about intentions to emerge, 
especially given the poor communication between nationalities. One report 
noted that the ‘very obvious and clumsy’ efforts to carry out Party work in the 
XV Brigade meant that: 
It appeared that the Communists were trying to ‘hide’ something from the 
rest of the troops. Naturally this did not help, but hurt, the unity between 
the Communists and others in the brigade – the non-party, anarchist, and 
others. This was especially evidenced among the Spanish comrades.48 
Although such incidents may have stemmed in part from misunderstanding, it is 
important to acknowledge that this potential was inherent in the structures of 
the International Brigades, and the constant injunctions for more intense 
political work could not be readily achieved without potentially alienating non-
communists. It was not only anarchists who chafed at Communist Party 
dominance. Similar complaints came from socialists, with one international 
delegate of the Italian Socialist Party calling for the freedom of non-communist 
soldiers and officers in the International Brigades to transfer to new units. The 
author, M. Masetti, reported that non-communists found the situation 
intolerable, and claimed to receive numerous reports of ‘fusilamientos sin previo 
judicio, degradaciones y detenciones injustificadas.’49 Taking aim at André Marty 
and other enchufistas [careerists] in the rearguard, whose removal would 
‘pondrá fin a muchos dispendios inútiles’, Masetti concluded that,  
La experiencia pasada de las B[rigadas] I[nternacionales] ha 
demonstrado que en estas condiciones, no es posible la convivencia 
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entre comunistas y socialistas o simpatizantes, porque estos no quieren 
estar bajo la dictadura de aquellos.50 
Such complaints were used to justify challenging the communist monopoly over 
political organisation in the International Brigades, and more broadly their 
perceived dominance over the Republican armed forces. In one communiqué to 
the Political Commissar of the XV Brigade in April 1938, the Defence Section of 
the CNT National Committee noted the presence of some 500 ‘libertarians’ in 
the brigade, and demanded that a commission be established to: 
a) Envío regular la propaganda a la Brigada. 
b) Nombrar un compañero responsable de la misma Brigada a los 
efectos de relación y propaganda. 
c) Pasar el 1o de Mayo con ellos e intervenir en los actos que se 
realizarán conmemorando la fecha. 
d) Procurar que un Sindicato apadrine un Batallón.51 
 
Beyond a natural interest in the welfare of their membership, this sort of 
intervention reflected concerns other groups had about the International 
Brigades. In part, this outlook was informed by fears that after being subject to 
communist leadership and propaganda, their adherents could be converted. It is 
these reservations that the demands listed above were intended to address in 
making their own propaganda available, and generally attempting to undermine 
the communist stranglehold on the units’ political culture. However, fears about 
communist proselytisation need to be understood as part of broader 
apprehension that the International Brigades were part of the Spanish 
Communist Party’s push for greater control over the war effort.52 The 
International Brigades’ status as communist-controlled outside agents raised 
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the possibility that they might be used as tools against internal rivals.53 While 
these concerns generally remained private, and most parties expressed public 
appreciation for them as a symbol of international solidarity, they nonetheless 
meant that the International Brigades’ internal politics were a matter of ongoing 
significance, and other parties took any chance to dilute or check Communist 
Party influence over the Spanish recruits.  
Although such issues continued to raise hackles throughout the conflict, it is 
important to note the extent to which they were both understood and 
addressed. On one level, this involved something akin to diplomacy, with 
carefully choreographed visits from delegations, and the exchange of carefully 
worded declarations and assurances of good faith.54 This was matched by 
efforts on the ground to ease tension. While the political commissariat 
functioned imperfectly, it did provide the International Brigades and other 
interested parties with the mechanisms to address many of these complaints. By 
later stages of the war, the International Brigades had grown more responsive 
to the varying needs of its soldiers.55 Scottish Political Commissar Tom Murray, 
who served from April 1938, recalled some of these provisions. 
One of my jobs in this connection was to distribute the press, to make 
sure that all the members who wanted to could get copies of the Spanish 
press. And I had to be careful that… papers of a Catalan quality had to be 
given to the Catalans.56  
Aside from responding to external pressure, the network of Political 
Commissars allowed for such issues to be identified and addressed from within. 
Numerous internal and external reports were written about both the British 
Battalion and XV Brigade, many of which touched on relations between the 
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Spanish and foreign soldiers. These reports reveal that the process by which 
Spaniards were integrated and catered for in the International Brigades was a 
slow one, doubtless undermined by the frequent changes in personnel and 
leadership that came with high casualties and reassignments after bloody 
battles at Jarama, Brunete and Calaceite. Even by December 1937, it was clear 
that there were still distinct problems that were far from resolved. 
Amongst the Spanish comrades there is no party organisation, few party 
members and a great number of recruits who have no political 
understanding and amongst whom a great amount of political work 
should be but is not done. The language difficulty and the low political 
level makes it exceedingly difficult to know what elements are 
responsible for the undiscipline [sic] that shows itself from time to 
time.57  
While it is tempting to dismiss this and other reports’ obsession with party 
organisation and political work as political correctness gone mad, the lack of a 
Spanish political representative undermined the Battalion’s ability to cater for 
their needs. The report’s recommendation that ‘a Spanish comrade be found 
capable of being responsible for Spanish comrades politically’ was aimed at 
addressing practical sources of discontent amongst the Spanish troops. It was 
recommended that the candidate be given equal rank to Battalion Political 
Commissar, Wally Tapsell, or at least made his adjutant, an important symbolic 
step in cementing the status of both Spanish soldiers and their particular 
needs.58 Moreover, the recommended ‘first task’ was eminently practical. 
[To] organise the feeding of Spanish comrades so that their rations are 
separately cooked to disprove once and for all of any suggestion that 
Internationals are living at the expense of Spanish comrades... As far as 
possible without disorganising things by undue complication the feeding 
and clothing of Spanish comrades should be controlled by a Spanish 
comrade.59 
It must be acknowledged that the commissariat was working as intended in this 
regard, as a practical way to address real issues affecting morale rather than 
                                                        
57 ‘Report on and Recommendations re the English Battalion’, AGGCE. 
58 ‘Report on and Recommendations re the English Battalion’, AGGCE. 




simply a mechanism of political control. It is clear that the author appreciated 
the substance of complaints, and recommended concrete steps to rectify these 
issues. However, this report, coming as it did nearly a year after the founding of 
the British Battalion, and many months after it started integrating Spanish 
recruits, shows that this system was often more reactive than proactive. While 
mechanisms did exist for positive change for Spanish and International soldiers 
alike, they worked slowly. Moreover, until capable and effective commissars 
were found for the Spanish sections, the ability of this institution to correct 
existing problems was substantially undermined.60 This meant that problems 
lingered throughout the International Brigades’ tenure in Spain. 
Despite the repetitive nature of these issues, other structural factors prevented 
them from souring relations between rank-and-file soldiers. This was perhaps 
especially so for the Scots, for the simple reason that exceptionally few Scots 
spoke Spanish, and as such often lacked knowledge of their Spanish comrades’ 
gripes and concerns. As noted in Chapter One, Scots were among the least likely 
of any national group to speak a foreign language, although this was certainly 
still an issue for the other contingents.61 It is no coincidence that testimony 
dealing with the complexities of relations between internationals and Spaniards 
often comes from the small minority of Scots who spoke the language 
competently. This included John Dunlop, who spoke at some length on the 
issues that arose from the integration of large numbers of anarchist conscripts.  
They were very inclined to question the right of anybody to give them 
orders, because of their Anarchist beliefs. And we had to explain very 
carefully to them why it was essential that in military matters anyway 
the orders had to be obeyed.62 
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Dunlop’s language skills meant that his encounters with Spanish comrades were 
more frequent and complex, as did his status as a non-commissioned officer 
who needed to instruct Spanish subordinates. This is reflected in his testimony 
when discussing the Spaniards’ politics above, but also in his recollection of his 
daily routines – he recalled that ‘whenever possible [he] used to go over to the 
Spanish group…and feed with them’, lamenting British cooks’ ‘insular’ attitude 
to Spanish cuisine and ingredients.63 This experience reflected that of 
Glaswegian ‘Cheeky’ McCraig, whose natural aptitude for languages meant that 
‘in Madrigueras everybody was starving but Cheeky was down the road eating 
well speaking fluent Spanish in a fortnight.’64 However, those who actively 
sought to understand and share the company of their Spanish comrades were 
relatively rare amongst the Scots – another, Alec Ferguson, recalled that very 
few volunteers spoke Spanish, and that his eventual competence ‘wasn’t 
typical.’65 Linguistic difficulties could cut both ways – Villar Esteban, serving for 
a time as the lone Spaniard on Battalion staff, bemoaned the resulting feeling of 
isolation.66 Similarly, volunteers sent to Spanish hospitals complained of the 
problems caused by mutual incomprehension between staff and patient.67 Being 
unable to communicate complex ideas, most volunteers were content with 
establishing basic goodwill with their comrades in arms – as William Gilmour 
put it in a letter, ‘we are all as happy as hell, in spite of the difficulties of 
language and customs.’68 Gilmour might well have substituted ‘because of’ in 
place of ‘in spite of’. Similarly, George Murray poked fun at his own linguistic 
incompetence: 
We have a Spanish class here and I am now a fluent linguist. My Spanish 
is so good that the Spaniards hardly understand a word I am saying! We 
must have them educated! Despite the language barrier, which is a 
perpetual nuisance, I have made good friends in many nationalities.69 
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The resulting tendency towards picking up fragments of other languages was 
parodied in a song composed about the language difficulties. 
Ich kam nach Spain in Januar 
Yo hablar seulemente English 
But jetzt I say Comment Savar 
Wie gehts, Que tal, tovarisch 
 
Ich fahren mit mein ambulance 
In woikin shoit and panties 
No tengo tiempo por romance 
Y arbeit más duro que antes.70  
 
Although clearly a source of humour, such fragmentary understandings of 
different languages did serve a useful purpose. At least among the more 
politically engaged elements on both sides, relations were facilitated by a 
common language of solidarity. Most Scottish volunteers were quick to learn 
and use the verbal and non-verbal expressions of the Popular Front, such as the 
clenched-fist salute, slogans such as ¡No Pasarán! and the ubiquitous camaradas. 
William Gilmour wrote to his friend at home that ‘often we understand each 
other spiritually as we are all imbued with the same antifascist spirit.’71 Alec 
Park, in a letter back to Scotland, was particularly evocative of the sights and 
sounds of solidarity. 
The Spanish people themselves welcome our assistance and on all hands 
we are greeted with ‘Salud Camarada’, even by the children. They have 
been celebrating Lenin’s birthday, in the market square there is a large 
picture of Lenin on a red banner, at night there is lit up a large red star 
and all around the balconies of the buildings display pictures of the 
various Soviet and Spanish Republican leaders amidst the Republican 
colours.72 
For their part, Scottish volunteers were thrilled to exchange such gestures with 
their Spanish comrades – they were putting into practice the theory of 
international solidarity, and its reciprocation represented an important 
affirmation of the power and rightness of their own political beliefs and purpose 
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in coming to Spain. Such interactions were superficial, yet sufficed to establish 
goodwill and common purpose.73 There was, however, a danger that in being 
satisfied with establishing a basic common ground between themselves and 
their Spanish comrades, more complicated underlying issues were simply not 
addressed or understood by the international volunteers. 
The dominance of complaints regarding material issues also mitigated against 
their influencing relationships amongst rank-and-file soldiers. Systemic issues 
such as rations and leave allowances were patently not the volunteers’ fault, and 
involving them in their complaints – even if this could have been communicated 
– made little sense. Moreover, it was difficult to avoid appreciating the 
considerable personal sacrifices the foreign volunteers were making. This 
reconciliation between appreciation and affection for the volunteers with 
criticism towards the institution of the International Brigades is striking in 
Villar Esteban’s memoir. While he was certainly critical in places, his 
appreciation for the volunteers’ self-sacrifice was also clear. 
All I could do was convey my thanks to all present… Thanks, for the 
generous, ready offering of their lives… Thanks, for their disinterested 
commitment, because the material assistance afforded to both sides had 
been handsomely paid for… Only the men of the International Brigades 
levied no charge.74 
As such, dissatisfaction with serving in the International Brigades should not be 
taken as evidence that basic everyday encounters between the volunteers and 
their Spanish comrades were generally characterised by bad blood. Yet this 
inability to communicate effectively did have consequences. The poor state of 
most volunteers’ Spanish language skills was a constant worry for the 
International Brigade leadership. Not only was a working knowledge of Spanish 
immensely important in a Spanish-speaking army, there was perceived political 
value in volunteers learning and speaking Spanish. Articles in Nuestro Combate 
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and Volunteer for Liberty, the XV Brigade newspapers, often hammered home 
the need for volunteers to learn Spanish: 
Outstanding… is the urgent need for all of us to learn the Spanish 
language. This is important for military reasons but it is also politically 
important. This change brings us into much closer contact with our 
Spanish comrades.75 
American and British comrades, learn Spanish! ... We must learn Spanish 
in order to fulfil our mission here with the maximum effectiveness. This 
effectiveness demands the closest and most intimate relationship 
possible with our Spanish fellow-fighters in our Brigade.76 
Such articles were accompanied by a range of practical initiatives, from the oft-
mentioned language classes to a specially designed English-Spanish grammar 
book.77 While encouragement to learn Spanish was often phrased positively – it 
could hardly be openly admitted that relations between Spaniards and 
internationals were anything other than excellent – the underlying message was 
that language was not only of practical benefit, but a major barrier preventing 
meaningful integration and understanding between the Spanish and foreign 
soldiers. This was echoed in the public and private statements and reports of 
the commissariat. The issue was stated plainly at a conference of British 
Political Commissars in November 1937. 
More and more we need to thoroughly absorb and act upon the idea that 
we are now a part of the Spanish army that we are as responsible for the 
Spanish comrades in our base, Battalion and hospitals as much as for the 
British and to interest ourselves in every way in their life and problems. 
An elementary knowledge of the Spanish language is essential for every 
one of us.78  
This oft-expressed concern about the language barrier between Spanish and 
English-speaking soldiers reflects a more pervasive issue that haunted the 
International Brigades and could threaten to undermine the basic cohesion of 
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its units. Many at all levels of the British contingent came to view the Spanish 
troops as unreliable and less willing to fight for the cause than the foreign 
volunteers. Battalion Commissar Wally Tapsell, writing after the bloodbath at 
Brunete, was particularly vehement. 
In plain fact, and it is hard to state this, on every occasion we were with 
Spanish troops in this engagement they let us down. Their behaviour on 
every occasion either resulted in serious casualties, or the immediate 
loss of positions won by us at heavy cost. This is a fact. I cannot speak for 
other Spanish troops, this is the hard fact of our experience. 
Consequently one of the biggest, if not the biggest morale question in the 
Battalion is – Why such behaviour from the Spanish troops. Pious prattle 
does not satisfy men who have been wounded, who have seen their pals 
and brothers shot down; wounded and killed and have a clear and 
truthful picture of what transpired.79 
Similarly, H.O. Knester reported that ‘the Spanish militia is useless’ and that ‘on 
a decisive day on the Jarama, 2 militia battalions were not there where they 
ought to have been.’80 Similar views can be detected in the testimony of Scottish 
volunteers, although often couched euphemistically. Hamish Fraser was the 
most blunt. 
The despair of the Republic was its inability to rely on any troops other 
than those units which were composed of, organized and led by 
Communists… No International Brigader is likely to dispute this. Indeed, 
that so many of the Brigaders drenched the soil of Spain so liberally with 
their blood was tribute to more than their mistaken idealism (and the 
Brigades were as a whole representative of the cream of the working 
class); their blood was willing tribute to the confidence the Spanish 
people did not have in the government of the Republic [original 
emphasis].81 
Fraser’s words cannot be taken at face value. Although a committed communist 
in Spain, he converted to both Catholicism and anti-communism later in life and 
this particular text was written for a Catholic publisher. It is clear that he 
wanted to downplay the Republic’s popular support and the willingness of its 
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citizens to defend it.82 Yet his words do reflect other volunteers’ more tactful 
views about the Spanish troops’ effectiveness. Responding to a question about 
whether the Spaniards needed the International Brigades because they were 
not willing to fight themselves, Sydney Quinn replied, 
What I would say was, unlike Britain, France, Germany…they’d lost their 
empire over a long period. They never had soldiers abroad, you know, 
and little wars and they never been involved in the world war and their 
military knowledge and experience among the top, well the top 
leadership had deserted to the Fascists, of course, they had all the 
available knowledge and military experience… it was just the fact that in 
that particular field at particular time they just didn’t have enough 
experience, and the Internationals played that role, gave the necessary 
experience.83 
Quinn’s statement represents a more typical opinion of Spanish soldiers. While 
generally neither hostile nor doubtful of their commitment, most Scots were 
condescending regarding Spaniards’ fighting ability. In part, these attitudes 
harken back to their very motivation in coming to Spain, and their preconceived 
notions about the nature of the struggle. Spain, and by extension Spaniards, was 
seen as the defenceless victim of militaristic fascism. The volunteers therefore 
saw themselves as saviours, reinforcements from abroad who could teach and 
protect innocent Spaniards until they were able to defend themselves. While the 
Spanish people were undoubtedly heroic in such formulations, this heroism was 
constructed in passive terms of resistance and suffering, serving to highlight 
their primary status as victims. The International Brigades’ role was seen as 
that of an older, more experienced sibling – there to ‘stiffen up the Spaniards’, in 
the words of James Maley.84 John Londragan drew explicitly on this imagery of 
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innocent, immature Spaniards unable to adapt to modern warfare in justifying 
the intervention of the International Brigades. 
[The Spaniards] were very childlike. I don’t use the word in an insulting 
way. They were very childlike in their innocence and they were very nice 
to get on with, they’d do anything for you. There’s a tale going about, and 
I quite believe it’s true, that in Jarama the Spaniards who used to help the 
British Battalion used to go back home at night time. They used to leave 
the line and go back home to their houses and then come back up again 
in the morning. That was the sort of childishness they had. They had 
never been involved in war before and had known nothing about it at 
all.85 
Paternal attitudes were also apparent when discussing their Spanish comrades’ 
non-military attainments. Like most Republican units, classes were established 
in the British Battalion to combat endemic illiteracy among the Spanish 
recruits.86 Particularly for the organisers of such classes, the assumed teacher-
student relationship could also feed in to their existing assumptions about their 
role in Spain. 
One of the jobs of a commissar was to provide educational facilities, 
especially for illiterates. And we trained a number of Spaniards in the 
elements of reading and writing and so forth… I vividly recall two 
Spaniards, Ors and Linaris, both of whom I am sorry to say were killed 
later on. These two had a chabola [shelter/shack] and I used to listen to 
them in the evening laboriously trying to read Spanish. I thought to 
myself what splendid fellows they were, making an effort like that 
because they had been denied education earlier in life.87 
Murray’s fond reminiscence was undoubtedly not intended to be patronising, 
yet it is hard to avoid reading it as symptomatic of the international volunteers’ 
attitude that they had come to Spain to better the locals.88 As argued in Chapter 
Two, the desire to be part of a civilising mission crafting a socialist Spain needs 
to be understood as a key motivation for volunteering, and it is natural that such 
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motivations translated into the volunteers’ understandings of their 
relationships with their Spanish comrades – particularly with the frequent 
inability of either party to communicate complex ideas.  
Beyond these saviour/victim and teacher/student dynamics, the Scottish 
volunteers’ attitudes to Spanish soldiers were also informed by imperial modes 
of thought. In particular, many volunteers subscribed to hierarchies of race 
when it came to explaining military effectiveness. James Maley of Glasgow was 
the most blunt when assessing the quality of the Spanish troops he served with 
at Jarama, opining that ‘the Spaniards, they’re like the Italians. They’re just not 
like British or German soldiers.’89 Such formulations were far from uncommon, 
and underpinned claims that the British Battalion was especially elite, such as 
Tommy Bloomfield’s assertion that they were ‘top dogs in Spain’, or David 
Anderson’s view that while the Americans were ‘extremely good organisers’, the 
‘British were better fighters’ as they ‘could accept hardships.’90 Many volunteers 
believed that races could be divided into warlike and unwarlike peoples, with 
Italians generally being placed at the bottom of such hierarchies.  
The Italians were pretty easy to capture, you know. Well, you know what 
happened to the Italians later on in the Second World War. I mean, they 
didn’t fancy fighting at all, because they are a peaceful kind of people, 
Italians.91 
While the retrospective nature of such claims – perhaps informed by British 
experiences of fighting Italy in the Second World War – is problematic, it must 
also be allowed that this trope of the ‘unwarlike’ Italian has deep roots, 
stemming as far back as the sixteenth century.92 As such, the tendency to adopt 
racialised hierarchies should be seen as a product of contemporary British and 
indeed European society rather than a later reimagining of the volunteers’ time 
in Spain. Such beliefs could be normalised and internalised through the 
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depiction of racial roles and stereotypes in contemporary popular culture, as 
well as accounts of the Great War, and this process offers the most convincing 
explanation for the prevalence of such attitudes among the Scottish 
volunteers.93 Nor should such factors be considered unique to the Scottish or 
British contingents: as discussed previously, narratives of national military 
superiority in the International Brigades were common.94 Rather, this strikes 
right to the heart of the International Brigades’ purpose in Spain. With the 
majority of British volunteers having little or no prior military knowledge, the 
formulations quoted above about providing ‘necessary experience’ are hard to 
sustain.95 In fact, this can be interpreted as echoing the classic imperial 
assumption that colonial troops needed to be led or ‘stiffened’ by white soldiers 
to be effective.96 The International Brigades’ very existence needs to be 
understood as being in part the product of such ways of thinking. 
Any such existing attitudes were also reinforced by the dynamic within 
Republican forces privileging the ‘volunteer’ as inherently superior to 
conscripts.97 Although this discourse featured on both sides, it became more 
important for the Republicans over the course of the war, as the imbalance of 
war materiel meant that greater emphasis was placed on soldiers’ morale and 
dedication.98 These assumptions often intersected with volunteers’ other views 
discussed above.  
I wasn’t impressed by the fighting qualities of Mussolini’s Italian troops 
in Spain, no. The toughest of the lot were the Germans, and the Moors 
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next. But the Italians! I saw the Garibaldis o’ the International Brigade. 
They were different: they had men that were fighting for a belief. It was 
bred in them. They werenae there because they were sent there. They 
were volunteers. And there’s quite a difference between a volunteer and 
a man ramrodded into a thing.99 
The Scots’ status as volunteers therefore acted to cement implicit perceptions of 
superiority and boosted their self-confidence, but this contrasted uneasily with 
the status of most of their Spanish comrades as conscripts. As James Mathews 
has shown, Spanish conscripts throughout the Republican Army resented the 
perceived favouritism towards volunteers, and it is natural that this would be 
reflected in units such as the International Brigades, in which volunteers and 
conscripts were readily differentiated along the lines of language and 
nationality.100  
Assumptions of superiority could seriously disrupt relations between Spaniards 
and international volunteers. While complaints about material conditions and 
discrepancies in treatment in the International Brigades did not appear to have 
greatly influenced relationships between rank-and-file soldiers, perceived 
disrespect had the potential to undermine relations at all levels. The myriad of 
ways in which international volunteers assumed an inherent superiority was 
often apparent to many Spaniards in the International Brigades, which in turn 
naturally bred resentment. One report from January 1938 specifically singled 
out the British Battalion: 
En cuanto a las relaciones entre los españoles e internacionales, estas no 
son satisfactorias, En los [Batallones] de esta [Brigada] especialmente en 
el [Batallón] Inglés, existe un concepto de superioridad que les hace 
mirar con cierto desprecio a los combatientes españoles manifestándose 
esto hasta en los simples soldados llevado al extremo de no guardar el 
mismo respecto y obediencia a los mandos españoles que a los de lengua 
inglesa.101 
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This, as the report made clear, was a source of considerable frustration for 
Spanish officers, many of whom were better trained and more experienced than 
their international counterparts. Another report from August 1937 makes it 
clear that complaints about Spanish troops were already a well-established 
phenomenon. 
Savage and unjustified criticism of Spanish troops was heard, 
particularly from the weakest comrades. It must be understood that the 
attitude taken towards the Spanish comrades is perhaps the surest of all 
morale barometers.102 
Such animosity towards the Spanish troops and officers presented a circular 
problem for the International Brigades’ leaders. It was recognised that if 
Spanish troops felt that they were disrespected and treated like second-class 
citizens in their own country, they would be less likely to operate as an effective 
unit alongside foreign troops, resulting in the very symptoms that caused 
disrespect. Claiming, as Knester and Tapsell did in private, that Spanish troops 
were less motivated and reliable than the internationals, was therefore both 
politically and militarily unacceptable. Instead, the blame was placed at the feet 
of the international volunteers. 
Al lado de esos ha faltado también la comprensión necesaria del papel de 
las Brigadas Internacionales en el desarrollo del Ejercito Español, 
manifestado en la falta de compenetración entre los soldados españoles e 
internacionales. En los ataques, por ejemplo, ha habido casos en que los 
internacionales han avanzado y los españoles en los mismo batallones se 
han quedado atras. La responsabilidad ha sido de los camaradas 
internacionales que en muchos casos han adoptado una aptitud de 
desprecio a los españoles.103    
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The report, unsurprisingly, concluded that the problem lay in insufficient 
political work, and could be addressed by mobilising communists to serve as 
examples in discipline, care of arms, military training and supporting the 
political work of the commissariat.104 This conclusion was often echoed 
whenever the question of relations between Internationals and Spaniards 
arose.105 This was perhaps the only politically acceptable answer, and offered 
the attractive prospect that issues could be addressed through positive 
measures, albeit still reinforcing a teacher/student dynamic in which the 
success of Spaniards was dependent on the Internationals’ capacity to uplift 
them.  
However, efforts to shape interactions between Spaniards and foreign 
volunteers were never fully successful, and appear to have been cyclical 
throughout the International Brigades’ existence. Even by early 1937, articles in 
XV Brigade newspapers appeared with the intent of changing a troublesome 
status quo. One from March 1937 listed undesirable behaviours so specific there 
can be little doubt that they were addressing concrete behaviours: 
Encourage desertion, flee when advancing, let weapons rust, waste 
ammunition, constantly grumble, always talk about leave, don’t carry out 
orders, argue that anti-fascist officers are incompetent and needlessly 
send militiamen to their death, spread false rumours like that there are 
fascists in the popular army headquarters, blame lack of wine on 
H[ead]Q[uarters] and QM drinking it all… unfavourably compare Spanish 
soldiers with internationals, say that English and French militiamen 
should return home because of recent decrees.106 
Similarly, a survey conducted of Political Commissars in mid-1938 confirms that 
these same issues were of continued concern, asking commissars to detail the 
‘situación exacta de las relaciones entre camaradas internacionales y españoles’, 
any difficulties they presented and, echoing the report above, the level of 
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respect for the Spanish officers.107 Later in the conflict, the looming repatriation 
of foreign volunteers could also act to sour relations, ‘producido muy mal efecto 
entre los camaradas españoles’, who were aware that the volunteers were eager 
to leave to their respective countries, through desertion if necessary.108 
Without more intimate perspectives from Spaniards within the International 
Brigades, it is difficult to assess the extent to which such factors undermined 
relations between rank-and-file soldiers. It is clear that the Spanish recruits 
often resented the institution of the International Brigades. Certainly, the level 
of concern shown by the leadership, and the clear evidence of the persistence of 
such attitudes among the international volunteers, indicates that these were not 
isolated views. It is noteworthy that many of the themes addressed here are also 
present in the declarations made to the Nationalists by Spanish deserters from 
the International Brigades, one of the few sources that directly preserve the 
viewpoints of ordinary Spanish soldiers.109 Though often hyperbolic, the 
observations are familiar. 
Por su buen espíritu militar son tratados mejor que los españoles, cobran 
lo mismo que ellos pero son preferidos en lo que se refiere a vestuario y 
alimentación. Aunque a los españoles les faltan a ellos jamás les ha 
faltado nada. De ahí se explica también la animosidad de una infinidad de 
españoles... Esta animosidad ha nacido también del desprecio con que la 
Oficialidad trata a los españoles que más de una vez se manifiesta en 
reproches rudos diciéndoles que si al principio hubiesen tenido valor no 
habrían tenido que abandonar su trabajo para auxiliar a los proletarios 
que se habían caracterizado por su cobardía.110 
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These are of course not unmediated voices, nor even typical voices thanks to 
their status as deserters or defectors. These declarations were likely shaped by 
what the defectors believed their interrogators wished to hear. However, given 
that their themes overlap with the reports of the International Brigades’ own 
Political Commissars, they are unlikely to be outright fabrications. While not an 
even-handed window into the views of the Spanish soldiers in the International 
Brigades, it is also clear that deserters tended to use real, if potentially 
exaggerated, grievances to inform their stories. From them, we can posit that for 
a minority of Spanish soldiers in the International Brigades, the issues described 
here were serious and led to significant barriers between them and the 
international volunteers. However, other sources, such as censorship reports on 
Spaniards’ correspondence, indicate that morale was often considered high – in 
one case concluding that their letters indicated great satisfaction with the 
international military leaders.111 Nonetheless, these reports, while perhaps 
confirming that such issues never reached a critical level, provide only a very 
limited and generalised snapshot into the concerns of Spaniards in the 
International Brigades. They cannot be taken as contradiction of the many other 
sources that raised concerns about how these relationships took shape. 
From the Scottish volunteers’ perspective, relations with their Spanish 
comrades were shaped heavily by expectations of the conflict in Spain and their 
role in it. For the individual volunteers motivated by the desire to take action 
against fascism, going to Spain embodied their belief that their fight could make 
a tangible difference. The portrayal of the struggle overseas, which emphasised 
the bravery, sacrifice and martyrdom of the Spanish people, encouraged 
prospective volunteers to cast themselves as saviours. While they undoubtedly 
meant well, and their sacrifices were certainly appreciated by their Spanish 
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comrades, framing their participation in this way could not help but foster local 
resentment at being treated as less knowledgeable or capable. This in turn was 
compounded by the volunteers’ inability to leave behind the imperial ways of 
thinking of their home societies, with racialised hierarchies continuing to 
inform how the volunteers saw their role in the Spanish armed forces. Scots, 
given the ubiquity of Scottish ‘martial race’ ideologies, were perhaps especially 
prone to such ways of thinking, yet it is unlikely that they were exceptional. 
Most national groups thought in similar terms, constructing hierarchies that 
almost invariably placed themselves at the top. The underlying justification for 
the International Brigades project can be seen as stemming from an assumption 
that Spaniards made poor soldiers and that internationals, however 
inexperienced, would do better than the locals by virtue of their race. Friction 
caused by disrespect between Spaniards and non-Spaniards, fuelled by such 
assumptions of superiority, needs to be understood as a systemic issue for the 




While contact with Spanish comrades in arms was a daily experience for most 
international volunteers, contact with civilians was more sporadic. Yet for both 
individual volunteers and the International Brigade leadership, interaction with 
the civilian population was immensely important. For the individual, Spanish 
civilians – especially women and children – were representations of what they 
were fighting for. Positive exchanges affirmed their decision to fight for Spain, 
and these interactions became treasured memories for many volunteers. 
Volunteers were also fascinated by the differences to home – landscapes, food, 
even the ‘quaint Spanish peasant atmosphere’ underscored how exotic Spain 
was for working-class Scots.112 Yet it is telling just how difficult it is to present 
any information about the International Brigades from the perspective of 
ordinary civilians. While the structures of the Republican Army helped preserve 
                                                        




the perspectives of ordinary soldiers, the same cannot be said of civilians. As 
such, this section is concerned primarily with Spanish civilians as they were 
encountered and imagined by the Scots, with any presentation of civilians’ 
reciprocal views remaining speculative at best. 
The International Brigades’ leaders soon realised that these encounters 
required mediation. Relations between soldiers and civilians in wartime are 
always complex, with both sides having a series of needs that such interactions 
can fulfil, needs that did not necessarily align.113 It was politically vital that the 
International Brigades enjoyed a positive relationship with the Spanish people, 
and numerous practical and propaganda initiatives were launched in an effort 
to ensure that this remained the case. This came into conflict with the 
volunteers’ own desires for, and conceptions of, relaxation and leisure. For 
many Scots, this involved the consumption of alcohol, which often ended poorly 
when it came to maintaining good relations with the local population. Sexual 
relationships were also a product of the volunteers’ time in Spain, although 
success in pursuing them depended a great deal on location, timing and 
language skills, and these experiences were far from universal. Regulating such 
behaviour was seen as vital by the political leadership, for the sake of both 
avoiding problems with local populations and maintaining high levels of 
socialist morality and hygiene in the International Brigades themselves.  
Volunteers’ first experiences of Spanish civilians often came immediately upon 
crossing the border. The sheer excitement this engendered should not be 
underestimated. The symbols of the Popular Front and left-wing solidarity were 
immediate and very apparent. This served to reinforce their preconceived 
notions of what Spain and its people were like – a society in which the working 
classes were united and mobilised, and progressive politics were part of the 
fabric of everyday life. The volunteers’ testimony often lingered on descriptions 
of such moments: the slogans daubed on walls, the clenched-fist salutes of 
agricultural workers, as well as frequent singing and cries of salud 
                                                        




camaradas.114 Here was a vista and soundscape that underscored the difference 
between the society they had left and the one they aimed to defend. The 
kaleidoscope of symbols of international solidarity were often supplemented by 
concrete acts – passing through orange groves in the picking season, recent 
arrivals travelling by train found themselves showered with fruit by the 
pickers.115 Such gestures were reciprocated, as Jimmy Maley recalled. 
The first day I was there, a little boy spoke to me. I didn’t know what he 
was talking about but I knew what he meant, so I got some food and gave 
him it to give to his mother.116 
Maley’s words are interesting, especially in response to the interviewer’s 
question about whether he learned much Spanish while in Spain. Maley 
implicitly allows that he did not, and that his interactions with civilians were 
based as much on his expectations as their actual attempts at communication. 
His encounter can also be interpreted cynically: did locals realise that new 
volunteers, emotionally overwhelmed by the displays of solidarity around them 
and not yet realising the value of food in wartime, were easy marks? Maley 
recalled the reception as friendly, even ‘hospitable’, yet given the one-sided 
nature of their interactions there remains the prospect that this welcome was to 
some extent performative.117 A similarly ambiguous dynamic featured in Alec 
Ferguson’s testimony. 
The Spanish people were so extremely friendly that they would take you 
by the hand sort of thing, first there’s an instance before I learned to 
speak Spanish, we went to buy some fruit, which I incidentally gave away, 
the biggest mistake I ever made because the children were starving and I 
was going to give it to one little girl…  as soon as I gave them to one, of 
course, an army of children gathered round me and I finished up giving 
the lot away and the parents were condemning the children but I mean 
you could understand the children. When we wanted to buy this fruit the 
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prices they were charging were so exuberant [sic] that the Spanish 
people themselves wouldn’t buy them.118 
Like Maley, Ferguson’s instinctive generosity towards locals, especially children, 
highlights several underlying dynamics. On one level, such encounters could be 
seen as reinforcing the volunteers’ conception of themselves as saviours, carers 
as well as physical defenders of the Spanish people. It is also interesting that 
Ferguson’s train of thought, starting with the Spanish people’s friendliness, 
went almost immediately to his recollection of being mobbed by children 
seeking food from him, implicitly framing his friendly relationship with 
Spaniards in a transactional sense. This is also hinted at by the Ferguson’s 
observation that Spaniards were becoming unable to afford ‘luxury’ items such 
as fruit. This points not only to a growing awareness of the war’s impact on the 
civilian population, but also discrepancies in standards of living between 
relatively well-fed internationals and the hungry populace.  
It is difficult to imagine that Spanish civilians viewed such discrepancies with 
equanimity. Fausto Villar Esteban’s memoir describes he and his fellow 
conscripts’ reaction to their first meal after joining the XV Brigade. 
We newcomers find that the food here is plentiful; three separate 
courses plus butter and rice pudding… These fellows must eat their full 
regularly if they can indulge themselves in the luxury of conducting 
themselves with such refinement so that there is no rationing of their 
food and none of their abundance goes to waste. As we share our meal, 
Manolo and I pass comment on all of this and cannot get over our 
surprise.119 
Such issues could never be completely avoided given the practice of billeting the 
International Brigades in towns and villages when away from the front. This 
meant that managing their relationships with the local population was a 
recurring concern for the International Brigade leadership. The political 
necessity of maintaining positive connections with the Spanish people was 
readily apparent, and a great deal of propaganda was aimed at framing these 
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relationships appropriately. These efforts also sought to establish the foreign 
fighters’ good intentions in the eyes of Spanish comrades and civilians, as 
numerous Spanish-language articles make clear. 
Desde su llegada a España los combatientes de la libertad, que habían 
dejado en sus países hogar y familia para acudir en ayuda de la nación 
invadida, encontraron en nuestros pueblos todo el cariño y aprecio a que 
eran acreedores… En cuantas ocasiones disminuyeron las raciones para 
entregar su pan a los habitantes del pueblo; cuantas otras quedaron sin 
fumar para entregar su tabaco a los campesinos; pero, indudablemente, 
los mejores amigos de nuestros camaradas internacionales fueron 
siempre los niños. Todos les parecía poco para obsequiarlos: juguetes, 
meriendas, vestidos, material para sus escuelas…120 
Efforts were made to match such words with deeds. Parades, concerts and 
sports days were organised whenever possible to both provide entertainment 
and encourage positive interactions with the locals.121 Work among children 
was accorded particular significance in propaganda, with articles appearing 
regularly about children’s homes sponsored by the International Brigades.122 
When duties allowed, volunteers also aided local work, from repairing buildings 
to helping with the harvest.123 It is difficult to say how often this actually 
happened in practice, and given how few volunteers discuss it in their testimony, 
it is likely that it was rarer than propaganda made out.124 This should not 
necessarily be interpreted cynically – uninterrupted periods of rest were 
relatively rare – but can be taken as further evidence that the leadership 
recognised the necessity of maintaining positive relations with the Spanish 
people. This view was often reciprocated – various large and small Spanish 
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organisations sought to make concrete gestures of solidarity and appreciation 
to the international volunteers, such as the University Students Federation 
branch of the Lagasca Institute, which presented XV Brigade with a banner, to 
meetings filled with Popular Front dignitaries hosted by the Socorro Rojo 
Internacional.125 Such events were also reported in the Republican press, and 
this acted to cement the foreign fighters’ status as heroic defenders of the 
Republic in the eyes of civilians.126  
It is difficult to say whether these high-level expressions of gratitude and praise 
had much impact on ordinary volunteers’ time in Spain. Certainly, it was 
reported in the XV Brigade press, which gave ample space, for instance, to 
tributes received from all quarters on the anniversary of the International 
Brigades’ founding in October 1937.127 However, the volunteers themselves 
focused much more on concrete exchanges that they experienced directly. It is 
telling, for instance, that one of the few personal effects kept by Scottish Political 
Commissar George Aitken was a greeting card signed by the children and 
teachers at the local school at Mondejar, expressing their thanks and gratitude 
to the British Battalion.128 Of all the high-level praise heaped upon the 
volunteers in Spain, it was the occasions on which it was delivered personally 
that resonated. Many recalled the famous farewell parade in Barcelona, 
addressed by the incomparable Dolores Ibárruri, known as La Pasionaria.129 Yet 
the volunteers who were present only occasionally referred to her speech – it 
was the crowds that dominated their memories, and evoked the most emotional 
response.130Bill Cranston was clearly overwhelmed at the time and even 
recalling it decades later. 
I took part in the big final march in Barcelona. Oh, I couldnae explain it. I 
was wantin’ tae cry. We were marchin’ doon and the reception we got 
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from the people – women and everything, a’ kissin’ and huggin’ us and all 
the rest o’ it. It’s a thing I’ll never forget, never.131 
Being so openly welcomed and appreciated by ordinary Spaniards clearly 
moved many Scots, an experience that was not limited to their Barcelona 
farewell. One report from August 1937 tied the volunteers’ morale to the 
reception they received from civilians, noting that in one village ‘the feeling 
between the people and the comrades is very warm. Young girls dance in public 
with the comrades.’132 Similarly, Arthur Nicoll, who recalled having few 
opportunities for meeting Spanish civilians, was invited by a Spanish sergeant 
to stay with his family when both visited Valencia.133 For Nicoll, this wasn’t just 
a chance to experience warm hospitality, but to bolster his faith in the Spanish 
people themselves. 
He invited me to join him [at home] and I got an amazing reception. I 
stayed two nights in the household and they couldn’t do enough for me. 
These people just didn’t have any pro-fascist feelings at all, they just 
could not accept them there.134 
From the volunteers’ perspective, the positivity of such encounters was 
important, and Nicoll was not alone in pointing to such moments as confirming 
the underlying correctness of his coming to Spain. There is no doubt that many 
locals were delighted to host the international volunteers when they could, and 
wished to show hospitality and appreciation towards the foreigners who were 
so liberally sacrificing their lives. Yet it is important to acknowledge the self-
selecting nature of these encounters. Nicoll would never have been invited to 
meet this family had the sergeant not known that the reception would have 
been positive. In other contexts, similarly self-selecting forces were at work. 
John Dunlop, recalling socialising during training in Madrigueras, noted that he 
spent time with George Murray and several others in a local café, which was run 
by ‘the principal Communist official in the village’ – not a venue where he was 
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likely to encounter unsympathetic locals.135 As such, when other volunteers 
talked more expansively about their reception in Spain, it is difficult to take 
their words at face value. Tommy Bloomfield, for instance, recalled that ’Spanish 
civilians were very friendly and everywhere you went if there was a meal on 
their table they would invite you to partake of that meal.’136 While memories 
such as this should be taken as evidence that interactions between locals and 
internationals were frequently positive on both sides, they should not be taken 
as proof that all such encounters were positive. Bloomfield also glosses over the 
transactional element to meal sharing in Spanish village life – a practice referred 
to in Villar Esteban’s memoir, in which he describes the apparently everyday 
occurrence of partaking of locals’ meals in exchange for a small gratuity.137 In 
Bloomfield’s case, he recalled providing cigarettes for his hosts.138  
Accounts that stress the broad welcome received by volunteers should also be 
balanced against less positive memories of specific places and events. John 
Lochore claimed to recall the hostile action of the ‘Fifth Column’ when leaving 
Albacete by bus – ‘a bullet cut clean through the glass of the window, missing 
[his] head by the merest fraction.’139 Although Lochore had no way of knowing 
what had actually transpired, his rationalisation of it as the work of Fifth 
Columnists implicitly acknowledges the existence of hostile local opinion 
towards the International Brigades. While a fanciful story, Lochore had a point – 
by the very nature of civil wars, it is unlikely that they were ever universally 
welcomed everywhere they went. John Dunlop, who, as noted previously, had a 
firmer grasp of local politics than most volunteers, recalled concern about how 
anarchist-dominated areas would react to their presence. 
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When we used to go through Catalonian country we always had to watch 
out for ourselves because we didn’t know how we were going to be 
received at that particular time by the people.140 
It is important to acknowledge how the inhabitants of these locales might 
mirror Dunlop’s unease – civilians had considerably more to fear from an armed 
body of soldiers than the soldiers did from civilians. While it is difficult to 
imagine the British volunteers embarking on a programme of politically-
motivated violence directed towards Republican civilians, their good intentions 
were not necessarily apparent to an outside observer. There was quiet concern 
among Spain’s non-communist political organisations, particularly the 
anarchists, that the International Brigades might represent a weapon not just 
against Franco, but also against the Communist Party’s internal opponents.141 
These fears could be replicated on a local level – one refugee from the 
Republican Zone who made her way to France told Nationalist agents that an 
International Brigade had been lodged in her village. She claimed that it was 
‘creencia general que esta Brigada tiene por especial misión reprimir cualquier 
acto de protesta que pueda iniciarse en contra del Gobierno rojo.‘142 While such 
testimony is not necessarily representative, coming as it did from a refugee who 
evidently sought out Nationalist agents, it is nonetheless indicative of 
alternative local perspectives on the International Brigades. While it is unlikely 
that the international volunteers would have countenanced taking violent 
action against the ‘Spanish people’, this was a categorisation that excluded many 
– Fifth Columnists, Trotskyists and other elements perceived to be hostile and 
therefore not afforded status as civilians in a civil war setting.143 The boundaries 
between such categories could potentially be very malleable, depending on local 
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variation, political shifts within the Popular Front and the course of the war.144 
For many Spaniards, the appearance of foreign volunteers in their midst could 
only have been cause for concern, certainly among those who were hostile to 
the Republic but also for anyone whose politics could be construed as anti-
communist. Historians need to be wary of replicating wartime categories in 
their analysis in such cases, and be aware that the ‘Spanish people’ for whom 
the volunteers showed so much affection was a carefully moderated category, 
with many potential exceptions.  
Close proximity to civilians also opened the door for sexual encounters between 
locals and volunteers.145 This, it must be noted, was far from a universal 
experience. Writing home, ‘Dusty’ Miller bemoaned his lack of social life in Spain. 
This place isn’t so bad, although it isn’t quite so cheerful as Sauchiehall St 
on a Saturday evening, as a matter of fact it isn’t hellish cheerful at all. 
What I mean to say is, you can’t drop into Lauder’s and have a quiet one 
and then have a night at the Playhouse. As to women, I haven’t even 
spoken to one yet.146 
Equally, the constant movement and demands of fighting a war could often nip 
romance in the bud. David Anderson had gotten engaged to a local girl during 
training at Tarazona, an engagement Anderson considered ended when the 
March 1938 defeats cut the British off from that part of Spain.147 Those who 
were more successful in finding local women to interact with found that local 
courtship traditions were somewhat more stifling than they were used to. 
Tommy Bloomfield, for instance, recalled that while in Madrigueras he got to 
know a family with two daughters – and ‘if [he] wanted to court them [he] had 
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to court them in front of their father and mother.’148 The lack of astute linguists 
in the Scottish contingent also likely limited the extent to which their charms 
could be appreciated by the locals. There was, however, another route to 
gratification: prostitution. Imminent danger combined with the relative 
freedom of being away from home was a time-honoured formula, and more than 
a few volunteers chose to experiment in this direction. Brothels along the route 
to Spain soon acquired reputations, with Peter Kerrigan writing to Harry Pollitt 
in February 1937 asking that future volunteers be warned about those in 
Perpignan and Figueras, ‘as quite a few have contracted V[enereal]D[isease].’149 
This advice was evidently followed up: during John Dunlop’s journey in May 
1937, he recalled being given a lecture by Charlotte Haldane about the dangers 
of ‘casual women’, advice that some ‘puritanical’ individuals ‘took strong 
exception to.’150 Such recreational activity was hardly the preserve of the 
younger, more impressionable volunteers. John Lochore recalled visiting an 
unnamed but ‘prominent’ trade union official in hospital, whose case of VD had 
left him depressed and mortified, the latter feeling apparently shared by 
Lochore.151 The records of the International Brigades are generally reticent 
about such issues, although in some cases, what is left unsaid could be 
extremely pointed, as in one report discussing repatriation cases. 
J. Sloan. The last address I have of this man is No. 3 Hospital (VD) 
although there are other cases there. A telegram has arrived signed Dr 
Jackson saying ‘Please grant J Sloan leave wife undergoing serious 
operation’.152 
Reactions to the spread of VD in the International Brigades varied substantially, 
depending both on individuals’ personal outlook and the victim’s own standing. 
For those who were highly thought of, such as Lochore’s trade unionist, there 
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was a degree of sympathy. However, for those who had been found wanting in 
Spain, suffering from VD was further confirmation of their failings. Charles 
Bayley, who was repatriated without service, had contracting VD on his list of 
sins, alongside being a ‘rotter’ and a ‘coward.’153 Alexander Elder of 
Musselburgh was even accused of contracting VD deliberately to avoid frontline 
service.154 This variability in how sufferers of VD were treated irritated Alec 
Marcovitch. 
[It was] the differential in the standard and also the question of the 
morality. Not so much a lot of the lads, some of the people in the HQ 
knocked up with venereal disease and I argued the case as well that this 
was a military crime because it impaired the efficiency of a man to carry 
out his military duties apart from anything else.155 
Marcovitch’s views were extreme, and need to be seen as part of his broader 
vendetta against the communist leadership discussed in Chapter Four. Yet they 
indicate the breadth of thinking regarding sex and morality, and how this rather 
fundamental aspect of interaction with locals should be controlled. Marcovitch’s 
preferences clearly tended towards the International Brigades being composed 
of abstinent Marxist warrior monks, while others clearly saw sex as a right 
earned through frontline service. Tellingly, it was when VD was conceptualised 
as avoidance of line service – such as with Bayley and Elder above – that views 
on the sexual health of volunteers tended to converge. This contrasts 
interestingly with Lisa Kirschenbaum’s analysis of communist sexual mores in 
Spain. Kirschenbaum highlights the struggle between the expectations of a 
particularly Bolshevik personal morality – serious, disciplined and abstinent – 
with the working-class masculine ideal embraced by many rank-and-file 
volunteers.156 Among the Scots at least, sex in excess was the preserve of the 
hardened, tough and manly fighter, a right that had to be earned through service. 
Casual sexual encounters and the diseases they brought were otherwise 
indicative of moral decay – suggesting that communist norms were understood 
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as negotiable based on one’s perceived standing within the cause, reflecting 
attitudes towards political transgressions discussed in the previous chapter.  
Socialising with locals also needs to be distinguished from socialising in local 
spaces. The British – perhaps particularly the Scottish – attitude towards 
alcohol proved somewhat different to that of their hosts. While hardly a 
problem limited either to the British contingent, public drunkenness was an 
issue that would lead to considerable problems throughout their time in 
Spain.157 On occasion, this could actually improve relations with local 
communities. Tom Clarke, for instance, recalled when visiting Chinchón that 
We went away looking for beer but there was none. So we finished up in 
a little winery or suchlike. The fellows who were working there were 
eulogising the qualities of the wine and of course we had to sample them. 
So we sampled ever so many different qualities that night.158 
However, moments of drunken camaraderie with locals seem to have been the 
exception rather than the rule. Drunkenness was a flaw frequently attributed 
against individuals such as Daniel Mooney – ‘in the front he has a good record’ 
but ‘out of the line he is a danger.’159 This was hardly an uncommon complaint 
about individuals or groups. Marcovitch recalled another such incident 
involving a group of Glaswegian volunteers. 
They wanted to obtain the use of a lorry in order that the lorry could go 
into the village and buy some booze. The application was turned down, 
so a dozen of them commandeered a lorry and… they went into the 
village and they bought drinks and they went into a trade union club and 
they wrecked the place.160 
Marcovitch’s description is particularly interesting, as it touches on a dichotomy 
faced by the International Brigade leadership. Positive encounters with locals 
were to be encouraged, but if the volunteers’ own proclivities – especially 
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towards drinking – would lead to negative interactions, they needed to be 
controlled. In Marcovitch’s account, the incident stemmed from the decision to 
make the rank-and-file volunteers camp outside the village, where no wine was 
available.161 The battalion headquarters, in contrast, was billeted in the village 
itself, and permitted access to alcohol. While Marcovitch points to this incident 
to support his broader grievances about differential treatment between officers 
and men in the British Battalion, the episode also shows how the dynamics of 
excessive drinking were complex, and the difficulty of finding an effective 
solution through which the volunteers’ desire to ‘relax’ did not carry a risk of 
alienating locals. The necessity of preventing difficult incidents was clear, but 
effectively managing these encounters without causing widespread disaffection 
among the rank-and-file made the task extremely difficult.  
To address this, the leadership used a wide range of tactics to elicit suitable 
behaviour from the volunteers. Such measures could be quite basic and 
fundamental, such as a preference during recruitment for volunteers who 
avoided alcohol, and selecting teetotallers for positions of responsibility 
whenever possible.162 Some problems were noted to stem from the thorny old 
problem of communication – one report noted that the presence of a Cuban 
company helped considerably when the XV Brigade was recuperating in a 
village where the locals were already wary of international troops after 
incidents with a French contingent.163 Most often, however, the problem was 
understood to be one of discipline. Attitudes towards abstention – or at least 
controlled consumption – from alcohol built on a much longer effort to define an 
ideal communist morality emphasising self-discipline and control. The 
‘advanced worker’ of Bolshevik propaganda provided a model to which 
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communists could aspire to live their lives, framing discipline in their personal 
lives as being as vital as discipline in their politics.164 Yet the construction of this 
ideal was difficult to sustain in Spain, in part due to the differing levels of 
personal commitment to communist values among the volunteers and the 
lingering strength of ingrained cultural assumptions about working-class 
masculinities, but also because it was conceived of as an internalised, self-
driven process. While in the Soviet Union, where personal and political 
advancement were strongly linked, this might have proven a sufficient impetus 
to cultivate a Party elite, for volunteers in Spain who cared little for political 
advancement in the Party conforming to these ideals held little practical appeal. 
For such volunteers, this was a small carrot unaccompanied by a stick. 
This meant that efforts to instil an appropriately disciplined attitude towards 
civilians escalated over the course of the conflict, as a series of orders issued 
throughout 1937 makes clear. The first, published in Nuestro Combate, drew 
heavily on the ideal of the self-disciplined activist, and framed the problem as a 
need to remind and reinforce their commitment to voluntary discipline. 
In our Army discipline is voluntarily accepted AND THIS MUST ALWAYS 
PREVAIL IN THE 15TH BRIGADE. Up to the present this discipline has 
been maintained in the face of the enemy and this has meant that 
Fascism has not passed. 
It is true, nevertheless, that some elements have failed to apply this 
discipline. Some have got drunk, others have refused to carry out duties 
etc. We must put the question bluntly: Shall we let the cohesion of our 
forces be shattered by these alien elements? All anti-fascist fighters will 
answer, emphatically: NO!165 
However, efforts to instil voluntary discipline clearly had limitations, and 
‘unworthy’ incidents in an occupied village resulting in more explicit orders in 
June 1937: 
1. Que todo el personal de la Brigada que se produzca con escándalo en 
estado de embriaguez por las vías pùblicas de las poblaciones civiles, 
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sea enviado a la Compañia de Trabajo, bajo férrea disciplina, a 
realizar los trabajos de fortificación de las primeras líneas. 
2. Las casos de reincidencia darán lugar a expulsar a los reincidentes 
del glorioso Ejercito al que indignamente pertenecen repatriandolos 
a sus Paises respectivos, previo aviso a las organizaciones Obreras y 
Partidos Politicos, publicando los motivos de tal media en los 
periódicos del Frente Popular de su país. 
3. Los que por escandalo sean intimados a entregarse por las patrullas 
vigilancia, sin hacerlo en el acto, y opongan resistencia a las mismas 
serán procesados y puestos a disposicioón del Tribuna; de Guerra 
Popular para ser juzgados severamente de acuerdo con el Código de 
Justicia Militar.166 
 
The shift from a voluntary, self-enforced discipline to the direct policing of 
behaviour is striking, yet still did not get the desired results. Just three months 
later, the division commander issued even harsher orders against such 
behaviour, emphasised by the typeset used. 
ESPERO QUE TODOS LOS COMPONENTES DE ESTA DIVISION HARAN 
HONOR A LA HOSPITALIDAD QUE EL PUEBLO NOS OFRECE, 
RESPETANTO A SUS HABITANTES, EDIFICIOS, GANADO Y PORTANDOSE 
COMO REQUIEREN LAS MAS ELEMENTALES REGLAS DE EDUCACION Y 
DELICADEZA. DE LO CONTRARIO ME VERE OBLIGADO A IMPONER 
SANCIONES GRAVES QUE PUEDAN LLEGAR HASTA EL FUSILAMIENTO 
IMMEDIATO.167  
The escalation of disciplinary measures across 1937 points to the inherent 
difficulty of shaping interactions between soldiers and civilians. It also exposed 
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the limitations of a positive approach, especially for those present at the 
bloodbaths at Jarama and Brunete that year, and for whom appeals to voluntary 
discipline might be met by cynicism. Such harsh orders should be interpreted as 
a sign of desperation, not ruthlessness. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
British Battalion was generally unwilling to actually impose discipline through 
harsh punishment, and no Scots were ‘summarily shot’ for offences committed 
in civilian areas. 
In the realm of civil crimes, rape was taken particularly seriously. Aside from its 
inherent heinousness, it was a crime with the potential to irreparably damage 
relations with local communities. However, it is difficult to say how many such 
cases there were among the Scots. The only confirmed incident was that of 
James Queen, ‘one of the worst’ volunteers.168 The ambiguity found in Queen’s 
file, however, makes it difficult to be certain that his was the only such case. 
Several documents reference only unspecified ‘scandalous’ conduct that led to 
his expulsion from the International Brigades and a sentence in a labour camp, 
while others are more explicit in labelling his crime as rape or attempted 
rape.169 Alec Marcovitch mentioned the case, confirming that one ‘MacQueen’ 
was shot or otherwise heavily punished for rape.170 However, perhaps 
unsurprisingly such topics were rarely broached in other interviews, leaving the 
possibility that further cases remain obscured by euphemistic language.  
A similar crime led to the only occasion on which the Scots observed severe 
punishment being carried out for non-military offences. Several Yugoslavian 
volunteers were convicted of raping a local woman. Alec Ferguson described 
what happened after the court martial. 
They lined these four up against the wall and six men stood in front of 
them and shot them, well this young Jewish boy was sick, and this miner, 
he was a good lad he came from Cowdenbeath, was a member of the 
party, he thought they’d been unjustly dealt with for a thing like that, 
when they were drunk, you know, ‘cos he liked a drink and he said 
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‘drunk people do things on the spur of the moment.’ I said ‘Drunk people 
can’t afford to do things on the spur of the moment in a struggle like 
this’… but he went up to the officers and called them all bastards that he 
could lay his tongue to, so they put him in jail for a couple of days.171 
Ferguson’s testimony highlights the conflicting attitudes among volunteers 
regarding discipline and the civil population. It is clear that from the perspective 
of the leadership, assuaging concerns among locals that such behaviour would 
not be tolerated was a clear priority – as Ferguson recalled, Spaniards as well as 
internationals were required to witness the execution, doubtless with an eye to 
demonstrating that their comrades were not above the basic laws of the land.172 
Yet at least some rank-and-file volunteers clearly had different ideas about their 
position in Spain. For them, drunken behaviour, and the consequences it 
brought, was a natural outlet for the stress of serving in combat, and perhaps 
even a right that had been earned by the volunteers. Harsh punishment for 
drunken acts, in this mindset, was breaking unwritten conditions of service. Just 
as sex was seen as a rightful preserve of fighters but a sign of moral decay for 
shirkers, a drunk in the rear was contemptible but veterans of the front had 
earned the right to ‘blow off steam’. The existence and persistence of such 
attitudes – here from a ‘good lad’ with standing in the Communist Party, no less 
– implies that some volunteers saw the needs of the civil population as ranking 
well below theirs, and believed that military service rendered them to some 
extent immune to the normal constraints of civil society.  
It would be entirely unfair to ascribe such views to the majority of volunteers, 
and even those who thought of recreational drinking and sex as being their right 
as combatants likely did not rationalise their needs as coming at the civil 
population’s expense. Yet it is nonetheless indicative of a conceptual gulf 
between the volunteers and the locals, despite all the efforts directed towards 
bringing the two groups together. For many volunteers, the ‘Spanish people’ 
were an abstraction – a framework through which their positive encounters 
could be understood, and negative encounters rationalised. Breaking through 
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this barrier could be difficult, with the battalion often on the move, and rarely 
visiting the same town or village twice. This meant that volunteers’ 
preconceived notions of the ‘Spanish people’ often went unchallenged to a 
surprising extent, and their relationships with locals often proceeded along the 
lines of their expectations. The result could be a conflation of lived experience 
and preconceived notions about the ‘Spanish character’. William Gilmour drew 
upon what appear to be preconceived notions about Spanish laziness and 
inefficiency while recovering from wounds, protesting the ‘vague excuses and 
elusive promises’ received from the Spanish authorities, glumly concluding that 
‘mañana is the most used word in the Spanish vocabulary.’173 Yet just months 
earlier, in better times, he effusively praised the Madrid authorities’ efficiency in 
responding to artillery attacks.174 Here, his expectations were shaped less by 
racial notions of Spanishness than the nature of a popular anti-fascist struggle. 
For Gilmour, as with others, the ‘Spanish people’ was as much a political 




Maintaining good relationships between foreigners and Spaniards was a far 
more difficult task than many historians have assumed. For the International 
Brigades’ leaders, the challenge was to manage the competing demands of 
maintaining morale and cohesion in difficult circumstances on one hand, and 
the political necessity of positive relations with Spanish soldiers and civilians on 
the other. They were aided greatly by the willingness of the volunteers to 
project their own desires and expectations onto the Spaniards they met. 
However, the complexities of the situation in Spain could always intrude on 
such comfortable understandings. Whether it was the slow starvation of the 
civil population, the shifting political attitudes across different locales or friction 
between the needs of soldiers and civilians, volunteers were on occasion forced 
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to implicitly or explicitly reassess their views of the ‘Spanish people’. This was 
not necessarily a bad thing, and could point to volunteers deepening their own 
understandings of Spain and their role there. Yet by the same measure, it means 
that simplistic assessments of the volunteers’ relations with locals – such as 
Daniel Gray’s view that ‘rarely before or since were foreign soldiers so welcome 
in another country’s war’ – also need to be reassessed.175 These relationships 
were complicated, and covered a much wider spectrum than wholehearted 
welcome. 
It is equally important to acknowledge, however, that these issues were 
addressed or ameliorated in several ways. The function of the political 
leadership needs to be understood in broader terms than as the enforcers of 
Stalinist norms. Many Political Commissars clearly saw their jobs in terms of 
alleviating practical issues affecting morale, including those caused by mixed 
units of international and Spanish troops. Moreover, there was awareness of the 
problems caused by the ways of thinking described here – most commonly 
described as ‘chauvinism’ – on the part of the volunteers.176 Such ways of 
thinking were framed as abhorrent to socialist ideals, and firmly discouraged. 
Ultimately, as the persistence of these issues shows, this was never enough to 
solve these problems for good. Such political work was always fragile in the 
International Brigades, with the turnover in personnel due to casualties, not to 
mention accompanying blows to morale, ensuring that any successes tended to 
be temporary. Even so, volunteers were likely correct in their comparisons with 
‘imperialist’ armies: the International Brigades were better equipped to address 
underlying problems than their more traditional counterparts.  
Friction between ordinary soldiers of all nationalities was often minimal, not 
least because it was apparent that each group shared hardships, and 
organisational problems could hardly be laid at the door of rank-and-file 
soldiers. Ironically, the language difficulties that helped fuel resentment and 
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military ineffectiveness and impeded relationships with civilians may have had 
the unanticipated benefit of smoothing relations between the international 
volunteers and their hosts. Unable to express complex grievances to one 
another, such interactions were by necessity extremely limited yet generally 
positive – while there was a mutual vocabulary of words and symbols that 
allowed them to express solidarity across the linguistic divide, this represented 
the practical limits of communication for most Scottish volunteers. Yet this 
limited spectrum of exchanges should not be underestimated. For many Scots, 
the tangible expressions of solidarity with Spanish soldiers and civilians evoked 
an intensely emotional response. As they departed Spain, with the sights and 
sounds of grateful Barcelona crowds impressed into their memories, there was 
correspondingly little space for doubting the righteousness of their cause or 


























The Scottish volunteers returned home to a hero’s welcome in December 1938 – 
crowds met their trains in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee, and smaller 
gatherings took place throughout the country.1 Yet despite the celebration of 
the volunteers by their peers, the British state did not share this enthusiasm. 
They had fought for a foreign government; in a conflict the British Government 
had attempted to avoid. Their participation in the Spanish Civil War was 
certainly against the spirit of the Foreign Enlistment Act (1870), even if actual 
prosecution proved difficult.2 Moreover, having demonstrated a willingness to 
fight and die for ideological beliefs considered anathema by the British political 
establishment, their future loyalties were murky at best.3 With the outbreak of 
war against Germany less than a year later, this question was thrown into stark 
relief: to what extent could these individuals be admitted as trustworthy or 
reliable participants in the British war effort? 
The post-Spain trajectory of the International Brigade volunteers has often been 
neglected in a British context.4 Insofar as this question has been addressed, 
Scottish and British accounts have reflected a trans-Atlantic dual narrative 
about the ex-International Brigaders’ role in the Second World War.5 One strand 
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of this narrative emphasises continuity, with those brave few who had first 
recognised the fascist menace leaping at the chance to continue their struggle. 
They had lost the battle in Spain, but now hoped to win the war by joining a 
truly global anti-fascist conflict.6 Many Scots’ wartime experiences and exploits 
conform to this broader narrative of heroic contribution, although they are not 
the focus here.7 Instead, this chapter deals with the other narrative strand. Here, 
the story is one of victimisation and wasted potential. Despite their experience 
in modern warfare, and clear dedication to combatting fascism, the state 
shunned their offers of help. Rather, the government chose to mistrust and 
mistreat them, monitoring their activities and introducing policies that 
restricted their participation in the war effort, particularly when it came to 
joining the armed forces. In the words of Francis Beckett, 
As the war approached, MI5 seems to have devoted a lot of time to 
compiling information about the International Brigades in Spain, and 
lists of those who fought in them. Some were blocked when they tried to 
get into the British army, others found their promotion blocked. In this 
way the British intelligence service deprived the army of the most battle-
hardened anti-Nazis the country possessed.8 
The term ‘premature anti-fascists’ seeks to capture the absurdity of such a 
situation – that individuals who had recognised the danger of fascism the 
earliest were somehow trusted least to fight against it later. The phrase itself 
has murky origins. The United States Government allegedly used it as a label for 
Spanish veterans to indicate their tainted loyalties, although some scholars 
claim that the term was fabricated.9 Despite this, and its specificity to the 
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American context, the term has come to be widely associated with the 
International Brigade veterans in North America and elsewhere, becoming 
adopted as a label of ironic pride.10 In Britain, while scholars have usually – 
though not always – been wary of using the term directly, the same underlying 
narrative of wide-scale victimisation remains accepted.11 Yet efforts to explain 
how these twin narratives can be reconciled – how, in other words, ex-
volunteers could be both widely excluded yet also heroic participants – have 
remained piecemeal. Tom Buchanan noted that discrimination was haphazard, 
but did not seek to either establish its scale or explain why it was so variable.12 
Bill Alexander posited instead that the volunteers were able to participate 
thanks to discrimination being overcome through ‘political pressure at all 
levels’, with ‘Brigaders forcing their way into the war effort’, but does little to 
establish either the basis or scale of discrimination, or allow for examples that 
do not fit this chronology.13 Only Richard Baxell has dealt with the question in 
any depth, although, as shall be seen, his analysis had important limitations, and 
concludes only that discrimination lessened over the course of the war.14 In 
addressing these issues, this account comes to quite different conclusions: 
principally, that these twin narratives can be reconciled as discrimination 
specifically against International Brigade veterans did not occur on the scale 
imagined, and that their experiences were generally similar to others associated 
with the Communist Party. 
                                                                                                                                                             
reaffirmation of the narrative, see Peter Carroll, From Guernica to Human Rights: Essays on the 
Spanish Civil War (Kent, 2015), esp. 123–36. 
10 It has been used across scholarly, popular and commemorative contexts, e.g. Gerben Zaagsma, 
Jewish Volunteers, the International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War (London, 2017), p. 147; 
John Gerassi, The Premature Antifascists: North American Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, 
1936–39 (Philadelphia, 1986); Humphrey McQueen, ‘Premature anti-fascists’, 4 December 2016 
[online], < http://surplusvalue.org.au/McQueen/film/Premature%20anti.pdf>, accessed 15 
November 2017. 
11 For use in a British context, see Baxell, Unlikely Warriors, 417 and British Volunteers, 149; 
Alexander, British Volunteers for Liberty, 258. Stradling, despite his generally critical approach, 
uses the term in relation to British participants without complication several times in Robert 
Stradling, History and Legend: Writing the International Brigades (Cardiff, 2003), 27, 95, 208n.  
12 Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge, 1997), 191. 
13 Alexander, British Volunteers for Liberty, 246–7. 
14 Baxell, Unlikely Warriors (London, 2012), 417–48. 
264 
 
Beyond establishing more precisely the scale, causes and nature of 
discrimination against International Brigade veterans during the Second World 
War, this chapter sheds light on a neglected aspect of the CPGB’s wartime 
history. While Communist Party attitudes towards the war have been dissected 
in considerable detail, much less attention has been paid either to the 
experience of rank-and-file activists or the Party’s involvement in the armed 
forces.15 Noreen Branson provides a partial exception, giving overviews of 
Communist Party organisation in the armed forces, and sketching the extent of 
discrimination against Party members. Branson, however, is notably uncritical 
of the Party, and does little to examine the state’s perspective or establish the 
extent of discrimination beyond specific examples.16 This lack of attention is 
especially striking when considering the rich body of work on the lived 
experience of communism in community, family and industrial spheres.17 As 
such, in arguing that the International Brigade volunteers were not especial 
targets of state intervention during the Second World War, this account 
contends that the International Brigade veterans’ experiences shed 
considerable light on broader communist experiences of military service. This 
insight is particularly valuable given the uneven preservation of source 
material. Thanks to the survival of security records relating specifically to the 
International Brigades and the efforts made to collect and preserve their 
experiences, the Spanish veterans offer a more diverse array of sources and 
                                                        
15 See, for example, discussion focusing on the Party’s political response to the war in James 
Eaden and David Renton, The Communist Party of Great Britain since 1920 (Basingstoke, 2002); 
Neil Redfern, Class or Nation: Communists, Imperialism and Two World Wars (London, 2005). In 
contrast, Morgan and Thorpe do more to integrate the perspective of the British state, but touch 
infrequently on how state policy affected members of the Party, as opposed to the Party itself. 
Kevin Morgan, Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and continuities in British Communist politics, 
1935–41 (Manchester, 1989), 235–42; Andrew Thorpe, The British Communist Party and 
Moscow, 1920-43 (Manchester, 2000), 264–7.  
16 Noreen Branson, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1927–41 (London, 1985), 
307–8 and History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1941–51 (London, 1997), 50-61. 
17 Perhaps because it eschews a traditional political approach and chronology, the Second World 
War rarely emerges from the background of the best single account of the lived experience of 
British communism, Morgan, Cohen and Flinn, Communists and British Society, 1920-1991 
(London, 2007). Other such accounts have excluded the war years, e.g. Matthew Worley, Class 





perspectives than is available for British communists more generally. Aside 
from revising historical understandings of the post-Civil War trajectory of 
British International Brigade volunteers, this account offers insight into the 
wartime relationship between communism and the British Government, as well 
as a precursor to post-war transatlantic efforts to crack down on perceived 
communist enemies within during the early stages of the Cold War.18 
The advent of war in September 1939 came to define the volunteers’ 
relationship with the British state. Yet this was far from the only encounter 
between the volunteers and British officials. The first section of this chapter 
argues that understanding the ex-volunteers’ treatment during the Second 
World War requires appreciating two interrelated contexts: the encounters 
between British officials and International Brigade volunteers during the 
Spanish Civil War, and policy towards the Communist Party during the Second 
World War. Both suggest that individuals’ status as International Brigade 
veterans was only ever a secondary concern. This is confirmed in the second 
section through an analysis of Security Service activity during the war, showing 
that British authorities settled upon a softer approach, with non-intervention, 
ironically, being the preferred option. Yet it is also clear that the treatment 
received by individual veterans was highly variable, and the third section 
explores how the limitations of British intelligence services, bureaucratic 
failings and differing institutional understandings of communism led to uneven 




                                                        
18 The link with postwar anti-communism is made in several accounts, notably Helen Graham, 
The War and its Shadow: Spain’s Civil War in Europe’s Long Twentieth Century (Brighton, 2012), 
92–3; Lisa Kirschenbaum, International Communism and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge, 
2015), 192–5. Despite the value of both texts, both assume consistency in anti-communist 
cultures across Atlantic contexts, and neither seeks to complicate ex-volunteers’ own narratives 
about victimisation.  
266 
 
The British Government, Communism and the International Brigades 
 
Given the close relationship between the International Brigades and the 
Communist Party, it is problematic to look at policy towards the ex-volunteers 
in isolation from the broader policy towards the CPGB and its members. This 
chapter complements Richard Thurlow’s account of wartime policy towards the 
CPGB, although with important differences given the emphasis here on the 
treatment of individuals rather than the Party.19 Thurlow notes the striking fact 
that the CPGB was a legal entity throughout the Second World War, with liberal 
traditions of free association combined with the Party’s marginal status in 
British politics leading to a ‘live and let live’ approach.20 Even in 1940-1, when 
the impetus to enact broad repressive measures against subversive elements 
was strongest, this approach remained consistent. However, this did not 
preclude action against individual communists or managing their access to 
sensitive areas of state activity, nor did it preclude specific actions, or banning 
specific publications deemed to be prejudicial to the war effort, notably the 
Communist paper, the Daily Worker.21 Drawing on wartime policy documents 
generated by the Security Service and other ‘secret state’ institutions, this 
                                                        
19 Richard Thurlow, ‘“A very clever capitalist class”: British communism and state surveillance 
1939–45’, Intelligence and National Security 12:2 (1997), 1–21. There is limited other literature 
dealing with such questions, with most histories of MI5 concentrating on the more glamourous 
counterespionage cases. Discussing wartime treatment of British Fascists, Jennifer Grant points 
to the institutional factors working in favour of individual suspects. Roderick Bailey’s study of 
James Klugmann also suggests that British intelligence were far from indiscriminate or 
draconian. Jennifer Grant, ‘The Role of MI5 in the Internment of British Fascists during the 
Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security 24:4 (2009), 499–528; Roderick Bailey, 
‘Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmann’s Recruitment and Retention’, Intelligence and 
National Security 20:1 (2005), 72–97. Possibly due to the greater scale of archival releases, 
surveillance of ‘friendly aliens’, generally political refugees from Axis countries, has received 
more recent attention than the treatment of domestic communists, e.g. Daniel Münzner, ‘The 
surveillance of friends: MI5 and friendly aliens during the Second World War’, Journal of 
Intelligence History 13:2 (2014), 131–43; Charmian Brinson and Richard Dove, A Matter of 
Intelligence: MI5 and the surveillance of anti–Nazi refugees, 1933–50 (Manchester, 2014). 
20 Thurlow, ‘“A very clever capitalist class”’, 1. For a broader account of anti-communist policy 
over the interwar period, see Jennifer Luff, ‘Covert and Overt Operations: Interwar Political 
Policing in the United States and the United Kingdom’, American Historical Review 122:3 (2017), 
742–752.  
21 The January 1941 ban was in response to the ‘People’s Convention’ organised by the CPGB 





section contends that the key aim of security policy was to efficiently control the 
involvement of individual communists in the war effort, with security measures 
balanced against public perception and manpower shortages. 
While the CPGB itself was consistently viewed as a threat, British intelligence 
generally held that the bulk of members did not subscribe fully to the Party’s 
aims or share its allegiance to Moscow, and adhered to the Party out of 
appreciation for its immediate anti-fascist agenda and effective critique of 
British society. From this perspective, only the hard core of Party leaders and 
activists, who were aware of and accepted the Party’s role as agents of 
international communism, posed significant security risks.22 This, of course, was 
a function of official perception rather than reality, with individual communists’ 
loyalties generally being more complex than this simple binary allowed. 
Nonetheless, this belief was engrained in official mindsets – even those who 
argued for greater repressive measures against the CPGB did so from this 
standpoint.23 Equally, it was appreciated that seemingly unjustified measures 
were likely to increase the Communist Party’s legitimacy and popularity among 
the British left.24 Taking the long view that communist success depended on 
material conditions in Britain, and that the state was best served by starving the 
Party of exposure and legitimacy, British intelligence generally counselled 
against active suppression of the Communist Party.25 This was in stark contrast 
to the repression of the BUF, who were perceived as likely ‘fifth columnists’ in 
the event of invasion and thereby legitimate targets for preventative 
internment.26  
In practice, communists still faced state interference, but this was generally 
based on specific rather than speculative or pre-emptive grounds. The emphasis 
was on monitoring and acting against individuals or groups actually engaged in 
                                                        
22 E.g. Untitled Memo, [January 1941?], TNA, KV 4/265/17b.  
23 See, for instance, a memorandum arguing for new laws composed by Lord Swinton, 
‘Communist Activities’, 28 January 1941, TNA, KV 4/265/16a. 
24 A ‘most unfortunate reaction’ was anticipated if ‘repressive action were taken against the 
Communist Party’, HD(S)E, 10 July 1940, also ‘Circular 30’, 3 July 1940, TNA, KV 4/265. 
25 E.g., ‘The Communist Party’, 3 August 1940, KV 4/265/11a. 
26  ‘Circular 30’, 3 July 1940, TNA; Grant, ‘Role of MI5’, 502–3. 
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criminal or subversive activity.27 The advent of the war itself provided a 
convenient watershed by which to make distinctions between those requiring 
careful management and surveillance and those who did not. The Security 
Service was aware of the inner-Party turmoil caused by the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact, and the resulting line that the war was between imperialist nations and 
therefore to be opposed.28 While the result of these debates only strengthened 
official perceptions of the CPGB as subservient to Moscow, it was considered 
that many rank-and-file members, especially those animated by a spirit of anti-
fascism, would still be willing to participate in the war effort or at least not 
actively impede it.29 As such, members who did not actively embrace the Party 
line of opposing the ‘imperialist war’ warranted little concern.  
Mid-1941 offers a particularly useful moment for understanding British policy 
towards communist participation in the war effort, as the invasion of the Soviet 
Union prompted reassessment of current practice. The Home Defence (Security) 
Executive (HD(S)E), the interdepartmental body coordinating domestic 
security, hosted a particularly insightful discussion.30 It emerged that policy 
‘since the introduction of conscription’ was 
To take into the Forces rank and file members of the Party, but to 
arrange, by administrative action between the Security Service and the 
Ministry of Labour, that those members of the Party whose record 
showed them to have been active and troublesome in the past should not 
be called up.31 
Policy, in other words, still stemmed from the view that communists might be 
divided into a harmless majority and dangerous revolutionary minority, with 
the former allowed to participate in the war effort. Although there were only 
‘between 20 and 30’ individuals wholly rejected for service, the potential for 
                                                        
27 ‘The Communist Party’, 3 August 1940. This was frequently reiterated, especially to the police, 
e.g. R. Hollis, Circular No. 254, 9 February 1941, KV 4/265/20a. 
28 Thurlow, ‘“A very clever capitalist class”’, 4–7. 
29 ‘ADNI for Commander Carmichael’, 19 February 1941, TNA, KV 4/265/21a. 
30 On the HD(SE)’s background, see Thurlow, ‘”A very clever capitalist class”’, 2. 
31 ‘Appendix II – The Communist Party’, HD(S)E Minutes, 9 July 1941, KV 4/265. Similar 
continuities were visible in munitions factories, where ‘a normal measure of security steps have 
been taken for some years to exclude Communists from pivotal positions.’ Hollis to Home Office, 




even one such case to substantiate CPGB claims that manpower was being 
wasted was considered grounds to revisit this policy.32 This acted to reinforce 
efforts to shift troublesome activists from industry to the armed forces, ‘where 
they would probably cause less trouble’ and there was ‘greater opportunities 
for control and possible reformation.’33 However, while the HD(S)E concluded 
that the Army should consider amending their approach, this was conceived as 
expanding rather than upending existing policy. While cases had previously 
been considered on their individual merits only ‘in the sense that it had to be 
decided how far each man should be regarded as an active and trained Party 
member’, assessments would now take into account broader factors in 
evaluating an individual’s suitability for the armed forces.34 While the changed 
situation, and the CPGB’s new pro-war line, certainly did not convince the 
Security Service that previously-suspect individuals were now trustworthy, it 
did alter the criteria on which their participation in the war should be based. 
This meant that even following the invasion of the Soviet Union, there was 
continuity in anti-communist policy, which focused on troublesome individuals 
rather than sweeping measures. This continuity was informed by the Security 
Service’s judgement that despite the CPGB’s newfound enthusiasm for the war 
effort, their overarching goal of revolutionary change at the behest of Moscow 
had not changed, and their manoeuvring in support of the war effort had 
ulterior motives.35 This view patently stemmed from institutionalised anti-
communism, with senior intelligence officials clearly prepared to see the worst 
in any communist initiative, assuming conspiratorial intent behind every action 
                                                        
32 Appendix II – The Communist Party, 9 July 1941. This number was later confirmed as being 
28, out of 60 cases from all ‘subversive’ organisations. Home Defence Committee Minutes, 11 
and 25 August 1941, TNA, CAB 93/5. 
33 Appendix II – The Communist Party, 9 July 1941; ‘War-time Control of Communism – General’, 
9 June 1941, TNA, KV 4/265/39b. 
34 Appendix II – The Communist Party, 9 July 1941, TNA. 
35 E.g. Roger Hollis, Appendix B of Minutes of Conference of RSLOs, 26–7 August 1941, TNA, KV 
4/266/62c. This was informed by analysis presented in ‘The Communist Party of Great Britain 
and the Attack on Russia’, 11 July 1941, TNA, KV 4/265, and further developed into a document 
circulated to the highest levels of government, including Churchill. TNA, PREM 4/64/5B. 
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or policy.36 However, it must be allowed that private utterances from senior 
Party figures provided ample basis for reconfirming the Security Service’s own 
prejudices.37 Ultimately, the subjective judgement as to whether this approach 
was justified rests on the extent that the CPGB should be considered as either a 
legitimate domestic political movement, or agents of a hostile foreign power. 
While the Security Service undeniably embraced the latter view with little 
nuance, considering that this basic debate continues to animate historians, it 
was a somewhat understandable institutional failing.38 
The consistent intent of wartime policy can therefore be summarised as 
attempting to distinguish between the bulk of communists who were 
considered relatively harmless, and those for whom restrictions were deemed 
necessary. These restrictions could take the form of assigning them to 
secondary military duties, or refusing their involvement in the war effort 
altogether. However, it should not necessarily be assumed that International 
Brigade veterans were treated in the same way as other communists. 
Particularly before the invasion of the Soviet Union, when the main security 
assessment was whether an individual had sufficient training and motivation to 
pose a threat, International Brigade volunteers might easily have been assumed 
to automatically meet this threshold. Not only had they taken up arms in – 
arguably – a revolutionary cause, they had been exposed at length to communist 
propaganda and training.  
Yet such a differentiated approach was an unlikely outcome of official 
encounters with the volunteers. The nature of these encounters consistently 
acted to exaggerate rather than hide the extent that a substantial minority of 
                                                        
36 Thurlow, ‘“A very clever capitalist class”’, 2–3. 
37 In a rather circular instance, William Robson was recorded justifying Security Service towards 
the CPGB: ‘joining the CP means that a man’s first loyalty is to the Party, not to the Government’, 
‘ours is regarded as a body guided mainly from Moscow’, also pointing to their role in enabling 
Soviet espionage and noting that ‘they know that when we do something, it is not innocent – it is 
done deliberately.’ Robson and Joyce, 19 November 1942, TNA, KV 3/387. For a selection of 
other instances, see Hollis to Hoare, 24 July 1941, TNA, HO 45/25573. 
38 It is not intended to enter into this debate here, the basis of which can be found in various 




volunteers had grown hostile, disillusioned or indifferent towards the 
Communist Party, as discussed in Chapter Four. How significant any given 
interaction was for the development of security policy is uncertain – especially 
as Foreign Office representatives tended to have the most frequent direct 
contact. However, diplomatic encounters are occasionally cross-referenced in 
surviving Security Service files, indicating that diplomatic reports did reach 
them.39 More broadly, metadata indicates a single-direction flow of information 
from the Foreign Office to Security Service. While over two hundred volunteers 
appear in Security Service records but not Foreign Office records, the reverse is 
true for fewer than fifteen individuals.40  
For many volunteers, the only direct contact with security personnel came 
when they were interviewed on their return to Britain. Their responses varied 
markedly, sometimes denying having fought in Spain or being Party members, 
sometimes openly admitting both.41 The only confirmed contact between British 
intelligence and the volunteers in Spain came following the capture of several 
dozen Britons at the Battle of Jarama.42 The Nationalists permitted Brigadier Sir 
Walter Maxwell-Scott, a descendant of Sir Walter Scott, to view the prisoners 
during his personal fact-finding mission in their territory. As revealed in 
Security Service records, his visit was actually at the behest of British 
intelligence, and he provided reports on the British International Brigaders he 
interviewed.43 While the secret reports are not available, his public commentary 
have been aptly described as ‘dotty’ by Judith Keene.44 Maxwell-Scott’s hostility 
towards those he interviewed, however dotty, can be surmised by his politics. 
                                                        
39 E.g. ’GILMOUR, William Dieter: SB Report re Spanish matters’, 24 October 1938, TNA, KV 
2/3979/42. 
40 See Appendix A. 
41 Edward Mathers, for instance, admitted fighting in Spain but not his membership of the CPGB, 
while George Stark denied even having fought. ‘MATHERS, Edward’ and ‘STARK, George’, TNA, 
KV 5/127,130. 
42 Baxell, British Volunteers, 109–12. 
43 E.g. ‘BLOOMFIELD, Thomas Jarvis’, TNA, KV 5/118. 
44 Judith Keene, Fghting For Franco: International Volunteers in nationalist Spain, 1936–39 
(London, 2001), 59. 
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He was instrumental in founding a Scottish branch of the Friends of Nationalist 
Spain in early 1938, with his wife serving as a speaker.45  
Foreign Office officials had a much broader range of encounters with the 
volunteers, all of which were in circumstances likely to highlight the scale of 
internal divisions and disillusionment. Visiting prisoners of war, for instance, 
was likely to evoke pity rather than fear.46 Deserters certainly evoked strong 
negative reactions, with Foreign Office representatives vowing to avoid future 
dealings with what they considered as burdensome ‘thugs’ or ‘misguided stiffs’ 
who they were ‘saddled with.’47 Foreign Office representatives also came into 
contact with individuals being repatriated, who were forced to sign forms 
promising to repay the cost of repatriation to the Foreign Office before 
assistance was granted.48 Even unwounded volunteers became frustrated and 
demoralised at the endless delays to repatriation, particularly in the final 
months of 1938, after their withdrawal had been announced but not yet 
effected.49 When they finally did cross the border, diplomatic reports explicitly 
differentiated between ‘leaders’ and ‘men.’ 
Mr Wild, and his assistant Cooney, took violent objection to being given 
food by the Salvation Army, shouting, ‘Send this food to Spain’; all my 
efforts to induce them to adopt a reasonable attitude were in vain… If it 
had not been for the leaders the men, I feel certain, would have had no 
objection.50 
The Foreign Office, as well as MPs, also received a steady stream of 
correspondence from the volunteers’ friends and families.51 These letters had a 
                                                        
45 Glasgow Observer, 29 January 1938, 1; Glasgow Herald, 21 April 1938, 8. 
46 E.g. ‘Christmas gifts for British prisoners in Spain’ December 1938, TNA, FO 371/24122/22. 
For an account of British diplomacy in Spain, see Tom Buchanan, ‘Edge of Darkness: British 
'Front-Line' Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1937’, Contemporary European History 
12:3 (2003), esp. 290-2. 
47 Correspondence between British Consulate, Madrid and British Consulate, Valencia, April-
May 1937, TNA, FO 889/2/81–118.  
48 A large collection of these undertakings can be found in TNA, FO 369/2514/84–269. 
49 Fred Thomas, To Tilt at Windmills (East Lansing, 1996), 168. This issue recurred throughout 
the conflict, Baxell, British Volunteers, 138–9. 
50 H. J. Dorey, ‘Repatriation of British Volunteers from Spain’, 13 December 1938, TNA, FO 
369/2514/236. 




variety of purposes – seeking information, confirming whether loved ones were 
alive or dead or asking for diplomatic intervention on behalf of prisoners. Such 
letters were careful to downplay political associations, framing volunteers as 
British subjects first and foremost, in the hope of presenting them as deserving 
objects of official intervention.52 Even volunteers’ own private responses to the 
Foreign Office contrasted with public statements, particularly when it came to 
the thorny issue of repatriation costs. While several indignant responses to 
Foreign Office demands are well known, others, such as Joseph Hughes’, were 
more conciliatory, with Hughes claiming that he was ‘unemployed at the 
moment’, but if ‘I got a job I will repay the money I owe.’53 While another 
impression might be gleaned from some secondary texts, returned volunteers 
were not uniformly defiant.54 
It is uncertain how much attention the Security Service paid to diplomatic 
reports, or even whether such reports could fundamentally sway their attitudes. 
This, however, is precisely the point – there was little impetus from these or 
other reports that would prompt officials to view the International Brigade 
veterans as a qualitatively different threat than other communists or their 
associates. Most encounters during the civil war reinforced rather than 
challenged the view that some were dangerous and others were mostly 
harmless. This view is supported by small asides in Security Service records, 
such as a note confirming that ‘membership of the International Brigade 
Association (IBA) by no means denotes membership of the Communist Party’, 
indicating an appreciation that International Brigaders were not a monolithic 
bloc.55 Bureaucratic inertia likely also mitigated against the creation of a special 
category of communist; so long as the Security Service and other interested 
parties were content to deal with individuals on a case-by-case basis, there 
would need to be a strong rationale to introduce exceptions. While it may have 
been possible to formulate such a rationale, the absence of wartime documents 
                                                        
52 E.g. Marcovitch to Lord Halifax, 29 January 1939, TNA, FO 371/24122/223–4. 
53 ‘Repatriation expenses of Joseph Hughes’, 24 December 1938, TNA, FO 369/2514/222–3.  
54 E.g. Gray, Homage, 204. 
55 W. O. Gilvie, Memorandum, 16 November 1941, TNA, KV 5/46/25a. 
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promoting such an approach, combined with the actual effects of the policy 
discussed below, indicate that International Brigade veterans tended to be 




Although policy towards communist participation in the war effort can be 
traced throughout the war years, the same cannot be said of International 
Brigade veterans. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, however, at 
least one document exists showing that they were considered to be especial 
risks. In January 1939 instructions were issued to Territorial Army Recruiting 
Officers, outlining how ex-International Brigade volunteers were to be dealt 
with.56 Allowing that some ‘may have returned to this country disillusioned’, 
there was held to be ‘no doubt that the majority of them have returned strongly 
imbued with revolutionary sentiments.’57 Any International Brigade veteran 
who applied was to be ‘referred to the Security Service for investigation’, while 
any found to have already enlisted would be kept under ‘quiet observation’ until 
they could be investigated.58 While the goal was explicitly not to ‘prevent any 
man who had served in the International Brigades from serving in the British 
Army’, they aimed to ensure that no one was admitted ‘who had become imbued 
with revolutionary ideas which would render his presence in the ranks 
undesirable.’59  
This document has been vital in informing recent historical understandings of 
government policy. According to Richard Baxell, it left relatively broad leeway 
for interpretation, and as such could provide bureaucratic grounds for the 
wholesale rejection of ‘a large number of men precisely because they were 
                                                        
56 A copy is enclosed in TNA, KV 2/609, as it was relevant to that case. It is unclear whether 
similar instructions were issued to other service branches. 
57 ‘Internal Security Instructions 1933 and 1937’, January 1939, TNA, KV 2/609/42a. 
58 ‘Internal Security Instructions 1933 and 1937’, January 1939, TNA. 




former International Brigaders.’60 This intent might be inferred from the 
preamble, which clearly stated that a majority were dangerous revolutionaries. 
This was perhaps a sign that the framers intended these measures to affect most 
applicants, with those passing investigation expected to be the exception. 
However, the document does have key limitations. It predates the outbreak of 
war, and thereby the yardstick that the CPGB’s new line provided for judging 
individuals’ loyalty to Party over country. It is also predated the need for total 
wartime mobilisation, with the course of the war, particularly from mid-1940, 
making it difficult to justify broad measures that wasted scarce manpower. 
Furthermore, this document was of military origin, rather than produced by the 
Security Service, and therefore does not necessarily offer insight into the 
thinking of the organisation actually undertaking investigations.  
Baxell points to two bodies of evidence to resolve this ambiguity, both of which 
have their own problems. First, the contemporary outcry against the 
mistreatment of these individuals, including instances like Aneurin Bevan’s 
critique of the treatment of former XV International Brigade Chief of Staff 
Malcolm Dunbar, who was never promoted beyond sergeant.61 As Baxell 
acknowledges, however, this was not entirely prejudice – Dunbar himself had 
refused further promotion.62 Other sources suggest that Dunbar’s choice was 
not uncommon. One discussion in Communist Party offices recorded by the 
Security Service, for instance, complained about the tendency for capable Party 
members to avoid promotion, ‘in their heart of hearts [preferring] to remain a 
gunner or a private on the plea that they are being victimised.’63 Moreover, the 
Party showed considerable calculation regarding which International Brigade 
veterans should be made into causes célèbres. When Jock Cunningham, the 
Scottish ex-commander of the British Battalion, was raised as a possible case, it 
was noted that Cunningham’s history – he mutinied while previously serving in 
                                                        
60 Baxell, Unlikely Warriors, 421. 
61 Aneurin Bevan, 2 July 1942, House of Commons Debate (Hansard), Vol. 381, Col. 537–8.  
62 Baxell, Unlikely Warriors, 437–8. Baxell was correcting a longstanding tendency to repeat 
wartime propaganda about Dunbar, e.g. Branson, History of the Communist Party, 1941–51, 54. 
63 Robson and Phillip, 10 May 1943, TNA, KV 3/387. 
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Jamaica– was grounds for refusal regardless of Spain.64 It is worth noting that 
International Brigade veterans offered a special resource for the CPGB in this 
context. While Labour figures such as Bevan were unlikely to campaign against 
Party officials being victimised, International Brigade veterans evoked 
considerably more sympathy. As such, it is unsurprising that the rejection of 
Spanish veterans was publicised ahead of the same treatment received by other 
high-ranking communists. 
Baxell also discusses several veterans who were apparently unable to enlist or 
were discharged after their Spanish service was discovered.65 John Peet, for 
instance, was interviewed after applying for a short-service commission. He 
recalled that the interview itself went well, especially as he deliberately left out 
any mention of Spain.66 However, 
A week or two later an official letter arrived: we have to inform you that 
you are unsuitable for a short-service commission. I showed the letter to 
a senior man in our organisation, the International Brigade Association. 
‘So you are another of the rejects,’ he said. ‘It seems that all applications 
for commissions in the armed forces are being screened by the Special 
Branch at Scotland Yard, to keep out anybody who has actually been 
through a modern war.’67 
Peet’s tale apparently provides direct confirmation that the screening process 
was being used to actively discriminate against International Brigade 
volunteers, as well as hinting that his case was one of many. Yet this conclusion 
is more problematic than it first appears, not least as Peet was soon successful 
in joining the Palestine Police Force.68 More fundamentally, Peet was hardly a 
typical ex-volunteer. Class and education already precluded most from 
                                                        
64 Beauchamp and Robson, Telephone Check, 21 October 1942, TNA, KV 3/387. The same 
conversation noted that ‘no IBA members have been refused by the Army.’ 
65 Baxell, Unlikely Warriors, 418–22. 
66 The opposite approach might have succeeded. James Klugmann’s candor about politics helped 
convince superiors that he had nothing to hide. Bailey, ‘Communist in SOE’, 84. 
67 John Peet, quoted in Baxell, Unlikely Warriors, 419. 
68 Upon learning of his Palestinian appointment, no grounds were found to actually remove him 
(TNA, KV 2/3933/12a-14a). This points to a key distinction in Security Service methods – the 
threshold for removing someone from a role was substantially higher than for preventing them 
obtaining it. E.g. Minutes 1–8, 29 October to 20 December 1942, TNA, KV 3/386. See also Luff, 




obtaining sensitive government jobs or wartime commissions. The experience 
of Peet, and other middle-class volunteers, was therefore inherently dissimilar 
to the majority of volunteers from working-class backgrounds. Moreover, Peet’s 
continued close association with the IBA was not typical – by this stage, only a 
third of ex-volunteers were members, let alone active members.69 Peet was 
unusually active after his return from Spain, which points to a wider issue: for 
committed communists, their domestic political activities may well have 
ensured their rejection, regardless of their time in Spain. In other words, it is 
exceedingly difficult to use such accounts to distinguish between attempts to 
screen active communists and measures specifically against International 
Brigade veterans. 
Baxell faced another constraint in his analysis. Security Service files relating to 
International Brigade volunteers were disposed of in the 1950s, with only those 
few judged to be of ongoing relevance – such as Peet’s – retained. For the most 
part, these individuals were far from typical, being judged to be of security 
concern over the course of decades. Yet new evidence has recently emerged that 
does deal with the broader experience of many more ex-volunteers. Though 
their files were destroyed, the card index to these files survived.70 Although the 
detail recorded varies considerably, cards do record summaries of what 
happened when an individual came under investigation. Out of approximately 
400 Scots who returned, 67 ex-volunteers had their files updated during the 
Second World War, indicating some level of continued surveillance or 
investigation. This in itself suggests that the Security Service took a less 
interventionist approach than might be assumed.  
Moreover, the detail contained within the summaries tends to confirm that few 
ex-volunteers faced heavy-handed interference, including those that attempted 
to enlist. James Gillespie, a Communist Party member from Lumphinnans in Fife, 
was a relatively typical example. Gillespie had left Fife in 1938, apparently for 
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70 The full series is TNA, KV 5/117–31. 
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London, and had managed to enlist in the Black Watch by 1940. As per 
regulations, this discovery led to an investigation. Fife Police claimed they had 
‘learned nothing to the detriment of GILLESPIE from the subversive point of 
view’, a conclusion backed by ‘HQ Scottish Command’, who noted ‘no tendencies 
of special political opinions.’71 He was hospitalised for much of 1942-3, with the 
hospital also recording that ‘there was nothing subversive to report.’72 On 28 
May 1943, his case was cleared for good.  
Gillespie’s file indicates several things. First, Security Service investigations of 
armed forces members appear to have been relatively diligent. As well as 
consulting local police, the Security Service solicited reports from multiple 
military sources on Gillespie’s conduct, a process that lasted more than two 
years. Clearly, the intent was not to identify and remove Gillespie as quickly as 
possible on whatever grounds could be found. Second, reports focused on 
whether Gillespie was undertaking ‘subversive’ activity in the military rather 
than his personal politics, confirming that the Security Services had adopted 
wartime political activity as its key litmus test for intervention. Lastly, and most 
pertinently for this study, the Security Service was aware from the beginning 
that Gillespie had spent nearly two years fighting in Spain. This indicates that 
International Brigade veterans were not considered as a special class of 
communist – they, like others associated with the Party, were judged on their 
record since the outbreak of war rather than pre-war affiliations or activity. 
Cases with negative outcomes tend to confirm rather than challenge these 
conclusions. Robert Middleton, the brother of prominent Glaswegian 
communist George Middleton, did face investigation and eventual 
imprisonment. His case index makes it clear, however, that his politics were 
unlikely to have been a factor. He had in fact been expelled from the Communist 
Party on his return from Spain, where he had been implicated in a ‘Trotskyite’ 
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plot against the British Battalion leadership.73 He managed to enlist in the 
Cameron Highlanders by June 1940, but deserted his unit just months later. He 
was arrested in Glasgow in October 1941 after for assault, and rearrested for 
desertion upon release from prison.74 In June 1942, he was placed on a 
restricted person’s list and prevented from entering ‘Protected Areas.’ It seems 
overwhelmingly likely that this had nothing to do with politics, but rather 
authorities had come to share the Communist Party view that this was ‘a 
disreputable person morally.’75 
Although other examples with similar levels of detail are available, they only 
provide limited snapshots into the thinking of British authorities when it came 
to dealing with the International Brigade veterans. The case of William Gilmour, 
whose full file survived, offers more substantive insight. Gilmour was one of the 
few ex-volunteers who faced restrictions upon his wartime service explicitly 
due to his politics: his application to join the Buckhaven Home Guard was 
rejected in 1942.76 Although this organisation, at first glance, is not an 
immediately obvious place to find explicit discrimination, the origins and 
evolution of the Home Guard made for more stringent political controls.77 In 
practice, as Penny Summerfield and Corinna Peniston-Bird have shown, access 
to the Home Guard was closely regulated along political lines, including ‘several 
cases involv[ing] men associated with the International Brigades.’78 There was 
nominally a blanket ban on those ‘engaged in subversive activities’ or with 
otherwise dubious loyalties, although, as S. P. Mackenzie points out, this 
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280 
 
judgement was generally left in the hands of local police, who often proved 
relatively pragmatic.79 
Despite his rejection, Gilmour’s case still reinforces the hypothesis presented 
here, with his eventual refusal explicitly not based on his time in Spain. His file 
reveals substantial correspondence between Scottish police forces, reflecting 
difficulties caused by to Gilmour moving frequently in the years prior to 1942, 
necessitating cooperation across police jurisdictions.80 This correspondence 
reveals that Gilmour’s fate was sealed by a report from the City of Glasgow 
Police, which noted that Gilmour had been dismissed from an engineering job in 
May 1941 for carrying out ‘abnormal communistic activity in his place of 
employment.’81 It was this record of wartime political agitation that led to his 
rejection, not his time in the International Brigades. In fact, Gilmour’s service in 
Spain had been declared as prior military experience on his application to join 
the Home Guard.82 If this sufficed to bar him from enlisting, no further 
investigation would have been required. 
It is certainly possible that Gilmour’s time in Spain meant that his application to 
the Home Guard came to the attention of the Security Service rather than simply 
being a matter for local police. Records such as these do indicate that 
surveillance of the International Brigade volunteers was widespread, and their 
record in Spain may have helped to precipitate investigations. Questions can 
certainly be raised as to whether such surveillance was an efficient use of 
resources, particularly after mid-1941 when the Communist Party embraced 
the war effort. Yet equally, it is impossible to point to any case recorded in the 
Security Service index where an individual’s time in Spain appears linked to an 
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actual decision to reject them from military service.83 In other words, the British 
Government’s claim that no volunteer had been rejected or discharged purely 
on the basis of their time in Spain seems to have reflected actual policy. 
Bob Cooney’s case points to lingering ambiguities, however. By the Security 
Service’s understanding of British communism, Cooney was precisely the sort of 
individual they feared – a revolutionary leader rather than a follower. Prior to 
Spain, he had been the Communist Party leader in Aberdeen, developing the 
Party into a substantial local force and leading successful local resistance to 
attempts by the BUF to establish a foothold in the region, acquiring a criminal 
record in the process.84 He had considerable Party pedigree, having attended 
the International Lenin School in Moscow and had recently returned from a 
successful tenure as a senior Political Commissar in Spain.85 Neither the Party 
nor Cooney would have been surprised by an official refusal. Cooney claimed to 
have been informed by a contact that he had been barred from enlisting in the 
military or joining the Civil Service during the early months of the war, although 
he never tested this before being called up in December 1940.86 His ongoing 
activity in the Communist Party while in the army was anything but subtle: he 
was mooted as a parliamentary candidate in Greenock in 1941, and actually 
stood for Glasgow Central in 1945.87 
Cooney’s file was destroyed in the 1950s, and his case summary gives no 
indication that the Security Service ever actively investigated him, although he 
was certainly under surveillance.88 His case is nonetheless suggestive, partly 
because it indicates that there were substantial inconsistencies in the treatment 
                                                        
83 This provides context to a controversial exchange in Parliament. The claim that ‘no soldier has 
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of International Brigade veterans, but also because it shows the limits of the 
Security Service’s own files in illuminating the restrictions placed on ex-
volunteers. Cooney’s involvement in the war effort was carefully managed: he 
was assigned as a Gunner in a Royal Artillery Searchlight Battery, and was kept 
in Britain on several occasions when his unit was posted overseas. His posting 
was likely deliberate, using second-line units as a dumping ground for awkward 
characters was apparently common enough that Party activists noticed the 
pattern.89 Yet equally, the boundaries to Cooney’s participation were not 
absolute, nor were they absolute for most International Brigade veterans. As the 
next section shows, Cooney himself was able to exercise considerable agency 
within his unit, subverting attempted surveillance and eventually managing to 
obtain an overseas posting. Moreover, so ‘dangerous’ an individual as Cooney 
being admitted into the armed forces – before the invasion of the Soviet Union – 
points to a high threshold for outright rejection.  
This all points to a need to understand the boundaries of International Brigade 
veterans’ participation in the war effort as being considerably more complex 
than wholesale exclusion. Outright rejection was used only as a last resort, with 
the Security Service proving reluctant to intervene in such a manner without 
specific cause. Crucially, pre-war activities, such as joining the International 
Brigades, were not considered sufficient grounds for action. This finding 
challenges the established narrative of the ex-volunteers being punished 
specifically for choosing to fight against fascism ‘before the referee had blown 
the whistle’, in Cooney’s words.90 Rather, it is impossible to distinguish 
repressive measures against the ex-volunteers from those designed to counter 
and limit communist subversion more broadly. Moreover, such measures would 
have existed even had the Spanish Civil War never taken place, likely affecting 
much the same individuals. Yet it is equally clear that, despite the absence of 
measures designed to restrict their participation in a wholesale manner, the 
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state did not adopt a laissez-faire attitude to the veterans, who still often faced a 
series of official and unofficial barriers. By dealing with ex-volunteers on an 
individual basis, British authorities created a system that could lead to highly 
variable, sometimes arbitrary, outcomes.  
 
Policing and Contesting Boundaries 
 
The general intent of government policy appears to have been to permit the 
greatest possible ‘safe’ participation for any given individual, a judgement that 
rested upon their perceived wartime loyalties as well as capacity for causing 
disruption. As seen with Cooney, this might take the form of assignment to a 
second-line unit, or moving them to ‘small factories’, although it was considered 
unwise to move communists from ‘old-established factories’ unless strictly 
necessary, citing concerns that existing anti-subversion measures may be 
disrupted and resources wasted in tracing them.91 Such cases point to a 
concerted effort to manage human resources quite precisely, if not always 
effectively. Naturally, variation is to be expected in terms of how accurately 
officials were able to make such judgements.92 Moreover, the Security Service 
evidently enjoyed limited powers of intervention – as shown by Roderick Bailey, 
who details how other departments, including intelligence agencies, could 
simply ignore security advice.93 It is important to appreciate that the Security 
Service was far from omnipotent, operating within a series of bureaucratic and 
practical constraints and that these limits could affect how ex-International 
Brigaders were treated. The Communist Party itself certainly saw it in such 
terms. 
This Security thing is incomprehensible, there’s no logic to it. They’ve got 
their people that are certainly good soldiers and never will be anything 
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else, and they’ve got people in the bloody Army that are pests in my 
opinion… My view is that behind the scenes there’s a tug-of-war goes on. 
The Security fights over some things and is blind about others. They’re 
very inefficient of course. The system is efficient but the men handling it 
are inefficient.94 
The limitations of the Security Service in intervening in other branches of 
government and the armed forces points to another issue – the extent that 
regulations were actually followed in practice. Unofficial methods of managing 
the ex-volunteers could exceed the measures envisaged by authorities. As 
reported by some veterans, they could face differential treatment once in the 
military, ranging from bullying to denial of promotion or overseas postings. Oral 
history is a particularly useful resource for examining this question, as these 
projects have preserved a considerably wider spectrum of voices than other 
archival or published accounts. However, it is important to avoid extrapolating 
too far from these sources. Such evidence is both anecdotal and, given that it 
was collected decades after the fact in most cases, often inextricably bound up 
in post-war narratives, with some ex-volunteers openly relishing the perceived 
incompetence of the British state. Nonetheless, these accounts indicate that 
management and surveillance of the ex-volunteers in the military was in 
practice usually delegated to their unit’s commanding officer, and these officers’ 
attitudes towards ‘Reds’ serving under them could be crucial.  
A key constraint faced by the Security Service in monitoring International 
Brigade volunteers was geographical. The Security Service’s own personnel 
were overwhelmingly based in London, yet even in London they relied upon the 
Metropolitan Police for everyday work such as surveillance.95 This meant that 
the capabilities of local police were vital in enabling any large-scale surveillance 
of the ex-volunteers, particularly the large majority who lived outside of 
London. This reliance is reflected in the records of the Security Service itself – in 
William Gilmour’s case, for instance, their substantive input was apparently 
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minimal, with the file doing little more than collating police reports from across 
Scotland.  




Aberdeen 18 3 (16.7%) 
Dundee 42 9 (21.4%) 
Edinburgh 41 8 (19.5%) 
Glasgow 150 32 (21.3%) 
Dunbartonshire 19 2 (10.5%) 
Fife 32 8 (25%) 
Lanarkshire 35 3 (8.6%) 
Renfrewshire 23 1 (4.3%) 
Other 30 1 (3.3%) 
Total 390 67 (17.2%) 
Table 6.1: Surveillance of Scottish ex-volunteers during Second World War.96 
Table 6.1 shows how geography might affect surveillance. Those from cities 
reappeared on the Security Service’s radar more often, likely as urban police 
forces had sufficient resources to undertake this work effectively. Moreover, 
police in areas such as Fife or Glasgow had substantial experience in dealing 
with revolutionary politics, and already had considerable resources dedicated 
to monitoring left-wing activism. Moreover, they were likely more familiar with 
the process of liaising with the Security Service, and had a better idea of what 
was of interest to the intelligence community. Unsurprisingly, Glasgow and Fife 
police appear as particularly regular, proactive and diligent correspondents in 
the Security Service records.97 This points to ex-volunteers’ place of residence 
providing at least a partial explanation for variable treatment at the hands of 
the authorities, with those from cities or locales with a history of political 
agitation much more likely to face effective surveillance. 
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Aberdeen 1 1 1 
Dundee 6 1 1 
Edinburgh 2 6 0 
Glasgow 15 12 6 
Dunbartonshire 1 1 1 
Fife 3 1 4 
Lanarkshire 1 1 0 
Renfrewshire 1 0 0 
Other 0 1 0 
Total 30 24 13 
Table 6.2: Intensity of surveillance of Scottish ex-volunteers.98 
Geographic disparities grow more apparent when considering the substance of 
reports. For nearly half of ex-volunteers with active files, their cards indicate 
only sporadic or ineffectual surveillance, let alone active intervention. 
Moreover, detailed updates were even more concentrated in the districts 
identified above as having larger or especially experienced police forces, with 
Glasgow and Fife again proving the most proactive in updating the Security 
Service and providing them with fuller information. Edinburgh police, while 
referring lower numbers to the Security Service, were also relatively diligent in 
providing substantive information. 
These observations are open to multiple interpretations. Security Service policy 
might have been implemented incredibly effectively, with ex-volunteers being 
efficiently triaged between threatening and non-threatening categories, with 
few resources wasted keeping an eye on the latter, leading to many inactive 
files. Yet it might also indicate a breakdown in the system envisaged by 
policymakers, with the bulk of veterans escaping surveillance altogether, and 
never actually being evaluated as a threat. The paucity of sources relating to 
investigations of serving armed forces members suggests either that few ex-
volunteers were discovered during their service, or that the military often 
                                                        




ignored the policy of referring such individuals to the Security Service, opting 
instead to deal with them on their own terms. In fact, the concentration of 
investigations dealing with Glaswegians and Fifers suggests that these 
individuals were being discovered on the civilian side, through the police rather 
than military.99 In other words, the envisaged close liaison between armed 
forces and Security Service may never have functioned as intended. 
This possibility is also suggested by the ex-volunteers’ testimony. Frank 
McCusker, for instance, recounted joining up after the outbreak of war, but 
being discharged within days of admitting to a doctor that an old wound was 
from Spain – if his timeline was correct, it is implausible that any sort of 
investigation was carried out as per regulations.100 James Maley recalled being 
rejected out of hand by a recruiting officer when he volunteered in July 1940.101 
He was eventually accepted after getting involved in a labour dispute at 
Parkhead Forge in May 1941 – likely in the expectation that he would do less 
damage in uniform.102 It is noteworthy that he apparently came to Security 
Service attention as a result of this strike, with no addition to his file being 
recorded in 1940 when he attempted to enlist.103 Examples such as these 
suggest that the military sometimes acted unilaterally – against regulations – in 
rejecting ex-volunteers.104 It is unclear what extent this reflected their time in 
Spain as opposed to their status as communists, although it is certainly possible 
that the two were sometimes conflated.  
It is important to note, however, that those facing outright rejection were not 
the norm, nor was gaining admission the only hurdle. Some Scottish volunteers 
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managed to navigate entry to the armed forces, but reported being treated with 
suspicion, especially by senior officers. Sydney Quinn was aware of special 
treatment, believing – likely correctly – that the army kept a ‘dossier’ on him 
and that his superiors kept him away from sensitive documents.105 Others, such 
as Roderick MacFarquhar, recalled that the army was ‘very, very strongly biased 
against people like myself who had been in the Spanish Civil War’, although he 
does not specify what this entailed, and he still managed to reach the rank of 
captain.106 Alec Marcovitch recalled being ‘suspected wherever I went’ and was 
barred from serving overseas.107 However, others reported little discrimination 
against them, such as Michael Clarke, who stayed in the army until 1954, or 
Eddie Brown, who noted that the army knew he was in Spain, but he was not 
‘victimised or discriminated against.’108 
One clue to this variability lies in the experiences of a particular group of 
volunteers who elicited a very specific reaction in the armed forces. For a 
certain type of British officer, the instruction to keep a soldier under 
surveillance was evidently distasteful, if not dishonourable, and they preferred 
instead to speak candidly with their subordinate. Marcovitch, for instance, 
recalled being summoned to the company office during his training, and being 
told that he should avoid making trouble in this posting, implying that they 
would leave him alone if he kept his head down.109 In some cases, officers 
candidly revealed the existence of surveillance measures, and strongly indicated 
their disapproval of them.110 For such officers, soldiers’ behaviour under their 
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command was their main concern – they were apparently willing to tolerate 
diverse political views so long as they did not affect job performance.  
Bob Cooney’s case shows how these attitudes could undermine efforts to 
manage and monitor ex-volunteers. Soon after joining his unit, Cooney was 
summoned by the commanding officer and warned about his future conduct in 
the ranks, although in a relatively conciliatory fashion.111 While Cooney’s own 
account, recorded in front of an audience, is somewhat self-serving, it seems 
clear from the officer’s own reports that he did not have a particularly firm 
grasp of either the troops under his command, or left-wing politics in general. 
All ranks seem very elated with the show being put up by Russia, it has 
even made some of the Gunners slightly ‘Cocky’, as it is feared that there 
[sic] political opinions are slightly tinged with Red.112 
By class, training and vocation, it is likely that many officers had a similar 
appreciation of communists under their command, particularly in the kind of 
second-line units to which troublesome individuals such as Cooney were sent. 
Cooney was able to win over his comrades over time, receiving a telegram of 
support from the sergeant and men of his unit when his candidacy for 
parliament was announced. Moreover, his willingness to stand up for himself 
and escalate his concerns eventually led to an overseas combat posting.113 It 
also helped subvert attempts to keep him under surveillance. 
After discovering that I was not a monster, but quite an interesting lad, 
the orderly room sergeant confided to me one night in the pub, that 
every month a circular and questionnaire from field security personnel 
was arriving without fail, and had such stupid questions as the following: 
What it is his character, a) as a man and B) as a soldier. Is he a barrack 
room lawyer? Is there any evidence he is indulging in subversive 
propaganda? Is there any evidence he is distributing subversive 
literature a) Communist b) Fascist c) IRA.114 
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If Cooney’s recollections were accurate, the use of a generic, centralised report 
format suggests that such surveillance was relatively common. It also confirms 
that these procedures were not always taken especially seriously – certainly not 
with much regard for internal security. Talented individuals such as Cooney 
were also clearly capable of subverting the system. Moreover, it is worth noting 
that unlike the Security Service, the British armed forces had far less 
institutional knowledge of British communism.115 If they were taking active 
measures to dismiss or manage the volunteers, without liaising with the 
Security Service, it becomes understandable why the treatment veterans 




The assumption that the British state imposed substantive blanket restrictions 
on the wartime activities of the ex-International Brigade volunteers gives the 
state both too much and too little credit. Too much, as it supposes that the state 
had the wherewithal to effectively watch and control almost two thousand 
individuals at a time when its resources were being stretched to the limit, such 
as when public paranoia regarding potential ‘fifth columnists’ exploded 
following the Fall of France.116 As shown by the geographic variability in the 
effectiveness of surveillance, it is clear that the actual power and reach of the 
Security Service itself can be easily overestimated. State surveillance and 
intervention occurred on a scale much smaller than previously imagined, with 
only a minority of the veterans ever actually watched, let alone targeted. Too 
little credit, however, is given for their relatively pragmatic approach. From the 
perspective of the Security Service at least, the spirit of policy designed to 
regulate participation in the war effort was generally adhered to. By continuing 
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to treat communists and International Brigade veterans as individuals rather 
than categories, the Security Service avoided making wasteful mistakes. While 
the continued necessity of this policy can certainly be questioned, particularly 
after June 1941, this remains a value judgement as to the nature of British 
communism itself.  
What is certain is the differences this case demonstrates between British official 
anti-communism and the virulent post-war McCarthyist strain.117 While 
communist affiliations often sufficed to engender official suspicion, communists 
were not persecuted as an enemy category in wartime Britain. The Security 
Service had extensive lists of both communists and International Brigade 
veterans, yet these never appear to have been the sole basis for decision-
making. The insistence on due process for individuals, and an unwillingness to 
take direct action without a high threshold of evidence against those known to 
be in suspect categories needs to be seen in part as an outcome of these war 
years, particularly in light of Jennifer Luff’s research on the scale of anti-
communist interventions in interwar Britain.118 
The ‘premature anti-fascist’ narrative also overlooks the reality of the 
compromises necessary for the creation of a mass, civilian army in a democratic 
society. Although revolutionary beliefs may have been anathema to the culture 
of the peacetime British armed forces, rapid expansion during wartime meant 
that change was both necessary and inevitable. As such, it is useful to place the 
watershed of greater tolerance of International Brigade veterans not in June 
1941, as is often assumed, but May-June 1940, with mid-1941 onwards seeing 
only incremental liberalisations of a policy that already encouraged the 
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integration of subversive elements into the armed forces. The remainder of 
1940 saw individuals such as Bob Cooney called up, a sign that it was no longer 
acceptable to waste scarce manpower. This coincided with important shifts in 
the Communist Party’s own line on the conflict, yet rather than an official 
response to the Party line, both Party and government policy should be seen as 
stemming from the shock of France’s defeat and Britain’s newly precarious 
position. Those with uncomfortable political beliefs would now have to be 
tolerated in the armed forces, so long as they kept their behaviour within 
certain boundaries.  
This should not, of course, be taken as a sign that the British state now trusted 
and welcomed communists, but rather that wholesale exclusion was no longer 
practicable given the scale of mobilisation now necessary. Some boundaries – 
notably in the Home Guard – would remain in place until the last years of the 
war.119 Moreover, this was not a frictionless process, especially in the armed 
forces, where limited institutional understanding and tolerance of communists 
was a much greater barrier than official Security Service efforts. Undoubtedly, 
the latitude given to mid-ranking officers in dealing with the surveillance and 
management of individual ex-volunteers led to unpredictable outcomes. The 
apparent unwillingness of military services to liaise with the Security Service 
added to the variability, putting volunteers at the mercy of commanding 
officers’ prejudices. For some officers, little excuse was needed to throw the 
book at International Brigade veterans. For others, the surveillance itself was 
compromised by their laxity or distaste for underhandedness. Many, perhaps 
most, cared only that individuals did their job and kept quiet about politics. In 
turn, many International Brigade veterans were quite willing to do just that – a 
small price to pay for the chance to avenge their loss in Spain
                                                        
119 Notably, shifts towards tolerating communists in the Home Guard in early 1943 was framed 
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On leaving Spain, the International Brigade volunteers swore to continue their 
struggle in support of the Republic. It soon became apparent that this would 
mean the overthrow of a victorious Franco regime, whether through internal 
revolt, or external intervention. There is little doubt that almost all returned 
volunteers maintained their antipathy to Franco, with only a small handful – 
such as Hamish Fraser – going so far as to renounce this core belief during their 
lives. Yet beyond this common ground, forging a collective purpose for the 
International Brigade veterans proved difficult.1 Only a minority proved 
immediately willing to remain active in political work, although successful Aid 
Spain campaigns such as the ‘International Brigade Convoy’ showcased how 
they could speak with authority and impact on Spanish issues.2 The founding of 
the International Brigade Association (IBA) in early 1939 represented the 
desire to institutionalise and defend this political capital, forming a vehicle 
through which future campaigns could be coordinated and the volunteers’ 
legacy defended. Unsurprisingly, the new organisation retained close ties to the 
CPGB, although as Tom Buchanan notes, the relationship was at times 
‘surprisingly complex.’3 An early attempt to mobilise the political potential of 
the IBA – in support of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Finland – backfired 
spectacularly in the face of widespread public sympathy for Finnish resistance.4 
The Party had hoped to create a new revolutionary elite, able to speak to wider 
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political issues with an independent, respected voice. Finland demonstrated the 
impossibility of this vision – they could either be dismissed as a mere 
mouthpiece for the Party line, or remain a single-issue advocacy group.  
The Second World War had come at an awkward time from the perspective of 
the IBA for other reasons. While time may have brought more volunteers back 
into the fold, and allowed for enduring organisational structures to be firmly 
established, war brought upheaval. The IBA lost contact with many former 
volunteers now serving in the armed forces, and many of its most active and 
fittest members were therefore unable to help establish the Association. 
However, Scotland, with its particularly high concentration of volunteers, was 
better placed than most districts to establish a somewhat functional branch 
system during and after the Second World War. The Glasgow IBA branch 
managed to hold commemorations, reunions and fundraising events on a semi-
regular basis for over a decade after the volunteers’ return, while most other 
districts outwith London fell into inactivity.5 In 1944, Gary McCartney reported 
that ‘the IBA in Glasgow, despite its many weaknesses, had become a real live 
body, recognised and respected amongst wide circles in the city and with a 
corporate existence of its own.’6 By 1946, the Glasgow IBA was in touch with 
more veterans than any other city or district, including London, with 150 
members.7 Glasgow’s continued efforts put it at ‘the top of the class’, according 
to IBA secretary Nan Green – of particular significance as the national 
organisation was nearly insolvent by 1949, and the occasional cheque from 
Glasgow was immensely welcome.8  
Not all news from Scotland was quite so welcome. Although the IBA had 
retreated from politics beyond the Spanish question, this concealed rather than 
resolved the underlying tension between their links to the Communist Party and 
their purpose as an overarching group for all Spanish veterans. With the 
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changed political climate of the Cold War, divisions could swiftly resurface. The 
rupture between Tito and Stalin in 1948 proved to be the catalyst for one such 
instance. After Yugoslavian International Brigade veterans reached out to the 
IBA, the Scottish district protested the decision to denounce the Yugoslavs. Nan 
Green sent a blistering reply north. 
What is Titoism in essence and what is the essential content of the letter 
which was addressed to us? Its purpose is: 
a) To split the working class progressive movement 
b) To blacken and destroy confidence in the Soviet Union. 
 
In other words, exactly the same purpose as the Trotskyites ever since the 
1930s, and if you have any doubts on the matter or can’t see what it has to 
do with us, we ask you to cast your minds back to the POUM in Spain, whose 
role was exactly the same.9 
Green’s efforts to invoke the same tropes of Stalinist discourse that had worked 
so well in defending orthodoxy in Spain were less effective in 1949. The 
secretary and treasurer of the Scottish IBA both resigned, and were replaced by 
Andy Shaw and Phil Gillan. These two, Nan Green was pointedly reassured, 
were ‘not likely to indulge in heretical or heterodox viewpoints.’10 Yet although 
the Party was able to maintain its dominance over the inner life of the IBA, such 
conflicts served as reminders that the organisation’s unity rested solely on 
Spain. Future events, such as Krushchev’s 1956 denunciation of Stalin and the 
Soviet invasion of Hungary, would further splinter the political views of the 
International Brigade veterans. Political diversity, which had been largely 
illusory during their actual service, was now very real.  
Even then, it is difficult to judge the IBA’s effectiveness in its advocacy. Sporadic 
events and conferences were held, solidarity campaigns launched and 
publications issued, which undoubtedly helped keep Spanish issues alive, at 
least among the left. As implicitly allowed by Baxell, however, these efforts seem 
to have achieved little beyond raising public awareness during the Cold War – 
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attempts to protest the treatment of leading PCE figure Julián Grimau, for 
instance, could not prevent his execution in 1963.11 As Buchanan notes, the IBA 
was poorly suited to campaign along purely humanitarian grounds, yet few 
other avenues appeared to remain.12 From a Scottish perspective, a greater 
threat to the regime came from Glasgow anarchist Stuart Christie, whose 
attempt to blow Franco up with plastic explosives was foiled in Madrid in 1964, 
long after the Spanish Communist Party had abandoned such direct efforts to 
remove Franco.13  
Yet as their capacity for influencing events in Spain declined, the IBA grew more 
effective in pursuing their other mandate: commemoration. As their ties to the 
Communist Party grew less overt, the way opened for a wider range of 
organisations to embrace the volunteers’ memory. In Scotland, the 1970s 
marked a change in fortunes, with wider public acknowledgement in the media 
and celebration in the labour movement. The ex-volunteers were guests of 
honour at the 1972 Scottish Miners Gala, and they marched with the miners at 
demonstrations in 1976.14 Such publicity fed into calls for more permanent 
forms of commemoration, with memorials mooted in Dundee, Glasgow and 
Edinburgh.15 Notably, these efforts saw the active support of local Labour Party 
representatives, although in Edinburgh at least local conservatives opposed the 
memorial unless it commemorated both sides of the conflict, a compromise 
likened by one journalist to ‘asking the Luftwaffe to do a fly-past at Churchill’s 
funeral.’16 While the International Brigades remained politically divisive, these 
divisions no longer resembled those between communist and anti-communist. 
The International Brigades were being embraced by the broader British left, as 
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they had hoped for – but never quite succeeded – during the Spanish Civil War 
itself.  
Franco’s death in 1975 made it possible for the ex-volunteers to consider 
returning to Spain. By this stage, they were already an aging group, and growing 
steadily fewer in number. By the mid-1970s, the IBA was in contact with just 50 
Scottish veterans.17 When the first group departed Britain to visit old 
battlefields in 1976, the youngest was already 63.18 The declining health and 
capacity of its members coincided with an upswing in the responsibilities and 
demands on the IBA itself, which especially by the 1980s was involved in 
significant fundraising efforts, particularly for the new London memorial in 
Jubilee Gardens, and organising widespread 50th Anniversary commemorations. 
Yet the Association was unable even to hold an Annual General Meeting by this 
point, and kept going chiefly through the efforts of Bill Alexander.19 Alexander’s 
decisions were sometimes controversial, such as not arranging for British 
veterans to attend anniversary commemorations in Madrid in 1986, opting 
instead to send a three-person delegation.20 The Association was also ill-
equipped to manage its increasingly complicated finances transparently, 
particularly as internal democratic reporting processes had been effectively 
suspended. Money available to support commemorative activities in Britain was 
not distributed evenly or at all, while the organisation’s new treasurer raised 
private questions about the allocation of funds, pointing out that expenditure 
had often not been properly accounted for, and projects such as cataloguing the 
IBA’s archive had proven poor value for money.21 While there is no suggestion 
that money had been used improperly, it seems clear that the IBA was ill 
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prepared for the ‘remarkable’ interest in the conflict that emerged during the 
1980s, and the demands this entailed. Through Bill Alexander’s stubborn 
efforts, the IBA battled on but resisted internal change, especially the original 
provision that only veterans could be full members. Only with Alexander’s 
passing did change occur, with the IBA finally merging with the newer 
supporters’ organisation, the Friends of the International Brigades, to form the 
International Brigade Memorial Trust (IBMT). 
By 1996, there were few Scottish volunteers remaining to take part in 
anniversary celebrations in Spain, although two still managed to make the 
journey as part of a commemorative tour across three cities.22 A more 
favourable political climate meant that greater resources were available to 
support them – veterans had their accommodation, meals and transport paid 
for, with further financial aid available for the especially needy. The Spanish 
Government also agreed at last to honour a promise made to the volunteers on 
their departure from Spain: that they would be eligible for Spanish citizenship 
after the war had been won. Seven Scots completed initial paperwork accepting 
this offer, but were never able to claim it, as none proved willing to comply with 
Spanish law requiring that they renounce their British citizenship.23 It was not 
until 2008 that this requirement was removed, by which stage only one Scot – 
Thomas Watters – remained to accept this offer. Watters had actually served as 
a driver with the Scottish Ambulance Unit, not the International Brigades.24 No 
Scottish International Brigader was ever formally recognised as a Spanish 
citizen. 
However, even as the Scottish International Brigade veterans dwindled, efforts 
to remember and celebrate their actions have continued apace. Despite Tory 
reservations, the memorials were built, and have never stopped being built. The 
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most recent, to John Smith, the sole volunteer from Irvine in Ayrshire, was 
dedicated just weeks prior to the time of writing.25 With memorials came art 
inspired by the volunteers, with a rich tradition of music, theatre and poetry 
commemorating or taking inspiration from the volunteers.26 As with memorial 
building, this process has shown no sign of slowing, with performances of 549: 
Scots of the Spanish Civil War recently taking place – to critical acclaim – in 
Glasgow and Prestonpans.27 Through the all-important modern metric of social 
media engagement, the Spanish Civil War remains alive – the ‘Scotland and the 
Spanish Civil War’ Facebook group has over 1,100 members, and inaccurate 
tweets about the volunteers from the Radical Glasgow account often garner 
hundreds of engagements.28 Regular commemorations continue to take place at 
memorials across Scotland, and pilgrimages to Spanish battlefields – usually to 
Jarama for the anniversary of the battle in mid-February – are still organised 
each year.29 Those involved with commemoration efforts have produced several 
publications dealing with the Scottish volunteers, most notably Daniel Gray’s 
popular history but also several local studies.30 
Given the variety of efforts to remember the International Brigades in Scotland, 
the dearth of scholarly history writing on the subject appears all the more 
curious. In England, Wales and Ireland, the same passion translated into history 
books, which in turn inspired more books seeking to refute these celebrations. 
It is possible that the lack of ‘intellectuals’ among the Scottish contingent, noted 
at times throughout this study, meant that none of the veterans felt themselves 
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in a position to write such a history, just as few of them considered committing 
their own personal experiences to paper. It is telling that perhaps the most 
significant publication from a Scottish academic came in the form of theatre, 
with Professor Willy Maley of Glasgow University writing a popular play based 
loosely on the experiences of his father, Jimmy Maley, in Spain.31 In many ways, 
this case represents a striking example of working-class agency in preserving 
history, made possible by the dedication of the friends and families of the 
volunteers, the work of organisations like the IBA and IBMT and perhaps above 
all the continued resonance of their story. For those on the political left, the 
International Brigades offer an exceptionally useful example of how determined 
individuals can stand up and be counted against seemingly monolithic enemies. 
If five hundred Scots could make a stand against the spread of fascism in one of 
the darkest periods of European history, then the hopes of new generations of 
activists remain plausible. 
The different memory landscape in Scotland compared to elsewhere in Britain 
throws the purpose of this study into stark relief, particularly in how it relates 
to ‘revisionist’ histories of the International Brigades. Is this a revisionist 
account, if there is no established scholarly view to challenge? While there are 
certainly some misconceptions about Scotland’s involvement in the Spanish 
Civil War in public discourse, correcting them has been incidental rather than a 
fundamental aim of this account. Nor do I harbour any illusions that these 
corrections will have the power to fundamentally alter the tone of public 
discussion of the International Brigades in Scotland. Those who seek to 
celebrate the International Brigades will continue to celebrate them, 
irrespective of what is written here or elsewhere. If scholarly research is to 
affect public understandings, it must seek to explain rather than correct. In 
seeking to offer grounded explanations – such as why Scots volunteered in 
greater numbers than other Britons – it is hoped that this account will be of use 
                                                        




not just to scholars, but also to anyone with a broader interest in the Scottish 
International Brigaders.  
Moreover, as noted from the very beginning, the scope of this study’s findings 
are not limited to Scotland. The Scottish volunteers were part of much larger 
stories that often transcend the borders of Scotland or Britain. Theirs is the 
story of the International Brigades themselves – how they functioned, how they 
were experienced and how they succeeded and failed in living up to the ideals 
they sought to embody. They are the product of a global response to the rise of 
fascism in the 1930s, one of the most visible consequences of the emergence of 
anti-fascist ideas, organisations and networks, and the reaction they provoked 
from governments at home and abroad. They form a crucial chapter in the 
history of foreign fighters, with the exceptional scale of transnational 
mobilisation challenging historians to explain what set Spain apart. Rather than 
seeking to continue the stale debates surrounding celebratory and revisionist 
accounts, these questions will hopefully continue to animate new discussions of 
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This appendix contains a simplified version of the database of Scottish International 
Brigade volunteers constructed as part of this project. It is intended to provide a basis 
for the tables presented in Chapters One to Three, but does not include all information 
contained in the main database, nor the various notes and supplementary information. 
Not all individuals have the same level of detailed information available. For entries 
that appeared especially uncertain, a ‘?’ has been used to signify this. Due to the uneven 
and inconsistent nature of the available source material, mistakes or clashes with other 





Surname: Surname as it most often appeared, using the most common spelling 
provided. 
First name: As above. Middle names occasionally included if this was a key point of 
distinction. 
Age: Age at time of arrival in Spain. Where possible, this has been calculated by 
comparing date of birth to date of arrival, otherwise the age given on enlistment 
paperwork or elsewhere has been accepted. 
Location: Where the volunteer is deemed to have originated. This was often a complex 
decision, and the judgement made here is based on a hierarchy of evidence based on 
the needs of this study (see Chapter One). This is a simplified record that represents the 
single best point of approximation,  
 
Affiliations 
Party: Affiliation(s) to various political parties (see acronym list). If an individual was 
known to have previously left or been expelled from the party, this is indicated (“ex” or 
“exp”).  
Union: Known affiliations to various trades unions (see acronym list). Acronyms have 
been used when available, or otherwise to ensure consistency, but often only a written 
description (e.g. ‘Boilermakers’) has been given. For some acronyms given in primary 
sources, it has proven very difficult to establish which group is being referred to, either 
because the acronym was too obscure to recognise, the acronym used was not ‘official’ 
or there was a mistake made in the source itself. These entries are marked with (Unk.). 





Arrive: Date of first arrival in Spain. Some imprecision is to be expected as different 
sources measured different dates. For volunteers who left and later returned to Spain, 
the date of second arrival is not measured in this version of the database. 
Depart: Date of final departure from Spain, with similar limitations as the ‘Arrived’ 
category. For volunteers who died in Spain, this is the date of their death. 
Death: Whether a volunteer died in Spain, including where possible the battle they fell 
in.  
Desertion: Whether a volunteer deserted during their time in Spain. 
Capture: Whether a volunteer was taken prisoner in Spain. This covers only those made 





CPGB: Communist Party of Great Britain 
ILP: Independent Labour Party 
ISLP: International Socialist Labour Party 
LLY: Labour League of Youth 
LP: Labour Party 
SSP: Scottish Socialist Party 
SSPYM: Scottish Socialist Party Youth 
Movement 
YCL: Young Communist League 
Trades Unions 
AEU: Amalgamated Engineering Union 
ASW: Amalgamated Society of 
Woodworkers 
AUBTW: Amalgamated Union of Building 
Trade Workers 
CEU: Construction Engineers Union 
ETU: Electrical Trades Union 
FCKMU: Fife, Clackmannan and Kinross 
Miners’ Union 
LMU: Lanarkshire Miners’ Union 
MFGB: Miners’ Federation of Great Britain
 
NSFU: National Sailors' and Firemen's 
Union 
NUDAW: National Union of Distributive and 
Allied Workers 
NUFW: National Union of Furnace Workers 
NUGMW: National Union of Government 
and Municipal Workers 
NUR: National Union of Railwaymen 
NUS: National Union of Seamen 
NUVB: National Union of Vehicle Builders 
RCA: Railway Clerks’ Association 
SAU: Shop Assistants’ Union 
SHMA: Scottish Horse- and Motormen 
Association 
SPS: Scottish Painters’ Society 
TGWU: Transport and General Workers’ 
Union 
UMS: United Mineworkers of Scotland 
WLMU: West Lothian Miners’ Union 
Other 
NUWM: National Unemployed Workers 
Movement 





This is intended as an indication of the sources available for each individual, although 
this should not be considered as an exhaustive list of all relevant material. For reasons 
of space, it is not practical to provide detailed sourcing for each entry, instead a letter 
code (A-K) has been given indicating which resources underpin each entry. 
 
A) Lists compiled by the International Brigade Association and International 
Brigade Memorial Trust, and other papers held at the Marx Memorial Library. 
B) Foreign Office Records (FO) held at The National Archives, Kew. 
C) Security Service Records (KV) held at The National Archives, Kew. 
D) Records of the International Brigades held at the Russian State Archive of Socio-
Political History, Moscow (RGASPI).  
E) Papers held at the National Library of Scotland. 
F) Papers held at the People’s History Museum, Manchester. 
G) Records held in the Trabajadores Collection, University of Warwick 
H) Oral histories, including those published by Ian MacDougall and those held in 
the Imperial War Museum Sound Archive and the Tameside Local Studies 
Archive. 
I) Records held at the Glasgow City Archives 
J) References in contemporary newspapers 
K) Records held in the Archivo General de Guerra Civil España 
























